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1 Introduction
Simple textbook models of perfect competition and monopoly markets, and their
corresponding solutions of equilibrium prices and quantities provide only crude de-
scriptions for the forces at hand that drive the microeconomic behavior of agents in
many markets. Consequently, alternative and more detailed approaches need to be
developed. This thesis is rooted within this ﬁeld of research and studies two phe-
nomena that are not satisfactorily explained by classical textbook models: ﬁrstly,
market entry and competition for a duopoly considering the underlying geometrical
and spatial market structure, and secondly, the existence and determinants of price
dispersion using empirical data from the Austrian retail gasoline market.
What are the limitations of the textbook models and why are phenomena such as
spatial competition and price dispersion not accounted for? The common model of
perfect market competition explains observed market prices and produced quanti-
ties by the concept of an equilibrium state where supply matches demand based on
consumers' preferences and ﬁrms' production technology. In this model it is well un-
derstood that supply and demand rest upon an aggregation of individual preferences
and budget endowments as well as individual production and cost curves. Since the
number of ﬁrms and consumers is assumed to be suﬃciently high, for each individual
ﬁrm and consumer it is impossible to have an impact on the equilibrium outcome.
Put diﬀerently, the achieved price and quantity are given for each agent and strate-
gic interaction between any of the many agents can be considered negligible for the
equilibrium state (and would therefore not occur). A further implication is that the
traded product in a perfectly competitive market would have to be perfectly homo-
geneous with respect to its physical characteristics and utility for consumption. That
is, each individual product needs to be a perfect substitute, otherwise a ﬁrm would
have arbitrage opportunities and the competitive forces exempliﬁed by the equilibri-
um price would not be eﬀective. Moreover, the model requires free entry and exit for
ﬁrms into the perfectly competitive market. The intuition is again to avoid arbitrage,
and that for the competitive market forces to work swiftly consumers should be able
to switch between diﬀerent suppliers without any cost.
Now, consider the ﬁrst of the research interests of this thesis: to model the economic
behavior of two ﬁrms located at diﬀerent retail outlets and competing for consumers
distributed over a geographical area consisting of a road network the basic conjectures
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of perfect market competition have to be adapted. Firstly, the concept of an equilib-
rium as a result of an aggregation of individual economic parameters (and interests)
can not be sustained in a duopoly. Clearly, the strategic interaction between ﬁrms
represents a determinant for the market outcome. The proﬁt-maximizing price deci-
sions of each agent have to consider the optimal decision of its rival. Consequently,
the derivation of an equilibrium outcome requires a detailed examination of possible
strategies a ﬁrm could devise accounting for mutual dependencies, that is for the ri-
val's response and consecutive actions to be taken. Secondly, since sellers are located
at diﬀerent places their products can not be considered as homogeneous anymore. A
reasonable assumption in a spatial market setting is that consumers located closer to
a particular retail outlet enjoy an advantage in consumption compared to remotely
located consumers. Thus, the geographical proximity to sellers' premises serves as a
characteristic that diﬀerentiates their products. In this case products are considered
to be horizontally diﬀerentiated since the valuation of characteristics depends on the
particular consumer.1 The instance of horizontal diﬀerentiation is linked to the third
assumption since the notion of product heterogeneity is linked to transportation costs
incurred by the consumers which are proportional to the distance traveled. Moreover,
location and relocation costs for ﬁrms are likely to be prohibitively high on certain
markets such that free entry and exit as well as free relocation choices may not be
generally justiﬁed.
Turning to the second research interest of this thesis, the existence of price dispersion
breaks with the assumption that in a perfectly competitive market equilibrium one
distinct price occurs. Rather, empirical evidence suggests that price dispersion of ho-
mogeneous goods is widespread and signiﬁcant. One important explanation for price
dispersion are information asymmetries suggesting that market demand does not
consist of perfectly homogeneous consumers. Rather, the asymmetric dissemination
of information and the existence of diﬀerent consumer groups may help to explain
the phenomenon of price dispersion. This motivates our work for an investigation of
price dispersion with data for the retail gasoline market in Austria.
Besides the common source of the idealized textbook model of perfect market com-
petition, how are the two diﬀerent research interests of this thesis connected? In a
seminal paper in the discipline of industrial economics Salop (1979) showed that a
number of diﬀerent sellers who are located in a symmetrical pattern around a cir-
cle all charge the same proﬁt-maximizing price (above marginal cost). In his model
sellers are located at diﬀerent locations but due to the symmetry a unique price
level in equilibrium obtains. Furthermore, Economides (1993) demonstrates that for
a number of sellers on a bounded line (in a variant of the original model of Hotelling
(1929)) a symmetrical location pattern yields a convex, symmetric, U-shaped equi-
librium price structure. His explanation rests upon the fact that as a result of the
1For further explanations on the deﬁnition of a product space see Tirole (2003), p. 96ﬀ.
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geometrical environment sellers have a diﬀerent degree of market power. In particu-
lar, the closer a ﬁrm is located to the edge of the market the more it is able to exploit
its monopoly power and therefore charges a higher price. In general, it can be con-
cluded from these studies, ﬁrstly, that diﬀerences in the spatial distribution of sellers
critically impact their optimal price decision and thus the overall price distribution
in the market, and secondly, that the geometrical set-up is also a determinant for the
spatial competition and ﬁrms' price decision. This, in a nutshell, deﬁnes the 'game
plan' of this thesis. In the ﬁrst part the research interest focuses on the explanation
of ﬁrms' location decision in the geometrical setting of intersecting roads. As it can
be expected that the price distribution shows special characteristics in such a market
environment, the second part studies the empirical price distribution on the gasoline
market which serves as a representative example for the sort of spatial competition
investigated in the theoretical part.
A formal requirement for this thesis is that the research output shall be presented at
relevant scientiﬁc conferences. This requirement has been achieved. The developed
sequential two-stage price-location model has been presented at the 8th Internation-
al Research Meeting in Business and Management (IRMBAM) on 5th of July 2017
held at the IPAG Business School in Nice, and the XXXII Jornadas de Economia
Industrial on 7th of September 2017 held at the University of Navarra in Pamplona.
The empirical study on the gasoline price distribution for Austria has been presented
at the XXVI Jornadas de Economia Industrial on 16th of September 2011 held at
the University of Valencia in Valencia, and at research seminars at the School of Ge-
ographical Sciences of the Arizona State University (ASU) on 14th of April 2012 and
at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen in September 2011 in the cause of scholar visits
supported and organized by the Network for European and United States Urban and
Regional Studies (NEURUS).
To sum up, this thesis examines the eﬀects of an extension of the assumptions of the
classical model of perfect market competition. In particular, a spatial competition
model for a duopoly with two ﬁrms competing under horizontal product diﬀerentia-
tion is explored, and an empirical investigation of price dispersion for a market with
horizontal product diﬀerentiation is conducted. Generally, the outcomes stress that
a closer look at the supply side in terms of the strategic interaction between ﬁrms,
and a closer look at the demand side in terms of heterogeneous consumer groups
proves to be valuable to gain insights on determinants of market equilibrium states.
More detailed ﬁndings are as follows.
The ﬁrst essay provides an introduction into the literature of spatial competition
models and studies their predictions on the degree of horizontal product diﬀeren-
tiation. For this purpose a selection of articles, mainly from the game theoretical
strand of the literature, is re-examined in which each model extends and modiﬁes
basic parameters of the original model of Hotelling (1929). The selection is based on
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a representation of characteristic determinants to explain spatial product diﬀerenti-
ation.
The main determinants are considered to be: consumers' reservation price, trans-
portation costs, the number of ﬁrms, the timing and further speciﬁcs of the price-
location game, characteristics of the consumer distribution, and the market geometry.
Furthermore, the literature survey emphasizes that markets consisting of intersecting
roads represent a particular fruitful subject of future research. The nature of com-
petition in this market setting is diﬀerent compared to the linear city exempliﬁed by
the importance of asymmetrical location patterns. Consequently, the strategic inter-
action, ﬁrms' proﬁt-maximizing behavior and potential equilibrium outcomes under
sequential entry in a market with intersecting roads remain to be an interesting ﬁeld
to study.
The second essay addresses this research gap and based on the work of Anderson
(1987) studies a two-stage market entry game in a spatially extended Hotelling's
duopoly. Particularly, the eﬀect of a demand dependent centrality bonus Z dis-
tributed in the middle of the linear city is examined on the reaction functions of
an incumbent ﬁrm and the strategic entry decision of an entrant ﬁrm. A solution is
provided for an entry accommodating scenario where both players optimize proﬁts
over their strategic variables and the center Z is taken by the incumbent ﬁrm. The
results further suggest that the entrant is not capable of capturing Z. In addition,
the model implies a lower degree of product diﬀerentiation as Z increases.
A comparison with the literature shows that these results are well in line with An-
derson's model for Z = 0. In a business strategy view the outcome supports the
thesis of Gelman & Salop (1983), coined by the term 'judo economics', since the en-
trant earns highest proﬁts by committing himself to a distant location and charging
a comparatively lower price than the incumbent.
The third essay analyzes the price distribution of diesel in the Austrian retail gasoline
market and tests predictions of the impact of the fraction of informed and uninformed
consumers on the mean price and price variance. Further, introducing two measures
of spatial competition, the relation of local competition between stations and the
mean and variance are examined.
In a pooled cross-section analysis a two step approach is followed. Initially, price lev-
els are estimated with respect to the inﬂuence of competition, search costs, stations'
location and further station-speciﬁc characteristics. Controlling for these observable
price characteristics, the residuals are used in the second step to investigate the
behavior of the price variance. In addition to OLS, to account for spatial spillover
eﬀects a Spatial Error Model (SEM) is applied to estimate the price function. Addi-
tionally, tests on model speciﬁcation and robustness checks using diﬀerent weighting
matrices, search cost proxies and dispersion measures are carried out.
The results reveal a negative (positive) correlation between the fraction of informed
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(uninformed) consumers and the mean price. Further, price variance shows an in-
verse U-shape with the fraction of informed consumers. Thus, the variance initially
increases as the proportion of informed consumers increases and starts to decline
after the share of informed exceeds a threshold of roughly 43%. These ﬁndings are
in line with predictions of classical search models, most notably Stahl (1989), and
empirically support the meaning of consumer search in the context of oligopolistic
pricing. Further, the mean price decreases as competition intensiﬁes whereas the price
variance increases under increased entry competition (Janssen & Moraga-Gonzalez
(2004), Carlson & McAfee (1983)). This suggests stations' tendency to focus more
strongly on the lower price segment as competition increases.
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2 Centrality and Spatial Diﬀerentiation
- A Literature Survey
2.1 Introduction
The Hotelling model is an established tool to analyze spatial competition in various
market settings. It is appealing because of its analytical tractability and the intu-
itive predictions that can be deducted. Therefore, the literature that ﬂows from the
Hotelling model is vast.
Previous surveys aim at providing a comprehensive overview of the diverse strands
of the literature that is linked to spatial competition modeling. For instance, Biscaia
& Mota (2013) classify respective articles into groups diﬀerentiating the type of com-
petition (Bertrand competition vs. Cournot competition), the shape of the market
(circular vs. linear markets), and the existence of incomplete information. Another
survey that accounts for a wide range of determinants for product diﬀerentiation is
provided by Brenner (2001). The categories he deﬁnes to distinguish the literature
cover the topics of price competition, spatial price discrimination, demand charac-
teristics (price elasticity, customer distribution), the number of ﬁrms, collusion, as
well as multiple product dimensions.
Comparable to the study of Graitson (1982) and in contrast to the more recent con-
tributions, the present survey has the goal to deﬁne a narrow sphere and focus on the
basic parameters of the Hotelling model according to its original formulation. The
narrow scope deﬁnition is justiﬁed ﬁrstly, by the goal to keep the review tractable
and to avoid oﬃcious complexity, and secondly, by the ambition to take a deep dive
into the mechanical details of the models in order to disclose their economic argu-
ments and gain insights into their predictions on spatial product diﬀerentiation.
The selection of articles is admittedly a subjective issue. Inspired by the study of
numerous contributions in the ﬁeld, the choice of the research papers for this survey
is motivated by picking out representative articles (mainly with a game theoretical
focus) that highlight characteristic determinants of spatial product diﬀerentiation
which will be summarized in the concluding section. According to this outline, par-
ticular streams of the literature that would be interesting to study in detail, however,
are not part of the scope. Speciﬁcally, in this survey only models with deterministic
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and one-dimensional characteristics are considered. Thus, multidimensional product
spaces, models where the strategic variables price and location follow probabilistic
measures as well as two-dimensional markets with an areal problem set are not ex-
plicitly examined.
Essentially, the unique contribution of this survey is two-fold. Firstly, the impact of
market geometry and of the distribution of consumers on market equilibrium out-
comes shall be highlighted. In particular, markets consisting of intersecting roads
deserve our attention since they represent an important link between theoretical
models and their predictions on the one side and empirical analyses and suitable
econometric methods on the other side. Consequently, in addition to the theoretical
model survey a section is included that presents evidence from empirical studies to
reveal the consistency between these two ﬁelds of research. Secondly, intuition for
the importance of the strategic interaction of players for the determination of market
equilibria shall be developed. Applying considerations on the strategic interaction to
the market setting of intersecting roads leads us to identify an interesting research
gap in the present state of the ﬁeld.
In the examination each research paper is analyzed regarding (i) its basic research
question, (ii) its methodology and mathematical arguments, and (iii) its predictions
on spatial product diﬀerentiation and ﬁrms' optimal location decision. In subsec-
tion 2.2 articles on the Hotelling model and its extensions with respect to the basic
model assumptions are presented. Subsection 2.3 deals with articles concerning dif-
ferent market shapes. To start the examination and provide a concise overview in
comparison with linear markets the case of circular markets is presented in subsec-
tion 2.3.1. In subsection 2.3.2 models emphasizing the position of a market center
either by introducing variations in the consumer distribution or by imposing an al-
ternative market geometry are considered. Subsection 2.4 presents examples from the
empirical literature, and in subsection 2.5 a brief overview on models of economic
agglomeration is given. Eventually, Subsection 2.6 closes with concluding remarks.
2.2 Spatial diﬀerentiation in the Hotelling model
The purpose of this section is to give a thorough overview on the Hotelling model
and provide intuition for its possible ramiﬁcations. Starting from the original version
of Hotelling in 1929 a couple of papers from the classical stream of the literature on
the Hotelling model will be re-examined with respect to similarities and diﬀerences
to the original model structure. Special attention is given to the results of these
papers concerning market equilibrium states for sellers' prices and locations and the
determinants of respective market equilibria. Thus, the model predictions on sellers'
tendency to locate in a cluster or disperse in the market as well as explanations
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on the challenges of the existence for equilibrium conﬁgurations and the diﬀerent
strategies to solve these issues are presented.
The seminal paper of Hotelling (1929) introduces the notion of oligopolistic market
competition in space, even though space is only one of various product characteristics
to determine the mechanics of economic decisions. Hotelling motivates his work with
the question on the possibility and the conditions of a stable market equilibrium in
terms of produced quantities and prices for a few number of sellers that serve a com-
paratively large consumer base. The point of departure for his model is Cournot's
duopoly with quantities as sellers' strategic variables leading to a state of equilibri-
um given by price levels above marginal cost and a state of mutual readjustment in
production if one seller changed his decision for the amount produced. The common
critique of the Cournot equilibrium focuses on prices and not quantities as strategic
variables. In particular, a price undercutting strategy of one seller proves to be prof-
itable leading to a downward pricing spiral ﬂoored with sellers' marginal costs which
represent the level of equilibrium prices describing the outcome of a Bertrand price
competition game.
Hotelling's basic idea is to set up a model which avoids discontinuities, i.e. a situ-
ation where all buyers in the market switch to the seller with the lowest price, but
rather provide an explanation of the continuous variation in prices and quantities
and the corresponding variation in consumer demand. This leads to the prototype of
a monopolistic competition model. A seller does not gain or lose the whole market
with a strategic decision on price or quantity, despite of more or less profound price
diﬀerences sellers are able to exercise a certain degree of monopoly power determined
by the unique features of their product. Every competitor serves a deﬁned consumer
base and market competition is described by a continuous transition of demand
which Hotelling interprets as a degree of stability. This 'stability in competition' is
attributable to frictions in the market caused by the unwillingness of certain con-
sumers to switch to the cheapest seller who assess certain product characteristics as
particularly valueable, most illustratively the geographical proximity to the seller's
store.
Methodologically, equilibrium prices, quantities and proﬁts are determined when
the quantity sold by each is considered as a continuous function of the diﬀerence in
price. (Hotelling (1929), p. 44). Input parameters for the optimization are the total
size of the market (number of consumers), switching costs (i.e. transportation costs
per unit distance), marginal cost of production (normalized to zero), sellers market
position, and perfect price inelasticity. Local monopoly regions are divided by the
indiﬀerence condition comparing product prices and incurred transportation costs.
Equilibrium conditions are determined by sellers' proﬁt maximization. The case is
exempliﬁed for a duopoly in the well-known setting of a linear city of length l and
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sellers' location given by the distances of a and b from respective ends of the line.
Equilibrium proﬁts reduce to Π1 =
c
2(l+
a−b
3 )
2 and Π2 =
c
2(l− a−b3 )2 and are derived
under ceteris paribus conditions, thus mutually assuming arbitrary but ﬁxed values
for the price of the respective competitor. Subsequently, Π1 and Π2 imply that each
seller is inclined to gravitate towards his rival which is referred to as the principle of
minimum diﬀerentiation (PMD). Thus, the Hotelling model suggests that sellers ag-
glomerate in a central position of the market and predicts the tendency to make only
slight deviations in order to have for the new commodity as many buyers of the old
as possible, to get, so to speak, between one's competitors and a mass of consumers.
(Hotelling (1929), p. 54)
Naturally, a leap forward from the Hotelling model is achieved by relaxing the un-
derlying critical assumptions. The condition of perfectly inelastic demand at every
point of the market leads to the PMD and gives away one of the major conclusions
as regards sellers' location patters. This ﬁnding is challenged by Lerner & Singer
(1937) who scrutinize the case of inelastic demand over a price range extending from
zero to an upper bound. Smithies (1941) extends the previous approaches assuming
a linear elastic demand function over the whole market area and three diﬀerent con-
jectural hypotheses on the reaction of the competitors to each other's optimal price
and location decision. This enables him to investigate the impact of a variation in
the transportation cost per unit of distance (i.e. freight rates) on the market equilib-
rium and derive critical values for a transportation cost parameter1 that determines
sellers' tendency to locate towards the center. The critical assumption says that at
every point of the market there can be only one price, and there are identical lin-
ear demand functions relating price to quantity sold per unit of time at that point.
Thus, the total amount sold at any point is supplied by the competitor charging the
lower delivered price at that point. (Smithies (1941), p. 425) Clearly, this implies
that the demand in competitors' hinterlands reacts to changes in location due to a
corresponding variation in freight rates which in turn impacts proﬁts. In a nutshell,
this marks the main diﬀerence to the Hotelling model where each seller enacts 'abso-
lute' monopoly power over his hinterland passing on the entire freight rates without
aﬀecting proﬁts.
In particular, Smithies proposes three states of competition, ﬁrstly, sellers choosing
the exact same price and location, secondly, sellers choosing the exact same price
but compete in locations, and thirdly, competition occurring in price and location
excluding the case of market deterrence strategies. For each of these, equilibrium
prices, proﬁts and locations are derived. In the ﬁrst case sellers choose the quartiles
of the city so as to maximize their proﬁt. Locating closer to the center does not yield
higher proﬁts since then sellers' hinterlands can not be exploited optimally which
1The parameter s is deﬁned as the ratio of the unit transportation cost parameter to the price
intercept of the linear demand curve. (cf. Smithies (1941), p. 432)
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is attributable to comparatively higher freight rates. By contrast, when introducing
competition in locations in the second case the dominant strategy is to locate close
to the center. Given equally charged prices, for each seller gains in his hinterland are
lower when remaining at the quartile position compared to an increase in demand
due to the expansion of his territory.2 Thus, the proﬁt maximizing equilibrium results
in equal seller locations closer to the center than the quartile positions and proﬁt
maximizing prices below the equilibrium prices of the quartile solution due to higher
average freight charges. Finally, in the third case the notion of price competition
intensiﬁes sellers' tendency to locate towards the center. As prices decrease the ad-
vantage of an advance in each sellers' territory increases, moreover, each competitor
has to face the price decision of his rival. Ceteris paribus, i.e. under the same level of
freight rates, an equilibrium results with equal prices lying below and equal locations
closer to the center than respective values in the second case of sole competition in
locations. (cf. Smithies (1941), table 1, p. 435) Put diﬀerently, the threshold for sell-
ers tendency to agglomerate at the center in terms of the freight rate is higher under
full competition.3
In sum, Smithies major ﬁnding concerning the location patterns in spatial markets
is that in a setting of elastic demand the level of transportation costs is crucial for
determining sellers' tendency to agglomerate at the center. The reason is that sellers
are not free to pass on transportation costs without any cost but rather balance
the chance of achieving territorial gains with the necessity to impose higher freight
charges on their hinterlands. Higher transportation costs imply that sellers are in-
clined to behave more like local monopolists or as Smithies puts it imagining the
extreme case of an insuperable wall erected at the center of the market. (Smithies
(1941), p. 434f) By contrast low transportation costs support competitive behavior
and emphasize the tendency to locate at the center. Further by distinguishing three
conjectural hypotheses, Smithies illustrates that sellers' strategic decision is depen-
dent on the type of market competition.
The paper of Eaton & Lipsey (1975) represents an important building block in the
literature on spatial competition models. Except for the structure of the market de-
mand4 the authors challenge the critical assumptions underlying the Hotelling model,
derive conclusions on the range of application of the PMD, and provide further princi-
ples on the issue of equilibrium location settings in oligopolistic markets. Particularly,
they investigate cases with more than two sellers, consider bounded and unbounded
market areas, scrutinize the eﬀect of diﬀerent consumer density functions on the lo-
2Consider also that a retreat for one competitor from the equilibrium position towards the edge
of the city is not proﬁtable since the same reaction can not be expected by his rival.
3Setting sellers' relative distance to zero Smithies achieves critical values of s = 4
7
and s = 8
11
for
location competition and full competition respectively.
4This is dealt with, for instance, in Lerner & Singer (1937) and Smithies (1941).
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cation equilibrium, and on top, extend the analyses to two-dimensional spaces. This
makes it necessary to apply simplifying assumptions on other aspects of the model.
These are, ﬁrstly, that all ﬁrms set the same mill price, and secondly, two types of
strategic reaction functions (conjectural variation) are assumed: (i) that ﬁrms do not
react to the location decision of a competitor and retain their own location (zero
conjectural variation, ZCV), and (ii) that a change in location of one ﬁrm causes a
maximum possible loss to one competitor. Thus, in their pure location model the
impact of competitors' strategic price setting on the location patterns is not of in-
terest.
The following summarizes their treatment of four models in one-dimensional markets:
• Model 1 represents the setting of the linear city with ZCV and evenly distribut-
ed consumers. The argument is made for two conditions deﬁning location equi-
libria, namely, (1.i) no ﬁrm's whole market is smaller than any other ﬁrm's
half market and (1.ii) the two peripheral ﬁrms are paired (Eaton & Lipsey
(1975), p. 29). Intuition suggests that concerning condition (1.i) there is always
the fallback-option for one ﬁrm of locating inﬁnitesimally close to the nearest
neighbor. As for condition (1.ii) a peripheral ﬁrm whose market boundary on
one side borders to the edge of the city has the dominant strategy of increas-
ing its market area by shifting its location inﬁnitesimally close to its nearest
neighbor and forming a pair.
As a consequence, for two ﬁrms the PMD is fulﬁlled with both locating at the
center. By contrast, for three ﬁrms no equilibrium is achieved since both pe-
ripheral ﬁrms want to form a pair with the interior ﬁrm, and clearly, no player
accepts to take the interior position.5 Comparable to the duopoly, four ﬁrms
form two pairs where in equilibrium each player's market is maximized equally
dividing up the market with pairs at the quartiles. For ﬁve ﬁrms two pairs
remain, in the equilibrium conﬁguration the stand-alone player locates in the
center and the pairs at 16 and
5
6 of the market respectively. In this case the in-
terior ﬁrm beneﬁts from the fact that pairs are formed due to the inward move
of each peripheral ﬁrm. A further inward move of the pairs towards the center
leads to an increase in the hinterlands of the peripheral ﬁrms at the expense of
the market area of the centrally-faced, paired ﬁrms and thus does not represent
an equilibrium state. Finally, for six players no unique equilibrium but a con-
tinuous range of equilibrium states exists. The dynamics in this conﬁguration
are attributable to the two interior ﬁrms. In the extreme cases, these minimize
their distance and form a third (interior) pair resulting in equally distributed
market shares or maximize their distance taking the double market size of the
remaining four competitors (two pairs each comprising one peripheral ﬁrm).
5Formally, condition (1.i) is violated.
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In sum, this leads to the general conclusion that (1) no ﬁrm can have a mar-
ket more than twice as large as any other ﬁrm's market; and (2) no ﬁrm can
have a market smaller than the market length of the ﬁrms in the peripheral
pairs (Eaton & Lipsey (1975), p. 31). The respective bounds for equilibrium
market sizes for interior and peripheral ﬁrms are a decreasing function in the
number of ﬁrms. Interestingly, the socially optimal equilibrium conﬁguration
corresponds to the state where the diﬀerence or the inequality of the distribu-
tion in the market sizes between the interior ﬁrms and the ﬁrms of the outer
pairs is greatest, i.e. a state with the interior ﬁrms spread evenly. Moreover, it
is concluded that the location equilibria critically depend on the spatial char-
acteristics of the market which is illustrated by applying the calculus from the
linear city to a circle.6
• Model 2 investigates the setting of the linear city under the competitive scenario
that the location choice of one ﬁrm is made under the conjecture of incurring
maximum losses, i.e. that a competitor will form a pair on the long side of
its market. As a result, the dominant location strategy of each player is to
maximize the short side which is established by choosing the middle position
in one's market area. For the two peripheral ﬁrms this implies that they locate
at a distance of one-third of the distance from the city edge to their rival (with
a total market area of two-third of this distance), the interior ﬁrms choose the
midpoint of the distance between their competitors. In the unique equilibrium
with n players an equidistant location conﬁguration with market areas of 1n
obtains which minimizes the overall transportation costs and thus corresponds
to the socially-optimal state. Moreover, the authors mention only one exception
to this result highlighting that a distinction between new market entry and
moves of existing ﬁrms only matters for the case of a duopoly. (cf. Eaton &
Lipsey (1975), p. 33) If two players anticipate that no entry occurs they locate
at the center and the PMD applies, thus in this particular case no diﬀerence in
the results between the case of ZCV and maximum losses obtains. By contrast,
if the duopolists know of a third ﬁrm to enter the market their dominant loss-
minimizing strategy is to take the quartile positions.
• Model 3 uses ZCV but deviates from the assumption of evenly distributed
consumers. Consumer density is modeled with the consumer density function
c(X) with X denoting the distance from the geometrical market origin, e.g.
one of the market's edges. In comparison to model 1 the obvious consequence
of introducing c(X) is that the equilibrium conditions apply with respect to
the consumer distribution and not with respect to the market geometry. Thus,
the critical measure of gaining half of the market and subsequently condition
6This case is more extensively treated in chapter 3.1 of this survey.
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(1.i) has to be generalized to the principle (3.i) that no ﬁrm's whole market
is less than another's long-side market (Eaton & Lipsey (1975), p. 33).7 The
principle that peripheral ﬁrms form a pair remains.8 Furthermore, two addi-
tional principles to deﬁne the equilibrium state are considered. The ﬁrst is that
for interior ﬁrms the value of the consumer density function at the left- and
right-handed market boundaries has to be equal (cp. Eaton & Lipsey (1975),
condition 3.iii, p. 34), and the second is that for paired ﬁrms the value of the
consumer density function at the short-side of the market has to be greater
or at least equal to the respective value at the long-side (cp. Eaton & Lipsey
(1975), condition 3.iv, p. 34). Intuitively, in equilibrium incentives to move must
not prevail, i.e. each interior ﬁrm locates at the density-related midpoint of its
respective market, and paired ﬁrms do not move away from their peripheral
neighbor towards regions of higher density. The mathematical explanation is
rooted in a comparison of cumulative probabilities if the location is varied by
a unit distance.9
In sum, the four principles lead to the following conclusions for equilibrium
conﬁgurations. Firstly, the PMD persists in a duopoly with the two ﬁrms lo-
cating at the median of the distribution. Secondly, there exists no equilibrium
for three ﬁrms since peripherals are inclined to form a pair which is at odds
with condition (3.i). Thirdly, the general principle applies that in equilibrium
the number of ﬁrms is restricted by the structure of the distribution, particu-
larly, the number of modes must match (or be greater) than half of the number
of ﬁrms. This is a direct consequence of (3.iii) and (3.iv) which imply that in
the market area of every interior ﬁrm a mode has to be located, and that for
one ﬁrm of any pair the market area must also include a mode. If the number
of ﬁrms equals twice the number of modes all ﬁrms are paired (otherwise no
equilibrium is achieved). For a smaller number of ﬁrms the equilibrium state de-
pends on the characteristics of the distribution. Moreover, the principle makes
clear that a strictly monotonic unimodal density function never provides an
equilibrium for a market with more than two ﬁrms which is attributable to
(3.iv).10
• Model 4 represents a combination of model 2 and model 3 incorporating a
7The long side consistently being deﬁned as the market side with the higher number of consumers.
8The dominant strategy for a peripheral ﬁrm to extend its market area by forming a pair is
independent of the consumer distribution since no territory is lost by moving inwards.
9The market area for an interior ﬁrm i at position Xi is expressed as the diﬀerence of the cumu-
lative distribution at the right- and left-handed boundaries: Mi =
∫Xi
BL
c(X)dx+
∫ BR
Xi
c(X)dx =
C(BR)− C(BL). Optimizing Mi w.r.t. Xi yields the equivalence relation: ∂Mi∂Xi = 0⇒ c(BR) =
c(BL). The analogous argument applies for paired ﬁrms with short- and long-sided boundaries
leading to ∂Mi
∂Xi
> 0 if c(Bshort) < c(Blong).
10The authors give an example for this case in ﬁgure 4 (cp. Eaton & Lipsey (1975), p. 34).
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variable consumer density function c(X) under the conjecture of players' loss-
maximizing strategic behavior. Recall that the dominant strategy of each player
then is to maximize the short-side of its market. An equilibrium state is deﬁned
as regards moves of a ﬁrm with respect to its nearest neighborhood (local
equilibrium) and with respect to the whole market area, i.e. ﬁrms consider
the whole city to be a feasible location area (global equilibrium). For states
of local equilibrium two types of equilibrium conditions are deﬁned. The Type
I conditions demand ﬁrstly that the cumulative consumer density in a ﬁrm's
market is divided by its location Xi into two equal parts,
11 and secondly that
the value of consumer density at Xi exceeds (or matches) half of the value at
the respective boundary of the short-side of its market12. Under a violation of
each of these conditions a ﬁrm increased the short side and thus gained a higher
number of consumers, if it changed its location. As a consequence, the Type
I equilibrium reveals the same result as under an even distribution function
(model 2), namely that each ﬁrm locates at the middle of its market, i.e. the
distribution median. Now, states occur where ﬁrms are centrally located but
2c(Xi) < c(Bshort). This gives rise to Type II equilibrium conditions which ﬁx
c(Xi) to the respective value at the short-sided boundary. (cf. Eaton & Lipsey
(1975), conditions 4.iii a-b and 4.iv a-b, p. 37) Concerning the existence of global
equilibria no particular conditions are derived, respective conﬁgurations depend
on the structure of c(X).
The signiﬁcance of the paper by Eaton & Lipsey (1975) is attributable to the gen-
eralization of the framework in spatial competition modeling techniques. As regards
projections on the PMD in one-dimensional markets, they conﬁrm that in a duopoly
ﬁrms locate at the, consistently deﬁned, center of the city unless the two ﬁrms antic-
ipate the entry of a third rival under the assumption of a loss maximizing behavior.
The general implication of their model is that ﬁrms are inclined to form pairs in
a wide range of equilibrium and disequilibrium states. In particular, they illustrate
that an increase in the number of ﬁrms contradicts with the tendency to locate at the
center with the interesting result of a continuum of equilibria for six ﬁrms and more
under ZCV and a rectangular distribution. Also, the authors show that the assump-
tion of a loss minimizing strategy is at odds with sellers' preference to locate at the
center. Finally, it is made clear that the characteristics of the consumer distribution
function are critical for determining the equilibrium in locations.
11
∫Xi
Bleft
c(X)dx =
∫ Bright
Xi
c(X)dx (cf. Eaton & Lipsey (1975), condition (4.i), p. 36)
12This pins down to the condition 2c(Xi) ≥ c(Bshort). For any ﬁrm i the market boundaries
are given by BL =
Xi−1+Xi
2
and BR =
Xi+Xi+1
2
with the market value Mi =
∫Xi
BL
c(X)dx +∫ BR
Xi
c(X)dx = C(BR) − C(BL). Thus, considering the chain rule a move towards the right-
handed boundary changes the market by a rate of 1
2
c(BR)−c(Xi) (for the right-handed market),
and c(Xi) − 12c(BL) (for the left-handed market). The argument applies to the two peripheral
and the interior ﬁrms (cf. Eaton & Lipsey (1975), conditions (4.ii. a-c), p. 36f).
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The paper of Hay (1976) stresses a feature in spatial competition modeling that has
not received attention in the previous studies. In particular, he drops the assump-
tion that the relocation for ﬁrms is costless and investigates the existence of market
equilibria when ﬁrms choose their most proﬁtable location in a sequential order.13
Comparable to Smithies (1941), his model rests on Hotelling's linear city under price
elastic and identical linear demand curves. The linear city is not explicitly restricted
in size and corresponds to an inﬁnte line. His major assumption, however, is the
irrevocability of the location choice, i.e. once the ﬁrm has located itself, its capi-
tal equipment is immobile. [...] A consequence of this is that the plant must have a
long planning horizon in taking location decisions. [...] So in locating his plant the
entrepreneur will seek to secure a suﬃcient market to give him an adequate return
at least over this period. (Hay (1976), p. 243) The starting point of the analysis is
to set up the demand and proﬁt functions. Speciﬁcally, qx = y(a − b(P + x)) refers
to the positive linear demand function for an arbitrary ﬁrm at a distance x with P
as the price at the point of sale (mill price), and y as the population density (num-
ber of consumers) at any point in the market. Subsequently, for a market boundary
of z to each of the two nearest neighbors the total demand function is deﬁned as
q = 2
∫ z
0 qxdx = 2yz(a− bP − b2z). The cost function is postulated as C(q) = kq+X,
and the proﬁt function follows with Π = Pq−kq−X. A ﬁrm chooses between the two
strategic variables of setting a proﬁt-maximizing price P and occupying a territory
of z to one neighbor, according to the ﬁrst order condition these are negatively pro-
portional.14 Further, due to the linear demand function the maximum market area
z for any P requires z = ab − P (i.e. the highest possible price is capped at ab ). This
implies that for the proﬁt-maximizing price P ∗ the boundary z∗ = 23(
a
b − k) obtains
and that a ﬁrm always wants to expand its market boundary to z∗ since ∂Π(P
∗)
∂z > 0
requires z < z∗.15
The subsequent analysis of sequential entry distinguishes between the two scenarios
of locating in the neighborhood of two competitors and settling down in a vacant
space of the market where no other rivals have located yet.
In the ﬁrst case the maximum critical distance between two ﬁrms is evaluated such
that an entrant ﬁrm may still locate between the two incumbents. (cf. Hay (1976),
appendix 2, p. 255f) Recall that ﬁrms' locations are assumed to be immobile; addi-
tionally, ﬁrms react to entry by setting a post-entry mill price denoted as Pc. The
13His model corresponds to model 2 in Eaton & Lipsey (1975), however, they lay out the assumption
that there are no costs of relocation. (cf. p. 28). Furthermore, Eaton & Lipsey (1975) do not
provide a treatment of a sequential entry game. In Hay (1976) the number of ﬁrms is determined
by the corollary of monopolistic market competition that entry occurs until excess proﬁts vanish
and the market demand curve of each ﬁrm is tangential to the cost curve.
14Setting ∂Π
∂P
= 0 yields P ∗ = a
2b
+ k
2
− z
4
.
15The minimum for z is determined by the condition Π(P ∗) > 0 such that the arbitrary parameters
a, b, k and X at least allow for a tangential relationship between the demand curve and the cost
curve. (cp. Hay (1976), p. 254f)
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initial market boundary between the incumbents is given at a distance Zc, where-
as the total (minimum) market covered by the entrant (within the area of 2Zc)
adds up to 2Zm. Consequently, incumbents' post-entry proﬁts comprise of a piece
attributable to the market towards the entrant's location and one piece contingent
upon the market on the far side: Π = (Pc − k)(Zc − Zm)(a − bPc − b2(Zc − Zm)) +
(Pc−k)Zc(a−bPc− b2Zc)−X.16 Applying the ﬁrst order condition ∂Π∂Pc = 0 yields the
optimal incumbents' post-entry price P ∗c as a function of Zc and Zm, the entrant's
proﬁt-maximizing price is given by P ∗m =
a
2b +
k
2 − Zm4 (cf. footnote 14 above). An
expression for the critical spacing is obtained by leveling the entrant's and incum-
bent's price at the market boundary: P ∗c + Zc − Zm = P ∗m + Zm, which reduces to
Zc
Zm
= 2.215. Thus, for any Zc below 2.215Zm it is not proﬁtable for the entrant to
locate between the incumbent ﬁrms.17
The second case emphasizes that the optimal market size for a ﬁrm choosing a re-
mote place is in fact given by twice the size of its minimum market area which in
turn leads to an orderly spacing of ﬁrms. As Hay (1976) argues qualitatively, this
outcome critically depends on the ﬁrms' interaction since subsequent entrants are
required to locate at the minimum distance to the initial ﬁrm (and act preemptively
to entry). Accordingly, irregularities from a general equidistant equilibrium pattern
for the whole market are expected if the location patterns of two distant neighbor-
hoods from diﬀerent edges of the city collide which generally can not be outruled.
(cf. Hay (1976), p. 247)
Eventually, Hay (1976) analyzes two further aspects of market dynamics: an increase
in the total market demand by a constant growth rate and a variation in consumer
density. Clearly, as the total market size increases the entrant is confronted with
the intertemporal trade oﬀ that locating closer to a competitor reduces proﬁts in the
short run but increases proﬁts in the long run as entry is prevented for a comparative-
ly longer time period. (cf. Hay (1976), p. 248) Then obviously, the location decision
results from the maximization of the present value of future pay-oﬀs. More precisely,
under ceteris paribus conditions, e.g. identical discount rates, the equidistant equilib-
rium spacing from the static analysis is conﬁrmed. The eﬀect of a change in consumer
density is shown leveling the general proﬁt function at the proﬁt-maximizing price
Π(P ∗) = 0 and evaluating the partial derivative of y against the minimum market
for entry zm. (cf. Hay (1976), p. 251) From the bijective relation between y and zm
over the relevant range it is concluded that an increase in consumer density causes
the size of the minimum market to decrease, or ∂zm∂y < 0. Additionally, it is demon-
strated that a rise in y leads to an increase proﬁts. This meets the intuition that
those segments of the market with a higher y oﬀer larger proﬁts even though the
16Consumer density is normalized to y=1.
17The critical distance is greater than 2Zm (twice the minimum market size) since the incumbents
also serve the opposite side of their market (up to the distance of Zc) and thus charge a lower
mill price than the entrant.
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centres will be closer together (Hay (1976), p. 251), and thus, represents a model
that suggests spatial clusters contingent upon the consumer density distribution in
conjunction with ﬁrms' locating according to entry deterring strategies.
In sum, the work of Hay (1976) predicts that under a constant number of consumers
and both in a static and dynamic market scenario the assumption of immobile loca-
tions leads to regular location patterns where ﬁrms tend to be spread out evenly over
the whole market area by a measure of the minimum distance zm. Consequently, as a
result of sellers' commitment to a ﬁnal location decision the PMD is discarded. The
variation in consumer density, however, allows for the emergence of spatial clusters.
Comparable to the work of Hay (1976), Prescott & Visscher (1977) provide an analy-
sis of a strictly sequential location process. The model structure is that only one ﬁrm
enters at a time, where each player is confronted with prohibitively high relocation
costs. For the optimal location decision a ﬁrm accounts for the proﬁt-maximizing
decisions of all competitors who have already taken a position, and importantly, also
those ﬁrms who will enter later in the sequence: Each ﬁrm is assumed to choose
the proﬁt maximizing market position based on the observed choices of ﬁrms already
located and the location rules that subsequent, equally rational entrants and potential
entrants will use. Thus, each ﬁrm takes into consideration the eﬀect of its location de-
cision upon the ultimate conﬁguration of the industry. (Prescott & Visscher (1977),
p. 379) Now, this method is applied to diﬀerent settings.
Firstly, the case of the Hotelling city is investigated. The assumptions comprise a
linear market with unit boundaries [0; 1], a rectangular consumer density distribu-
tion (the number of consumers is N), exogenously given and equal prices for every
seller, and a ﬁxed number of n ﬁrms to enter the market. Firms' optimal locations
are determined by an algorithm based on the principle of backward induction. To il-
lustrate the argument, the last ﬁrm n as a proﬁt-maximizing agent devises a decision
rule to choose the most proﬁtable location based on the present market conﬁgura-
tion. In turn, ﬁrm n − 1 accounts for ﬁrm n's decision rule as well as for the given
market structure of the remaining n − 2 ﬁrms when setting up his own location
decision rule. This process is followed up to the ﬁrst entrant ﬁrm 1 who considers
all proﬁt-maximizing decision rules of his competitors when taking his optimal po-
sition. Clearly, for two players the equilibrium with both locating back-to-back at
the center obtains since ﬁrm 1 knows that the best reaction is to maximize his short
side as ﬁrm 2's dominant strategy is to locate as closely as possible on ﬁrm 1's long
side.18 Moreover, consider the case of three ﬁrms. As was argued by Eaton & Lipsey
(1975) in a simultaneous game no equilibrium exists. By constrast, Prescott & Viss-
cher (1977) provide an equilibrium solution for the sequential case. (cf. Prescott &
Visscher (1977), p. 382) In a nutshell, ﬁrms' decision rules suggests to locate in the
18This supplements the predictions of Eaton & Lipsey (1975) in their model 1 and model 2 for a
duopoly.
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most vacant spaces accounting for diﬀerent cases that consider all potential locations
of their rivals.19 The equilibrium yields ﬁrm 1 and 2 to be located at the quartiles
and ﬁrm 3 at 12 .
In the second setting, the assumption of a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms for the linear city
is dropped, that is, market entry is endogenized. The underlying calculus rests upon
a function w to quantify the market share for an arbitrary proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm
in an equilibrium industry structure. The market share is, evidently, dependent on
the distance z to the nearest neighbors.20 (cf. Prescott & Visscher (1977), equations
(1)-(3), p. 383f) The purpose of w is to determine the expected value for entry, thus,
to set the condition for proﬁt maximization. Clearly, a higher distance implies higher
market shares and consequently higher proﬁts, however, the extension of the market
area is limited by upcoming entrants and, as the analysis in ﬁgure 1 (Prescott &
Visscher (1977), p. 384) illustrates, is capped by the amount of the ﬁxed costs α. As
a result, the optimal location x suggests a ﬁrm to locate from a distance of α from
the respective ends of the city and to choose vacant middle markets and locate at a
distance of 2α from the nearest neighbor. (cf. Prescott & Visscher (1977), equation
4, p. 384) The number of ﬁrms is restricted by 1α , in case that
1
α ≥ 4 is not an integer
an additional ﬁrm enters and locates at a remaining interval exceeding the value of
2α. In sum, the location algorithm leads to an uniform market structure with ﬁrms
spaced out evenly by a distance of 2α subject to 1α being an even integer, otherwise
one irregularity in the location pattern emerges.
In conclusion, Prescott & Visscher (1977) provide a comprehensive treatment of a
sequential location model that, in extension to previous works (e.g. Hay (1976)), ex-
plicitly accounts for future expectations on the location choice of subsequent ﬁrms to
enter the market. Furthermore, they derive a solution for the equilibrium state when
entry is endogenized. As regards the PMD the results of Prescott & Visscher (1977)
are in line with Hay (1976), ﬁrms' dominant location strategy under costly sequen-
tial entry leads to a location distribution with ﬁrms spacing out which is at odds
with a general tendency to agglomerate at the market center. In addition, Prescott
& Visscher (1977) show that the location choice is also dependent on the level of
entry costs. Particularly, in the case where the number of ﬁrms is restricted to n ≤ 3
a lower level of ﬁxed costs leads the ﬁrst two entrants to locate closer even when
the entry barrier still prohibits the third ﬁrm to enter. This illustrates that location
19W.l.o.g. ﬁrm 1's location is restricted to one half of the city, i.e. x1 <
1
2
(left half), then the
decision rules for ﬁrm 3 are: locate to the right of ﬁrm 2 if it is also settled in the left half (case
(i)), locate to the left of ﬁrm 1 if it is located far right in his half and ﬁrm 2 is in the right half
(case (ii)), locate to the right of ﬁrm 2 if it is located far left in the right half (case (iii)), and
locate between ﬁrm 1 and 2 if the middle market is large (case (iv)). Firm 2's decision rules
require to locate closer to ﬁrm 1 if it is close to the edge and to choose a remote location if it is
positioned more centrally.
20Note that a distinction between locations at the edge of the city with only one nearest neighbor
and between the case of two nearest neighbors has to be made.
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acts as a strategic instrument to forestall further entry expressed by the counterin-
tuitive result of higher proﬁts and prices under comparatively higher ﬁxed costs. (cf.
Prescott & Visscher (1977), table 2, p. 389) Finally, it has to be noted that Prescott &
Visscher (1977) emphasize that the Hotelling model does not provide a complete set
of noncooperative Nash equilibrium prices: The diﬃculty with this solution concept
[...] is that when locations in Nash are suﬃciently close, Nash equilibrium prices will
not exist. The nonexistence of equilibrium is a problem that frequently arises when
reaction functions are [...] discontinuous. The source of the discontinuity in the price
reaction function here is that a lower price by one of the ﬁrms does not always gain
the ﬁrm market share in a smooth continuous fashion. A price suﬃciently low can
capture the entire market, whereas a price slightly higher loses the rival ﬁrm's entire
hinterland. (Prescott & Visscher (1977), p. 386) However, it was not until the inﬂu-
ential note of d'Aspremont et al. (1979) to mathematically prove the nonexistence
of Nash price equilibria at every point in the market.
Fifty years after the publication of Hotelling's famous paper d'Aspremont et al.
(1979) challenge the general prediction of the PMD and prove that in the simulta-
neous price competition a Nash equilibrium does not exist over the whole range of
the linear city. Speciﬁcally, they show that for close locations no equilibria obtain.
In their proof the usual assumptions apply, distances a and b are deﬁned from the city
edges (line of length l), and ﬁrms A and B charge p1 and p2, unit transportation costs
are denoted with c. The demand functions q1, q2 are derived from the position of the
indiﬀerent consumer and proﬁts pi1, pi2 obtain as a function of price diﬀerences, thus,
pi1, pi2 reveal two discontinuities when sellers' prices are undercut.
21 (cf. d'Aspremont
et al. (1979), p. 1145f) Now, ﬁrstly, it is justiﬁed that a price equilibrium can only
occur in the competitive region of the proﬁt function, i.e., the price diﬀerence is re-
stricted to |p∗1−p∗2| < c(l−a−b). Intuitively, outside the range any seller could in any
case increase his proﬁts by adapting his price.22 It follows that equilibrium prices are
derived from the parabolic parts of the proﬁt function applying the ﬁrst order condi-
tion which yields p∗1 = c(l+
1
3(a−b)) and p∗2 = c(l+ 13(b−a)). Furthermore, applying
the deﬁnition of the Nash equilibrium23 it follows that the equilibrium is fulﬁlled
only for restricted intervals of locations a and b. Intuitively, proﬁts gained under p∗1
must exceed proﬁts under an undercutting strategy. For symmetric locations (a = b)
21The seller who undercuts his rival gets the whole market l, the undercut ﬁrm earns zero demand
and proﬁts. Since linear transportation costs are assumed (following Hotelling (1929)) a seller
captures the whole market if the price cut shifts the market boundary to the rival's mill, thus
the conditions for the discontinuities are derived setting q1 = 1− b and q2 = a respectively.
22The undercut ﬁrm would decrease his price, moreover condition |p∗1−p∗2| = c(l−a−b) implies that
a seller who captures a fraction of the market is inclined to drop his price to the undercutting
level.
23p∗1 maximizes pi1(p1, p
∗
2) over the whole domain of possible price strategies, and for ﬁrm B vice
verser. (cf. d'Aspremont et al. (1979), p. 1146)
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the quartiles mark the threshold for the Nash equilibrium condition.24 Additionally,
the authors conduct the analysis with quadratic transport costs and show that Nash
price equilibria p∗1 = c(l − a − b)(l + 13(a − b)) and p∗2 = c(l − a − b)(l + 13(b − a))
hold for all a and b on the line.25 Furthermore, Nash proﬁts pi1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) and pi2(p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
increase with decreasing a and b respectively. Thus, under quadratic transportation
costs proﬁt-maximizing sellers maximize their distance and locate at the ends of the
city.
To sum up, d'Aspremont et al. (1979) provide evidence that a general PMD, as sug-
gested by Hotelling (1929), is invalid which is attributable to the structure of the
proﬁt functions under the linear transportation cost scheme. Moreover, their note
suggests a contrary principle of maximum diﬀerentiation for the location decision
when applying quadratic transportation costs. Using quadratic transportation costs
proves advantageous since then a Nash equilibrium in prices (for a simultaneous
pricing game) exists for all locations on the city domain.
According to the negative result achieved by d'Aspremont et al. (1979) it would have
not been surprising to accept the conclusion that the PMD in the Hotelling model
should be ﬁnally discarded. However, the conﬂicting evidence spurred more research
activities. Exemplarily, the papers of Economides (1984), Economides (1986), and
Economides (1993) illustrate that the level of consumers' reservation price, the func-
tional form of transportation costs and the number of competitors critically deter-
mine the equilibrium in prices and location for the Hotelling model.
In these works, the existence and the solutions for price and location equilibria are
scrutinized for a two stage game where in the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms simultaneously choose
locations and in the second stage a simultaneous price competition takes place (for
previously determined locations). To begin with the Hotelling model is restated in a
generalized form. In particular, the utility function of consumer ω purchasing a unit
of the diﬀerentiated product x is deﬁned by Uω(x,m) = m+Vω(ω)−f(d(x, ω))−Px
with m standing for the budget (endowment with a Hicksian composite good),
Vω(ω) = k the constant reservation price for all consumers, f(d(x, ω)) a function
for the disutility of traveling in space from ω to a ﬁrm's mill at x (for f(d) = d and
24Formally, for any  > 0: pi1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) =
1
2t
(p∗1(p
∗
2))
2 > l(p∗2 − c(l − a − b) − ). The same argument
applies for ﬁrm 2. Then after a little algebra this yields the two conditions l2 +(a−b
3
)2 ≥ 2l(a+b)
and l2 + ( b−a
3
)2 ≥ 2l(a+ b) (these correspond to equations (1) and (2) on p.1146). To complete
the proof see that out of these conditions follows ( |a−b|
3
)2 ≥ 2l(a+ b)− l2 = 2l(a+ b− l
2
), further
evaluating |p∗1 − p∗2| < c(l − a − b) leads to |a−b|3 < 12 (l − (a + b)). Thus, a consistent solution
with respect to the upper and lower bound requires 5
2
l( l
2
− (a+ b)) + 1
4
(a+ b)2 ≥ 0 which is not
fulﬁlled for all a and b on the domain, e.g. a = b = 1
2
.
25Traveling a distance x to a seller a consumer incurs transportation costs of cx2. Thus, the utility
of consuming at ﬁrm A and B (with a suﬃciently high surplus s) is uA = s− p1− t(x− a)2 and
uB = s− p2 − t(1− x− b)2. For the indiﬀerent consumer between A and B set uA = uB which
yields the demand and proﬁt functions. (cf. d'Aspremont et al. (1979), p. 1148) Furthermore,
proofs for the uniqueness of the price and location equilibrium for quadratic transportation costs
are provided in Neven (1985).
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f(d(x, ω)) = |x−ω| this corresponds to linear transportation costs) and Px the price
of x.26 (cf. Economides (1984), p. 347 and 349f) From the total utility the disutility
function gx(ω) = f(d(x, ω)) + Px can be separated. Thus, consumers' optimization
problem is to minimize gx(ω) for given k, that is depending on the constant reserva-
tion price a consumer will travel to the nearest seller. Firms' locations are taken both
from the zero edge of the city with unit length and w.l.o.g. x < y (for a duopoly),
the indiﬀerent consumer z between the two ﬁrms lies at z and represents also the
most disadvantaged consumer since his value for g among consumers in the middle
market is the highest.27 Then, Nash prices in a duopoly are P ∗x =
1
3(2 + x+ y) and
P ∗y =
1
3(4−x−y) with an equilibrium state only if: x2 +y2 +2xy−8x+28y−20 > 0
and x2 + y2 + 2xy − 32x + 4y + 4 > 0.28 (cf. Economides (1984), proposition 2 on
p. 352, and p. 353)
Now, in Economides (1984) the assumption that every buyer purchases one unit of
the diﬀerentiated product is dropped.29 As a consequence, sellers' demand and proﬁt
functions comprise of three parts segmented by diﬀerent price bounds. (cf. Econo-
mides (1984), p. 354ﬀ) This is rooted in the critical consumers who are indiﬀerent
between buying and not participating in the market and who are now not located at
the market edges z = 0 and z = 1 anymore. Their behavior is characterized by the
condition k = gx(z) and k = gy(z) respectively, that is the reservation price equals
their total disutility of consumption. Formally, for these two conditions four solutions
obtain, i.e. the locations for four indiﬀerent consumers, two for each seller one on the
right and the left side of the mill: z1,3(Px) = x∓(k−Px) and z2,4(Py) = y∓(k−Py).
Then, the ﬁrst part of ﬁrms' proﬁts refers to the instance that undercutting one's
rival is a viable strategy, the remaining ﬁrm (e.g. product x) serves the market as
a monopolist with the undercutting price Px = Py − (y − x) and demand by the
amount of twice the distance to the indiﬀerently reluctant consumer: 2(k−Px). The
second part describes the competitive scenario where the rivals establish a market
boundary at z in their middle market (see above). Then, each seller takes demand
determined by the distance from their market edge to z (e.g. for product x that is
z − z1). The respective (upper) price bound is deﬁned by the price to capture the
reluctant indiﬀerent consumer to the right of z (e.g. z(Px) = z3(Px)) The third part
allows both ﬁrms to stay in the market as a local monopolist, clearly, then their
market areas are not connected. Formally, demand corresponds to part one of the
26Likewise Uω(y,m) = m + Vω(ω) − f(d(y, ω)) − Py for consuming one unit of the diﬀerentiated
good sold at the second mill at y.
27To determine z set: gx(z) = gy(z)
28This recaps the results of d'Aspremont et al. (1979). Demand is Dx = z, Dy = 1 − z. Then,
gx(z) = gy(z) yields z =
1
2
(Py − Px + y + x). Proﬁts are Πx = DxPx, Πx = DyPy applying the
ﬁrst order condition and solving for Px and Py yields the Nash prices. The undercutting prices
are obtained setting z = y and z = x or Px = Py − (y − x). For an equillibrium Πx(P ∗x ) >
Πx(P
∗
y − (y − x)) must hold and analogously for the second good y.
29Note that in Economides (1986) it is retained (cf. second paragraph on p. 67).
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proﬁt function and the upper price bound is, of course, the reservation price k. To
sum up, the distinct feature of the total demand curve is a kink at the transition
from part two to three and a discontinuity at the transition from part two to one
due to the undercutting behavior. (cf. Economides (1984), Fig. 4, p. 355)
Subsequently, the Nash price equilibria and equilibrium proﬁts are determined for
all three parts and the consequences of the underlying demand structure are drawn
for the existence of equilibria. For the case of local monopolies (either for one or two
ﬁrms) and the competitive case unique price equilibria are derived, at the kink a
continuum of price equilibria ('touching' Nash equilibria30) exists. (cf. Economides
(1984), Theorem 1, p. 359f) The equilibrium conﬁguration critically depends on the
level of the reservation price k, therefore for given k according to their existence
conditions all Nash price equilibria can be assigned to deﬁned sets for the location
of the mills x and y.31 To derive the solutions of the location game for all three cas-
es the derivatives of the corresponding proﬁt functions Π∗x(x, y, P ∗x (x, y), P ∗y (x, y))
and Π∗y(x, y, P ∗x (x, y), P ∗y (x, y)) with respect to x and y respectively are evaluated.32
The result is that in the case of competitive Nash price equilibria and the case of
'touching' Nash equilibria the two players move towards the edges of the city, if local
monopolies are established no incentives to move prevail.
In sum the model of Economides (1984) conﬁrms the intuition that for a large dis-
tance y − x and comparatively low reservation prices, a Nash price equilibrium in
two local monopolies obtains. As the distance decreases and the reservation price
increases the price equilibrium is realized for a continuum of prices ('touching' Nash
equilibrium at the kink of the demand for Px + Py = 2k − (y − x)). Subsequently,
for closer distances and higher reservation prices a price equilibrium is established
in competition and if ﬁrms approach even further undercutting strategies prohibit
a Nash price equilibrium. Location preferences clearly suggest a tendency for sell-
ers to separate from each other, in the case of local monopolies, however, ﬁrms do
not move unless their respective market cannot fully be exploited. Put diﬀerently,
Economides (1984) consolidates the results of the previous literature that is at odds
30These result from the discontinuity of the derivative of the proﬁt function. The economic inter-
pretation of the Nash price continuum is that the value of the reservation price is such that
the indiﬀerent and most disadvantaged consumer in the middle market is at the same time the
critical consumer for both ﬁrms to opt out of the market. He has equal utility for purchasing at
one of both ﬁrms and for not consuming at all. (cf. Economides (1984), p. 357f)
31In equilibrium the Nash prices yield maximum proﬁts and the price has to lie within the respective
price bounds of the distinguished segment of the demand and proﬁt function. Speciﬁcally, for the
local monopolistic case with both players in the market the existence condition is k < y−x. (cf.
Economides (1984), p. 356) For the competitive scenario the existence of the Nash equilibrium
additionally requires that proﬁts at the local peak in the price interval have to exceed proﬁts
at the left corner referring to the undercutting proﬁts. In sum this corresponds to equations (6)
and (7) summarized in (8) on p. 357. For the 'touching' Nash equillibria the existence conditions
are given in equations (10) and (11) summarized in (13) on p. 358.
32Proﬁt functions are abbreviated by Π∗x and Π
∗
y. Thus, the location equilibrium demands
∂Π∗x
∂x
=
∂Π∗y
∂y
= 0.
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with the PMD (e.g. d'Aspremont et al. (1979), Prescott & Visscher (1977)) in a two
stage price-location game for the linear city and provides evidence in favor of a Nash
equilibrium in locations at a 'local monopolistic' conﬁguration with the ﬁrms choos-
ing to produce very diﬀerent products. (Economides (1984), p. 366). Essentially, the
fact that sellers are not able to exploit the whole market area towards the city edges
is the explanation for this outcome. Moreover, based on d'Aspremont et al. (1979)
he shows that Nash price equilibria are not principally inexistent if ﬁrms settle to
close, rather the location threshold for a Nash price equilibrium to be discarded is a
function of the level of reservation prices.
The purpose of the second paper (Economides (1986)) is to scrutinize the eﬀect of
transportation costs on sellers' proﬁt-maximizing location decisions in a Hotelling
duopoly.
This is achieved by extending consumers' utility function with a ﬁxed but arbitrary
exponent α (with 1 ≤ α ≤ 2) in the transportation cost term, i.e. set f(d) = dα which
leads to the utility function Uz(x,m) = m+k−|x−z|α−Px when consuming x. (cf.
p. 68) Subsequently, ﬁrms' proﬁt functions accounting for the Nash price equilibrium
in the second stage are set up and the 'zero relocation locus' ∂Π
∗
x
∂x = 0 is determined.
It is important to note that the location equilibrium is derived under the assumption
of symmetric locations, i.e. y = 1− x. (cf. Economides (1986), p. 69) Inserting equi-
librium prices into the proﬁt function and evaluating the proﬁt derivative yields the
derivative as a function of α, i.e. ∂Π
∗
x
∂x ≤ 0 only if x ≥ x(α) = 54 − 34α which implies
that for values of α < 53 ﬁrm x relocates to x as the proﬁt-maximizing locus and
that for α > 53 the proﬁt-maximizing location is x = 0 (since then x < 0).
33 Thus as
stated in proposition 1, for a solution in the price game, the symmetric equilibrium
in the location game is x = x(α) and y(α) = 1−x(α). (cf. Economides (1986), p. 69)
Now, what is the range of validity for the location equilibrium? Clearly, the bound-
ary is determined by the relation of undercutting proﬁts to the Nash proﬁts. For this
purpose the function f(x, α) = ΠUCx − Π∗x is used.34 Then, for f ≤ 0 the area of
subgame perfect symmetric location equilibria is deﬁned, and for f > 0 undercutting
is proﬁtable and no Nash price equilibrium exists and the location equilibrium is not
deﬁned. Subsequently, the boundary for equilibrium conﬁgurations is determined by
33Recall that x < y, the indiﬀerence condition is Px − Py = |z − y|α − |x − z|α where z denotes
the solution for the location of the indiﬀerent consumer. For Πx = PxDx = Pxz this leads
to ∂Πx
∂Px
= z + Px
∂z
∂Px
. Using ∂Px
∂z
from the indiﬀerence condition yields the Nash price P ∗x =
αz((z−x)α−1 +(y−z)α−1) and similarly P ∗y = α(1−z)((z−x)α−1 +(y−z)α−1). Consequently:
Π∗x = αz
2((z−x)α−1 + (y− z)α−1). For further details on the evaluation of ∂Π∗x
∂x
see Economides
(1986) footnote 4 on p. 69.
34In the derivation of the proﬁt functions y = 1−x and P ∗x and P ∗y are used. Further, note that for
a symmetric location equilibrium z = 1
2
. Then P ∗x = α(
1
2
− x)α−1 and Π∗x = 12P ∗x , and similarly
for Π∗y. Undercutting proﬁts are Π
UC
x = P
UC
x . The undercutting price fulﬁlls the indiﬀerence
condition PUCx + (1 − x)α = P ∗y + (1 − y)α, that is, ﬁrm y sets the Nash price and ﬁrm x
undercuts and takes the whole market by shifting the indiﬀerent consumer to the edge z = 1.
Then, PUCx = α(
1
2
− x)α−1 + xα − (1− x)1−α. (cf. Economides (1986), p. 70)
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the solution for f = 0 and denoted with x(α). It follows that the intersection of
x(α) with x(α) yields a critical value for the exponent of the transportation costs
(α) above which a symmetric equilibrium under a Nash price equilibrium is reached.
Below α no locational equilibria exist since then the optimal location x falls into the
region where f > 0. (cf. Economides (1986), Fig. 1 on p. 69)
The crucial ﬁnding is that α ≈ 1.26 and together with the deﬁnition of x this im-
plies that ﬁrms are not inclined to maximally diﬀerentiate their products and take
the extreme positions at the city edges. Particularly, for transportation costs with
5
3 > α ≥ α they will take equilibrium positions on the line and charge Nash prices.35
In sum, this result generalizes the ﬁndings in d'Aspremont et al. (1979) where a prin-
ciple of maximum diﬀerentiation is suggested for α = 2 and the indeterminate case
for the Hotelling model if α = 1. Essentially, it can be concluded that the equilibrium
conﬁguration, speciﬁcally the location equilibrium, is determined by the transporta-
tion cost scheme.
In the third paper (Economides (1993)) the two-stage location-price game is gener-
alized from a duopoly to a setting with n ﬁrms competing on the linear city.
Firms' strategic variables are captured in the price and location vectors p = (p1, ...pn)
and x = (x1, ...xn) with Πj(p
∗
1, .., p
∗
j−1, pj , p
∗
j+1, ..., p
∗
n|x) ≤ Πj(p|x) ∀j = 1, . . . , n as
the consistently deﬁned Nash price equilibrium. (cf. p.305f) In addition, marginal
and ﬁxed production costs (m,F ) are introduced into the model. Also note that the
linear transportation cost coeﬃcient is denoted with λ. Then, the solution to the sec-
ond stage price game reduces to the expression p∗ = A−1y where A is a nxn matrix
(with well behaving properties) consisting of fraction numbers and the elements of y
are a function of the locations xj(j = 1, . . . , n).
36 As a result, equilibrium proﬁts are
for interior ﬁrms Πj =
(p∗j )
2
λ , and for ﬁrms closest to the market edges Πj =
(p∗j )
2
2λ .
(cf. Economides (1993)), Proposition 1, p. 307f) These proﬁt functions constitute the
objective functions for the derivation of the optimal locations in the ﬁrst stage of
the game. (cf. Economides (1993)), p. 308) Since λ is a constant the signs of
∂Πj
∂xj
and
∂p∗j
∂xj
are equivalent and from the structure of A−1 it follows that
∂p∗j
∂xj
= A−1 dyjdxj .
According to the structure of y the respective derivative reduces to expressions in
λ, thus
∂p∗j
∂xj
∀j = 1, . . . , n depends on real numbers (following from the elements
(ainv)i,j from A
−1) and λ. The relationship between the terms of the (ainv)i,j in the
derivative expression can be further evaluated which leads to the important condi-
35For instance, in Fig. 1 (cf. Economides (1986), p. 69) it is illustrated that at α and slightly above,
ﬁrms even locate closer than the quartile positions.
36This generalizes the solution for the price equilibrium in a duopoly (cf. (Economides (1984))).
In particular, p∗ represents the solution for the case of pure price competition which requires
that consumers reservation prices are suﬃciently high, i.e. k ≥ pj + m + λ|w − xj | and that
undercutting is not proﬁtable, i.e. zj ≥ xj−1. (cf. Economides (1993), p. 306) Consequently,
setting up expressions for ﬁrms' market boundaries and proﬁt functions, and applying the ﬁrst
order condition leads to the algebraic equilibrium equation. The properties and the existence of
the inverse of A are shown in lemma 1 and corollary 1. (cf. Economides (1993), p. 307)
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tion
∂p∗j
∂xj
> 0 (< 0) only if n+12 > j (< j) in lemma 2. (cf. Economides (1993), p. 309
and the proof on p. 318f) Clearly, this implies that for every ﬁrm j located to the
left of the centrally located ﬁrm(s) (j < n+12 ) an increase in its location increases
its proﬁts (and equilibrium price), likewise every ﬁrm located to right (j > n+12 ) can
increase its proﬁts (and equilibrium price) by decreasing its location. Thus, there is
a dominant strategy for every not centrally located ﬁrm to move towards the central
ﬁrm(s). Consequently, given equilibrium prices p∗ there exists no subgame perfect
equilibrium for the choice in locations if ﬁrms compete.37
Subsequently, more details on market equilibrium properties are given. Firstly, the
intuition is conﬁrmed that as ﬁrms move inwards the eﬀects of the location change on
the equilibrium prices and proﬁts on the other ﬁrms decreases with distance and is
thus strongest on the nearest neighbors. Ceteris paribus, prices and proﬁts decrease
for neighboring ﬁrms in the direction of the centrally spaced ﬁrm(s) and increase
for more distant neighbors as one ﬁrm adapts its location. (cf. Economides (1993),
Proposition 3, p. 310 and the proof on p. 319) Secondly, by a violation of the non-
undercutting condition it is ruled out that a state where all ﬁrms in the market gain
the same proﬁts serves as an equilibrium since diﬀerences in the levels of equilibrium
prices suggest that peripheral ﬁrms are undercut by their neighbors. (cf. Economides
(1993), p. 308) Thirdly, the location scenario of an equidistant spacing is scrutinized
where d denotes the distance of interior ﬁrms and c the distance from the edges, and
c < d2 . (cf. Economides (1993), p. 310 and footnote 5) Nash prices are p
∗
j = λ(d+cej)
and ej is a variable determined by elements of A
−1. The main result is that by
the properties of ej equilibrium prices reveal a strictly convex, symmetric, U-shaped
structure over the line [0, 1]. (cf. Economides (1993), Proposition 4, p. 310 and the
proof on p. 319) Thus, in an equidistant setting the peripheral ﬁrms exploit the high-
est degree of monopoly power and charge the highest prices, by contrast the centrally
located ﬁrms set the lowest prices. Due to ﬁrms' market sizes it is then the second
(and n − 1st) ﬁrm who make the highest proﬁts, depending on the level of c the
peripherals could be the second most proﬁtable (c ≈ d2 , n ≥ 5) or the least proﬁtable
ﬁrms (c = 0). (cf. Economides (1993), p. 311) Finally, it is shown that the suggested
pricing structure (in an exogenously imposed equidistant spacing structure) repre-
sents a competitive price equilibrium for n ≥ 4 if reservation prices are suﬃciently
high, and also an equilibrium for n = 3 provided that c is bounded (c < 0.435d). This
can be interpreted as a generalization of the critique of d'Aspremont et al. (1979)
on the existence of Nash price equilibria in the Hotelling duopoly for oligopolistic
37Recall from the duopoly case in Economides (1984) that consumers' reservation price k determines
the type of market interaction, for high k ﬁrms compete, for low k ﬁrms form local monopolies
and not all consumers are served, and for intermediate k kink solutions obtain. This characteristic
remains in the oligopolistic model with n players. The number of local monopolists is bounded
by k and an equidistant spacing allows for the largest number of ﬁrms. There are no relocations
incentives for local monopolists. (cf. Economides (1984), p. 312f) Additionally, as in the duopoly,
at the kink multiple equillibria exist. (cf. Economides (1984), p. 314)
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market structures (n ≥ 3). (cf. Economides (1993), p. 312 and Theorem 2)
The study of Economides (1993) sends a key message in terms of ﬁrms' tendency to
locate at the center or the periphery of the linear city: there is no perfect equilibrium
for n ﬁrms in a simultaneous two-stage price-location game under linear transporta-
tion costs and provided that the whole market is served. The location of the central
ﬁrm(s) represents an 'attractor' and rivals have a dominant strategy to locate away
from the city edges. Furthermore, it is interesting that an equilibrium state for n
ﬁrms with identical proﬁts does not exist, thus, depending on the location conﬁgura-
tion an order in ﬁrms' proﬁtability obtains. A special case is made for an equidistant
spacing pattern where it is shown that a price equilibrium implies a strictly con-
vex, U-shaped structure over the line. For this equilibrium the condition to cover
all consumers in the market (i.e. for suﬃciently high reservation prices) restricts the
peripheral ﬁrms to control a smaller market than the interior ﬁrms.
In a two stage sequential entry game in the Hotelling model with ﬁrms choosing
their position in the ﬁrst stage and selecting a proﬁt-maximizing price in the second
stage the application of quadratic transportation costs comes with the beneﬁt of a
well-deﬁned set of Nash equilibrium prices for every location.38 Thus, with quadrat-
ic transportation costs a perfect subgame equilibrium in locations can be examined
which is exploited in the papers of Neven (1987), Economides et al. (2004) and Goetz
(2005). The goal of these studies is to scrutinize location equilibrium conﬁgurations
and determinants for market deterrence in the linear city.
The important feature of the underlying model is the assumption of ﬁxed entry costs
F and a sequential entry process while prices are chosen simultaneously in the sec-
ond stage. Otherwise the classical assumptions of the Hotelling model apply: line
of unit length, uniform consumer distribution, constant and zero marginal costs of
production, and a constant consumers' reservation price. Moreover, analogous to the
principle in Prescott & Visscher (1977), ﬁrms' subgame perfect location decisions are
derived under the assumption of perfect foresight with respect to subsequent location
decisions of other competitors.39 Following the notation of Neven (1987), the demand
function Di for ﬁrm i is deﬁned by the locations of the indiﬀerent consumers in the
middle markets to its left and right side, in sum demand equals a ﬁrm's total market
area.40 Proﬁts are Πi = PiDi−F (i = 1, ..., n). In addition, as was previously shown
for a duopoly in Neven (1985), the model implies that the simultaneous price game
38Quadratic transportation costs are convex and guarantee concave proﬁt functions, thus second
order conditions are satisﬁed and a noncooperative price equilibrium is obtained. Here, once
again, Economides (1984) proves to be a valueable source (see proposition 1 and p. 350ﬀ).
39For an illustrative example of the calculus see Economides et al. (2004), section 4 on p. 11f.
40Assume n ﬁrms, then Di = max(0,minR − maxL) =: max(0, αi − αi) where L is the set of
all possible market boundaries (α) with all neighbors to the left of i (including the city edge
0), and R is the corresponding set to the right, formally: L = [0, αi,k, k = 1, ..., i − 1] and
R = [1, αi,k, k = i+ 1, ..., n] (cf. Neven (1987), equation (3), p. 422f)
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in the second stage yields a unique equilibrium also for n ﬁrms. (cf. Neven (1987),
p. 432f) Thus, a perfect subgame in locations can be played.
In Neven (1987), the results for the case of an exogenously given number of ﬁrms
yield the monopolist locating at the center (x1 =
1
2), and in a duopoly the two
players locating at the opposite ends maximally diﬀerentiating their product. Fur-
ther, it is mentioned (Neven (1987), p. 425) that the outcome of sequential entry in
a duopoly is fully in accord with the result of a simultaneous location decision (cf.
Neven (1985)). The equilibrium for three ﬁrms reveals an asymmetric pattern with
the ﬁrst ﬁrm located centrally (but not at 12) and the subsequent competitors close
to the edges. The asymmetry follows directly from the backward induced calculus,
in particular, it proves to be more proﬁtable for the second entrant to divert from
a regular location pattern if the ﬁrst ﬁrm took the center (and the third ﬁrm acted
accordingly)41, in turn, this implies that the optimal decision of the ﬁrst ﬁrm is to
locate asymmetrically with respect to the central position. For four ﬁrms a higher
degree of symmetry prevails, the ﬁrst two entrants balance the advantages from a
central position with increasing market sizes (and locating farther apart). In sum,
the equilibrium for n = 4 reveals a ﬁrst-mover advantage with the ﬁrst ﬁrm locating
more centrally than the second and thus gaining the highest proﬁts. Furthermore, it
is concluded that the ﬁrst-mover advantage and thus the asymmetry in the equilib-
rium location pattern decreases as the number of ﬁrms increases.
Next, let us turn to the results in Neven (1987) for the case of entry deterrence.
In this case the number of ﬁrms and ﬁrms' location is endogenized and entry re-
sults from the level of ﬁxed costs and the location choice of the incumbent ﬁrms.
Clearly, the higher F , the lower n. Furthermore, the level of F determines ﬁrms'
strategic behavior. As expected, for the monopoly case the ﬁrst entrant locates at
the center, in a duopoly with comparatively high ﬁxed costs both ﬁrms maximal-
ly diﬀerentiate. However, if ﬁxed costs are further reduced the two players apply a
deterrence strategy and move inwards. The outcome then is a symmetric location
pattern, and a continuum of unique possible equilibrium locations dependent on the
level of ﬁxed costs obtains with the extreme location pair given at 0.31 and 0.69. (cf.
Neven (1987), table 2, p. 429) Similarly for three players, the market conﬁguration
starts with the unconstrained case for a deﬁned interval of ﬁxed costs.42 As ﬁxed
costs further decrease deterrence strategies are devised and equilibrium locations re-
sult contingent on F . Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst ﬁrm locates close to the center and the
second and third entrant choose an entry deterring position on each of its sides. For
decreasing F the location pattern becomes more symmetric with the extreme case of
ﬁrm 1 at 12 and the other players locating symmetrically at a position slightly below
41The second and third ﬁrm would locate at 1
8
and 7
8
respectively.
42Conﬁrm that the locations in table 1 (Neven (1987), p. 425) and table 2 for 0.0245 < F < 0.0255
(Neven (1987), p. 429) are the same.
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the quartiles indicating an advantage for the ﬁrst entrant. For four ﬁrms it is ﬁrstly
observed that, in contrast to the previous cases, the unconstrained equilibrium can
not be supported, and secondly, later entrants bear the cost of entry prevention. For
a comparatively higher level of ﬁxed cost (e.g. F = 0.007) the ﬁrst entrant locates
close to the center, and for low F (e.g. F = 0.004)) locations close to the city edges
are more proﬁtable for the early entrants. Additionally, the location pattern is sym-
metric for the boundary case such that a new ﬁrm is indiﬀerent in which market slot
to enter.
Economides et al. (2004) provide further details and consolidate Neven's ﬁndings.
For a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms the location equilibrium conﬁgurations for n = 1, 2, 3 are
conﬁrmed. Furthermore, the principle that the proﬁts decrease with the consecutive
order of entry, in particular, that the ﬁrst mover locates centrally and gets the highest
proﬁts is supported. In contrast to Neven, however, in the case of n = 4 the results
of Economides et al. (2004) suggest the second entrant locating not centrally but
between the ﬁrst ﬁrm and the left corner of the city (cf. Economides et al. (2004),
table 3, p. 9 and Fig. 1, p. 7).43
In addition, as regards the entry deterring game a couple of diﬀering points to Neven's
study deserve attention. Firstly, Neven (1987) claims that in a duopoly both ﬁrms
simultaneously move towards the center as ﬁxed costs decrease leading to a sym-
metric pattern.44 By contrast, Economides et al. (2004) show that initially only the
ﬁrst ﬁrm actively prohibits entry by moving inward. Clearly, then an asymmetric
location equilibrium over the ﬁxed cost range results. (cf. Economides et al. (2004),
p. 13 and Fig. 2, p. 14) Moreover, this ﬁnding is also conﬁrmed by Goetz (2005) (cf.
Goetz (2005), p. 253 and Fig. 1, p. 252).45 The second point pertains to the case
where n = 3. Neven (1987) emphasizes that deterrence costs are mostly borne by
the second and third entrants with an equilibrium for the boundary of a forth ﬁrm
to enter at (0.255, 0.5, 0.745).46 On the contrary, the results of Economides et al.
(2004) yield an evenly spaced out boundary equilibrium (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (cf. Econo-
43Indeed the unconstrained case with the predeﬁned number of four entrants in Economides et al.
(2004) seems to resemble the outcome of the free entry game in Neven (1987) for F = 0.007 (cf.
Neven (1987), paragraph (vi), p. 430 and table 2, p. 429).
44[...] the duopolists will deter entry of a third ﬁrm. They will both move inside, to an extent such
that the second ﬁrm will have to choose symmetric location to deter entry. This is a situation in
which the burden of entry deterrence is shared equally between two ﬁrms. (Neven (1987), p. 429)
45Note also that in Goetz (2005) the proﬁts of the ﬁrst entrant increase as he takes on the task of
entry deterrence and increases his location. This marks an important distinction of his model
where equilibrium locations are calculated for changes in market size. Technically, his demand
function is supplemented by the total population in the market denoted with N , formally:
Di = max(0, N(minR −maxL)). (cf. Goetz (2005), p. 251) Thus, a variation in entry costs is
modeled by changes in N keeping ﬁxed costs in the proﬁt function constant, e.g. for increasing
N entry costs fall. By contrast, in Economides et al. (2004) and Neven (1987) ﬁxed costs are
variable.
46It is noticeable that [...] the burden of entry deterrence is mostly carried by the second and third
ﬁrms which are being constrained. (Neven (1987), p. 430) The numbers are from table 2 on
p. 429.
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mides et al. (2004), table 6, p. 21). Again, Goetz (2005) provides similar results. (cf.
Goetz (2005), paragraph x, p. 257) Furthermore, Economides et al. (2004) stress the
fact that when comparing proﬁt losses due to entry deterrence with the scenario of
a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms the ﬁrst entrant bears the highest costs of the prohibitive
action. Therefore, no clear sign of an advantage for the ﬁrst ﬁrm in the deterrence
game if n = 3 is recognizable. Thirdly, for the case of four active ﬁrms as for the
triopoly Neven (1987) suggests that the ﬁrst entrant unambiguously beneﬁts from
the entry deterring eﬀorts of the later entrants.47 The results of Economides et al.
(2004) are in striking contradiction to this prediction of a ﬁrst-mover advantage since
they ﬁnd that in certain ranges of ﬁxed costs the order of proﬁts does not correspond
to the order of entry anymore (as in the unconstrained case). Particularly, regions
are observed where proﬁts of the second entrant are larger than of the ﬁrst mover,
and even proﬁts of the third ﬁrm increase those of the ﬁrst ﬁrm which leads them
to conclude that late entry in a free entry game is proﬁtable. (cf. Economides et al.
(2004), p. 22 and Fig. 16, p. 23)
Goetz (2005) picks up the notion of advantages for late movers under free entry and
focuses on the case of n = 3. He ﬁnds a third-mover advantage where proﬁts of the
third entrant exceed those of the second in a deﬁned ﬁxed cost range. Consider the
following explanation. As the ﬁrst ﬁrm takes the burden of entry deterrence it moves
to the center. However, this implies that the advantage of the second ﬁrm against
the third diminishes since, for a given location of the ﬁrst ﬁrm, when taking his turn
the second ﬁrm can always choose the 'better' side. Only when the ﬁrst ﬁrm locates
in a small interval around 12 this strategic advantage vanishes which in turn gives
a beneﬁt to the third entrant.48 Subsequently, the second ﬁrm bounces back when
it starts to locate more centrally participating with the ﬁrst ﬁrm in entry deterring
actions which kicks oﬀ at the particular value of the market size for equilibrium loca-
tions of the simultaneous game at (18 ,
1
2 ,
7
8). (cf. Goetz (2005), paragraphs vi and vii,
p. 255f) Eventually, the entry deterring behavior of the ﬁrst and second ﬁrm leads to
a discontinuity in the equilibrium locations for increasing market sizes (decreasing
ﬁxed costs) since it becomes proﬁtable for the ﬁrst ﬁrm to switch from the center to a
more remote position. However, note that the proﬁt function of the ﬁrst ﬁrm remains
continuous. (cf. Goetz (2005), Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, p. 256 and paragraph ix, p. 257) This
ﬁnding is in contrast to the predictions given in Economides et al. (2004).
Now, what is to conclude from these studies of market entry dynamics with regards
to the PMD? In sum, the papers argue that ﬁrms' location choice implies the strate-
gic element of entry deterrence. It is illustrated that as market conditions become
47As observed in the case of three ﬁrms, the ﬁrst entrant is able to use the entry deterring behavior
of further entrants to its own advantage. (Neven (1987), p. 431)
48Note that Economides et al. (2004) already provided an analogous result but did not give a
thorough explanation. (cf. Economides et al. (2004), p. 18f and the ﬁxed cost range [0.020, 0.022]
in Fig. 10, p. 19)
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more competitive, that is under decreasing levels of ﬁxed costs (and increasing mar-
ket size), ﬁrms move together and bear the cost of entry prevention. Consequently,
ﬁxed costs (and market size) and consecutive strategic decisions imply an attract-
ing potential for ﬁrms' location even under quadratic transportation costs (which
otherwise are an indicator of repellent forces for equilibrium locations). Generally,
location conﬁgurations and thus the tendency to locate at the center are dependent
on the level of entry costs revealing symmetrical and asymmetrical equilibria. In
particular, examples are provided for boundary solutions with symmetric location
patterns49 which speciﬁes previous ﬁndings of Hay (1976) and Prescott & Visscher
(1977). Moreover, the sharing of the cost of entry prevention depends on the market
structure, but predictions in the studies diﬀer. The state of the ﬁeld suggests that in
deﬁned parameter ranges late entry in free entry games can be beneﬁcial for markets
with three and four ﬁrms.
A way to circumvent the problem of the existence of Nash price equilibria and perfect
subgame location equilibria in the Hotelling model is to apply a Stackelberg leader-
follower structure in the price and location subgame. This approach is analyzed in
Anderson (1987) for a duopoly where in the ﬁrst stage one ﬁrm is the leader and the
other the follower in choosing the location, and in the second stage a price leader-
follower game is played. Subsequently, the goal of the paper is to determine the
order of ﬁrms' actions, speciﬁcally, to endogenize the pricing decisions (since the
assumption is that one ﬁrm will always be the ﬁrst to locate in the market).
The setting is the linear city with linear transportation costs and the game is solved
by backward induction. Thus, initially and w.l.o.g., the price reaction function for
player A is derived, that is ﬁrm B is to be taken as the price leader. The price
reaction covers the possibility to undercut B if he sets a price pB > pB, react to
an undercutting of B who charges pB < p˜B by an adaptive price just to stay in the
market, and set the proﬁt-maximizing price if pB ∈ [p˜B, pB]. The set of A's pricing
responses is dependent on the location pair (a, b). (cf. Anderson (1987), proposition 1,
p. 373f)50 Subsequently, ﬁrm B's leadership prices as a function of a and b are derived.
(cf. Anderson (1987), proposition 2, p. 379ﬀ) If the competitors are located fairly
close, i.e. for 1 − a ≤ √b, B's best decision is to set the price pˆB for which A is
indiﬀerent between undercutting and playing defensively. For greater distances B
has three proﬁt-maximizing pricing strategies which all lead to A optimizing the
49Neven (1987), table 2, p. 429: (n = 2, F = 0.0255), (n = 3, F = 0.009) and (n = 4, F = 0.004).
Economides et al. (2004), table 5−7, pp. 17, 21 and 25: (n = 2, F = 0.025857), (n = 3, F = 0.009)
and (n = 4, F = 0.00435). Goetz (2005), pp. 254 and 257: (n = 2, F = 0.0258(N = 967.6)) and
(n = 3, F = 0.00892(N = 2804.0)).
50As ﬁrms get relatively close, the region of proﬁt maximization M collapses and the price reaction
is solely characterized by a discontinuous behavior. (cf. Anderson (1987), ﬁgures on p. 376f)
Technically, the price intersections of the proﬁt functions corresponding to the three diﬀerent
strategies are evaluated. The location regions for the applicability of the strategies follow from
the order of the price intersections. (cf. ibid, paragraph (d) in proof of proposition 1 on p. 391f)
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quadratic part of his proﬁts over the price. For B these are the corner solutions p˜B
and pB as well as the price where the quadratic part of his proﬁts is maximized.
51
Based on the solution for ﬁrms' optimal price setting behavior with B as the price
leader and A as the price follower their location reaction functions are determined.52
The distinct feature is that if both players locate very close at one of the city edges
(either for b ≤ 12(45 − 7
√
41) ≈ 0.089 and b ≥ 12(7
√
41 − 43) ≈ 0.911) then ﬁrm
A's repellent move is deﬁned by the reaction function a(b) = 1 − √b and a(b) =√
1− b respectively. However, for any other b, a continuum of favorable locations
for A obtains, that is his location reaction function consists of a set of diﬀerent
combinations (a∗, b) yielding the same proﬁts.53 For ﬁrmB a deﬁned location reaction
function obtains dependent on which side of 12 his rival locates. Considering ﬁrm A's
proﬁts along B's location reaction function yields the highest value for a = 12 , that
is given B's location reaction ﬁrm A has the incentive to locate at the center. (cf.
Anderson (1987), p. 397) Now, two scenarios are compared.
1. Firstly, ﬁrm A is the location leader, ﬁrm B the follower. The price leadership
retains with B. Clearly, A then picks the center and B locates according to his
reaction function for a = 12 at the equilibrium location b
∗ = 0.131 and 0.869
respectively. Since A is the price follower he sets a lower price than B to expand
his market area whereas B charges a higher price to maximize his proﬁts. In
sum, this yields the highest proﬁts for A as the location leader, given the
structure of the Stackelberg pricing game. (cf. Anderson (1987), proposition 5,
p. 384f)
2. Secondly, ﬁrm B is the location leader and A the follower. The price leader-
ship retains with B. Since B is the location and price leader he takes a remote
position according to his location reaction function allowing him to charge a
high price. To derive the highest possible proﬁts for B it is assumed that a = 0
since the set of indiﬀerent locations for A also allows for other less proﬁtable
outcomes. In sum, this yields the highest proﬁts for B as the location lead-
51For an illustration see ﬁgure 8 (Anderson (1987), p. 382). If both players are located close to the
city edges, B wants to expand his market area with the the lowest possible price p˜B such that
A remains accommodating (region 2b). If B locates more centrally and comes not too close,
a high price strategy is the best reply where pB represents the highest price such that A has
no incentive to undercut. (region 2a) For distant locations of B and A locating centrally the
proﬁt-maximizing price is the best choice (region 2c).
52For ﬁrm A the algebraic conversions involve for every of the four cases (pˆB , p˜B , pB) as well as B's
proﬁt-maximizing price the evaluation of the reduced form price reactions, i.e., insert pB into
the corresponding price reaction of A. Subsequently, the resulting pA is inserted into A's proﬁt
function and the corresponding market demand is calculated. Finally, proﬁts are diﬀerentiated
by a. (cf. Anderson (1987), proof of proposition 3, pp. 392-394) Analogously, prices and demand
for ﬁrm B are derived for every of the four strategies and the partial derivative of his proﬁt
function by b is evaluated. (cf. Anderson (1987), proof of proposition 4, pp. 395-397)
53This is due to A's proﬁt function evaluated at pB which results as Π
∗(pA(pB), pB) = 2t(1−
√
b)2
and is thus independent of a. (cf. Anderson (1987), p. 392f)
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er, given the structure of the Stackelberg pricing game. (cf. Anderson (1987),
proposition 6, p. 385f)
The ﬁnal argument of the paper is concerned with the price leadership decision (and
not with the location leadership decision). It is to prove that the ﬁrst scenario yields
an equilibrium, that is to show that price followership by the early entrant (ﬁrm
A) is supported by the later entrant (ﬁrm B). Therefore consider that the diﬀerence
between the location leaders in the two scenarios is their role in the Stackelberg game
in prices. A comparison of respective proﬁts yields the price follower in an advan-
tageous position. This means that ﬁrm A prefers to be the price follower. But does
ﬁrm B act accordingly? Indeed, this is the case since for ﬁrm A locating at 12 , that
is for given locations in the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm B earns higher proﬁts as a price leader
than as a price follower.54 (cf. Anderson (1987), proof of proposition 7, p. 387)
To conclude, in terms of the PMD the study of Anderson (1987) oﬀers a new per-
spective where in the cause of a sequential price setting game an equilibrium is found
with the ﬁrst entrant locating at the city center and taking the role of the price fol-
lower. The location reaction of the second ﬁrm, however, suggests to locate distantly
(b∗ = 0.131 and 0.869) such that repelling forces in the location strategy dominate.
Furthermore, the second entrant's dominant pricing strategy then is to take the po-
sition of the leader. Two aspects characterize the equilibrium outcome. Firstly, the
sequential order in choosing price and location leads to a strategic advantage for the
ﬁrst ﬁrm exempliﬁed by the taking of the central position and higher proﬁts and
lower prices. Secondly, the threat of being undercut leads the second player to take
a secure market position with comparatively lower proﬁts and a lower market size
but charging higher prices than the incumbent ﬁrm.
More recently, Fleckinger & Lafay (2010) study a two stage game in the Hotellling
model where in contrast to the previously presented papers the assumption of irrevo-
cable product choices is relaxed. Instead, they introduce catalog competition, that is
they examine equilibrium states in a duopoly where each ﬁrm decides for the product
position (location) and price in one stage of the game. Consequently, the structure
is such that in the ﬁrst stage ﬁrm A (leader) chooses its strategic variables, and in
the second stage ﬁrm B (follower) decides on his.
In their model the usual assumptions apply.55 To recap, one consumer's problem
located at x is to minimize his disutility (p+C(x−a), q+C(b−x)) where C shall be
convex, monotonically increasing and diﬀerentiable. Thus, the indiﬀerent consumer
54Proﬁts for B as a leader in the ﬁrst scenario are 0.428t, proﬁts as a follower are derived using the
follower proﬁt function considering the optimal price-follower location, i.e. ﬁrm A's proﬁts for
b = 1
2
which yields 0.172t.
55These are: unit interval (x ∈ [0, 1]), even consumer distribution f(x), zero production costs,
suﬃcient reservation price. Note that locations a, and b are measured by their distance from
zero.
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between the two ﬁrms at position y shall be characterized by p+C(a−y) = q+C(b−y).
The set (p, q) denotes the product prices and (a, b) the locations where the pair (p, a)
denotes the calls of the leader and (q, b) those of the follower. The consecutive ﬁnd-
ings essentially rest upon two propositions. Firstly, it is proved that the follower
always gains (weakly) higher proﬁts than the leader.56 This conﬁrms the intuition
that the follower has two proﬁt-maximizing choices, he could either undercut and
kick the leader out of the market, or he could accommodate the leader. In the case of
accommodation, it is secondly proved that the follower locates at the position of the
indiﬀerent consumer b = y and that he charges a strictly higher price than the leader
along consumers' disutility function, i.e., q = p+C(b−a) > p.57 In what follows, these
results are applied to the Hotelling model, i.e., set C(x) = t|x|. Then, accommoda-
tion yields proﬁts of ΠAccB = q(1− b) = (p+ t(b−a))(1− b). Evaluating ∂ΠB∂b = 0 and
using q = p+ t(b−a) yields the optimum pair (b∗ = 12(1 +a− pt ), q∗ = t2(1−a+ pt )).
Undercutting proﬁts are ΠUCB = p. Proﬁts for ﬁrm A in the accommodation case
are ΠAccA = pb
∗ which shall be maximized subject to ΠAccB ≥ ΠUCB . Evaluating this
constraint yields a∗ = 1 + pt − 2
√
p
t . Subsequently,
∂ΠAccA (a
∗)
∂p = 0 leads to p
∗ = 49 t. In
sum, for a ≤ 12 the catalog solutions (a∗, p∗, b∗, q∗) = (19 , 49 t, 13 , 23 t) obtain. (cf. propo-
sition 4, p.64) Walking through the same principles for quadratic transportation
costs C(x) = tx2 the equilibrium is found for the set (a∗, p∗, b∗, q∗) = (0, 14 t,
1
2 ,
1
2 t).
(cf. Fleckinger & Lafay (2010), proof of proposition 5, p. 68)
In conclusion, due to set up and the particular timing structure of choosing a cat-
alog for the strategic variables price and location, Fleckinger & Lafay (2010) derive
diﬀerent results for the Hotelling model with linear transportation costs compared
to Anderson (1987). In terms of the location it is revealing that ﬁrms share a com-
paratively shorter distance on one side of the market (a = 19 , b =
1
3 for a ≤ 12) under
catalog competition. It is then the leader's strategy to choose a remote location with
a low price while the follower beneﬁting from the potential undercutting threat can
decide on a more centralized location and charges a higher price. This emphasizes
that players have to commit themselves diﬀerently under diﬀerent circumstances
which may turn out for their advantage or disadvantage. In Anderson (1987) the
ﬁrst entrant commits himself by his location and draws an advantage from the irre-
56The indirect proof initially assumes that ΠB < ΠA with corresponding equilibrium pairs (a
∗, p∗)
and (b∗, q∗). Since ﬁrm B is free to undercut A with p∗ −  this leads to a contradiction. Thus,
ΠB ≥ ΠA. (cf. Fleckinger & Lafay (2010), proof of Proposition 2, p. 67)
57By symmetry assume a ≤ 1
2
. If ﬁrm B accommodates, he does not undercut, thus q > p for
b ≥ a. Since q > p ﬁrm B exploits the consumers to its right market side. Thus, the goal is to
minimize y. Applying ∂
∂b
to the indiﬀerence condition yields: ∂C(y−a)
∂b
= ∂C(b−y)
∂b
→ C′(y−a)y′ =
C′(b− y)(1− y′) or (C′(y − a) + C′(b− y))y′ = C′(b− y). Two cases have to be diﬀerentiated.
Firstly, y ≤ b which leads to y′ > 0 and a decrease in b causes y to decrease. Then ﬁrm B
seeks to minimize b. Secondly, y ≥ b implying y′ < 0 and an increase in b leads to a decrease
in y. Then ﬁrm B seeks to maximize b. The optimum is, of course, to locate at b = y. The
proﬁt-maximizing price follows directly from the indiﬀerence condition under consideration of
the best location choice: q = p + C(b − a). (cf. Fleckinger & Lafay (2010), proof of lemma 1,
p. 67)
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vocability of this choice by becoming the price follower. By contrast, in Fleckinger
& Lafay (2010) the commitment of the leader to set the strategic catalog leads to a
disadvantage. It is interesting to see that the nature of the product and the market
characteristics is the source for this asymmetry.58 Market peculiarities that imply
the requirement to chose the location (product position) and price simultaneously
give the second entrant the credible power of an attrition strategy. As the follower
he can wait for the leader to post his price before he chooses his position (and price).
However, if the circumstances are binding only for the location and allow for ﬂexi-
bility in the pricing decision, then the ﬁrst mover is far better oﬀ. As the presented
models convincingly demonstrated, this instance has profound consequences for ﬁrms
equilibrium locations and their respective distance.
Departing from the study of Economides (1984) the paper of Hinloopen & van Mar-
rewijk (1999) investigates the impact of a variation of consumers' reservation price
in a two stage sequential Hotelling game where location and price are each simulta-
neously chosen in one stage. Hinloopen & van Marrewijk (1999) re-examine previous
results on sellers' tendency to disperse in the market and develop a general frame-
work to analyze the eﬀect of the reservation price on Nash equilibrium prices and
equilibrium locations.
The common model structure of a Hotelling duopoly under linear transportation
costs is used with locations of ﬁrm A and B taken from the respective edges of the
interval [0, l] and denoted as ha and hb. Throughout it is assumed that ﬁrms locate
symmetrically, i.e. ha = hb. The reservation price is variable but shall be the same
for all consumers in the market denoted as v. As a distinct model parameter α is
introduced. (cf. Hinloopen & van Marrewijk (1999), p. 737) α measures the market
size relative to the eﬀective reservation price vt with t deﬁned as the transportation
cost for traveling one unit distance. Thus, total market length can be expressed as
l = αvt . Keeping l constant, it is obvious that a high value of α corresponds to a low
value of v and vice verser. Subsequently, the task is set to ﬁnd equilibrium sets for
the price-location pair for the range of intermediate reservation prices 87 < α < 2
since the case of high reservation prices α < 87 is covered in Hotelling (1929)
59 and
the case of low reservation prices α > 2 is dealt with in Economides (1984)60.
The subsequent analysis is separated into two parts that consider comparatively low
58Fleckinger & Lafay (2010) provide some examples for ﬂexible catalogs. See their discussion section
on p. 65f.
59For the primary reference to check for this dependency see Hinloopen & van Marrewijk (1999),
p. 738 and their reference section.
60Recall that in Economides (1984) the market equilibrium for the duopoly is determined by two
local monopolists whose market areas do not intersect and who both completely serve their local
markets implying that a fraction of consumers (between the boundary and the city edge) are not
served. Thus for given l, the market size of the local monopoly is determined by the reservation
price v
t
= l
α
(which essentially accounts for the indiﬀerent consumer at the boundary). Since
the city shall allow both monopolies to thrive this implies 2 v
t
< l or α > 2.
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reservation prices (43 < α < 2, cf. Hinloopen & van Marrewijk (1999), pp. 738-742)
and high reservation prices (87 < α <
4
3 , cf. ibid., pp. 742-747).
• Part 1: Two cases have to be distinguished, ﬁrms locating below the quartiles
ha = hb <
l
4 and between the center and the quartiles. For hi <
l
4(i = a, b) two
local monopolies exist. Now, a ﬁrm could set a price such that the consumer
at the city edge has a positive net utility of purchasing which is equivalent to
his reservation price exceeding the total cost of buying (price plus transporta-
tion cost). Then demand comprises of hi plus the area extending to the most
distant consumer located at x = 1t (v − pi) who is indiﬀerent between buying
or not. Alternatively, a ﬁrm could charge a price such that the indiﬀerent con-
sumer sits at the city edge. Clearly, demand then extends the area twice of
the ﬁrm's distance to the edge, i.e., 2hi. Based on this demand function the
proﬁt functions are set up, using ∂Πipi = 0 equilibrium prices p
∗
i and equilibri-
um proﬁts Π∗i = Π(p
∗
i ) are derived. From
∂Π∗i
∂hi
> 0 it follows that sellers are
inclined to move towards the quartiles (if they are located at hi <
l
4).
61 For
l
4 < hi <
l
2 demand and proﬁts correspond to Economides (1984), p. 355. How-
ever, since now a comparatively higher v is considered (that is for α < 2) two
supplementary remarks concerning the derivation of Nash price equilibria and
respective price bounds are made.62 (cf. Hinloopen & van Marrewijk (1999),
p. 741) Nevertheless, these do not modify the prediction on sellers tendency to
61The ﬁrst demand-subcase yields Πi = pi(hi +
v−pi
t
), setting the ﬁrst derivative zero gives p∗i =
1
2
(v + thi). To be consistent recall that p
∗
i < v − thi (also charging the Nash price gives the
consumer at the city edge a positive net utility) which is equivalent to hi <
v
3t
, and for v
3t
< l
4
we get 4
3
< α. To prove sellers' relocation tendency, see that
∂Πi(p
∗
i )
∂hi
= 1
2
(v + thi) > 0 and
h∗i = − vt leading to Π∗i = −
(p∗i )
2
t
. In the second demand-subcase x = hi, thus p
∗
i = v− thi, and
Π∗ = 2hi(v − thi), and ∂Π∗∂hi = 2v − 4thi. Clearly, the maximum is h
∗
i =
1
2
v
t
. The market area
must suﬃce 2hi <
l
2
, and ∂Π
∗
∂hi
> 0 requires h∗i >
l
4
which is equal to α < 2.
62The ﬁrst remark speciﬁes the range of α where the model of Economides (1984) can be applied
without restrictions which is for α exceeding an approximate value of 1.884. (cf. Hinloopen & van
Marrewijk (1999), equation (A.4), p. 750) This threshold indicates that by undercutting one's
rival the complete market can be served, that is the indiﬀerent consumers with their reservation
price leveling total buying costs on both sides of the mill are served. For instance, for higher
v (and lower α) the indiﬀerent consumer to the left of ﬁrm A (locating ha from zero) falls out
of the city and would be located in the negative range. (cf. ibid, Fig. 3b, p. 740) The critical
condition for all to remain in the market is given by hi <
1
t
(v − pUCi ). Thus, for α < 1.884
the validity range for the price equilibria have to be adapted (see ibid., equations (6b) and
(6c), p. 742). The second remark states that the 'touching' Nash price equilbrium of Economides
(1984) on p. 357f does not necessarily exist. The existence is subject to a value of α > 12
7
. As
ﬁrms move away from the center (i.e. equilibrium locations decrease) Nash prices increase. A
touching equilibrium will not exist if, starting from the competitive Nash price equilibrium pca,
a price (smaller than the Nash price of the 'touching' equilibrium pta) is reached such that the
indiﬀerent consumer at the city edge is served (this price is found in the 'competitive equilibrium
with full supply', cf. Hinloopen & van Marrewijk (1999), Fig. 4, p. 741). This happens to be the
case for comparatively high values of v (horizontal line for v is shifted upwards). By contrast,
the touching equilibrium is reached if the price for a competitive equilibrium in full supply lies
below pca which occurs for comparatively smaller values of v.
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move outwards if they are located at hi >
l
4 . Bringing these results together
for 43 < α < 2 the equilibrium location results with h
∗
i =
l
4 .
63
• Part 2: Again the two cases hi ≤ l4 and l4 < hi < l2 have to be analyzed.
If locations are below the quartiles, already a competitive situation arises.
The economic interpretation is that as v increases (and α decreases) more
consumers are inclined to purchase which leads both rivals - even though they
are located comparatively far apart - to compete for the indiﬀerent consumer
at the market center at 12 .
64 It is clear that then p∗i =
1
2(v+ thi) (the consumer
at x = 0 enjoys a net utility surplus), and that the market area comprises
l ≤ [ha + v−pat ] + [hb + v−pbt ].65 Further, proﬁts are Π∗i = p∗i l2 , and from part 1
follows
∂Π∗i
∂hi
> 0 which implies both ﬁrms locating towards the quartiles (if they
are located at hi <
l
4). Next consider locations above the quartiles and the case
of market competition. Then, no net utility surplus obtains, thus p∗i = v− thi,
and Π∗i = p
∗
i (
l
2 + (hi−hj)).66 Subsequently for symmetrical locations,
∂Π∗i
∂hi
= 0
yields h∗i =
v
t − l2 = l( 1α − 12). Then, h∗i ≥ l4 reduces to α ≤ 43 which illustrates
that under price competition ﬁrms will locate within the market quartiles if
4
3 ≥ α ≥ 87 .67 Clearly, for higher v (and lower α) both ﬁrms locate towards the
center with the closest locations for α = 87 at hi =
3
8 l and hj =
5
8 l which equals
a minimum distance of one quarter of the city length.
In conclusion, Hinloopen & van Marrewijk (1999) provide evidence that ﬁrms in a
Hotelling duopoly have the tendency to agglomerate at the city center. However for
the assumption of symmetrical locations, they emphasize that ﬁrms' optimal location
decisions are crucially dependent on the level of consumers reservation price. In
particular, they specify the corresponding bounds for which the Nash price-location
equilibrium to solve the underlying two stage simultaneous game exists such that
every consumer in the market is served. Accordingly, the closest ﬁrms could get is a
quarter of the market length. Furthermore, in their model the economic intuition is
63Then the equilibrium price is given by the corner solution p∗i (h
∗
i ) = v − thi = v(1 − 14α). (cf.
Hinloopen & van Marrewijk (1999), lemma 1, p. 742)
64Recall that if v is low in the limiting case α > 2 ﬁrms only serve the customers in their local
monopoly region and some consumers close to the edges are not served at all which is originally
dealt with in Economides (1984). Also recall from part 1 in the ﬁrst bullet above that for
intermediate values 4
3
< α < 2 no competition for hi <
1
4
occurs.
65Consequently, inserting proﬁt-maximizing prices yields 2l− 2 v
t
≤ ha +hb, and for ha, hb ≤ 14 this
reduces to ha + hb ≤ l2 . Consistency demands 2(l − vt ) ≤ l2 or α ≤ 43 .
66Proﬁts are described in a general form to show the location reaction function hi(hj). Demand
equals l
2
plus an additional term if ﬁrms would locate asymmetrically. (cf. Hinloopen & van
Marrewijk (1999), p. 745)
67The lower bound is derived by ruling out the possibility of undercutting one's rival. The undercut-
ting price demands to take the whole middle market, thus pUCi = p
∗
j −t(l−hi−hj) = v−tl+thi.
Undercutting gives total demand of l and is discarded if ΠUCi ≤ Π∗i which reduces to
l( v
2t
− l) ≤ v
t
(hi − hj) − h2i + hihj − 32 lhi, and for symmetrical locations to hi ≤ − v3t + 23 l.
Combining h∗i with the undercutting threshold gives
v
t
− l
2
≤ 2
3
l − v
3t
or 8
7
≤ α.
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conﬁrmed, suggested by Hotelling and continuously revised by subsequent studies,
that it is then proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to move towards the market centre in order to
strive for a larger market share, but never so much that undercutting will be proﬁtable.
But the closer ﬁrms locate (or, the more homogeneous the products are), the ﬁercer
competition will be, and hence, the lower the price the ﬁrms can quote. (Hinloopen
& van Marrewijk (1999), p. 747)
Recent work on the application of the Hotelling model analyzes the eﬀects of entry
regulation measures on price and location equilbria as well as on consumer surplus.
Elizalde et al. (2015) motivate their work empirically by government action in the
Spanish province of Navarra where between 2001 and 2007 restrictive and relaxing
measures regulating the number of pharmacies have been enacted. For the authors
this raised the question whether the regulatory decisions have been eﬃcient in terms
of social welfare. In particular, two ways of regulation, ﬁrstly, concessions on the
number of licenses, and secondly, minimum distance rules between ﬁrms' locations
have been investigated in a Hotelling duopoly with quadratic transportation costs
and under a variation of the reservation price k.
For the ﬁrst policy measure of conceding licenses a simultaneous choice of locations
and a sequential entry game are studied (prices are assumed to be always chosen
simultaneously after the location decision is made). The concession of licenses refers
to a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms constituting the market conﬁguration, thus the results of
Elizalde et al. (2015) have to be assessed in the context of the models of Economides
(1984) and Hinloopen & van Marrewijk (1999) for the simultaneous location game,
and Neven (1987), Economides et al. (2004) and Goetz (2005) in case of sequential
entry. Now, the ﬁndings of Elizalde et al. (2015) for a duopoly under simultaneous
entry reveal that the transportation cost scheme (linear or quadratic) does not make
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of ﬁrms' equilibrium locations in the range of low
reservation prices. (cf. Elizalde et al. (2015), p. 20f) Particularly, the results show
that according to d'Aspremont et al. (1979) for suﬃciently high reservation prices
maximum diﬀerentiation obtains. As k decreases the demand eﬀect dominantes the
price eﬀect and ﬁrms move towards the center. For further decreasing k ﬁrms remain
at the quartiles. For very low k no pure location equilibrium obtains. In a duopoly
under sequential entry the same pattern as under simultaneous entry is observed.
Concerning the second policy measure, the impact of a variation in the minimum
distance d in the range [14 ,
1
2 ] at diﬀerent levels of reservation prices k is evaluated
in a sequential location subgame. For high k and over a comparatively high range
of k an asymmetric location equilibrium is observed. For d = 12 both ﬁrms locate at
the city edges, as d decreases ﬁrm 1 moves towards the center while ﬁrm 2 remains
at its remote position. At a value of d = 13 the location pattern reverses and ﬁrm 2
turns to the center while ﬁrm 1 locates towards the city boundary. Due to the more
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central position ﬁrm 1 gains higher demand and charges higher prices, thus taking
away a higher proﬁt than ﬁrm 2. Furthermore, the characteristic feature is an entry
deterring behavior, that is ﬁrms' distance is kept at 2d and their distance to the
city boundaries does not exceed d. (cf. Elizalde et al. (2015), p. 22f) For low k no
ﬁrst mover advantage pervails and ﬁrms choose the quartiles, as k further decreases
the whole market can not be served. In terms of social welfare, consumer surplus is
higher under the minimum distance rule provided that k is high (and that demand
is inelastic), for low k no respective signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two policy
measures is observed.
In a nutshell, the paper of Elizalde et al. (2015) contributes to previous work concern-
ing equilbrium location patterns by emphasizing the impact of regulatory measures
such as a minimum distance rules. It is revealing that under consideration of quadrat-
ic transportation costs a decrease in the minimum distance measure spurs the ﬁrst
entrant to locate towards the center leading to an asymmetric location equilibrium.
Furthermore, a decrease in the reservation price increasingly levels the ﬁrst mover
advantage. In sum, these ﬁndings complement the results of the previously presented
location models (e.g. Hinloopen & van Marrewijk (1999), Economides et al. (2004)).
To summarize this section, the general conclusion can be drawn that Hotelling's
original proposal that sellers tend to agglomerate at the market center which is re-
ferred to as a principle of minimum diﬀerentiation (PMD) can not be unilaterally
supported for pure Nash price equilibria. Notably, it has been shown that this con-
clusion depends on particular parameter assumptions. For instance, for quadratic
transportation costs pure Nash price equilibria emerge and subsequently location
equilibria for diﬀerent oligopoly settings can be analyzed. Furthermore, the level of
consumers' reservation price proved to be an important determinant for equilibrium
location patterns in a duopoly with ﬁrms locating closer the higher the reservation
price, i.e. the more inelastic demand in the market. Particularly, for oligopolistic mar-
ket with more players (n ≥ 3) no perfect equilibrium in a simultaneous two-stage
price-location game exists which is due to ﬁrms' inclination to move away from the
city edges. In addition, the literature suggests that the type of the underlying game
impacts the equilibrium outcome, that is whether simultaneous and sequential entry
under ﬁxed cost is considered, or a Stackelberg setting is imposed on the strategic
variable decision, or that the revocability of the product choice and the ﬂexibility
of the pricing strategy is assumed. Finally, evidence is provided for the impact of
regulatory measures concerning ﬁrms' location choice on equilibrium results.
The limitations of this survey have already been mentioned in the introductory note.
At this stage it should be subsequently remarked that under modiﬁcations of the
Hotelling model that generalize the deterministic model structure and introduce
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probabilistic measures further conclusions concerning ﬁrms' optimal location decision
can be drawn. More speciﬁcally, in models with heterogeneous consumer preferences
and multiple product characteristics the PMD can be restored. Pioneering work has
been contributed by de Palma et al. (1985) who relax the original assumption of a
ﬁxed reservation price and conjecture that consumers have speciﬁc and varying asser-
tions about the oﬀered products about which ﬁrms are only informed on an aggregate
level. Consequently, the utility function is modeled by a probabilistic measure. This
implies that for suﬃciently large heterogeneity in consumers' preferences, modeled
by the parameter µ in the logit function, ﬁrms locate at the center in a location Nash
equilibrium. (cf. de Palma et al. (1985), proposition 1 and 2, p. 774f) In a consecutive
paper Rhee et al. (1992) extend the notion of heterogeneous consumer valuation to
unobservable product characteristics and thus model uncertainty in the buying de-
cision. They show that for suﬃcient heterogeneity minimum diﬀerentiation results.
Furthermore, Irmen & Thisse (1998) introduce multiple dimensions in which ﬁrms
diﬀerentiate and suggest that the PMD holds for all dimensions except for the par-
ticular dimension which is weighted most importantly. Additionally, in an interesting
extension for the case of multi-dimensional product diﬀerentiation in an evolutionary
model Hehenkamp & Wambach (2010) provide evidence for the restoration of the
PMD when ﬁrms play a dynamic game and optimize their strategy between oﬀering
already established products and new products.
2.3 The Eﬀect of Market Shapes
2.3.1 Models with Circles
First insights on location equilibria for markets with circular shapes are established
by Eaton & Lipsey (1975).68 The immediate implication of the circular shape is that
the market is not bounded, thus, no ﬁrms at the market periphery exist and all ﬁrms
face the equal optimization problem locating in a neighborhood with two nearest
neighbors.
As a consequence, for Eaton and Lipsey's model 1 with ZCV diﬀerent results in com-
parison with the linear city are derived. In particular, equilibrium conﬁgurations on
68For a detailed description of their four model speciﬁcations refer to chapter 2 of this survey.
Moreover note that in footnote 4 on p. 33 Eaton & Lipsey (1975) make reference to a previ-
ous discussion on location equilibrium patterns in circular markets that is concerned with the
minimization of transportation costs and the existence of a socially eﬃcient outcome. (cf. Grace
(1970) and Samuelson (1970)) At least two points are of interest in this debate and cast a shadow
on upcoming studies. Firstly, emphasis is given to the signiﬁcance of relocation costs and its im-
pact on regulatory issues and policy planning. Secondly, provided that transportation costs are
increasing in distance traveled, it is shown that regardless of the functional form an equidistant
spacing leads to an eﬃcient location outcome in terms of minimal total transportation costs (for
the proof see Samuelson (1970), p. 342).
39
Chapter 2. Centrality and Spatial Diﬀerentiation - A Literature Survey
the circle yield multiple equilibria. For instance, duopolists are not inclined to form
a pair at 12 since due to the unbounded spatial characteristic of the market for every
seller location total demand is split in halves, that is each player shares a market
boundary to his left and right and in sum sellers' distances are equally divided. As
for n = 3 a set of possible equilibrium locations for the third ﬁrm obtains on the long
side of the other two competitors' markets. (cf. Eaton & Lipsey (1975), Fig. 3, p. 32)
Generally, locations are chosen according to the principle that no ﬁrm holds a market
smaller than half of the market of any other ﬁrm (i.e. condition 1.i). In contrast to
the linear city the socially optimal conﬁguration with an equidistant spacing of ﬁrms
locating at a distance of 1n is part of the equilibrium solution set for the circle in
model 1 since no peripheral ﬁrms exist whose dominant strategy is to move inwards
and form a pair. (cf. Eaton & Lipsey (1975), p. 31f)
In model 2 (with a maximum loss conjecture) the socially optimal conﬁguration yields
the unique equilibrium for the circle since ﬁrms' dominant strategy is to maximize
the short side of their market. (cf. Eaton & Lipsey (1975), p. 32f) The only deviation
from the 1n -solution obtains for the case of a monopoly and a 'pure' duopoly (with
no anticipation of a third player entering) where in contrast to the line multiple
equilibria exist, that is ﬁrms' locations can not uniquely be determined. In addition,
models 3 and 4 with variable consumer densities under ZCV and the maximum loss
conjecture respectively do not produce diﬀerent outcomes for the circle compared to
the bounded line. (cf. Eaton & Lipsey (1975), pp. 36 and 39)
In a nutshell, the diﬀerence in market shapes between a bounded line and a circle
in the models of Eaton & Lipsey (1975) (under a simultaneous location game and
no price competition) implies that the central position at 12 on the line loses its
importance. Consequently, multiple equilibria for the circle obtain whereas in the
linear city, for instance, the duopolists locate at the center and no equilibrium for
three ﬁrms can be achieved. In addition, it becomes clear that the socially optimal
conﬁguration with 1n -spaced ﬁrms becomes more important in the treatment of cir-
cular market shapes and is, for instance, part of the solution set of model 1 under
ZCV. Furthermore, the following papers represent particular examples for the case
of equidistant location patterns in circular markets.
Pioneering work on spatial competition in a circular market is provided by Salop
(1979). His goal is to apply the mechanics of monopolistic competition to the diﬀer-
entiated product market on a circle and study the equilibrium properties under free
entry. Since two classes of products are considered and consumers either purchase
one unit of the diﬀerentiated good on the circle (according to their positive net utility
of consumption) or spend the remaining income on a homogeneous 'outside' good
the model can be considered as an extension of a monopolistic competition model a
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la Chamberlin.69
The set up follows a two stage order. In the ﬁrst stage a set of potential entrants
simultaneously chooses to enter the market, in the second stage they simultaneously
compete in prices. The important assumption is that ﬁrms' locations are exogenous-
ly given by an equidistant spacing along the circle. As a consequence, this reduces
ﬁrms to charge an uniform price p in equilibrium and lays emphasis on the equil-
librium number of ﬁrms n that can be still supported by the market under a zero
proﬁt condition. Thus, technically the goal is to ﬁnd the symmetric zero-proﬁt Nash
equilibrium. (cf. Salop (1979), p. 145)
The optimization problem of the L evenly distributed consumers per unit distance
on the circle with unit circumference is to maximize their net utility v− c|li− l∗|−pi
with v as their reservation price70, pi and li as the price and location of ﬁrm i, l
∗
as the most preferred brand speciﬁcation (the consumer's location), and c as the
constant marginal rate of transportation. Evidently, linear transportation costs are
assumed. (cf. ibid.) Subsequently, the case of a monopoly region and a competitive
region are distinguished.71 Contingent upon v a monopolist captures consumers up
to a maximal distance of xm = v−pc on its right and left side, thus gains total demand
of qm = 2Lxm. By contrast, if ﬁrms compete an indiﬀerent consumer is located at
xc = 12c(pi ± pi∓1 + cn) and total demand is qc = 2Lxc. This translates into a total
demand curve where the monopoly region exhibits a smaller slope than the compet-
itive region and a kink marks the spot where the monopoly regions of two neigh-
boring ﬁrms touch.72 (cf. Salop (1979), Fig. 1, p. 143) Now, the market equilibrium
requires the two standard conditions that, ﬁrstly, marginal revenue equals marginal
cost ∂Π∂q =
∂AC
∂q = m, and secondly, price equals average cost p = AC = m +
F
q
(with F as the level of ﬁxed costs). Further note that provided all consumers in the
market are served equidistant spacing requires q = Ln . Then, the price and number
of ﬁrms in equilibrium are determined as pm = m +
c
2nm
and nm =
√
cL
2F for the
monopoly region and pc = m +
c
nc
and nc =
√
cL
F for the competitive region.
73 (cf.
Salop (1979), p. 147) At the kink the tangent to the average cost curve is not deﬁned,
however, since the kink marks the interaction point of the monopoly regions of two
ﬁrms the monopolistic demand function qm evaluated towards the direction of one
69For an introduction into Chamberlinian models see for instance chapter 7.2 in Tirole (2003).
70Consumption of the diﬀerentiated product only occurs if v > 0 which is equivalent to the utility
from consuming the diﬀerentiated product exceeding the utility from consuming the outside
good u > s. (cf. Salop (1979), p. 142)
71The case of a 'supercompetitive' region refers to an undercutting strategy and proofs not to be
proﬁtable since the equilibrium price does suﬃciently exceed marginal cost. (cf. Salop (1979),
p. 148f)
72Limits and possibilities of equilibria at kinks in the Hotelling model (bounded [0, 1]-line) are
studied in Economides (1984) and Economides (1993).
73Π = p(q)q yields ∂Π
∂q
= p′q + p, use ∂p
∂qm
= − c
2L
and ∂p
∂qc
= − c
L
to determine the prices, and the
deﬁnition of average costs and q = L
n
to determine n.
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nearest neighbor (i.e. qm = Lxm = Ln ) can be used to express the equilibrium price
pk = v − cn . Subsequently considering p = AC, the equilibrium number of ﬁrms at
the kink follows with v − m = nk FL + cnk . (cf. Salop (1979), p. 148) These results
establish the economics of monopolistic competition for product diﬀerentiation on
the circle. Firms price above marginal cost with zero proﬁts. The mark up declines
as the number of ﬁrms rises, in terms of the exogenous variables the mark up is a
positive function of transportation costs c and ﬁxed costs F and a negative func-
tion of the market size L (number of consumers per unit distance). Corresponding
relations obtain for the equilibrium number of ﬁrms. Furthermore, Salop emphasizes
the counterintuitive equilibrium behavior at the kink solution where an increase in
average costs leads to a decrease in equilibrium prices.74 The economic argument
is given that higher costs cause proﬁts to become negative, as a result some ﬁrms
exit the market and the remaining competitors enjoy higher demand and economies
of scale leads them to charge lower prices in the subsequent equilibrium. (cf. Salop
(1979), p. 149)
The ﬁnal part of the paper is concerned with welfare implications. Firstly, it is shown
that a local monopolist provides a positive net surplus which implies that the entire
circular market should be served.75 (cf. Salop (1979), p. 150f) Secondly, the number
of ﬁrms that maximizes total market surplus is derived and found to be lower than
the equilibrium number of ﬁrms.76 (cf. Salop (1979), p. 151f)
The paper of Salop (1979) represents a classical study of monopolistic competition
in a circular market providing solutions for equilibrium prices and the equilibrium
number of ﬁrms in the case of local monopolies, market competition as well as the
boundary case of touching local monopoly markets. To keep his analysis tractable,
however, he does not endogenize ﬁrms' location choice in his model but rather im-
poses an equidistant spacing pattern.
74Graphically the AC-curve moves to the right and the kink solution slides down the monopoly
part of the demand function. (cf. Salop (1979), Fig. 8, p. 150)
75The proof proceeds in two steps. (1) The net surplus of a ﬁrm is given by the value of its
production (quantiﬁed by the product price p) subtracting respective costs (m,F ). Recall that
the diﬀerentiated product is sold to all L consumers over a distance x up to the indiﬀerent
consumer (located at x∗) whose reservation price v equals transportation costs cx and price of the
product p. The ﬁrm sells to this consumer at the lowest possible price, thus x∗ = v−m
c
. Generally,
p and thus net surplus B can be stated as a function of the distance x. Total net surplus sums up
the value of the sold products up to the critical distance where the indiﬀerent consumer is located:
B = 2L
∫ x∗
0
(p(x)−m)dx−F = 2L ∫ x∗
0
(v−cx−m)dx−F = 2Lx∗(v−m−cx∗+ 1
2
cx∗) = L
c
(v−m)2.
Then, B ≥ 0 reduces to v −m ≥
√
cF
L
. (2) Monopoly proﬁts are Πm = (p(qm) −m)qm − F =
(v− c
2L
qm −m)qm −F . Let qmaxm solve the ﬁrst order condition, then Πm(qmaxm ) ≥ 0 reduces to
v −m ≥
√
2cF
L
. Thus, Πm ≥ 0 always guarantees B ≥ 0.
76In sum n ﬁrms serve 2n local markets with the indiﬀerent consumer located at the market
boundary 1
2n
. Recall that L is the number of consumers per unit distance. Thus, accordingly to
the preceding footnote, total surplus for the whole circle is W = 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
(p(x)−m)Ldx− nF =
2n
∫ 1
2n
0
(v − cx − m)Ldx − nF . Solving the integral and evaluating ∂W
∂n
= 0 gives n∗ = 1
2
cL
F
.
Clearly, n∗ = 1
2
nc and n
∗ < nm.
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The study of Economides (1989) serves to demonstrate the existence of equilibri-
um states for prices and location choices in circular markets and vindicates Sa-
lop's assumption of an equidistant location pattern by endogenizing ﬁrms' opti-
mal location decisions. In particular, he develops a model that proceeds in three
stages. Firstly, ﬁrms choose to enter, secondly, they simultaneously take their opti-
mal location, and thirdly, given the resulting location setting they simultaneously
choose their proﬁt-maximizing prices. Consumers' utility function is taken to be
Uω = m − pj + Vω(xj) = m − pj + k − (xj − w)2 and comprises a budget endow-
ment m, a constant reservation price k as well as the disutility covering the product
price pj and the transportation cost term.
77 Transportation costs are assumed to
increase quadratically in distance traveled. Furthermore, consumers are assumed to
be distributed uniformly with density µ over the circumference and ﬁrms incur total
production costs of Cj = F + cj(qj) with an increasing marginal cost function, i.e.,
∂cj
∂qj
≥ 0. (cf. Economides (1989), p. 180f)
Now, each stage is separately analyzed following the principle of backward induction.
The starting point for the treatment of the price game are the demand functions (ex-
emplarily for ﬁrm j) for a local monopoly DMj = 2µ
√
k − pj and for the case of price
competition between nearest neighbors Dj =
pj+1−pj
2(xj+1−xj) +
pj−1−pj
2(xj−xj−1) +
xj+1−xj−1
2 .
78
Based on these the total demand curve for a ﬁrm proves to be concave leading to a
unique noncooperative equilibrium for the price subgame that depending on the level
of the reservation price k yields a solution for an equilibrium of local monopolists
(ﬁrms' markets do not overlap and not all consumers are served), a competitive equi-
librium (ﬁrms' markets overlap), and kink equilibria (ﬁrms' markets touch).79 (cf.
Economides (1989), p. 180ﬀ) The solution to the price game is denoted with p∗(x)
where vector element j stands for the equilibrium price of ﬁrm j and each p∗j is a
function of the ﬁrms locations x = (x1, ...xn). Subsequently, to solve the location
game in the second stage for each ﬁrm j the objective function Πˆj(x,p
∗(x)) has to
be maximized. It is shown that for the case of a competitive price equilibrium (suf-
ﬁciently high k) and constant marginal costs c the symmetric equidistant location
77The model structure is analogous to previous work, e.g. Economides (1984), see chapter 2 of this
survey.
78Monopoly demand accounts for the consumer who is - contingent upon his reservation price k
- indiﬀerent between buying or not, i.e. pj = Vω(xj), with the position of this consumer at
x∗j =
√
k − pj . Demand under price competition is the sum of the expressions for the location
of the consumer who has equal utility between buying at nearest competitors j and j − 1 and j
and j + 1 respectively, that is the sum of the market boundaries of ﬁrm j to its right and left
side.
79Exemplarily, the case of price competition between j and j + 1 is considered. The price bounds
between nearest neighbors lie on the monopoly curve. The graphical representation is that the
monopoly demand curve engulfs the linear demand curves for all potential competition between
neighboring ﬁrms. Thus, the total demand curve generally comprises sections of the concave
monopoly demand curve and sections of decreasing linear demand curves. In sum a concave
structure obtains. (cf. Economides (1989), Fig. 1, p. 182) In addition, the uniqueness of the
equilibrium is linked to the second derivatives of the proﬁt function. (cf. Economides (1989),
Lemma 1, p. 190)
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pattern where ﬁrms are separated by a distance d leads to equal equilibrium prices
p∗j = p = c+d
2 and further maximizes Πˆj . (cf. Economides (1989), p. 186f) Based on
the expression of the objective function Πˆj and equilibrium prices and locations equi-
librium proﬁts for each ﬁrm Π∗ = µ
n3
−F as a function of the number of ﬁrms, ﬁxed
costs and the marked size obtain. This allows the number of ﬁrms to be endogenized
by demanding Π∗(n∗) ≥ 0 and Π∗(n∗ + 1) < 0. Thus, the equilibrium number of
ﬁrms is given by the integer of the root 3
√
µ
F . (cf. Economides (1989), p. 187) Finally,
concerning welfare issues Salop's ﬁnding is vindicated that the equilibrium number
of ﬁrms n∗ under free entry exceeds the number of ﬁrms that maximizes total surplus
(cf. Economides (1989), p. 188f).
In conclusion, Economides (1989) proves that in a three stage price-location entry
game on the circle the setting of symmetrical equidistant locations with identical
prices above marginal cost is an equilibrium with the number of ﬁrms proportional
to the ratio of the market size with the level of ﬁxed production costs. In comparison
to the linear city it is striking that the use of quadratic transportation costs allows
for an equidistant pattern. However, it is noted by the author that the model is
restricted to the instance that the existence of other locational (varietal) structures
as prefect equilibria, although unlikely, cannot be ruled out. (Economides (1989),
p. 185)
Finally, in a more recent study Madden & Pezzino (2011) provide an example for a
model of product diﬀerentiation on the circle with an additional ﬁrm located at the
center of the circle and oﬀering a homogeneous product. The focus of their work are
the resulting welfare implications where a comparison with the results of the Salop
model highlights the impact of the central ﬁrm.
The model proceeds in three stages. In stage 1, a ﬁrm from a set of potential candi-
dates chooses to take the central position, in stage 2, N ﬁrms enter the market and
take equidistant positions on the circumference, and in stage 3, all ﬁrms compete si-
multaneously in prices. (cf. Madden & Pezzino (2011), p. 7) Furthermore, the model
assumes uniformly distributed consumers on the perimeter with unit length, demand
is suﬃciently inelastic so that every consumers purchases one unit of the good, the
location pattern is exogenously imposed and symmetric, transportation costs on the
perimeter are linear in distance and the coeﬃcient is set to be t = 1. Moreover,
transportation costs to purchase at the central ﬁrm are δ > 0, entry costs for the
perimeter ﬁrms are F and for the central ﬁrm G. Prices of the perimeter ﬁrms are
denoted with Pi, i = 1, ..., N and of the central ﬁrm with Pc. (cf. Madden & Pezzino
(2011), p. 4)
To derive the market equilibrium (following backward induction) demand and prof-
it functions are set up based on the position of the indiﬀerent consumer on the
perimeter. In addition, to account for the central ﬁrm the indiﬀerence condition
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Pi+z = Pc+δ is considered for a consumer at the closest location z to the perimeter
ﬁrm i. As a result, the Nash equilibrium prices are contingent upon the number of
perimeter ﬁrms N . For small N perimeter ﬁrms and the central ﬁrm have positive
Nash prices (P ∗i , P
∗
c > 0), for intermediate N the central ﬁrm charges the competitive
price (P ∗c = 0,Πc = 0) and does not gain market share, however its presence creates
competitive pressure on the prices of the perimeter ﬁrms, and ﬁnally, for large N
the central ﬁrm is outperformed (Πc = 0) and the Salop price equilibrium obtains.
(cf. Madden & Pezzino (2011), Lemma 2, p. 9) The proﬁt functions for the equilibri-
um Nash prices are continuous in N and allow to solve for the zero proﬁt condition
Π(c,N) = F (c = 0 if no central ﬁrm exists and c = 1 if a central ﬁrm has entered).
In line with the solution of the equilibrium Nash prices the equilibrium number of
perimeter ﬁrms for c = 1 is distinguished for three regimes according to the level of
ﬁxed costs, obviously for c = 0 the solution of the Salop model obtains. (cf. Madden
& Pezzino (2011), p. 10) Using the equilibrium number of perimeter ﬁrms from the
second stage, the decision to take the position of the central ﬁrm in the ﬁrst stage is
solved. Intuition is conﬁrmed that for suﬃciently high ﬁxed costs G or for low levels
of ﬁxed costs for perimeter ﬁrms F entry of the central ﬁrm is deterred, and for
suﬃciently low G (and F intermediate or high) a central ﬁrm enters the market. The
corresponding threshold for G is an increasing function in F and further determined
by δ. (cf. Madden & Pezzino (2011), Theorem 2, p. 10 and Fig. 2, p. 11)
Finally, according to the welfare analyses social optima80 consist of two exclusive
states, that is the market should either be served only by perimeter ﬁrms (N 6=
0, c = 0) or only by a central ﬁrm (N = 0, c = 1). (cf. Madden & Pezzino (2011),
p. 6) A comparison of the social optima with the market equilibrium yields the stan-
dard result of excessive product diﬀerentiation provided that G is suﬃciently high
and F is low. In addition for high F , the cases where the social optimum suggests
c = 1 but the market equilibrium either reveals N > 0 and c = 0 (for high G), as well
as N > 0 and c = 1 (for low G) are covered. The striking result emerges for a com-
bination of low entry costs G and F . As F is low the social optimum suggests that
only perimeter ﬁrms should serve the market and the standard result is reproduced
(the equilibrium also covers the central ﬁrm). However, for intermediate F it turns
out that the number of perimeter ﬁrms is too low compared to the social optimum
which is in contrast to the standard result. (cf. Madden & Pezzino (2011), p. 13)
In sum, the study of Madden & Pezzino (2011) illustrates the example for an intro-
duction of a measure of centrality into markets with a circular shape. Subsequently,
the paper demonstrates the impact of such an extension on market equilibrium prices
and the equilibrium number of ﬁrms. In addition, the eﬀects on welfare and the emer-
gence of potential market failures are shown. Insights on the determinants of location
80In accordance with Salop (1979) social optima represent market conﬁgurations that minimize
total costs due to entry and transportation. (cf. Madden & Pezzino (2011), p. 5)
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patterns, however, are not provided since, as in Salop (1979), a symmetric location
conﬁguration is assumed.
To sum up this subsection, one important common property of spatial competition in
bounded linear and circular market geometries is the notion of localized competition.
For instance, according to Mulligan & Fik (1989) equilibrium prices are predom-
inantly determined by the locations and marginal production costs of the nearest
neighbors. Moreover, when assessing the inﬂuence of further neighboring ﬁrms, a
dominant distance decay eﬀect on equilibrium prices is inherent for spatial compe-
tition under linear transportation costs. However, diﬀerences between the bounded
linear and the circular city lie in the determinants of equilibrium prices. Whereas
on the circle equilibrium prices obtain as a function of the relative distance between
ﬁrms, in the linear city the spatial boundary conditions lead to a dependence of the
price on the length of the market as well as on ﬁrms' locations. (cf. Mulligan & Fik
(1989))
As regards the location equilibrium, issues on the existence of a perfect subgame
equilibrium for the linear city have already been addressed in section 2 of this sur-
vey. For circular market shapes the unique existence appears to be challenging to
prove, however, as was demonstrated in Economides (1989) a symmetrical location
conﬁguration serves as the prominent candidate for a subgame perfect equilibrium.
As is demonstrated in the seminal paper of Salop (1979), a consequence of the notion
of localized competition is that ﬁrms retain monopoly power and set prices above
marginal costs. As the number of ﬁrms increases the markup and proﬁts decrease,
in the limiting case of a zero proﬁt condition ﬁrms still act as local monopolists.
However, this prediction does not generally hold regardless of the market shape as
will be presented - among other things - in the next subsection.
2.3.2 Models with Market Centers
2.3.2.1 Non-uniform consumer distributions
First ﬁndings on the impact of the consumer distribution on ﬁrms' location decision
in the Hotelling model are provided in Eaton & Lipsey (1975). The optimal location
of a ﬁrm is critically determined by the structure of the distribution which is exem-
pliﬁed by the relation of modes to the number of ﬁrms. As a result, ﬁrms maximize
their market area according to the shape of the distribution, in a special case they
form pairs.81 Eaton & Lipsey (1975) did not, however, analyze how the consumer
distribution aﬀects price and location competition. This is, for instance, to be done
81For details refer to Eaton & Lipsey (1975) pp. 33-39 and chapter 2 of this survey.
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in the paper of Neven (1986) where in a simultaneous two-stage price-location game
with two players under quadratic transportation costs on the unit line (x ∈ [0, 1])
the market equilibrium contingent upon the density distribution c(x) (and the cu-
mulative density C(x)) is examined.82 Speciﬁcally, c(x) is assumed to be continuous,
diﬀerentiable and symmetric with one mode at the center x = 12 . (cf. Neven (1986),
p. 122) As usual, the indiﬀerent consumer sits at α = p2−p12(x2−x1) +
x1+x2
2 , then de-
mand and proﬁts respectively for ﬁrm 1 follow with Π1 = p1C(α), and for ﬁrm 2
Π2 = p2C(1− α).
To derive the solution for the game three propositions are made. Firstly, it is shown
that under the given proﬁt functions a Nash price equilibrium requires c(x) to be con-
cave. The intuition is that the concavity of c(x) is linked to the existence of a single
peak. A single peak of c(x) in turn requires proﬁts to be concave and single-peaked
(e.g. for ﬁrm 1 ∂
2Π1
∂p21
> 0 and ∂
3Π1
∂p31
< 0 over the range α ∈ [0, 12 ]) which reduces to
c′′(x) < 0. (cf. Neven (1986), p. 123) Clearly, the set of possible concave distributions
is bounded by the two extremes of a rectangular and a triangle distribution.83 Sec-
ondly, the unique price equilibrium for symmetrical locations x1 = 1− x2 is derived
with p∗1 = p∗2 =
1−2x1
c( 1
2
)
.84 Moreover, the uniqueness for the symmetrical case is proved
by showing that the convex price reaction functions intersect in one deﬁned point.
(cf. Neven (1986), p. 123f) Thirdly, proﬁts Π1(p
∗
1) and Π2(p
∗
2) are maximized with
respect to x1 = 1 − x2 which reduces to the location equilibrium x∗1 = 12 − 34 1c( 1
2
)
.
(cf. Neven (1986), p. 124f) This proves that for the concave family of consumer dis-
tributions and provided that ﬁrms locate symmetrically the optimal locations are at
the city edges if 1 ≤ c(12) ≤ 32 , and optimal locations continuously move towards the
center for increasing values of c(12) in the interval
3
2 ≤ c(12) ≤ 2. Thus, the closest
position is at x∗1 =
1
8 and x
∗
1 =
7
8 under a triangular distribution.
In conclusion, the study of Neven (1986) shows that in a duopoly ﬁrms tend to lo-
cate where consumer are concentrated. This is exempliﬁed by the comparison of the
contracting forces due to quadratic transportation costs and the attracting forces
due to an agglomeration of consumers at the city center. In particular, he provides a
unique solution for a two-stage price location game under the restriction of symmet-
rical locations and concave distributions. The balance of gaining higher demand and
being exposed to ﬁercer price competition is described by equilibrium locations as a
function of the density peak with the extreme solutions of maximally diﬀerentiating
(and conﬁrming results of d'Aspremont et al. (1979)) or coming as close as 3/8 to
the market center (x∗1 =
1
8 , x
∗
1 =
7
8).
82Demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic.
83It follows that the maximum value of c(x) is bounded by [1, 2]. The mass must equal one, thus,
for a rectangular distribution c(x) = 1 for all x on the domain, and for a triangular distribution
the peak is at c( 1
2
) = 2.
84 ∂Π1
∂p1
= C(α)−p1 c(α)2(x2−x1) = 0, thus p1 = 2(x2−x1)
C(α)
c(α)
, similarly, ∂Π2
∂p2
= C(1−α)−p2 c(1−α)2(x2−x1) = 0
and p2 = 2(x2 − x1)C(1−α)c(1−α) . In equilibrium, p∗1 = p∗2 which equals α = 12 , and then C( 12 ) = 12 .
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The study of Tabuchi & Thisse (1995) scrutinizes equilibrium states in a Hotelling
duopoly under a triangular consumer density distribution (in comparison to a uni-
form density) in both a simultaneous, and a sequential location game. Their paper
stresses the importance of asymmetric location equilibrium patterns.
As in Neven (1986) quadratic transportation costs are assumed and prices are cho-
sen simultaneously after locations are taken. Moreover, an important assumption
in their model is that ﬁrms are not restricted to locate on the interval [0, 1] and
can choose any position on the real line. For locations x1, x2 (taken from the city
origin) and prices p1, p2, proﬁts are Π1 = p1F (xˆ) and Π2 = p2(1 − F (xˆ)) with, as
expected, the indiﬀerent consumer at xˆ = p2−p12(x2−x1) +
x1+x2
2 and f(x) denoting the
density distribution and F (x) the cumulative density. Speciﬁcally, for x ∈ [0, 1] the
triangular density can be expressed by f(x) = 2− 2|2x− 1| and the uniform density
is, of course, f(x) = 1.85 (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (1995), p. 215) The price game and
ﬁrst order conditions are analogue to Neven (1986), thus Π∗1 = 2(x2 − x1)F
2(xˆ)
f(xˆ) and
Π∗2 = 2(x2 − x1) (1−F (xˆ))
2
f(xˆ) . Note that xˆ(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) has to be distinguished for the trian-
gular density for the regions xˆ < 12 (or x1 + x2 < 1) and xˆ >
1
2 (or x1 + x2 > 1). (cf.
Tabuchi & Thisse (1995), p. 217)
To solve the location game the ﬁrst order conditions at p∗1 and p∗2 with respect to x1
and x2 are used.
86 For the simultaneous location game the solution for the uniform
distribution is obtained by solving the two equations Π∗1(p∗1, p∗2) and Π∗2(p∗1, p∗2) in
the two variables x1 and x2.
87 This yields a symmetric location equilibrium in the
outside quartiles of the [0, 1]-city and gives the 'real' solution of the maximum diﬀer-
entiation result of d'Aspremont et al. (1979). (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (1995), p. 218)
The interesting result for the triangular distribution is that in a simultaneous loca-
tion game symmetric equilibria do not exist.88 The economic rationale is that due to
the demand eﬀect players can increase their proﬁts by moving towards the center if
they are located far apart, and owing to the price eﬀect proﬁts can be increased by
moving outwards if they are located closely. An asymmetric location equilibrium ex-
ists and assigns one ﬁrm a location on [0, 1] and the other a location outside [0, 1].89
85It is evident that the triangular distribution comprises two branches, for x ∈ [0, 1
2
] f(x) = 4x,
and for x ∈ [ 1
2
, 1] f(x) = 4(1− x).
86Exemplarily:
∂Π∗1
∂x1
= ∂
∂x1
(2(x2 − x1)F2f ) = −2F
2
f
+ 2(x2 − x1) ∂∂x1 (
F2
f
) = −2F2
f
+ 2(x2 −
x1)[2F
∂F
∂x1
∂xˆ
∂x1
1
f
− F2
f2
∂f
∂x1
∂xˆ
∂x1
] = −2F2
f
+ 2(x2 − x1)[2F ∂xˆ∂x1 −
F2
f2
∂f
∂x1
∂xˆ
∂x1
]. (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse
(1995), equation (8a), p. 217)
87Recall that f = 1 and F = xˆ. (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (1995), equations (10a) and (10b), p. 218)
88In the proof small deviations from symmetric locations are considered and proﬁts for these loca-
tions are compared to the proﬁts under symmetric locations. In any case deviations from the
symmetric pattern yield higher proﬁts. This also becomes clear from the structure of the density
distribution since at the center x = 1
2
it shows a peak, thus f ′(x = 1
2
) is discontinuous and
therefore the location reaction functions are discontinuous. (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (1995), p. 219f
and Fig. 1)
89The exact Nash equilibrium locations are x∗1 = 1 − 5
√
6
18
≈ 0.319 and x∗2 = 1 +
√
6
9
≈ 1.272, and
by symmetry x∗1 = −
√
6
9
≈ −0.272 and x∗2 = 5
√
6
18
≈ 0.680 respectively.
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(cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (1995), Proposition 3, p. 220) In comparison with the uniform
distribution equilibrium proﬁts under the triangular distribution for both ﬁrms are
lower. This indicates the impact of the price eﬀect. Even though ﬁrms move com-
paratively closer towards the region where consumer density is concentrated, price
competition drives proﬁts down. (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (1995), p. 221) The solution
for the sequential location game also yields an asymmetric location equilibrium. As
intuition suggests, the ﬁrst entrant enjoys a ﬁrst-mover advantage and irrespective
of the distribution (uniform or triangular) chooses the central place for his location
x∗1 =
1
2 whereas the second entrant locates outside of [0, 1].
90 Again a comparison
of proﬁts between the uniform and the triangular distribution suggests higher price
competition in the latter case. (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (1995), p. 222)
To conclude, the paper of Tabuchi & Thisse (1995) shows that irrespective of the
timing of the location game a higher concentration of consumer density around the
center leads ﬁrms to locate close by. Moreover in conjunction with the results of
Neven (1986), it is illustrated that the speciﬁc form of the distribution critically
impacts the market equilibrium. In particular, a triangular distribution implies an
asymmetric location conﬁguration and rules out the existence of symmetrical conﬁg-
urations. As will be shown by the next paper, this argument also applies to convex
and log-concave density functions whereas as was shown in Neven (1986) concave
and symmetric densities allow for symmetric location equilibria.
In the paper of Anderson et al. (1997) a rigorous examination of the impact of the
consumer distribution on location equilibria in the standard simultaneous two-stage
price-location game for a duopoly is conducted. They provide general expressions for
the perfect market equilibrium dependent on the consumer distribution and condi-
tions for the existence and uniqueness of the perfect subgame location equilibrium
states. Thus, an important contribution of the study is to determine the properties
for the density function f(x) such that (symmetric or asymmetric) location equilibria
emerge.91
The model of Anderson et al. (1997) is the standard model with quadratic trans-
portation costs utilized in previous studies (e.g. d'Aspremont et al. (1979), Neven
(1986), Tabuchi & Thisse (1995)). The critical assumption, however, is to impose
the condition of log-concavity on the density f(x) in order to easily set up the equi-
librium of the price subgame. (cf. Anderson et al. (1997), Assumption 1, p. 106)
90The equilibria for the uniform case are x∗1 =
1
2
and x∗2 =
3
2
(and by symmetry x∗2 = − 12 ), and for
the triangular case x∗1 =
1
2
and x∗2 = 1.443 (and x
∗
2 = −1.443). (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (1995),
p. 222)
91Tabuchi & Thisse (1995) already anticipate that restrictions on the density functions to provide
the existence and nonexistence of symmetrical location equilibria are lacking: a symmetric
equilibrium might not exist even with a smooth consumer density if this density increases very
sharply near the center. Clearly, more work is called for here to determine the conditions under
which symmetric equilibrium never arises. (Tabuchi & Thisse (1995), p. 220)
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Exploiting the ﬁrst order conditions (f.o.c.) of the proﬁt functions Π1 = p1F (ξ) and
Π2 = p2(1 − F (ξ)) reveals that a unique solution for the location of the indiﬀer-
ent consumer given the proﬁt-maximizing prices (that solve the f.o.c.) denoted with
ξ := ξ(p1, p2) exists. This is a consequence of the log-concavity assumption. (cf. An-
derson et al. (1997), equation (2.3), p. 107) It follows that the f.o.c. in the ﬁrst stage
location game reduce to an expression in terms of f(ξ) and F (ξ) and to derive the
optimal location pair (x∗1, x∗2) a solution ξ∗ for this expression has to be obtained.
(cf. Anderson et al. (1997), equation (2.8), p. 108) Thus, the subgame perfect equi-
librium (x∗1, x∗2, p∗1, p∗2) is a result of the properties of f and F (that determine ξ∗)
and is generally determined by the shape and the modes of f . (cf. Anderson et al.
(1997), Proposition 1, p. 109) In the special case of a symmetric distribution with the
median at x = 0 the location equilibrium is symmetric and prices are identical (cf.
Anderson et al. (1997), corollary 1, p. 116), and the comparative static results are in
line with the predictions of Neven (1986). A higher density at the center f(M = 0)
leads to higher price competition and lower prices, and to agglomeration and lower
values for x∗1 and x∗2. Furthermore, as the variance of f increases in the symmetric
example equilibrium prices and locations rise, that is tighter distributions lead ﬁrms
to cluster at the center. (cf. Anderson et al. (1997), p. 110f)
To prove the existence and uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium (in ad-
dition to the log-concavity of f) two conditions are required. (cf. Anderson et al.
(1997), Proposition 2 and the proof, p. 115) Firstly, for given f there must not be
an incentive for one ﬁrm to change its location and jump over to its rival's side.92
Secondly, the degree of concavity of f is bounded.93 This implies that if f is, for
instance, symmetric and log-concave this is not suﬃcient for an (symmetric) equi-
librium to exist, rather f must not be 'too' concave.94 In addition, given that f
fulﬁlls the restriction on the concavity for densities with a high degree of asymmetry
a subgame perfect equilibrium does not exist since then the straddle condition is
violated.95 Thus, in sum the degree of concavity and asymmetry of the density f
determines the existence of the location equilibrium and the perfect subgame equi-
librium.
A further interesting point is raised by generalizing the results of Tabuchi & Thisse
(1995) who demonstrated the nonexistence of symmetric location equilibria for a
92According to Anderson et al. (1997) this is stated as the 'straddle condition'. (cf. ibid., p. 113f)
93More precisely, an auxiliary functionH(x) determined by f and F shall be strictly pseudoconcave.
(cf. Anderson et al. (1997), Assumption 2 and equation (4.1), p. 114) Moreover, the example is
provided that for a symmetric distribution f with medianM the requirement of pseudoconcavity
of H(x) reduces to the condition that the measure for the normalized concavity of f is restricted
by − f ′′(M)
(f(M))3
< 8. (cf. ibid., equation (4.2), p. 114)
94IfH(x) is strictly pseudoconcave then ξ∗ is unique. Moreover, ifH(x) is not strictly pseudoconcave
multiple equilibria obtain (see the examples of the logistic density on p. 116 and the Laplace
density on p. 122).
95In general, the impact of the asymmetry of f has to be analyzed numerically on a case by case
basis. An example is provided for the Weibull density. (cf. ibid., p. 117)
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triangular density. Anderson et al. (1997) reduce the stability of the location equi-
librium to the concavity properties of f .96 (cf. Anderson et al. (1997), Proposition
3, p. 118) This implies that for symmetric, log-concave densities with moderate con-
cavity (− f ′′(x)
(f(x))3
< 8) a symmetric location equilibrium is unique and stable, for
intermediate concavity (8 < − f ′′(x)
(f(x))3
< 24) the symmetric location equilibrium is
not stable and unique, and multiple equilibria obtain where potentially asymmetric
location equilibria coexist; eventually, if concavity is high (− f ′′(x)
(f(x))3
> 24) symmetric
equilibria cease to exist, and asymmetric equilibria possibly obtain (if they fulﬁll the
straddle condition).97 The economic rationale behind this inﬂuence of the shape of
f is that asymmetric locations reduce competition and allow to charge comparative-
ly high prices in cases where consumer density is highly concentrated at the market
center (i.e., for highly concave f), whereas symmetric locations intensify competition
for the indiﬀerent consumer at the point of concentration if f is symmetric.
In conclusion, Anderson et al. (1997) demonstrate the inﬂuence of the properties
of the density distribution f on the market equilibrium and provide the critical
conditions for its existence. Economically, the tendency of ﬁrms to agglomerate is
explained by the concentration of demand which is attributable to the concavity
properties of f . They demonstrate that under mild market conditions symmetric
location equilibria exist, subsequently competition can be attenuated by choosing
asymmetric locations; ﬁnally, under harsh market conditions equilibria do not exist.
Two recent studies illustrate the relationship of a modiﬁed uniform consumer distri-
bution, and of a location cost distribution with ﬁrms' proﬁt maximizing strategies
in the Hotelling model. They serve as particular interesting examples since they do
not directly test variations in the speciﬁcs of the density distribution on the market
equilibrium but oﬀer alternatives to model these eﬀects. In particular, these studies
demonstrate that nonlinear variations in market characteristics that subsequently
inﬂuence the structure of market demand (and make certain market areas more
attractive than others) have impacts on ﬁrms' proﬁts and their proﬁt-maximizing
behavior.
96In particular, they formulate an expression of the steady state point (i.e. the location equilibrium
x∗i ) to which the location of a ﬁrm according to the best response dynamics of its reaction
function converges. Take for instance player 1, in general his reaction function R1 depends on
x∗2 which is described by Ω1 := R1(R2). For an arbitrary starting point of the iteration process
s0 > x
∗
1 the best response is to decrease the location and move towards x
∗
1 provided that
s0 > Ω1(s0). (cf. Anderson et al. (1997), Fig. 1, p. 119) Thus, the condition for a steady state is
Ω(x∗1) = x
∗
1. Then the properties of Ω1(x) at the equilibrium x
∗
i are determined by the concavity
of the density f . (cf. ibid., equation (4.5), p. 118). In the extreme of a very concave density the
reaction function is discontinuous. (cf. ibid., Fig. 2, p. 120)
97They provide the example for fα(x) = N(α)(α −
√
1 + (α2 − 1)2x2) with x ∈ [−1, 1], α > 1
and N(α) as a numerical constant such that
∫
fα(x)dx = 1. The triangular density converges
to fα(x) for α → ∞. (cf. Anderson et al. (1997), p. 120) Unique symmetric location equilibria
exist for α <≈ 5.3, symmetric and asymmetric equilibria coexist for ≈ 5.3 < α <≈ 20, and
asymmetric equilibria solely obtain for α >≈ 20. (cf. ibid., Fig. 3, p. 121)
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Thomadsen et al. (2013) address the question of the eﬀects of a decrease in the
number of consumers and the market size on the equilibrium prices and proﬁts if
ﬁrms compete with a horizontally diﬀerentiated product. They make the, at ﬁrst
sight, surprising proposition that a decline in market size caused by a drain of con-
sumers who are not particularly committed to the consumption of the diﬀerentiated
product leads to an increase in equilibrium prices and proﬁts. Thus, under speciﬁc
circumstances but leaving the general market characteristics unchanged (number of
competitors, cost structure, transportation cost scheme) a declining market leaves
ﬁrms better oﬀ.
The framework of their analysis is the Hotelling duopoly with linear transportation
costs98, a uniform consumer distribution and constant marginal costs normalized to
zero. Speciﬁcally, consumer j's utility for a deﬁned location when purchasing at ﬁrm
i is uij = V − pi − dij with V as the reservation price, pi as the product price and
dij the traveling distance. Two important assumptions underly ﬁrms' locational set-
ting. Firstly, their locations are exogenous, secondly they locate symmetrically with
relative distance 2D and a distance of 35V − 25D from the respective ends of the city.
In addition, it is assumed that the reservation price V is small enough such that not
for every location conﬁguration the whole market is served. (cf. Thomadsen et al.
(2013), p. 1001)
A variation in the market size is examined in three diﬀerent settings. In the ﬁrst
scenario the variation is such that consumers located around the city edges exit the
market. That is the market is truncated symmetrically from both sides leaving the
ﬁrms with a remnant hinterland of an amount denoted by K.99 Comparing equilibri-
um prices and proﬁts before and after the exit yields a well-deﬁned range for K such
that proﬁts for both ﬁrms after the exit exceed proﬁts before the exit, as well as a
range for K such that an increase in proﬁts results from a decrease in K, i.e. for a
decrease of the peripheral market size.100 (cf. Thomadsen et al. (2013), Theorem 1,
p. 1002) The economic interpretation is evident, as ﬁrms need not attract consumers
with comparatively low utility from the edges they are able to exploit their local
98The robustness of the results is tested under quadratic transportation costs. (cf. Thomadsen et al.
(2013), p. 1004)
99The distance from ﬁrms' location to the edges after the exit is K. (cf. Thomadsen et al. (2013),
Fig. 1, p. 1002)
100Before the exit the hinterland is d = 3
5
V − 2
5
D, then equilibrium prices are derived from the
utility function p = V − d and demand and proﬁts are q = d + D and Πbef = pq. Note that in
equilibrium there is no competition in the region between the ﬁrms. After the exit assuming that
all consumers in K are captured (p < V −K) the proﬁt function is Πi = pi(K+D+ 12 (pj−pi)),
applying the ﬁrst order condition yields p = 2(K+D) and a transition obtains solving 2(K+D) <
V − K for K. For K above the proﬁt function is Πi = pi(V − pi + D + 12 (pj − pi)). Then
however, a higher price than the proﬁt-maximizing price can be charged which is the kink
solution p = V − K. Thus, in equilibrium proﬁts after exit are Πafter = (V − K)(K + D).
Setting Πafter > Πbef and solving for K yields the lower bound on K for the level of proﬁts,
and
∂Πafter
∂K
< 0 the respective bound for changes in proﬁts. Note that presumably they made a
mistake for the undercutting case where setting undercutting proﬁts < 0 reduces to K > V −2D
and not K > V − 4D. (cf. Thomadsen et al. (2013), proof on p. 1006)
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monopoly power by charging higher prices. In sum, the price eﬀect dominates the
demand eﬀect and proﬁts increase under consumer exit. Comparative statics conﬁrm
this intuition, equilibrium prices (at the kink) rise with decreasing K. Moreover,
undercutting is ruled out, therefore ﬁrms' dominant strategy is to complement the
rival's pricing behavior. The limit of this phenomenon is set by a lower bound on
K, if this is breached a declining market size is not oﬀset by a high price strategy
anymore. The second scenario assumes an asymmetric truncation of the market size
only on one side. The qualitative ﬁndings and the proceeding are analogous to the
previous symmetric case. (cf. Thomadsen et al. (2013), Theorem 2, p. 1003) In the
third case consumers exit from the market center at 12 around a distance of G and
by a fraction f . As before conditions for an increase in ﬁrms' proﬁts compared to the
pre-exit state are provided such that a price equilibrium is guaranteed. (cf. Thomad-
sen et al. (2013), Theorem 3, p. 1004)
In conclusion, Thomadsen et al. (2013) do not provide new insights on determinants
of ﬁrms' location decision since locations are imposed exogenously. Nevertheless,
their model represents an interesting case where it is demonstrated that the seem-
ingly disadvantageous decline in market size does not lead to shrinking proﬁts and
a decline in prices as a desperate reaction to retain one's customer base. Rather, a
counterintuitive change in the pricing strategy leads ﬁrms to a more proﬁtable sit-
uation. Put diﬀerently, the model illustrates that given ﬁxed absolute locations and
thus no ﬂexibility in one strategic variable, the optimization of the remaining strate-
gic variable (product price) suﬃces to be proﬁtable and absorb fundamental changes
in the market environment that cause, for instance, relative locations to change.
Fairly recently, Hinloopen & Martin (2017) introduce a cost of location function
for a Hotelling duopoly that imposes a cost for each ﬁrm to set up their mill that
varies according to the chosen location on the unit line. This introduces an addition-
al degree of freedom in ﬁrms' optimal decision in a classical simultaneous two-stage
price-location game. Subsequently, conditions are provided and the properties of the
cost of location function are examined such that a perfect subgame equilibrium can
be established.
The model of Hinloopen & Martin (2017) is essentially the model of d'Aspremont
et al. (1979) with the only notable exception that the proﬁt function accounts for
the term of the location cost function c(y) where the argument y is deﬁned as the
distance from the ﬁrm's location to the nearest end of the line (y = a for ﬁrm A,
y = b for ﬁrm B). (Hinloopen & Martin (2017), p. 120) Thus, c(y) has to be de-
ﬁned for y ∈ [0, 12 ] and c(y) is symmetric. Now, the inclusion of c(y) and subsequent
equilibrium conditions are analyzed for linear and quadratic transportation costs.
In the linear case d'Aspremont et al. (1979) gives the conditions for the subgame
price equilibrium. (cf. d'Aspremont et al. (1979), equations (1) and (2), p. 1146, and
Hinloopen & Martin (2017), equations (1) and (2), p. 120) Equilibrium prices p∗A
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and p∗B remain unchanged, proﬁt functions, however, are ΠA =
1
2t(p
∗
A)
2 − c(a) and
ΠB =
1
2t(p
∗
B)
2 − c(b). As the price equilibrium is deﬁned, conditions for the location
equilibrium are set up which are (i) that undercutting is not proﬁtable compared
to equilibrium proﬁts, (ii) the ﬁrst order condition in a and b, (iii) the second order
condition in a and b, and (iv) that equilibrium proﬁts are positive. The fact that
the proﬁt function contains c(a) and c(b) respectively implies that the location cost
function and its ﬁrst and second derivatives are part in all equilibrium conditions.
(cf. Hinloopen & Martin (2017), Proposition 2, p. 121) Evaluating the ﬁrst order
conditions for ﬁrm A and B yields the solution of symmetric locations (a∗ = b∗),
and since c′(a∗), c′(b∗) > 0 and c′′(a∗), c′′(b∗) > 0 the location cost function has to
increase at an increasing rate towards the center at 12 . The increase of the location
cost and therefore the particular solution for a∗ and b∗ is due to the speciﬁcation of
c(y). The example for the case c(y) = yβ is presented where for low values of β ≥ 1
location costs increase rapidly and for β = 1 the equilibrium locations are at the city
edges, and for high values of β ≤ 2.43 locations costs increase moderately and for
β = 2.43 ﬁrms locate at the quartiles. (cf. Hinloopen & Martin (2017), p. 123f and
Fig. 3)
In the case of a quadratic transportation cost scheme again the results of d'Aspremont
et al. (1979) for the price game are exploited by the authors. Since there are no re-
strictions on the location choice due to undercutting the conditions for the existence
of a location equilibrium are (i) the ﬁrst order conditions, (ii) the second order condi-
tions, and (iii) that equilibrium proﬁts are positive. (cf. Hinloopen & Martin (2017),
Proposition 3, p. 125) As in the linear case the solution to the ﬁrst order conditions
is a symmetric location equilibrium. However, in contrast to the linear case, the ﬁrst
order conditions reveal c′(a∗), c′(b∗) < 0 and according to the second order condi-
tion c′′(a∗) and c′′(b∗) can be positive or negative. Thus, a location equilibrium under
quadratic transportation costs requires the location cost function to decrease towards
1
2 or to increase towards the city edges. Again the particular solution for a
∗ and b∗
results from c(y) with the general ﬁnding that for rapidly decreasing functions ﬁrms
are inclined to locate towards the center and thus a principle of maximum diﬀeren-
tiation would not generally hold.
To conclude, the paper of Hinloopen & Martin (2017) illustrates that possible per-
fect subgame location equilibria in a simultaneous two-stage price-location game are
critically determined by the cost of location modeled by a cost distribution c(y).
The intuition is conﬁrmed that, similar to respective variations of the consumer dis-
tribution (e.g. Neven (1986), Tabuchi & Thisse (1995)), the location cost function
creates incentives to locate in particular regions of the market such that a subgame
perfect equilibrium is guaranteed. A prominent example is provided with the case
of quadratic transportation costs in which location costs are required to increase
towards the city boundaries, and thus ﬁrms would not maximally diﬀerentiate but
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rather tend to agglomerate at the center.
2.3.2.2 Intersecting roadways and networks
Intersecting roadways represent the case of two (or more) intersecting lines and
spatial competition in this setting can be explained by applying the principles of the
Hotelling model. In the standard formulation with uniformly distributed consumers
one distinguishable feature of this market setting is that the intersection connects two
markets and makes locations close by more attractive since a larger customer base
can be potentially served. Consequently, intersecting roadways may be interpreted as
a market setting in which a certain degree of centrality pervails that is exogenously
imposed by the market geometry. As in the case of the linear city general interests
arise concerning the conditions on the existence and the properties of price and
location equilibria.
In Braid (1989) it is demonstrated that a perfect subgame equilibrium does not exist
since ﬁrms always have an incentive to relocate towards the center.
The model assumes an arbitrary number of n = 1, ..., N inﬁnite roads radiating from
a center at x = 0 where on each spoke an arbitrary number of ﬁrms i is located at
positions xn,i charging prices pn,i. Transportations costs increase linearly in travel
distance by rate k. Furthermore, the assumption is made that the center is taken
by ﬁrm 0 with x0 = 0. Excluding undercutting strategies the solution to the sec-
ond stage price game is straightforward. For an arbitrary ﬁrm i on spoke n market
demand is derived by the location of its indiﬀerent consumers on the centrally ori-
entated and peripheral side (zn,i−1 and zn,i respectively). The proﬁt function, ﬁrst
order conditions and consecutive proﬁts for proﬁt-maximizing prices Πi and Π0 are
derived. (cf. Braid (1989), p. 108f) The strategic advantage of a central position is
exempliﬁed by a comparison of the proﬁt functions where a factor of N2 indicates that
on every spoke consumers are served by the central ﬁrm and in case of an equidis-
tant spacing (and equal equilibrium prices) this clearly leads to higher proﬁts. (cf.
Braid (1989), equations (6) and (7), p. 109) To show the nonexistence of the loca-
tion equilibrium it is considered that all ﬁrms but one hold their location and the
concerned seller moves towards the center (w.l.o.g. ﬁrm 2 on spoke 1 which implies
∆x1,2 < 0). Subsequently, the eﬀects of the relocation on equilibrium prices of all
ﬁrms are evaluated.101 In particular, the eﬀect of the price change for the moving
101Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst order conditions of the price game are expressed in terms of variations of the
prices and locations. This leads to a set of equations where on spoke n = 1 only the price changes
of the neighboring ﬁrms i = 1 and i = 3 result as a function of ∆x1,2 < 0 (see equations (12)
to (14)). The solution for the zero-set equations of the price changes for i > 3 on spoke n = 1
and for i > 0 for all other spokes are given in equations (17) and (18). They are obtained by
evaluating the recursive relationships and solving a quadratic equation for the coeﬃcient of the
∆p's (which is not explicitly carried out in the article). The proceeding is described on p. 110f
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ﬁrm on its proﬁts are provided for the case of two, three and four spokes. (cf. Braid
(1989), p. 111) It is revealing that for the case of the unbounded linear city (N = 2)
no advantage due to the inward move obtains. This is explained by equivalent price
changes of the neighboring ﬁrms as a result of ∆x1,2 (the closer located neighbor de-
creases his price, the more distant neighbor increases his price by the same amount).
In sum, the equilibrium price of the moving ﬁrm does not change and neither do the
positions of the indiﬀerent consumers, then clearly, ∆p1,2 = 0 does not eﬀect proﬁts
∆Π1,2 = 0. By contrast, for N = 3 and N = 4 the centrally located neighbor does
not decrease his prices by the same amount as the peripheral neighbor increases his
price (|∆p3| > |∆p1|). The asymmetry is due to the best reply of the central ﬁrm.
At the center the price reaction does not directly respond to the stimulus of one
particular spoke, rather ﬁrm 0's optimal behavior accounts for competition on all
spokes which has a dampening eﬀect on the price drop due to the inward move of
only one ﬁrm.
In sum, the paper of Braid (1989) demonstrates that road intersections are a deter-
minant for ﬁrms' optimal location decision. The prediction that ﬁrms agglomerate
at the center is in line with previous studies on the subject of nonuniform consumer
distributions (Anderson et al. (1997), Tabuchi & Thisse (1995), Neven (1986)). As a
result of the underlying market geometry intersecting roadways can be interpreted as
a limiting case of a highly concentrated consumer distribution that collapses at the
intersecting point (provided that consumers are uniformly distributed on the lines).
In this sense the nonexistence of a perfect subgame equilibrium ﬁts in well with the
ﬁndings of the previous literature.
The study of Braid (1993) extends the market setting with one intersection and
bridges the gap between models with one-dimensional intersecting lines on the one
hand and spatial competition models in two dimensions on the other hand. The goal
is to determine the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous pricing game and conditions
for its existence given a network of roads spread over a two-dimensional plane. In
addition, the paper also considers the notion of a varying consumer distribution by
including demand concentrations at the grid points.
The market geometry consists of a square grid with side length R. Three types of
consumers are served by ﬁrms that are assumed to be located at every grid point,
thus ﬁrms' locations are an exogenous variable. The ﬁrst type of consumers is evenly
distributed over the plane with density D, the second type is evenly distributed on
each road of the network with density G, and thirdly, consumers are distributed with
density N at each node of the grid. Consumers' transportation cost increases by a
linear rate k when traveling on the network (travel costs to approach the main roads
are assumed to be negligibly small) and demand for every consumer of each type is
and in the appendix p. 112.
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assumed to be perfectly inelastic. (cf. Braid (1993), pp. 189 and 191) To determine the
Nash price equilibrium the derivation of the demand function of a ﬁrm is required. For
this purpose the location of the indiﬀerent consumer is set up for each customer type.
(cf. Braid (1993), p. 191f) Firstly, the N consumers concentrated at a grid point all
purchase by assumption, consecutive demand is qspot = N . Secondly, concerning the
consumers distributed on the lines, for each ﬁrm in sum four indiﬀerence points, thus
two linear market areas exist. Between each ﬁrm (grid point) the indiﬀerent consumer
locates at R2 if equal prices are charged, under price competition the position is d =
R
2 +
pi−pj
2k , thus in sum total demand on the roads for a ﬁrm is qroad = 4dG. Thirdly,
the indiﬀerence condition for the road customers also applies to the customers on
the plane (who take a costless trip to access the main road). Applying this argument
in four directions leads to a market area of 4d2, thus, a total demand on the plane
of qplane = 4d
2D. In sum, this yields proﬁts for each ﬁrm of Π0 = (p0 − c)(qspot +
qroad + qplane) with c as the marginal cost of production. In a Nash equilibrium all
ﬁrms charge equal prices which reduces the price diﬀerences in Π0 to zero. According
to the ﬁrst order condition the Nash price (net of production cost) obtains as a
function of the consumer densities N , G and D, the transportation cost coeﬃcient
k, and the distance between the grid points R: pE = c+kR
1
2
N+GR+ 1
2
DR2
GR+DR2
. (cf. Braid
(1993), p. 192) The condition for the existence of a price equilibrium rules out the
case of undercutting and of a high price strategy such that only the customers at the
gird point are exploited. (cf. Braid (1993), equations (5) and (6), p. 193)
Addressing the comparative statics the Nash price equilibrium reveals the following
properties: (i) pE increases in k and R which expresses the local monopoly power
of each ﬁrm on its consumer base, (ii) pE decreases in D (consumer density on the
plane) which highlights that an increase in the global population of the market leads
to higher competition between ﬁrms, and (iii) pE increases in N which illustrates the
signiﬁcance of the consumer point concentrations at the road intersections, as these
locations become signiﬁcant incentives to attract and compete for consumers from the
periphery vanish. In the limit an excessive increase in N causes the price equilibrium
to break down and ﬁrms to devise a high price strategy or an undercutting strategy. It
is interesting to follow the author's argument that the nonexistence of the equilibrium
is a direct result of the impact of N and, importantly, existence can not be restored
by changing to a quadratic transportation cost scheme. (cf. Braid (1993), p. 200)
In conclusion the paper of Braid (1993) emphasizes the role of the market geometry,
and in particular consumer concentrations on the road network, in the determination
of the price equilibrium. This marks a diﬀerence to the predictions of models for
linear bounded markets (e.g. d'Aspremont et al. (1979)) and circular markets (e.g.
Economides (1989)). Furthermore, the symmetric price equilibrium pE is in line with
ﬁndings of other articles in the ﬁeld of intersecting roads and networks (cf. examples
in Braid (1993), p. 194f). For the case of purely intersecting roadways (N = D = 0)
57
Chapter 2. Centrality and Spatial Diﬀerentiation - A Literature Survey
pE = c+ kR reproduces the price equilibrium in Braid (1989) and hints at the more
general results of Fik & Mulligan (1991).
The study of Braid (2013) departs from the concept of Braid (1989) and develops a
model to examine the location patterns in a network of intersecting roads with ﬁnite
distance of unit length where on each road one ﬁrm chooses its optimal location pro-
vided that the center is taken by an incumbent ﬁrm.102 Put diﬀerently, this model
refers to a set of linear cities where one ﬁrm is located at one end of the city and
simultaneously competes (given its ﬁxed location) with all other ﬁrms that optimize
in the second stage over price and in the ﬁrst stage over location.
The model follows the 'classical' approach in the fashion of d'Aspremont et al. (1979)
with the assumptions of quadratic transportation costs, uniformly distributed con-
sumers with density normalized to 1, and completely inelastic demand. All of these
apply to each of the n unit road segments. Generally, there are n + 1 ﬁrms (and n
roads) charging prices Pi but the main focus of the paper lies on the case n = 4. (cf.
Braid (2013), p. 794)
The derivation of the Nash price equilibrium assumes that a particular ﬁrm (ﬁrm 1)
locates at a distance a from the center where ﬁrm 0 has settled, while the remaining
ﬁrms (indexed with subscript 2) locate at b. The positions of the indiﬀerent con-
sumers for ﬁrm 1 (z1) and the remaining players (z2) follow, and consequently the
proﬁt functions of all ﬁrms Π0, Π1 and Π2. The ﬁrst order conditions (f.o.c.) deﬁne
the proﬁt-maximizing prices, clearly, the f.o.c. for the central ﬁrm is a function of
all n ﬁrms locations (a, b) and prices (P1, P2), while the f.o.c. of the peripheral ﬁrms
capture only the interaction with ﬁrm 0. (cf. Braid (2013), p. 795) The set of these
three equations can be solved for P0, P1, P2, these are reinserted into the proﬁt func-
tions which in turn are the objective functions for the location game. Focusing on
ﬁrm 1 and setting ∂Π1∂a = 0 under the assumption of symmetric locations (a = b) the
proﬁt-maximizing locations obtain as a sole function of the number of spokes n. (cf.
Braid (2013), equation (15), p. 796) Subsequently, setting n = 4 equilibrium loca-
tions a = b = 59 are derived which demonstrates, for this particular case, the general
ﬁnding that in a symmetric equilibrium with n ≥ 3 ﬁrms locate closer to the center
than the social optimum would suggest.103 (cf. Braid (2013), Propositions 3 and 5,
p. 797f) The crucial part of the analysis is that a perfect subgame equilibrium is not
generally deﬁned. For the case n = 4 the existence of the Nash price equilibrium
requires the location of ﬁrm 1 to be distant from the center while the other three
102Note that in contrast to Braid (1989) the roads have a ﬁnite distance and there is only competition
with the central ﬁrm, and in contrast to Madden & Pezzino (2011) locations are endogenized
and ﬁrms are allowed to move on a dimension connecting the circular periphery and the center.
103The social optimum is deﬁned as the conﬁguration that minimizes total transportation costs for
all consumers in the market. The optimum is found in a symmetric setting with ﬁrms locating
at a distance of 2
3
, then the maximum distance for a consumer to travel to a ﬁrm is 1
3
. (cf. Braid
(2013), Proposition 1, p. 794)
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players are located at their equilibrium location (b = 59), i.e. formally a > a
∗ ≈ 14 and
2
9 < a
∗ < 13 must hold. (cf. Braid (2013), Appendix, p. 806) Breaching this restriction
implies that the central ﬁrm is undercut by ﬁrm 1. Moreover, the point is made that
for n > 4 a Nash price equilibrium might fail to exist even if a (sic!) assumes its
equilibrium value [...] In fact, this is almost certainly the case in the limit that n goes
to inﬁnity. (Braid (2013), p. 806f)
In addition, the comparative statics of the model suggest that as the number of
ﬁrms (and spokes) increases ﬁrms move towards the center and equilibrium locations
decrease. The argument is essentially the same as in Braid (1989) and draws up-
on the optimal price setting behavior of the central ﬁrm which is dependent upon
the competition with all ﬁrms on all spokes and therefore price responses against
one particular peripheral ﬁrm are alleviated (in comparison with the case of 'direct'
competition). Also, equilibrium prices and ﬁrms' proﬁts decrease as n increases. (cf.
Braid (2013), Proposition 6, p. 798)
In sum, the model of Braid (2013) tackles a simultaneous two-stage price-location
game in a general setting of intersecting roads where each of the roads represents
a Hotelling city with unit length. A straight-forward solution to the game suggests
symmetrical locations and prices for the peripheral ﬁrms, the comparative statics
suggest sellers' tendency to agglomerate at the center for an increasing number of
ﬁrms. Moreover, the spatial diﬀerentiation of oligopolistic markets in equilibrium
does not represent a social optimal outcome. However, issues with the existence of
the subgame perfect equilibrium remain.
A further example of an oligopolistic market model that makes use of intersecting
roads is provided in the paper of Chen & Riordan (2007). Their study is related to
the literature of nonlocalized monopolistic competition104 and by imposing the net-
work geometry in a market with n players they establish an equilibrium for spatial
competition in a nonlocalized framework. (cf. Chen & Riordan (2007), p. 898) Since
ﬁrms' market areas are connected over a central hub, their model implies that opti-
mal pricing decisions are a result of direct competition between all sellers in contrast
to localized market competition where equilibrium prices are derived from competi-
tion with nearest neighbors.
Their setting consists of a network of N spokes with length 12 intersecting at a center.
Firms' locations are assumed to be at the end of the spokes, in contrast to the pre-
viously presented studies no ﬁrm is located at the center. The total number of ﬁrms
is n and only one ﬁrm shall be allowed to be located on a spoke. Generally, some
spokes remain vacant, i.e. n ≤ N . Locations are assumed to be given exogenously,
thus, variations in ﬁrms' locations are not subject to the examination. Additional as-
sumptions of the model are that consumers are distributed uniformly over the lines,
104For an introduction see Tirole (2003) pp. 287f and 298ﬀ.
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the number of consumers on a spoke is normalized to one, consequently consumer
density on a spoke is 2N .
105 Moreover, transportation costs are assumed to be a linear
function in traveled distance (with t = 1). (cf. Chen & Riordan (2007), p. 901)
Two critical assumptions underly the spokes model. Firstly, consumers' reservation
price v is ﬁnite. Secondly, optimizing their utility from consumption consumers only
choose between two alternatives.106 (cf. Chen & Riordan (2007), p. 903) Together
with the market geometry, this implies that the demand function (exemplarily for
a ﬁrm j) is a result of three diﬀerent categories of consumers.107 The ﬁrst category
refers to the standard case of a consumer who is indiﬀerent between purchasing at
ﬁrm i or ﬁrm j and whose location is a function of the price diﬀerential.108 More-
over, ﬁrm j competes in the same way with all ﬁrms in the market, by assumption a
consumer prefers ﬁrm j with a probability of 1N−1 and ﬁrm j could maximally gain
N − 1 of these indiﬀerent consumers (cf. Chen & Riordan (2007), second equation
on p. 902). The second category considers the indiﬀerent consumer on the spoke of
ﬁrm j who is according to his reservation price indiﬀerent between buying at ﬁrm
j or buying an outside good (the type of these consumers would purchase from a
ﬁrm that has not yet located on a spoke). Again the outside good is preferred with a
probability of 1N−1 (cf. ibid., third equation on p. 902). The third category accounts
for consumers on vacant spokes that choose ﬁrm j as their preferred seller with prob-
ability 1N−1 or buy an outside good. If the vacant spoke is occupied by a seller these
consumers then fall into category 1 (cf. ibid., forth equation on p. 902). This illus-
trates that the level of v is critical for ﬁrms' demand function, and subsequently for
the level of equilibrium prices and proﬁts.
Evaluating proﬁt functions and ﬁrst order conditions by cases yields the symmetric
price equilibrium p∗ as a monotonic function in v (over the range of interest). (cf.
Chen & Riordan (2007), equation (3), p. 904 and for the derivation pp. 917-919) In
the limiting case for high v (and high p∗) surplus from consumption is positive and
more ﬁrms generate more intense competition which drives prices down.109 As v de-
creases the indiﬀerence condition for consumers on vacant spokes becomes binding,
thus, ﬁrms charge their prices according to the corresponding marginal consumer.
For decreasing v the willingness of the marginal consumer to buy declines and to
105Density equals the number of consumers divided by the market length. There are 1
N
consumers
on one spoke of length 1
2
.
106These could be purchasing at two diﬀerent sellers in the market, or buying at a seller and buying
an outside good which is not buying at all. See explanations below.
107There are three relevant categories of consumers: consumers for whom brand j is preferred,
and whose two preferred brands are both available; consumers for whom brand j is the ﬁrst
preferred brand, whose second preferred brand is not available; and consumers whose ﬁrst brand
is unavailable and for whom brand j is the second preferred brand. (Chen & Riordan (2007),
p. 901)
108Locations are ﬁxed, the distance is measured from the end of a spoke (towards the direction
of the center) and utility from consuming at ﬁrm j is uj = v − pj − xj , and at ﬁrm i: ui =
v − pi − (( 12 − xj) + 12 ).
109There is no dependence on v here: p∗ = 2N
n−1 − 1.
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catch up ﬁrms decrease their price and stay on the kink.
As v further decreases the discrepancy between 'pure' competition with other ﬁrms
for the indiﬀerent consumer with two buying preferences for the diﬀerentiated good
on the one hand, and the goal to capture the indiﬀerent consumer on the vacant
spokes on the other hand becomes eminent. The result is that the marginal con-
sumers on the vacant spokes drive the price reaction and, importantly, the respective
demand function reveals a higher price elasticity than demand from 'pure' competi-
tion. Now, if the number of ﬁrms increases, the number of vacant spokes decreases
and competition intensiﬁes. This leads to a relative increase of the 'pure' competition
segment in the total demand function. Since demand from the vacant spokes is more
price elastic, the price elasticity for the total demand decreases. As a consequence,
equilibrium prices rise for an increasing number of competitors. (cf. Chen & Riordan
(2007), Corollary 1, p. 905)
Concerning equilibrium proﬁts the comparative statics further demonstrate the im-
pact of n and v. As n increases it is clear that demand from consumers on the
vacant spokes declines. This implies a reduction in proﬁts. This eﬀect is compara-
tively stronger for high levels of v since then a larger part of total demand is made
up by the vacant spokes. In sum equilibrium proﬁts decrease, despite rising prices
(as argued above). Likewise, if v is relatively low, initially proﬁts decrease (i.e. for
increasing n at low levels), however, as n becomes suﬃciently large the price eﬀect
takes hold since only small fractions on the vacant spokes are lost and rising prices
lead proﬁts to rise. (cf. Chen & Riordan (2007), p. 906f)
In conclusion, the model of Chen & Riordan (2007) illustrates the critical impact
of market geometry on the determinants and the behavior of a price equilibrium
for spatial competition in oligopolistic markets. Essentially, their paper stresses the
importance and the diﬀerences in the outcomes of localized competition and non-
localized competition which in their model results from the linkage over a central
node in the spatial market. Contrary to the predictions of the models with circular
shape (Salop (1979), Economides (1989), Madden & Pezzino (2011)) and of network
models with a central ﬁrm (Braid (2013)), the example is stated that under speciﬁc
parameter conﬁgurations an increase in the number of ﬁrms leads to an increase
in equilibrium prices and ambiguous eﬀects on equilibrium proﬁts. As the authors
emphasize, this is particularly noteworthy, since other determinants for the price set-
ting behavior such as imperfectly informed consumers or mixed pricing strategies are
explicitly excluded from the analysis. (cf. Chen & Riordan (2007), p. 900, footnote 8)
Finally, two studies shall be presented that incorporate network eﬀects in a spatial
price model and investigate the eﬀect of market geometry on the price equilibrium
under diﬀerent exogenous pricing conjectures.110
110In his introductory note Mulligan (1996) characterizes two strands in the literature of spatial
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The paper of Fik & Mulligan (1991) departs from the classical assumptions of the
Hotelling model: (i) uniformly distributed consumers on the line with unit densi-
ty throughout the market, (ii) linear transportation cost scheme with coeﬃcient t,
(iii) perfectly inelastic demand, and additionally assumes (iv) a cost function with
ﬁxed costs F and marginal costs k. (cf. Fik & Mulligan (1991), p. 81) Evidently,
the market area of an arbitrary interior ﬁrm i follows using the locations of the in-
diﬀerent consumer to its left where competition with ﬁrm 1 shall take place (ai1)
and to its right with the nearest neighbor ﬁrm 2 (ai2). In sum, market demand is
Ai = ai1 +ai2 =
1
2t(pi1 +pi2−2pi+t(Di1 +Di2)) where Dij is the distance of ﬁrm i to
any ﬁrm j. Essentially, network eﬀects are captured by assuming that ﬁrm i can have
ni nearest neighbors which leads to Ai =
ni∑
j=1
aij =
1
2t(
ni∑
j=1
pij−nipi+t
ni∑
j=1
Dij). Then,
ﬁrm i's proﬁt-maximizing prices are determined by the ﬁrst order condition with the
underlying proﬁt function Πi = (pi−ki)Ai−Fi.111 (cf. Fik & Mulligan (1991), p. 82)
The term for the partial derivatives
∂pij
∂pi
= φij is the price conjectural parameter and
accounts for the price change of neighbor j to a price variation of ﬁrm i, throughout
it is assumed that price changes of i are equal towards all neighbors.112 (cf. Fik &
Mulligan (1991), p. 83) Given a particular conjectural scheme the ﬁrst order condi-
tion connects ﬁrm i's optimal prices (pi) with the prices of its nearest neighbors (pij),
and with transportation costs (tDij) and marginal costs (ki). The multiplicative and
additive structure of the equation allows to separate the diﬀerent factors and write
the solution for the price equilibrium in algebraic form as p∗ = C−1X where p∗ is
the vector of equilibrium prices of all ﬁrms in the market, the nxn-matrix C incor-
porates the more or less complex topological structure113, and the vector X includes
competition models. (cf. p. 155f) One stream focuses on a game theoretical approach that sep-
arates location and pricing decisions and is extensively presented in this survey. The other is
dedicated to a general form of the price reaction function and leaves open diﬀerent forms about
the type of price reaction (a description is provided in footnote 112 below). The studies of Fik &
Mulligan (1991) and Mulligan (1996) are two examples that use the latter approach and apply
the assumptions to network structures whereas for instance the work of Braid (2013) falls into
the ﬁrst of his categories. Also recall that in an earlier stage the study of Eaton & Lipsey (1975)
considers two diﬀerent conjectures (zero conjectural variation and the minmax-conjecture) un-
der which ﬁrms optimize their location decisions. Moreover, in the article of Capozza & Order
(1978) the common price conjectures are considered and the characteristics of price equilibria
under spatial competition subject to a zero proﬁt condition are scrutinized. Subsequently, they
provide conditions under which an increase in the number of sellers leads to an increase in the
equilibrium price.
111Precisely, the equation is ∂Πi
∂pi
= 1
2t
[pi(
ni∑
j=1
φij − ni) +
ni∑
j=1
pij − nipi + t
ni∑
j=1
Dij − ki(
ni∑
j=1
φij − ni)].
(cf. ibid., equations (10) and (11), p. 82)
112However, note that price conjectures among diﬀerent ﬁrms, that is for diﬀerent i, can vary.
Generally, φij can take three values. Under Loeschian competition (φij = 1) price movements are
alike which implies the assumption that the market area of every ﬁrm is ﬁxed. Under Hotelling-
Smithies competition (φij = 0) nearest neighbors do not respond to price variations which
implies that prices of competitors are ﬁxed and market area and demand vary corresponding
to price movements. Under Greenhut-Ohta competition (φij = −1) each ﬁrm assumes that the
price at the market boundary is ﬁxed. (e.g. Capozza & Order (1978), p. 898)
113Formally, the variable ni measures the degree of connectivity. If ﬁrm i is located at a node and
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distances and marginal costs. (cf. Fik & Mulligan (1991), p. 83)
Subsequently, diﬀerences in equilibrium price levels between the market setting of
a linear city with equidistant locations and a modiﬁed linear city where the second
ﬁrm competes with three nearest neighbors are examined. Firms' locations and the
location pattern are exogenously imposed. (cf. Fik & Mulligan (1991), tables 1 and
2, and Fig. 1 and 2, pp. 83 and 86f) The corresponding results show that the exis-
tence of a node at the location of ﬁrm 2 in the network market leads to comparably
lower equilibrium prices for all ﬁrms under diﬀerent pricing conjectures. Moreover,
it is demonstrated that the degree of connectivity in terms of ni implies lower price
levels, that is, ﬁrm 2 and ﬁrm 4 in the network market have the highest number
of links and charge lower prices in equilibrium than the three peripheral ﬁrms (the
eﬀect is predominant under pricing conjectures that support competition).
In sum, this highlights the importance of market geometry for the determination
of the price equilibrium and suggests that higher connected markets imply a higher
degree of price competition for centrally located ﬁrms.
In Mulligan (1996) the model of Fik & Mulligan (1991) is used to generalize the
analysis and incorporate ﬁrms' location to characterize the market equilibrium. The
basic assumptions remain the same concerning linear transportation costs, perfectly
inelastic demand, and the production cost function. The price reaction functions are
derived from the ﬁrst order conditions by setting up the demand and proﬁt functions
based on the position of the indiﬀerent consumer. In particular, the case is made for
interior ﬁrms (to investigate circular markets) and exterior ﬁrms sharing a market
border with the end of the bounded market (to investigate linear bounded markets).
(cf. Mulligan (1996), p. 158)
The general solution for a circular and a linear bounded market geometry with n ﬁrms
follows from Y ∗ = C−1Z where Y ∗ contains the locations and prices in equilibrium,
the 2nx2n-matrix the price and location coeﬃcients accounting for the interactions
in the market topology and Z covers the exogenous variables. (cf. Mulligan (1996),
pp. 160 and 162) The information for this equation is deduced from the ﬁrst order
conditions in prices and from two assumption on ﬁrms' location behavior. Firstly,
it is proposed that interior ﬁrms choose their location according to a principle of
maximal diﬀerentiation.114 Secondly, exterior ﬁrms' location behavior is character-
competes with more than two neighbors (ni > 2), in row i and column i of C the corresponding
elements cij and cji represent the connection between ﬁrm i and neighbor j and are nonzero
since the ﬁrst order condition of ﬁrm i contains all pj of the nearest competitors. Thus, in general
the number of nonzero oﬀ-diagonal elements for a particular row (column) in C indicates the
number of nearest neighbors. (cf. Fik & Mulligan (1991), example of ﬁrm 2 in equation (16) and
Fig. 2, p. 83f)
114An arbitrary ﬁrm i locates at the position of the indiﬀerent consumer between his nearest neigh-
bors ﬁrm i − 1 and i + 1. (cf. Mulligan (1996), equation (7), p. 159) Mulligan argues that this
location pattern is obtained for the case of elastic demand functions (see for instance Hay (1976)).
Subsequently, he argues that in a limiting case of completely inelastic demand this assumption
also holds.
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ized by a principle of spatial aggression, that is, their location is assumed to lie in
0 ≤ X1 ≤ X1,max (for the left-sided ﬁrm 1) andXn,min ≤ Xn ≤ Z (for the right-sided
ﬁrm n, and Z denoting the city length). The interval bounds X1,max and Xn,min are
determined by the condition to prohibit the undercutting of the respective nearest
neighbor and the particular location choice is subsequently parameterized by λ (or
µ).115 From this the results for ﬁrms' equilibrium prices, locations and proﬁts for
the case of the circular city (cf. ibid., equations (13), (14) and (16), p. 161) and the
linear bounded city (cf. ibid., equations (20), (21), (24), (25), (29) and (30), p. 162ﬀ)
follow. The comparative static analysis shows that proﬁts and prices increase as the
density of ﬁrms decreases while a variation in the spatial aggression parameter λ
(or µ) leads to opposing eﬀects on ﬁrms' equilibrium prices in the linear bounded
market. As the two peripheral ﬁrms move towards the center their equilibrium prices
increase whereas the prices of interior ﬁrms decrease, thus, the corresponding price
ratio increases as λ (or µ) rises. Moreover, it is also interesting to see that the dif-
ference between the equilibrium prices in terms of the price ratio increases as seller
density increases. (cf. Mulligan (1996), p. 167)
Finally, the model is extended to a network market consisting of four nodes and ﬁve
links. (cf. Mulligan (1996), Fig. 1, p. 170) In the examination of the market equilib-
rium the proceeding assumes that a spatial leader anticipates his optimal location,
subsequently, the competitors choose their position according to the principle of max-
imal diﬀerentiation and all ﬁrms charge their price contingent on the price conjecture.
By backtesting the results the outcome is compared with the initial expectation to
check on the existence of an equilibrium.116 (cf. Mulligan (1996), p. 169) The calcu-
lations show that the market is characterized by the existence of multiple equilibria.
(cf. ibid., table 4, p. 171) Generally, equilibrium prices and proﬁts vary across ﬁrms
and are a function of the market geometry (the length of the links). This highlights
the interrelation of the geographical and economical properties of markets. Since
proﬁts across ﬁrms are a function of the geometrical properties, these in combina-
tion with the level of entry costs determine the number of ﬁrms and subsequently
the location pattern in equilibrium. (cf. Mulligan (1996), p. 172)
To summarize this subsection, the literature shows that the market characteristics
and the geometry of the Hotelling model can be extended by modifying the con-
sumer distributions and by introducing intersecting roadways and road networks.
115Consequently, the location parameter λ (or µ) is also bounded by a value λ < λmax. The bounds
are derived by setting up the problem for the case of the exterior ﬁrms behaving maximally
aggressive and solving for their equilibrium price. Subsequently, this price is set equal to the
equilibrium price of an interior ﬁrm, λmax decreases as the number of ﬁrms n increases. (cf.
Mulligan (1996), appendix, p. 175)
116This approach reﬂects the methodology of sequential entry with perfect foresight by Prescott &
Visscher (1977).
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Both approaches have in common that speciﬁc regions in market space become more
attractive with profound implications on the equilibrium outcome for prices and loca-
tions. For instance, if the assumption of a uniform consumer distribution is dropped
and more consumers are concentrated at the middle point of the Hotelling line (i.e.
the region of the market center is valorized), the market share eﬀect gains impor-
tance and ﬁrms have increased incentives to agglomerate at the center. However, it
is shown that under nonuniform distributions the existence of symmetrical location
conﬁgurations is not guaranteed and asymmetrical location equilibria are likely to
emerge (e.g. Neven (1986), Tabuchi & Thisse (1995)). In general, the properties of
the consumer distribution (the degree of symmetry and log-concavity) determine the
particular equilibrium outcome (e.g. Anderson et al. (1997)). Additionally, it is sug-
gested that alternative forces such as a nonlinear decline in the consumer distribution
(e.g. Thomadsen et al. (2013)), and the introduction of a cost of location distribution
(e.g. Hinloopen & Martin (2017)) impact ﬁrms' behavior.
For the case of intersecting roadways and networks the existence of market centers at
the intersections implies more complex interaction patterns. Even though nonuniform
consumer distributions impact proﬁt-maximization, competition remains localized.
By contrast, in the case of intersecting roads the nature of competition is funda-
mentally changed. This is attributable to the node in the market geometry allowing
for spatial ramiﬁcations in price and location competition. Since linear submarkets
are connected through a single point competition becomes nonlocalized and pricing
and location decisions become relevant for a greater number of nearest rivals. This
instance is demonstrated in diﬀerent studies where a ﬁrm located at the intersec-
tion is subject to competition with all ﬁrms located on adjacent spokes (e.g. Braid
(1989), Braid (2013)), and also for the case where the intersection remains unoccu-
pied but price competition is transmitted over the node from one ﬁrm to all other
competitors in the market (e.g. Chen & Riordan (2007)). Furthermore, according to
the empirical papers which are presented in the next subsection, it is revealing that a
central location in a local market (close to the intersection) implies an asymmetrical
location pattern and endows the central ﬁrm with more market power. This in turn
leads to diﬀerent outcomes of the price game compared to a symmetrical location
setting in the local market (e.g. Firgo et al. (2016)). In addition, two selected articles
from the spatial network literature illustrate that the particular geometrical shape
of a spatial network constitutes an important determinant for the price equilibrium
in oligopolistic markets (e.g. Fik & Mulligan (1991), Mulligan (1996)). To generally
conclude, it is forcefully shown in the literature that the extension of the geometry
from a line to a setting with two intersecting lines changes the equilibrium outcome
and introduces diﬀerent roles for the market players.
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2.4 Empirical Evidence for Price and Location Decisions
In this section some examples of the empirical literature concerning determinants
of ﬁrms' price and location decisions as well as the implications of ﬁrms' tenden-
cy to locate at a central point in a local market shall be presented. In particular,
recent studies dealing with retail gasoline markets are considered since these mar-
kets exhibit the driving forces for price and location decisions in a fairly pure form.
Concerning sellers' locations, as has been shown in the theoretical studies, a market
share eﬀect leads ﬁrms to agglomerate at market centers and a price competition ef-
fect implies a tendency to locate far apart. Retail gasoline markets serve as a fruitful
example to study the causes of price and location patterns due to the homogeneity
of the purchased good which allows to control for alternative product diﬀerentiation
characteristics easily as well as the intensity of price competition as a result of the
transparency of mill prices.
In Netz & Taylor (2002) data on station-level characteristics for 4,000 gasoline sta-
tions in the metropolitan area of Los Angeles between 1992 and 1996 are used. Based
on ﬁrms' geographical position the degree of spatial diﬀerentiation between two com-
petitors is measured by their Euclidean distance where the local market of each seller
is assumed to be of a circular shape with a predeﬁned radius. Competition is prox-
ied by the number of rivals in the circular local market. Moreover, gasoline stations
are distinguished by their type of brand to capture eﬀects due to perceived sellers'
diﬀerences. To account for the eﬀect of the spatial consumer distribution main roads
are considered as areas with a high concentration of consumers and speciﬁcally a
station's spatial characteristic of being as close to a main road as 0.25 miles is con-
sidered in the estimation. Further, the percentage of each station's rivals that are
located near a major road is used as a proxy for the number of intersections in a
local market. (cf. Netz & Taylor (2002), p. 167)
The empirical model is represented by a regression equation with the average dis-
tance of a station to its competitors in the local market as the dependent variable,
and the competition variables (number of sellers, number of sellers squared117), a
vector of station characteristics (e.g. brand, convenience store, car wash etc.) and
other variables to control for demand and market characteristics (e.g. median house-
hold income, median value of housing) as the explanatory variables.118 (cf. Netz &
117The squared termi is used to account for a decreasing eﬀect on ﬁrms' distance as the number
of stations increases which is particularly the case if the number of sellers in a local market is
comparatively high. (cf. Netz & Taylor (2002), p. 168)
118Location choices can be restricted by zoning laws, in addition there are entry costs for new sellers
coming into the market. The proxies that account for these two eﬀects are (i) the proportion
of stations (in a local market) requiring prepayment, (ii) the proportion of housing (in a local
market) that is rented rather than owner-occupied, (iii) the median value of housing, and (iv)
the median household income. (cf. Netz & Taylor (2002), p. 166) In addition, zoning eﬀects are
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Taylor (2002), equation (1), p. 164) To address potential spatial relations between
the observations and errors a spatial lag model and a spatial error model are applied.
Estimations are carried out for two diﬀerent data samples (entry stations and sta-
tions that are permanently present) and for diﬀerent sizes of the local market (half
a mile, a mile or two miles). The results show that (ceteris paribus) ﬁrms locate
farer from one another as competition intensiﬁes, that is, as the number of sellers
increases, as the proportion of independent stations increases, and as the fraction of
stations with the same brand as the central station in the local market increases.
Moreover, the results illustrate that ﬁrms are inclined to locate closer to main roads
and intersections which serves as an indication to conﬁrm theoretical predictions that
ﬁrms tend to locate where consumers are concentrated.
In the paper of Pennerstorfer (2009) the eﬀect of a gasoline station's brand on the
price level is examined and it is highlighted that two conﬂicting eﬀects characterize
competition for gasoline retailers in a local market. Firstly as in Netz & Taylor (2002),
according to the competition eﬀect price levels decrease as competition intensiﬁes and
as the number of unbranded stations increases. Secondly, due to perceived quality
diﬀerences between branded and unbranded stations an increase in the number of
unbranded sellers implies an increase in the local monopoly power of branded stations
and causes an incentive to increase their price (composition eﬀect). (cf. Pennerstorfer
(2009), p. 138)
The statistical analysis is based on cross section data of 400 stations in Lower Austria
from 2003 comprising price data and data on station level characteristics as well as
statistical data of the municipalities from 2001. In the regression model the price
level is estimated as a function of competition variables, station characteristics (incl.
brand) and variables capturing local demand and market characteristics (e.g. size
of the municipality, population density, speed limits). Competition is measured by
the number of sellers in the local market. Comparable to Netz & Taylor (2002) each
local market is deﬁned by a circular shape but with diﬀerent radii of 15.5 kilometer
and 20 kilometer respectively owing to the rural characteristics of the spatial area.
To examine the composition eﬀect the fraction of unbranded stations among the
number of competitors in a local market is considered. Dependent on whether the
central ﬁrm is branded or unbranded two corresponding variables are included in
the regressions. To control for spatial autocorrelation a spatial lag model is utilized,
furthermore the spatial distribution of unbranded sellers is explicitly accounted for
and spatial eﬀects of other explanatory variables are included by applying a spatial
weight matrix.119
captured by using ﬁxed eﬀects on the the level of municipalities. (cf. ibid., p. 168)
119To measure the distance decay eﬀect an element wij of the spatial weight matrix equals the
reciprocal value of the Euclidean distance of ﬁrm i and j. Rows are standardized to one. (cf.
Pennerstorfer (2009), p. 143)
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The results indicate positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀects of the brands as well as the
spatially lagged price on the price level. Thus, unbranded stations charge on average
lower prices and due to the positive spatial correlation lower prices of unbranded
stations cause the prices of branded stations to decline. By contrast, the fraction
of unbranded stations in a local market with a branded central ﬁrm (after spatial
weights) is positively correlated with price levels implying that an increase in the
fraction of unbranded direct competitors in the local market of a branded station
leads to an increase of its average price. Further evidence for the existence of this
composition eﬀect is provided by results of numerical simulations. (cf. Pennerstorfer
(2009), p. 148ﬀ) In sum the paper of Pennerstorfer (2009) suggests that an increase
in competition by unbranded stations does not necessarily lead to a decrease in
price levels of branded stations since the total price eﬀect is composed of a 'pure'
price competition eﬀect (regardless of the brand) and of a composition eﬀect that
is driven by perceived quality diﬀerences. Thus, evidence is found that a station's
brand represents an important characteristic for product diﬀerentiation and has to
be considered as a major determinant of gasoline price levels.
In the study of Pennerstorfer & Weiss (2013) the relationship of spatial clusters of
stations with gasoline price levels is examined. Subject to the research interest is
the intuition that - as a consequence of localized competition - nearest neighbors
along a road which belong to the same brand and form a spatial cluster are exposed
to less competition compared to a situation where each neighbor serves its product
under a diﬀerent brand. In particular the paper scrutinizes the case of a merger of
gasstations in the Austrian retail market that aﬀected the composition of brands and
spatial clusters.
The data on station characteristics (including geographical location) covers the cross
section of all 2.814 gasoline stations in Austria. Price data is available from 2000 to
2005 in quarterly observations in an unbalanced panel and covers the date of the
merger of 98 stations by a major brand in 2003. Moreover, data on local market
and demand characteristics is used (e.g. population density, land price, number of
tourists). Spatial cluster of stations with the same brand are modeled by an index
based on the concept of Thiessen polygons.120 The index characterizes the local
market of each station and is constructed by the total number of nearest competitors,
the number of neighboring stations that form an adjacent cluster, and the cluster
size (i.e. the total number of ﬁrms that form an adjacent cluster). (cf. Pennerstorfer
& Weiss (2013), p. 665) Correspondingly, an increase in the index value refers to an
120Thiessen polygons are a two-dimensional representation for spatial competition between two
stations along a road and deﬁne the local market of a station in relation to its nearest neighbors.
Conceptually, the position of the indiﬀerent consumer based on stations' location is marked by a
perpendicular line and the set of intersecting perpendiculars forms the polygon. (cf. Pennerstorfer
& Weiss (2013), Fig. 1, p. 663)
68
Chapter 2. Centrality and Spatial Diﬀerentiation - A Literature Survey
increase in the number of stations forming a (brand) cluster, and therefore, to an
increase in the cluster size which implies a potential increase in market power for
these stations as a result of a lower degree of price competition. Now, due to the
take-over of 98 stations of a major brand the structure of spatial competition and
of spatial clusters changed which is measured in movements of the index. The price
eﬀects are estimated with a 'diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence' model. Accordingly, price levels
are estimated (in a panel) as a function of station- and time-dependent variables,
time- and station-ﬁxed eﬀects, and as a function of the spatial clustering index as well
as two supplementary dummy variables to capture the merger eﬀects.121 The results
reveal a signiﬁcant and positive correlation of price levels with the spatial clustering
index variable and on average an increase in prices by 0.14 cent is observed for
stations which were directly aﬀected by the take-over. (cf. Pennerstorfer & Weiss
(2013), p. 668)
In sum the ﬁndings of Pennerstorfer &Weiss (2013) shed light on the interdependence
of stations' location patterns with their price levels. In particular, it is demonstrated
that a take-over of stations in the Austrian market caused a change in the spatial
structure which in turn implied a decrease in price competition and in the price levels
in the corresponding local markets.
The study of Firgo et al. (2015) highlights the empirical relationship of the degree
of centrality that characterizes stations' locations and the level of gasoline prices.
Theoretical predictions for their estimations are drawn from a model of intersecting
roads (combining features of Chen & Riordan (2007) and Braid (2013)) under linear
transportation costs and perfectly inelastic demand. Speciﬁcally, stations' locations
are assumed to be exogenously given and each spoke is occupied by one player. Im-
portantly, an asymmetric location pattern is imposed with one ﬁrm locating closer
to the intersection than its rivals and the center is assumed to be a vacant spot.
Then, from the expressions of market demand, the proﬁt functions, and the ﬁrst
order conditions (in prices) of the centrally located station and the peripherals it
follows that the price reaction of a remote station (to a price change of the central
station) is stronger than the price reaction of the central ﬁrm (to a price change of a
peripheral station). (cf. Firgo et al. (2015), Proposition 1, p. 82). This proposition is
in line with the ﬁndings in Braid (1989) and Braid (2013) and extends the argument
to an asymmetrical location pattern in a setting of intersecting roads. Additionally,
conditions are provided such that the price of the central station exceeds the price
of a remote station which highlights the countervailing forces of a price competition
eﬀect if the number of remote stations is high and they locate comparatively close,
and of a market share eﬀect if the central ﬁrm locates close to the intersection and
121These are ﬁrstly a dummy that measures whether the price of the merged station varies, and sec-
ondly whether the price of a nearest neighbor in the radius of 1.5 miles varies. (cf. Pennerstorfer
& Weiss (2013), p. 667)
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holds a large market share. (cf. Firgo et al. (2015), Proposition 2, p. 83)
The empirical investigation uses data for gasoline prices for the metropolitan region
of Vienna in an unbalanced panel for 22 points in time between 1999 and 2005, and
station speciﬁc data for all stations surveyed in 2003 as well as local market and de-
mand characteristics.122 The degree of centrality is measured based on the number
of times a station is a direct neighbor to another station.123 (cf. Firgo et al. (2015),
equation (6), p. 85) Subsequently, a diagonal centrality matrix C is constructed with
diagonal elements cii expressing the degree of centrality for station i.
The regression equation speciﬁes as the dependent variable the price and as the
explanatory variables (i) the spatially lagged price, (ii) the spatially lagged price ac-
counting for the degree of centrality, (iii) the degree of centrality (as a sole variable)
and (iv) a set of explanatory variables relating to station and local market charac-
teristics.124 (cf. Firgo et al. (2015), equation (7), p. 85) In addition, the speciﬁcation
includes spatially lagged error terms using binary spatial weights. As estimation
methods Maximum Likelihood estimation and the inclusion of instrumental vari-
ables are used. The results reveal a signiﬁcant positive correlation of market prices
with the spatially weighted prices of centrally located stations while the relationship
with the spatially lagged price vector is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This
conﬁrms the prediction that changes in the price levels in local markets are critically
determined by variations of the price decisions of the central player. Moreover, the
regression coeﬃcient for the centrality measure is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
which implies that the absolute price level is not explained by the degree of centrality.
Thus, on average the price of a centrally located station does not exceed the market
price suggesting that no evidence in favor or against the price competition eﬀect or
the market share eﬀect for the central station is found. In addition, based on the
regression coeﬃcients simulations illustrate that an exogenous price shock imposed
on a central station leads in total (after consideration of direct and indirect feedback
eﬀects) to higher price levels for the central station as well as to a higher average
market price as the degree of centrality increases. (cf. Firgo et al. (2015), p. 88f)
In conclusion, the paper of Firgo et al. (2015) provides evidence for the interrela-
tion of asymmetrical location patterns with the price level in retail gasoline markets.
Speciﬁcally, controlling for spatial dependencies among stations their results imply
a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the price of a centrally located sta-
122Initially conducted tests (variance ratio tests, two-way ﬁxed eﬀects estimation on station and
time ﬁxed eﬀects, rank reversal tests) reveal that the price variation in the cross sections does
not follow random movements. (cf. Firgo et al. (2015), p. 84)
123A matrix G is constructed with all stations spawning the rows and columns. Then, an element
gij equals one if station i and j are nearest neighbors and zero otherwise.
124The spatial weight matrix accounts for distance decay eﬀects and contains reciprocal values of a
distance measure between stations' locations. It is constructed based on a circular radius of 5
minutes driving time which implies that for stations farer away respective matrix elements are
zero.
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tion and the average local market price. The importance of the spatial dependence
between market players and asymmetric location patterns is further illustrated in
shock simulations where a higher degree of centrality implies that exogenous shocks
have stronger impacts on prices of the centrally located ﬁrm as well as on the average
local market price.
Recently, the paper of Firgo et al. (2016) corroborates previous ﬁndings of econo-
metric analyses on the importance of central locations for the determination of price
levels. They use data on station and local market characteristics for the Austrian
gasoline market, and unbalanced price data available for 23 points in time between
1999 and 2005. Local markets are deﬁned based on the average driving time to near-
est competitors. Consistency requires that the shortest driving time to a station
outside a local market always exceeds the shortest driving time to the closest rival
within. Moreover, the market center is deﬁned as the point which minimizes the sum
of distances to all stations in the local market. (cf. Firgo et al. (2016), p. 80)
Two regression models are examined (cf. Firgo et al. (2016), equations (2) and (3),
p. 81). Firstly, controlling for station and local market characteristics the relation-
ship of the spatially lagged price with the market price for markets with three, four,
ﬁve and six stations is estimated. Secondly, by including diagonal matrices to select
central and remote stations the eﬀect of the price of a central station on remote
stations, the eﬀect of a remote station's price on the central station as well as the
coeﬃcient of the price interaction between remote stations is estimated for the same
variation in market size as in the ﬁrst case.
The results show that for the ﬁrst model - where stations are assumed to have equal
(symmetric) market power in terms of their proximity to the center - the spatially
lagged price is signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with the market price. This con-
ﬁrms previous results (e.g. Pennerstorfer (2009), Firgo et al. (2015)) and indicates
that on average stations increase prices if their nearest neighbors increase prices.
Moreover, the regression results reveal that this interaction continuously declines as
the market size increases from three to six players. For the second case evidence is
provided that the asymmetric location pattern critically impacts the price interaction
between stations. For markets with three stations the ﬁndings of the ﬁrst regression
model is conﬁrmed. However, as the number of stations in the local market increases
the coeﬃcient of the central station on its rivals' prices increases (compared to the
case with three stations) whereas the coeﬃcient indicating the inﬂuence of the remote
station on the central competitor as well as the coeﬃcient measuring the interaction
between remote stations continuously decrease.
In sum, Firgo et al. (2016) provide clear-cut evidence for the inﬂuence of a central
location on the pricing behavior in local markets. Their results indicate that as the
market size in terms of the number of competitors increases the importance of a
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central market position increases. For growing market sizes remote stations are less
inﬂuenced by the prices of nearest rivals and more likely to follow the price setting
behavior of the centrally located station.
2.5 Models of Economic Agglomeration
Models of economic agglomeration use a more general approach to describe loca-
tion patterns of ﬁrms compared to game theoretically based price-location models.
These sort of models are rooted in the ﬁeld of economic geography and address the
fundamental questions of why economic activities of agents (households and ﬁrms)
agglomerate in certain places in space, and consequently try to identify the deter-
minants of agglomeration and dispersion forces. Typically cities represent central
points in space and clearly the size and signiﬁcance of cities widely diﬀer. Therefore,
a particular stream of the research activities is concerned with the functional and
locational characteristics of cities to provide explanations for their existence and de-
velopment as well as their hierarchical order.125
The goal in this subsection is to give a very brief overview on topics that are dealt
with in agglomeration models. Intuition shall be developed for the research topics
of regional economics that can have ramiﬁcations in very diﬀerent ﬁelds of the eco-
nomic literature such as growth and development theories or urban planning. For
this reason this subsection ﬁrstly draws largely on the literature review of Fujita &
Thisse (1996), and secondly presents the seminal paper of Eaton & Lipsey (1982)
and a more recent article of Tabuchi & Thisse (2011) in greater detail.
In the preceding chapters of this survey it was made clear that ﬁrms' tendency to ag-
glomerate or disperse in a linear and bounded market is the result of interdependent
proﬁt-maximizing decisions concerning price and location. In short, agglomerative
and deglomerative forces emerge from spatial competition that is inherently strate-
gic. According to Fujita & Thisse (1996) in the context of economic behavior and
125The origins of economic geography models date back to the work of Johann Heinrich von Thue-
nen. His approach yields concentric circles around a central place (city). Depending on speciﬁc
characteristics such as price, transportation cost and the production technology he argues that
it is proﬁtable to produce only one type of product in a certain spatial region with respect to
the center. Furthermore, the geographer Walter Christaller developed the prototype of a model
of central places. His model implies the existence of diﬀerent central places distinguished by
a degree of centrality which is deﬁned by the amount and quality of services rendered to its
population. Assuming a regular transportation network connecting a system of places, a basic
outcome is that in order to distribute the areas between the centers with goods and services a
triangular pattern of central locations emerges where the adjacent areas to each central place
form a regular hexagonal spacing. Conditions for this pattern to emerge are, ﬁrstly, that ﬁrms
need to sell at least to a minimum demand to remain proﬁtable, and secondly, that consumers
need to be close enough to a central place and be willing to incur transportation costs. Moreover,
Christaller's hierarchy model implies that the goods and services only ﬂow in one direction from
a city with higher centrality to less central places. (cf. Mulligan (1984), p. 9f)
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decision making in space two further general determinants have to be considered
to explain agglomeration and dispersion forces which are (i) externalities, and (ii)
increasing returns.
The standard approach for the ﬁrst determinant is to introduce information exter-
nalities and explain agglomeration as a result of informational spillover eﬀects among
ﬁrms. (cf. Fujita & Thisse (1996), pp. 348-351) The intuition behind this idea is that
ﬁrms share diﬀerent types of information and mutually beneﬁt from public good
characteristics of information ﬂows. Since close proximity fosters the use of commu-
nication channels and stimulates economic activity ﬁrms tend to settle at a central
location. On the other side a higher concentration of ﬁrms in one area leads to an
increase in the commuting distances of its employees that live in the surrounding
neighborhoods, thus, in turn to higher wage rates and land rents in the agglomer-
ation area. An equilibrium for the spatial distributions of ﬁrms and households is
reached if these countervailing eﬀects are balanced.
Formally, ﬁrms' proﬁts are an increasing function in the aggregate beneﬁt from ex-
changing information and a decreasing function in the amount of the two production
factors land and labour (cf. Fujita & Thisse (1996), p. 349, equation 2.2). On the
side households' income and total budget comprises of distance-dependent commut-
ing costs (with a unit transportation cost coeﬃcient) as well as the costs for the
consumption of land and a composite good. The aggregate information beneﬁt as
well as land rates, wage rates and commuting costs are a function of the agents'
locations. In equilibrium the land and labour markets are cleared and all households
achieve an optimal level of consumption (utility) and all ﬁrms an optimal level of
proﬁts. Within this setting research interests focus on the impact of the functional
form of the aggregate information beneﬁt function (e.g. linear or exponential decay
factor) on the characteristics of the equilibrium state and are associated with the
prominent works of the Japanese regional economist Masahisa Fujita (for corresond-
ing references see Fujita & Thisse (1996), p. 350f). Depending on the parameter
ranges and the functional form of the beneﬁt function either unique conﬁgurations
(one city with a center) or multiple equilibria (polycentric cities) obtain. Moreover,
in an extension of the model with costly intraﬁrm communication, solutions obtain
that cover the case of a city with a central business district surrounded by residential
areas in which ﬁrms' back units are located. This demonstrates that these sort of
agglomeration models are capable of relating communication technologies and ﬁrms'
intra-organizational structures with their spatial distribution and the structures of
modern cities characterized by the dichotomy of a central business district and resi-
dential areas.
The second determinant of increasing returns refers to the notion of monopolis-
tic competition and input diﬀerentiation. (cf. Fujita & Thisse (1996), p. 352ﬀ) The
prototype of this sort of model assumes a population of homogeneous consumers
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distributed in space who choose among a homogeneous product and a variety of n
diﬀerentiated goods. For a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods the utility is described
by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES-type function). Likewise, ﬁrms' produc-
tion function shall be of a CES-type. Formally, utility is U = (z0)
α(
∫ n
0 [z(ω)]
ρdω)
1−α
ρ
and produced output x = (z0)
α(
∫ n
0 [z(ω)]
ρdω)
1−α
ρ where z denotes the consumption
goods and the input factors respectively (with z0 as the homogeneous good and the
homogeneous input), ρ is a measure for the degree of substitution and diﬀerentiation
respectively (0 < ρ < 1), and α is a scaling factor. Furthermore, it is assumed that
labor represents the only input factor with a ﬁxed labor requirement and a variable
part in the production function (i.e. the marginal labor requirement a). Addition-
ally, transportation costs shall be increasing in distance and strategic price setting
of ﬁrms shall be ruled out, i.e. the standard assumption of monopolistic competi-
tion holds with a considerable number of diﬀerentiated products as substitutes and
thus no ﬁrm having a signiﬁcant impact on market price and total consumption. In
sum, this model implies increasing returns to scale (through ρ), isoelastic demand
curves, and an aggregate demand being independent of the spatial distribution of
consumers.126 In equilibrium the price for a ﬁrm is given by the marginal produc-
tion cost of labor with equilibrium wages W (x) varying in space times a mark-up
which increases with the degree of product diﬀerentiation: p∗(x) = aW (x)ρ . The basic
intuition for an equilibrium state in which agents agglomerate and form a city is
that a higher density of ﬁrms attracts more consumers to satisfy their needs for a
greater variety of goods. Likewise, a higher density of consumers attracts more ﬁrms
since they expect higher demand. Firms tend to agglomerate since they specialize in
production to increase proﬁts, and consumers tend to agglomerate since they prefer
a greater variety of goods to increase utility. Repulsive forces are represented by a
higher degree of competition in denser areas. Indeed the literature yields equilibrium
states with bell-shaped distribution functions, however, to dissolve repulsive forces
a certain degree of diﬀerentiation has to prevail. (cf. references in Fujita & Thisse
(1996), p. 354)
A further stream of the regional economics literature, which is associated with the
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, applies the monopolistic competition model on a two
sector economy and explains the emergence of core-periphery structures. (cf. refer-
ences in Fujita & Thisse (1996), p. 355ﬀ) As suggested above, two types of goods are
in the economy: a homogeneous agricultural good produced by an immobile labor
force and traded with zero transportation costs, and a continuum of diﬀerentiated
industrial goods produced by a mobile work force with distance-dependent trans-
portation costs and sold on a monopolistically competitive market. Agglomeration
126Intuitively, since buying from a more distant seller proportionally decreases utility and no ﬁrm
applying certain pricing strategies the elasticity of an individual demand at a certain location
is the same throughout the whole spatial area.
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forces emerge due to real income eﬀects. As ﬁrms agglomerate price competition
intensiﬁes generating an increase in real incomes which leads to a migration of the
mobile industrial workers, in turn causing more ﬁrms to locate at the central place etc.
By contrast, the immobile workers and production of the agricultural good remain
in the periphery. In sum this yields a core-periphery structure with the production of
the diﬀerentiated industrial goods concentrated in one region. In the literature it is
shown that the existence of an equilibrium depends on the degree of transportation
costs, the degree of diﬀerentiation, and the share of the industrial sector to the econ-
omy. Moreover, it is emphasized that the equilibrium is not stable suggesting that
the initial state of a regional economy plays a critical role in its development path.
Extended versions of this model consider a totally mobile work force and generally
positive transportation costs. In this case, a single city surrounded by agricultural
regions represents an equilibrium state subject to the degree of diﬀerentiation and
transportation costs as well as the total population of workers. Intuitively, the smaller
the degree of diﬀerentiation, i.e. if products become closer substitutes, more incen-
tives exist to locate at the periphery. Finally, consider that this model type is capable
of explaining hierarchical structures in regional patterns (as in the earliest works on
the subject by Walter Christaller). This is achieved by introducing diﬀerent groups
of diﬀerentiated industrial goods with diﬀerent transportation rates. Then, higher
ordered cities provide a greater amount of groups of diﬀerentiated goods. However,
in contrast to Christaller the ﬂow of goods also comprises reverse transactions from
less central to more central cities.
An example for an agglomeration model that exempliﬁes the eﬀect of a particular
type of externality is provided in the seminal article of Eaton & Lipsey (1982). They
motivate their work by developing a spatial model for ﬁrms' location decision that
is based on their proﬁt-maximizing behavior. The question that the paper tries to
answer is why, in other words, do ﬁrms retailing diﬀerent goods tend to cluster to-
gether? (Eaton & Lipsey (1982), p. 58) This stands in contrast to previous models
of central places, most prominently the Christaller model, which explains the hier-
achical pattern of agglomeration spots by geometrical arguments.
The model of Eaton and Lipsey assumes that households consume two goods (A
and B) with a constant rate over time normalized to one. The market is the one-
dimensional line with unit length and uniformly distributed consumers with density
D. After each time period households assess their stock and decide to go on a shop-
ping trip where they are allowed to buy either a bundle of good A consisting of 1α
units, a bundle of good B with 1β units, or both bundles. On their trip consumers
minimize transportation costs which are increasing in traveled distance. Then, the
probability to consume A in one period is α, and to consume B in one period is β.
On the supply side ﬁrms are distinguished into respective groups A and B. They
face ﬁxed costs of KA and KB, marginal costs are assumed to be zero. Moreover,
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prices are exogenously given (pA, pB), for the choice of the location each ﬁrm assumes
zero conjectural variation, and it shall be allowed for more than one ﬁrm to locate
on the exact same spot. Finally, for an equilibrium to prevail three conditions shall
hold: ﬁrstly, locations are optimal (i.e. guarantee maximal proﬁts), secondly, there
is no exit (i.e. revenues must exceed ﬁxed costs), and thirdly there is no entry. To
characterize equilibrium states these three conditions are exploited.
Using the proﬁt-maximizing condition, it follows that in equilibrium only central
places of order two (i.e. a seller of type A and a seller of type B are located at the
same place), or central places of order two and groups of sellers with the same type
(A or B) exist, or there could be a conﬁguration with groups of sellers of type A and
B only if they are separated by a central place of order two. (cf. Eaton & Lipsey
(1982), proposition 1 and 2, p. 62) In short, there will never exist an equilibrium
where a ﬁrm of type A is a neighbor of a ﬁrm of type B, rather they must form a
central place of order two. The intuition is that the two alternatives for ﬁrm A (to
forming a pair with B) do not constitute an equilibrium since then proﬁts for all
players are not maximal.127
Using the exit condition the second main argument of the paper is that multiple
equilibria obtain such that only one group of ﬁrms (A or B) and central places of
order two emerge in the market, or such that only central places of order two prevail.
Essentially, for one group of ﬁrms to exist the relation of ﬁxed costs (e.g. KA) to the
expected revenue (i.e. αpADY )
128 must stay within deﬁned boundaries. Formally,
the necessary conditions for ﬁrms of group A and ﬁrms of group B can not be ful-
ﬁlled simultaneously which rules out a state where they are located simultaneously.
(cf. Eaton & Lipsey (1982), proposition 4, p. 64 and the verbal arguments on p. 65)
The model of Eaton & Lipsey (1982) earns its signiﬁcance by establishing the ex-
istence of central places based on ﬁrms' proﬁt-maximizing decisions. It represents a
generalization of traditional central place models and emphasizes that central places
attract consumers who purchase two diﬀerent goods and therefore steal demand from
neighboring ﬁrms. In other words, there arise negative demand externalities for ﬁrms
producing one type of product due to central places at which two types of prod-
ucts are served. Therefore, central places require larger market areas for neighboring
ﬁrms to stay in the market. Moreover, the paper stresses that the equilibrium is not
uniquely deﬁned and that it depends on the transportation costs and the relative
volumes of multipurpose and single-purpose shopping. (cf. Eaton & Lipsey (1982),
p. 66f)
127The ﬁrst alternative is that the ﬁrm of type A (ﬁrm Ai) remains at its initial location ai, then
however, it could move towards ﬁrm B and increase proﬁts by gaining more consumers who
want product A and B. The second alternative is to locate at the spot of its nearest A-type
neighbor ﬁrm Ai−1 at ai−1, this leads to optimal proﬁts for the migrant ﬁrm Ai but only if the
local market for consumers who solely purchase good A is big enough. This condition, however,
leads the neighboring ﬁrm Ai−1 to move to the left of Ai. (cf. Eaton & Lipsey (1982), p. 63)
128Y denotes the length of the required market area such that a ﬁrm bears ﬁxed costs.
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The article of Tabuchi & Thisse (2011) serves as an example for the second determi-
nant for agglomeration and presents a model of monopolistic competition in space.
Within an economy of diﬀerent industrial sectors under monopolistic competition
it describes the linkage between transportation costs and spatial equilibrium conﬁg-
urations. The intuition behind the model is to provide the theoretical background
for the empirical observation that a substantial decrease in transportation costs over
the past decades is correlated with an increase in the population of major cities in
OECD countries.
The economcy consists of a homogenous (agricultural) good and a set of diﬀerentiat-
ed goods each produced in a speciﬁc industry (i = 1, ..., I). Each industry is subject
to monopolistic competition and comprises a continuum of varieties (v ∈ [0, n]). The
spatial setting is a circumference with length 1. The model can be considered as a
general equilibrium model and deploys a two-stage procedure that unfolds by back-
ward induction. In the ﬁrst stage the distribution of workers is dealt with, workers
are assigned to an industry and a city and the individual choices correspond to a
maximum level of utility. In the second stage, the prices, demand functions and wage
rates of the industries are derived.
The starting point of the analysis is a CES-type utility function. Total utility results
from consuming industrial goods and the agricultural good, the intensity of compe-
tition is captured by the elasticity of substitution (σi) for each industry. (cf. Tabuchi
& Thisse (2011), equation (2), p. 242) Maximizing total utility subject to the budget
constraint (total consumption has its source from earned wages) yields the individual
demand at a particular location for a variety of an industrial good that is produced
at a particular location. Transport costs (τ) are assumed to be the same accross
industries. (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (2011), p. 243) The speciﬁcation of the demand
functions and the introduction of transportation costs allows to deﬁne a ﬁrm's proﬁt
assigned to a particular industry and located in a particular city where the solution
for the population of workers in the city is subject to stage 1. (cf. ibid., equation (4),
p. 243) Maximizing respecitve proﬁt functions yields the equilibrium price for each
industry which hinges upon the amount of transportation costs (i.e. the distance to
travel from the production site in a city to the consuming worker) times a mark-up
that depends on the competitiveness of the industry. For each industry wages are
restricted by ﬁrms' operating proﬁts. Based on the equilibrium price level the condi-
tion that all varieties can be produced in a city the equilibrium wage level is derived
which diﬀers by industry and location since operating proﬁts are not equal across
cities and industries. (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (2011), equation (7), p. 243)
The distribution of the population over the whole economy yields multiple equilib-
ria. Therefore, Tabuchi & Thisse (2011) focus on two equilibrium conﬁgurations to
scrutinize the role of transportation costs in the model. In the ﬁrst case all cities are
of equal size and all industries are present in each city, but in every city diﬀerent
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varieties are produced. In the formal treatment of the ﬁrst case an interval for the
level of transportation costs is speciﬁed such that an equilibrium pattern of an even
number of cities which are symmetrically and equidistantly located around the circle
exists and is stable. The intuition for the condition to prove the existence is that an
equilibrium requires all industries to be equally represented in each city, i.e. to set
up an equilibrium industry share that is dependent on the elasticity of substitution
and the coeﬃcient in preference. (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (2011), equation (12), p. 244)
It follows that the problem reduces to the positiveness of an auxiliary function g ≥ 0
which yields the threshold value for transportation costs. If transportation costs are
suﬃciently low (beneath the threshold) then the number of cities in equilibrium
doubles compared to the opposite case. (cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (2011), Proposition 1,
p. 245)
The second case deals with a situation where cities have diﬀerent sizes and larger
cities oﬀer a larger set of industries. The corresponding section 4 in the paper deals
with the simpliﬁed case of one diﬀerentiated industry (i = 1) and the case of mul-
tiple diﬀerentiated industries in the economy. It contains mathematical descriptions
of the development of spatial patterns starting with an initial equilibrium state of a
given number of cities and deﬁnes the conditions under which the evolution process
evolves. The basic intuition for the outcome of the analysis for the single industry
case is that the initial development state starts with a relatively high value of trans-
portation costs, given a steady decrease as a ﬁrst threshold is passed the symmetrical
initial conﬁguration becomes unstable and the size of the cities ﬂuctuates. For further
decreasing transportation costs bigger cities grow and smaller cities shrink. Eventu-
ally, the numer of cities is halved and the size of the remaining cities has doubled.
(cf. Tabuchi & Thisse (2011), p. 247)
In conclusion, the article of Tabuchi & Thisse (2011) represents a prominent and
demanding example for a recent model of economic agglomeration. It demonstrates
that the emergence of agglomerations is the result of an outcome of economic inter-
actions between workers and consumers respectively on the one side and ﬁrms on
the other. The equilibrium states are not uniquely deﬁned but pertain to the princi-
ples of proﬁt- and utility-maximization. The main impact of the study is to provide
explanations for the evolution of spatial conﬁgurations as the level of transportation
costs decreases.
2.6 Conclusion
This survey tells the story of why diﬀerent ﬁrms in a market would be likely to
position their product and settle their premise or retail outlet in a similar segment,
or why this would not be the case. Two arguments (and a ﬁnal reference note) shall
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close the examination:
1. The selected articles show that the location determinants can be assigned to
groups representing the following diﬀerent economic impact factors (a summary
of the various model characteristics and predictions is provided in table 1):
• consumers' reservation price and elasticity of demand
• transportation costs incurred by consumers (t-costs)
• number of ﬁrms n
• characteristic and timing of the game
 simultaneous and sequential entry
 relocation costs and entry costs
 revocability and commitment of the decision on the strategic variables
 assumptions on the reaction of rivals' strategic behavior to one's ac-
tions (conjectural variations / strategic foresight)
• characteristics of the consumer distribution
• market geometry
To wrap up the state of the ﬁeld, generally two countervailing eﬀects impact
ﬁrms' locations. In a duopoly, the market share eﬀect suggests to maximize
the hinterland and move towards the center whereas price competition in-
creases the closer the two rivals get. Since all consumers purchase by assump-
tion Hotelling (1929) introduced the proposition of an agglomerative behavior.
Smithies (1941), and later Economides (1984) and Hinloopen & van Marrewijk
(1999) focused their research questions on this assumption of perfectly inelastic
demand and an inﬁnite consumers' reservation price. If an increasing number
of consumers opt out of the market since their net utility of consumption be-
comes negative, intuitively no additional consumers can be gained by relocating
and price competition becomes the dominant force. Thus, Economides (1984)
argues for a repulsive location behavior and eventually for the emergence of iso-
lated local markets served by monopolists. Hinloopen & van Marrewijk (1999)
demonstrate that Hotelling and Economides studied extreme cases of location
patterns in terms of the value of the reservation price and shed light on the
intermediary transition process partially vindicating Hotelling's suggestion to
move towards the center.
A general proposition of minimized product and location diﬀerences can not
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be obtained in a subgame perfect price and location equilibrium since for close
distances an incentive to undercut exists. This is, of course, one of the main
insights of d'Aspremont et al. (1979). Moreover, they show that this instance
can be traced back to the underlying transportation cost regime. More specif-
ically, Economides (1986) deﬁned the exact parameters for a transportation
cost function for which a subgame perfect market equilibrium exists. Within
certain parameter ranges lower transportation costs imply that ﬁrms agglom-
erate in equilibrium which reﬂects the signiﬁcance of the market share eﬀect
due to a higher ﬂexibility of consumers choosing their utility-maximizing prod-
uct. However, according to Economides (1993) who generalizes from a duopoly
to oligopolistic markets the proposition holds that for n ≥ 3 a subgame per-
fect equilibrium does not exist since the dominant strategy for remote ﬁrms
relies upon the market share eﬀect. This ﬁnding anticipates the importance of
asymmetrical structures in spatial markets whose signiﬁcance became clearer
in more recent theoretical studies concerning nonuniform consumer distribu-
tions and intersecting roadways, and empirical studies on gasoline markets.
Furthermore, the literature suggests that location patterns are critically de-
termined by the strategic interaction between the players, and particularly,
by the role of the timing in the game, that is the question of the sequence in
which each player decides on his strategic variable(s). The contributions of Hay
(1976) and Prescott & Visscher (1977) are among the ﬁrst to study sequential
entry games pinning down the strategic dependencies in the location choice
by introducing prohibitively large relocation costs. Generally, their studies ar-
gue for equidistant location conﬁgurations which conﬁrms the intuition that
the size of local markets has to correspond to the level of entry costs. Thus,
under sequential entry the market share eﬀect loses its signiﬁcance. Then, the
dominant strategy is to identify market niches and to secure one's position
against later entrants. Subsequent research interests focus on the question how
location patterns vary contingent on the level of entry costs and which player
takes the most advantages out of the sequential entry order. Exemplarily, the
studies of Neven (1987), Economides et al. (2004) and Goetz (2005) show that
symmetric and asymmetric location patterns result from sequential entry and
that ﬁrst-mover advantages exist, however, under certain parameter ranges al-
so late entry may be proﬁtable. Additionally, the studies of Anderson (1987)
and Fleckinger & Lafay (2010) include sequential interactions for price and
location decisions in a duopoly. They emphasize that particular product and
market characteristics cause players to commit themselves diﬀerently which
implies advantages for the ﬁrst or the late mover in the game and subsequently
location outcomes either reveal a dispersed pattern or the two players locating
comparatively close.
80
Chapter 2. Centrality and Spatial Diﬀerentiation - A Literature Survey
As the assumption of a uniform consumer distribution is dropped and the
market geometry is extended to a setting of intersecting roads the tendency is
observed that ﬁrms are attracted to the region where consumers are concentrat-
ed. Generally however, the problem of characterizing the interaction patterns
and ﬁnding an equilibrium for a price-location game becomes more complicat-
ed. For the case of nonuniform consumer distributions the studies of Neven
(1986), Tabuchi & Thisse (1995) and Anderson et al. (1997) illustrate that the
characteristics of the distribution determine the existence and the type of the
location equilibrium. For intersecting roads the studies of Braid (1989) and
Braid (2013) demonstrate that a subgame perfect equilibrium in a simultane-
ous price location game does not exist which is attributable to the inherent
asymmetry in the competitive relationship of the players related to the notion
of nonlocalized competition and the speciﬁcs of the market geometry.
Table 2.1: Model predictions on the location choice in spatial competition models a
la Hotelling
Spatial number model location location determinants
competition model of ﬁrms assumptions tendency and outcomes
Uniform consumer
distribution:
Hotelling (1929) 2 s2S-P-L game129, linear t-
costs
(+)130 perfectly inelastic de-
mand, ZCV131 in price
and location
Smithies (1941) 2 location game solved for 3
types of competition, lin-
ear demand, linear t-costs
(+,−) ratio of t-cost coeﬃcient
and intercept (demand
curve)
Economides (1984) 2 s2S-P-L game, ﬁnite reser-
vation price, linear t-costs
(−) ﬁnite reservation price im-
plies emergence of local
monopolies
Hinloopen & van
Marrewijk (1999)
2 s2S-P-L game, ﬁnite reser-
vation price, linear t-costs,
symmetric locations
(+,−) (+) for intermediate mar-
ket sizes ( 8
7
≤ α ≤ 4
3
)
and increasing reservation
prices
d'Aspremont et al.
(1979)
2 s2S-P-L game, inﬁnite
reservation price, linear
t-costs, price equilibrium
not subgame perfect
(−) quadratic t-costs yield
subgame perfect price
equilibrium
129simultaneous two-stage price-location game
130(+) indicates the tendency to agglomerate, (−) to disperse in space.
131zero conjectural variation
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Economides (1986) 2 s2S-P-L game, inﬁnite
reservation price, t-cost
exponent α, symmetric
locations
(+,−) (+) for decreasing α and
1.26 = α ≤ α < 5
3
Economides (1993) n ≥ 3 s2S-P-L game, inﬁnite
reservation price, linear
t-costs
(+) no subgame perfect loca-
tion equilibrium, distance
decay eﬀects, exogenous
equidistant spacing yields
U-shaped Nash prices
Hay (1976) n ≥ 2 elastic demand, costly re-
location, sequential entry
(−) cost and demand parame-
ters
Prescott & Visscher
(1977)
n ≥ 2 costly relocation, sequen-
tial entry, prefect foresight
(−) n, endogenization of n,
ﬁxed costs, endogeniza-
tion of mill price
Neven (1987), Econo-
mides et al. (2004),
Goetz (2005)
n ≥ 2 s2S-P-L game, quadratic
t-costs, sequential entry,
ﬁxed costs
(+,−) ﬁxed costs and market
size, entry deterrence,
symmetrical and asym-
metrical equilibria exist
Anderson (1987) 2 sequential game, one's
price and location chosen
at diﬀerent stages, linear
t-costs
(−) location leader takes cen-
ter and becomes price fol-
lower, ﬁrst mover advan-
tage, second mover locates
remotely, irrevocable loca-
tion choice
Fleckinger & Lafay
(2010)
2 sequential game, one's
price and location chosen
at one stage, linear and
quadratic t-costs
(+) ﬁrms locate on same side
of the market, second
mover advantage (location
closer to center), equal
ﬂexibility of product and
price
Nonuniform cons.
distribution:
Neven (1986) 2 s2S-P-L game, quadratic
t-costs, symmetrical loca-
tions, symmetrical distri-
bution
(+) peak of symmetrical dis-
tribution c( 1
2
), consumer
concentration implies ag-
glomeration
Tabuchi & Thisse
(1995)
2 s2S-P-L game, quadratic
t-costs, simultaneous and
sequential location sub-
game, triangular distribu-
tion, unbounded line
(+) asymmetrical equilibrium,
ﬁrst mover takes cen-
ter, consumer concentra-
tion implies agglomera-
tion
Anderson et al. (1997) 2 s2S-P-L game, quadratic
t-costs, log-concave distri-
bution
(+) convexity properties
determine symmetric or
asymmetric equilibrium,
consumer concentration
implies agglomeration
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Intersecting roads:
Braid (1989) n ≥ 2 s2S-P-L game, center oc-
cupied, linear t-costs
(+) no subgame perfect lo-
cation equilibrium, asym-
metric price reaction be-
tween central and remote
ﬁrms
Braid (2013) n ≥ 2 s2S-P-L game, center oc-
cupied, quadratic t-costs,
symmetric locations
(+) no subgame perfect lo-
cation equilibrium, asym-
metric price reaction be-
tween central and remote
ﬁrms, increase in the num-
ber of ﬁrms leads to ag-
glomeration
2. From the state of the ﬁeld it can be concluded that a complex set of determi-
nants has to be used to explain location conﬁgurations. The original setting
of the linear city has been subject to various analyses that bring diﬀerent im-
pact factors in sharper focus. By contrast, theoretical models for the setting of
intersecting roads allow for a wider range of research questions and still leave
interesting research gaps open. In particular, a model that examines the strate-
gic interaction in the price and location choice of an incumbent and an entrant
ﬁrm in a setting of intersecting roads has not been developed yet. Clearly,
ﬁndings for a two-stage game where prices and locations are chosen simulta-
neously are provided in the studies of Braid (1989) and Braid (2013) yielding
the outcome that a subgame perfect equilibrium does not exist. Inspired by
the treatment of the linear city and the approaches of Anderson (1987) (and
Fleckinger & Lafay (2010)), however, it is interesting to apply a sequential
entry game to the market type of intersecting roads and investigate ﬁrms' be-
havior and potential equilibrium outcomes. One of the considerable simplest
settings would be to treat the case of a duopoly and take the location of the
ﬁrst entrant as exogenously given. This provides the case of a model for entry
into a local monopoly market with spatial characteristics where location costs
are prohibitively high (thus relocation does not occur). The strategic interac-
tion in this game focuses on the choice of the entrant on his price and location,
and the subsequent price reaction of the incumbent ﬁrm. The dichotomous op-
tions for a reaction to entry would be to accept the competitor, or to undercut
him and deter entry. Consequently, conditions on the each of these have to be
speciﬁed.
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Admittedly, this survey took a narrow (but deep) focus to reﬂect the vast literature
on the Hotelling model. Therefore, it is natural that some aspects that are related
to model predictions on location decisions were not dealed with in greater detail. In
order to account for these further aspects the following streams of the literature can
be considered:
• Locations in mixed strategy equilibria
An interesting example for the case of mixed strategies in the Hotelling model is
provided in Gal-Or (1982). She demonstrates that a mixed strategy equilibrium
exists in a Hotelling duopoly with the two ﬁrms picking prices randomly from a
continuous price distribution. The existence condition requires that the drawing
is from a deﬁned price interval that decreases as ﬁrms move towards the center.
Moreover, a general treatment of mixed strategy equilibria and conditions on
their existence is provided in Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) who show that in the
Hotelling model each subgame in prices has an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
A further important contribution is the study of Osborne & Pitchik (1987).
They characterize the set of mixed strategy price equilibria in the Hotelling
model subject to diﬀerent location combinations. Based on these results the
location choices are examined and a unique subgame perfect location equilib-
rium is derived with the ﬁrms locating above the quartiles at 0.27. In addition,
they ﬁnd a subgame perfect equilibrium with mixed strategies in locations.
Xefteris (2013) departs from Osborne & Pitchik (1987) but in contrast to their
model he assumes an inﬁnite reservation price. Subsequently, he proves that
a subgame perfect equilibrium exists with both ﬁrms locating at the market
center.
• Cournot competition in the Hotelling model
Competition may take the form of price competition (Bertrand competition) or
via competition in quantities (Cournot competition). An example for Cournot
competition in the Hotelling model is given in the study of Anderson & Neven
(1991). They show that for a linear demand function Cournot oligopolists (n ≥
2) who spatially discriminate their price locate at the center of the market. Pal
(1998) conﬁrms the ﬁnding that in a linear city model ﬁrms agglomerate at the
market center and additionally ﬁnds that in a circular market an equidistant
location pattern under Cournot competition obtains. Matsushima (2001) re-
examines his results for the circular market and shows that an agglomerative
location tendency is sustained in equilibrium with half of the ﬁrms locating
at one point on the circle, and the other half locating at the opposite point.
More recently, Matsumura et al. (2005) relate the contradictory predictions of
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the previous studies for the circular market to diﬀerences in the transportation
cost functions as well as to simultaneous and sequential location choices.
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3 Does Entry Pay Oﬀ in a Linear City
with a Center?*
3.1 Introduction
Every time a ﬁrm considers entering a market it is confronted with the issues of
price setting and product positioning. Many examples illustrate that successful mar-
ket entry is based on a balanced approach where a business strategy is required
that diﬀerentiates the own product and deﬁnes the competitive space but also ac-
knowledges competitors' strengths and avoids thriftless head-to-head battles. Take
for instance the case of Capital One, which developed from a monoline credit card
company to one of the largest U.S. bank holding companies in less than a decade.
In 1994 there was little diﬀerentiation in the credit card industry which lead it to
develop statistical models to oﬀer custom-tailored products determining best com-
binations of product, price and credit limit. Key to success was not to aggressively
enter the market exposing itself to direct price competition taking on the incumbents'
uniform pricing strategies but to develop its own skills using analytics for product
customization.
Under a current market state characterized by a given set of incumbent ﬁrms entry
is by its nature a sequential phenomenon. Balancing the costs and proﬁts the entrant
ﬁrm determines his strategic variables, most importantly product and price, where-
as the incumbents separately choose for an appropriate reaction by means of their
strategic variables, which in a ﬁrst reaction would be their price excluding the option
to reposition products in the short run.1 For the entrant to optimize his proﬁts and
make consecutive strategic decisions he has to address the following questions. What
*This paper was presented at the 8th International Research Meeting in Business and Management
(IRMBAM) on 5th of July 2017 held at the IPAG Business School in Nice, and the XXXII
Jornadas de Economia Industrial on 7th of September 2017 held at the University of Navarra
in Pamplona.
1The assumption that pricing decisions are more ﬂexible than the choice of products can be disput-
ed. An interesting paper providing results where products and prices are chosen simultaneously
by one player is provided by Fleckinger & Lafay (2010). We stick to the classical approach to
study entry and assume that price setting is less costly than to reposition a product. A nonex-
haustive list of papers using this assumption are Goetz (2005), Lambertini (2002), Tabuchi &
Thisse (1995), and Prescott & Visscher (1977).
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is the most proﬁtable choice to design a new product accounting for the position of
the incumbent ﬁrms' competing products with regards to consumers' preferences?
What is the best price considering the current incumbents' product prices and, more
importantly, the anticipated future price decisions as a reaction to market entry? In
sum, what is the combined optimal choice for a new product and its price such that
entry proﬁts are maximized and given the incumbents' price reaction to entry?
Based on and inspired by the paper of Anderson (1987) we pick up these issues
and develop a model that examines market entry in a two-stage game with an en-
trant ﬁrm choosing his price and location in the ﬁrst stage and one incumbent ﬁrm
choosing his price in the second stage. Accordingly, the analysis is conducted within
the framework of a spatially diﬀerentiated market with a linear transportation cost
scheme where the only distinguishable characteristic between ﬁrms' products is given
by ﬁrms' location.
Our contribution to previous studies is two-fold. Firstly, we extend the original linear
spatial setting accentuating the central location and introduce an additional variable
Z which represents a node in the center and thus a measure of centrality in the mar-
ket. This enhances the strategic interaction between the players. Consequently, we
are interested in the impact the variable Z has on the pricing behavior, the decision
on the entry location, and the realized proﬁts of the players. Secondly, in the light
of the centrality bonus Z, we are interested if entry leads to a higher or lower degree
of product diﬀerentiation in the market. In terms of the taxonomy of Fudenberg &
Tirole (1984) we address the question whether a 'puppy dog' behavior of the entrant
ﬁrm that entails choosing a diﬀerentiated product and applying a low price strategy
proves to be a reasonable outcome of the entry game.
As usual, a short description of the structure of the paper is given at the beginning.
In section 2 the assumptions of the model are depicted. In section 3 the strategic
decision set of the incumbent ﬁrm is explained by sketching his reaction functions
dependent on the entry price and the entry location. In section 4 the strategic de-
cision of the entrant is scrutinized, based on the best replies of the incumbent, we
derive proﬁtable entry pricing strategies and pricing functions respectively, construct
proﬁt functions for each strategy and examine their dependency on the entry loca-
tion. This drills down to a set of propositions on the entry decision in subsection
4.2.4. In section 5 we exemplify and interpret the results in three entry scenarios and
compare our formulas with the model of Anderson (1987). Eventually, we summarize
our results and provide conclusions.
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3.2 The Model
The analysis departs from the classic duopoly model of spatial competition developed
by Hotelling (1929). Consider two ﬁrms, ﬁrm I and ﬁrm E, on a line of unit length
(l = 1), the linear city. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the line and each
consumer shall purchase one unit of a homogenous product. The total number of
consumers is normalized to N = 1. Further, ﬁrms' marginal costs c are assumed to
be equal and set to c = 0. To extend the setting we assume that a spoke of length
Z is attached to the market at a distance of z = 12 taken from the respective ends
of the linear city. The uniform distribution and unit demand assumption shall also
apply for the Z consumers on the spoke.
Clearly, since competing ﬁrms sell a good of identical properties they diﬀerentiate
themselves by two factors: price and location. Let pI and dI denote the price and
location of ﬁrm I and pE and dE the respective quantities for ﬁrm E. To be consistent
with the literature, locations dI and dE are deﬁned as distances taken from respective
extremes of the city as depicted in ﬁgure 3.1. Correspondingly, the market is divided
into two hinterlands attached to the respective seller and an intermediate market
consisting of the demand between the competing rivals 1− dI − dE plus the demand
given by Z concentrated in the market center at z = 12 . Consumers in the hinterlands
will always purchase at their dedicated seller, i.e. demand is perfectly price inelastic.
We now consider a two-stage sequential price-location game to study market entry.
Stage 1 : the entrant ﬁrm E decides on his location dE and price pE
Stage 2 : the incumbent ﬁrm I chooses his price pI and reacts to entry
The following general assumptions precede the analysis:
• Firm E does not incur any entry costs (f = 0).
• Consumer's transportation costs increase linearly with a constant factor t when
traveling one unit distance.
• The exogenous variable Z represents a measure for centrality in the market. The
player seizing the market center shall be rewarded by a shift in the demand for
his product. Consequently, all Z consumers from the additional spoke purchase
at the seller that captures the indiﬀerent consumer at x = 12 . This implies that
no transportation costs incur when traveling on the spoke. Without loss of
generality Z shall be restricted to 0 < Z ≤ 12 .
• Firm I's location dI shall be exogenously given, e.g. resulting from a former
market entry or a change in the regional market structure (length of the city).
Due to the symmetry of the problem the range of dI lies within [0,
1
2 ].
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• In the asymmetric case, i.e., dI < 12 the entrant principally has two options
to locate in the market. He could locate on the opposite end of the city with
respect to the incumbent's location. This implies that for dE <
1
2 the center
lies between the contenders (as depicted in ﬁgure 1). Alternatively, the entrant
could choose his location such that the incumbent lies between the entrant's
mill and the city center. To reduce complexity and study the eﬀect central-
ity has on the strategic decision of the incumbent ﬁrm we restrict ﬁrm E's
hinterland to be on the opposite spoke of ﬁrm I's location and set 0 ≤ dE < 12 .
• Consumers' behavior is solely characterized by maximizing their utility, likewise
ﬁrms' behavior is determined by proﬁt maximization. The endogenous variables
of the model are ﬁrms prices pE , pI and the entry location dE . These represent
the strategic variables of the game.
We solve the game by backward induction.
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the Hotelling model with a centrality bonus Z
Comment: At given locations ﬁrm I and ﬁrm E earn a hinterland of size dI and dE . In the market
center at z = 1
2
a spoke of length Z is connected with the linear city. In the given setting ﬁrm I
captures the market center and the indiﬀerent consumer locates on the right hand side of the center
at x > z.
3.2.1 Demand and Proﬁt Functions
The starting point of the analysis is consumers' utility indiﬀerence condition from
which the position x of an indiﬀerent consumer is derived. Since we apply the sim-
plifying assumption that consumers on the spoke bear no transportation costs when
traveling to the center at z = 12 the expression for x is the same as in the classi-
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cal Hotelling setting with linear transportation costs. Under a suﬃciently positive
surplus s¯ the familiar relation obtains:
uI = uE (3.1)
s¯− pI − t(x− dI) = s¯− pE − t(1− dE − x) (3.2)
The indiﬀerent consumer is attracted by comparatively lower prices and reacts pro-
portionately to a change in ﬁrms' locations:
x =
pE − pI
2t
+
1− dE + dI
2
(3.3)
Based on x(pI , pE , dI , dE) ﬁrms' demand and proﬁts are contingent upon the relation
of prices pI , pE , and locations dI , dE , e.g. for the incumbent I four diﬀerent cases
have to be distinguished:
qI =

1 + Z pI ≤ pE − t(1− dI − dE)
x+ Z pI < pE + t(dI − dE), x > 12
x pI > pE + t(dI − dE), x < 12
0 pI > pE + t(1− dI − dE)
(3.4)
In the ﬁrst case the incumbent undercuts the entrant and earns the whole market
1 +Z. We refer to this as the deterrence strategy and denote the respective price as
pDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE). In the second case the incumbent accommodates entry
and earns the center Z by setting prices below the threshold of pE + t(dI − dE).
In particular two options exist, ﬁrm I could either react modestly and choose to
set a price such that his proﬁt function is maximized, i.e. the ﬁrst order condi-
tion ∂ΠI(pI ,qI=x(pI ,pE ,dI ,dE)+Z)∂pI = 0 is fulﬁlled. Alternatively, he could react to an
aggressive entry behavior and defend his claim for the center Z by setting a price
that prohibits the entrant from taking the center. We refer to the ﬁrst of these
options as the accommodation-Z strategy, the second option as the deterrence-Z
strategy, and denote the respective prices as pAccZI =
1
2(pE + t(1−dE +dI +2Z)) and
pDetZI = pE + t(dI − dE). The third case refers to the situation where ﬁrm I accom-
modates entry but loses the center Z which occurs for prices above the boundary
pE+t(dI−dE). The best price the incumbent could set in this situation is derived from
the ﬁrst order condition neglecting the centrality bonus Z. We refer to this as the ac-
commodation strategy and denote the respective price as pAccI =
1
2(pE+t(1−dE+dI)).
Finally, the incumbent may apply a defensive strategy avoiding being undercut and
charge a price only to defend his hinterland dI . We refer to this as the deference
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strategy and denote the respective price as pDefI = pE + t(1− dI − dE).
To sum up, the following proﬁt function for ﬁrm I obtains:
ΠI =

pDetI (1 + Z) pI ≤ pDetI
pAccZI (x+ Z) p
Det
I < pI < p
DetZ
I , x >
1
2
pDetZI (
1
2 + Z) pI = p
DetZ
I − , → 0
pAccI x p
DetZ
I < pI ≤ pDefI , x < 12
0 pDefI < pI
(3.5)
3.3 Incumbent's Reaction Functions
3.3.1 The Price Reaction Function
The objective in the next subsections is to to examine the structure of ﬁrm I's pricing
behavior with respect to the entry price pE and the entry location dE . The analysis
provides an understanding of ﬁrm I's decision in the second stage of the game and
makes use of the predeﬁned ﬁve strategies pDetI , p
AccZ
I , p
DetZ
I , p
Acc
I and p
Def
I .
Lemma 1: Based on a comparative analysis of the proﬁt functions and provided
that d/E < dE ≤ d.E the incumbent ﬁrm prefers to charge his prices pI with respect
to ﬁrm E's prices pE according to:
(I) for dI ≤ d/I
pI =

pDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE) pE > pE
pAccZI =
1
2 (pE + t− tdE + tdI + 2tZ) pˆE < pE < pE
pDetZI = pE + t(dI − dE) p†E < pE < pˆE
pAccI =
1
2(pE + t(1− dE + dI)) p˜E < pE < p†E
pDefI = pE + t(1− dI − dE) pE < p˜E
(3.6)
(II) for d/I < dI < d
.
I
pI =

pDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE) pE > pE
pAccZI =
1
2 (pE + t− tdE + tdI + 2tZ) pˆE < pE < pE
pDetZI = pE + t(dI − dE) pˇE < pE < pˆE
pDefI = pE + t(1− dI − dE) pE < pˇE
(3.7)
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(III) for d.I < dI
pI =

pDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE) pE > pE
pAccZI =
1
2 (pE + t− tdE + tdI + 2tZ) pˆE < pE < pE
pDetZI = pE + t(dI − dE) pE < pˆE
(3.8)
with:
pE = t(3 + dE − dI + 2Z − 4
√
dE(1 + Z))
pˆE = t(1 + dE − dI + 2Z)
p†E = t(1 + dE − dI + 4Z − 2
√
2Z(1 + 2Z))
p˜E = t(3dI + dE − 1)
pˇE = t
(
dE + dI
(
1−2dI−2Z
1−2dI+2Z
))
d.E =
1
4(1+Z)
d/E = 3
√
Z(12 + Z)− 12(1 + 6Z)
d/I =
1
2 + Z −
√
Z(12 + Z)
d.I =
1
4(1− 2dE − 2Z +
√
4d2E + (1− 2Z)2 + 4dE(1 + 6Z))
Lemma 2: The incumbent ﬁrm maximizes his proﬁts for the accommodation-Z
strategy ΠAccZI in the market region x >
1
2 by charging p
AccZ
I only if dE < d
.
E , and
maximizes his proﬁts for the accommodation strategy in the market region x < 12 by
charging pAccI only if dI < d
/
I .
Proofs: See the appendix.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the incumbent's pricing strategies follow a distinct
order dependent on the entrant's prices pE . For high values of pE the incumbent
kicks the entrant out of the marked by shifting the market boundary to his oppo-
nent's mill setting pDetI . For a decreasing pE maximizing proﬁts over his prices and
charging pAccZI becomes proﬁtable for ﬁrm I while still being in charge of the center
Z (x > 12). Next, the accommodation-Z strategy is dominated by the deterrence-Z
strategy implying that the incumbent's best choice for a further decreasing pE is to
fence oﬀ his opponent to take the center and push the market boundary onto ﬁrm
E's spoke by charging pDetZI . Under speciﬁc locational settings and a low pricing
strategy of the entrant ﬁrm the incumbent accepts the loss of the center Z (x < 12)
and chooses to set the proﬁt maximizing price pAccI . Finally, for an aggressive pricing
behavior of ﬁrm E the incumbent defends his position in the market by applying the
deference strategy and setting pDefI .
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Lemma 1 demonstrates that ﬁrm I's pricing decision is a complex function of the
location parameters dI , dE , and the centrality bonus Z. This relation is best high-
lighted by comparing our results with the ﬁndings in Anderson (1987) where a re-
spective price reaction function is analyzed for the Hotelling case without the center
Z. In Anderson (1987) the existence of the accommodation strategy is dependent
on a sole relation between the locations. For market settings where the two players
locate fairly close, i.e., (1 − dI)2 < dE , the accommodation strategy is dominated
by the deterrence and deference strategy, and thus, is not a feasible option for the
incumbent ﬁrm. By contrast if the intermediate market becomes large enough, i.e.,
(1− dI)2 > dE , ﬁrm I optimizes his price pI according to his accommodation proﬁt
function in a given price interval for pE . For high pE deterrence dominates accommo-
dation and for low pE deference dominates accommodation, but for an intermediate
pricing behavior the accommodation case proves feasible.
The existence of the centrality bonus Z increases the strategy options for the in-
cumbent and divides the market into two sections x > 12 and x <
1
2 . In particular,
Z causes a shift in ﬁrm I's accommodation proﬁt function splitting it into a part
for the area x > 12 where Z increases accommodation proﬁts (accommodation-Z
strategy) and a part for the area x < 12 where I does not occupy the center, i.e.,
Z = 0 (accommodation strategy). A comparison of ﬁrm I's proﬁt functions shows
that under consideration of all ﬁve strategy options no explicit relation between dI
and dE to specify the viability for an accommodating pricing behavior of ﬁrm I ex-
ists (see proof 1). Instead the analysis demonstrates that a set of relations between
dE and Z for the part x >
1
2 , and between dI and Z for the part x <
1
2 obtains.
2
As regards dE and Z intuition suggests that for an increase in Z the range for the
two players to locate in the market becomes smaller such that the accommodation-Z
strategy for ﬁrm I yields the comparatively highest proﬁts which is highlighted by
the reciprocal relation d.E =
1
4(1+Z) . In line with this, a high value for Z corresponds
with a smaller space in which the entrant ﬁrm could locate such that the incumbent
would not promptly change from an undercutting behavior to the deterrence-Z strat-
egy to defend the center. Put diﬀerently, if the entrant comes relatively close to the
center (dE > d
.
E) the accommodation-Z strategy is always dominated either by the
deterrence strategy or the deterrence-Z strategy. Since the pricing functions pDetI and
pDetZI do not intersect the switchover point is described by a discontinuity given by
the intersection of the respective proﬁt functions at p×E = t(2+2Z−dE(3+4Z)−dI).
(cf. ﬁgure 3.5 and 3.3) If the entrant remains below the critical distance (dE < d
.
E)
the incumbent plays the accommodation-Z strategy maximizing his proﬁts by charg-
ing pAccZI for prices pE in [pˆE , pE ]. Then, his pricing behavior is characterized by a
discontinuity at pE . (cf. ﬁgure 3.4 and 3.2)
2In fact the existence of the accommodation-Z and the accommodation strategy in terms of the
thresholds d.E and d
/
I is not dependent on respective locations dI and dE .
93
Chapter 3. Does Entry Pay Oﬀ in a Linear City with a Center?
This ﬁnding is supplemented by the behavior of dI contingent upon Z. Graphically,
an increase in Z shifts deterrence proﬁts, accommodation-Z proﬁts and deterrence-Z
proﬁts upwards whereas the accommodation and deference proﬁts are not aﬀected.
In particular, if Z is small and ﬁrm I loses the center the accommodation strategy
reveals the comparatively highest proﬁts only for locations below the threshold d/I .
Now, if Z increases the range for the incumbent to apply the accommodation strat-
egy shrinks and if Z exceeds (1−2dI)
2
8dI−2 (which is equivalent to dI ≥ d/I) the incumbent
never accommodates entry when x < 12 but rather plays the deterrence-Z strategy.
Analogously, the proﬁtability of the deference strategy is restricted to moderate val-
ues of Z or locations in the interval [d/I , d
.
I ] respectively. This implies that given ﬁxed
values for dI and dE ﬁrm I has a dominant strategy to defend the center and charge
pDetZI for Z ≥ (dE+dI)(2dI−1)2(dE−dI) (equivalent to dI ≥ d.I). Put diﬀerently, given a ﬁxed Z
the incumbent prefers the deterrence-Z strategy to the deference strategy as well as
the accommodation strategy for low pE when having a location close enough to the
center, i.e. when dI > d
.
I .
Table 3.1: Model parameters for the extended Hotelling model
Location parameters Intermediate markets
Z d/I d
.
E d
/
E d
.
E − d/E 1− 12 − d.E 1− d/I − d.E
0 0.5 0.25 −0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.05 0.384 0.238 −0.153 0.238 0.262 0.387
0.1 0.355 0.227 −0.065 0.227 0.273 0.418
0.15 0.338 0.217 −0.013 0.217 0.283 0.445
0.2 0.326 0.208 0.022 0.186 0.292 0.466
0.25 0.317 0.2 0.049 0.151 0.3 0.483
0.3 0.310 0.192 0.070 0.123 0.308 0.489
0.35 0.305 0.185 0.086 0.099 0.315 0.510
0.4 0.3 0.179 0.1 0.079 0.321 0.521
0.45 0.296 0.172 0.112 0.061 0.328 0.531
0.5 0.293 0.167 0.121 0.045 0.333 0.540
An illustration of the relationships between dI , dE and Z is given in table 3.1
where the location parameters from lemma 1 and respective intermediate markets
(1 − dI − dE) are depicted. For equidistant and increasing values of Z the critical
values for d/I , d
.
E , and d
/
E are calculated. Recall that these are linked to diﬀerent
strategy options for ﬁrm I, namely d/I expresses the viability of the accommodation
strategy (ﬁrm I loses Z, x < 12), d
.
E indicates the viability of the accommodation-Z
strategy (ﬁrm I gains Z, x > 12), and d
/
E marks a lower limit for the applicability of
the deference strategy3.
As expected an increase in Z leads to a decrease in the location parameters d/I and
d.E whereas d
/
E rises. This is also demonstrated by the size of the intermediate mar-
kets. Speciﬁcally, we can compare the intermediate market in the extended Hotelling
3The negative values imply that for Z < 1
6
the deference strategy is feasible for all dE <
1
2
(cf.
proof 1).
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setting for the case where the incumbent locates at the market center (dI =
1
2) with
the intermediate market for the same ﬁxed dI in the classical Hotelling model ac-
cording to the relation dE = (1 − dI)2 (cf. Anderson (1987)). Clearly, the existence
of the center as well as an increase in Z implies a higher required distance between
the players for accommodation to still be a strategic option for the incumbent ﬁrm.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the incumbent's proﬁt functions over pI for pE ≈ 1.86
Comment: The solid lines depict the viable proﬁt ranges. For small pI the incumbent chooses the
deterrence strategy and charges pDetI . For pI > pE−t(1−dI−dE) he changes to the accommodation-Z
strategy and rides the curve until the proﬁt maximizing price pAccZI ≈ 1.88 is realized. The maximum
is a feasible solution since ﬁrm E's location lies below the boundary dE < d
.
E ≈ 0.19. For prices
pI > pE + t(dI − dE) the deterrence-Z strategy is preferred. The parabola below represents the
accommodation proﬁts for Z = 0. Parameter values are dI = 0.4, dE = 0.1, t = 1, and Z = 0.3.
Figure 3.3: Illustration of ﬁrm I's proﬁts over pI for pE ≈ 1.00
Comment: The entrant's location lies above the threshold dE > d
.
E ≈ 0.19. As a result the proﬁt
maximizing price pAccZI ≈ 1.35 depicted by the vertical dashed line exceeds the boundary value
pE + t(dI − dE) ≈ 1.10 and the accommodation-Z strategy is not viable. Parameter values are
dI = 0.4, dE = 0.3, t = 1, and Z = 0.3.
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of the incumbent's proﬁt and price functions over pE
Comment: The solid lines depict the viable proﬁt and price ranges. For high values of pE the
deterrence strategy yields the highest proﬁts. At pE ≈ 1.86 (ﬁrst vertical dashed line) the incumbent
changes to the accommodation-Z strategy, the change in prices is described by a discontinuity. At
pˆE ≈ 1.3 (second vertical dashed line) accommodation-Z proﬁts intersect with deterrence-Z proﬁts,
the transition is described by a kink in the proﬁt and pricing curves. Thus, for decreasing pE
charging pDetZI proves to be the most proﬁtable pricing strategy. Indeed the deterrence-Z strategy
dominates the accommodation and deference strategy (small dashed proﬁt curves) over the whole
price range since dI > d
.
I ≈ 0.34 and dE > d/E ≈ 0.07. This scenario represents part (III) of the
reaction function in lemma 1. Parameter values are dI = 0.4, dE = 0.1, t = 1, and Z = 0.3.
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of the incumbent's proﬁts and price functions for the case dE > d
.
E
Comment: The entrant locates close to the center with dE > d
.
E ≈ 0.19. As a result the
accommodation-Z strategy is not viable and the incumbent directly changes from the deterrence
strategy to the deterrence-Z strategy. The intersection is given at p×E = t(2+2Z−dE(3+4Z)−dI) ≈
0.94 (ﬁrst vertical dashed line). Additionally, the incumbent switches from pDetZI to the deference
strategy provided that pE < pˇE ≈ 0.1 (second vertical dashed line). The transitions in the proﬁt
functions are described by a kink whereas the price changes are characterized by two discontinuities.
This scenario refers to part (II) of the reaction function in lemma 1 with the noticeable diﬀerence
that charging pAccZI is not a viable option for ﬁrm I. Parameter values are dI = 0.4, dE = 0.3,
t = 1, and Z = 0.3.
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3.3.2 The Location Reaction Function
We set up the incumbent's best price response as a function of the entrant's location
choice for a deﬁned price range. Analogous to the proceeding in lemma 1 a set of
expressions of the form pI(dE) obtains. Since we conduct a comparative analysis
of ﬁrm I's proﬁts, as expected, analogous results with respect to the price reaction
function are derived. Additionally, for the low price range a particularity in the
location reaction is found. In the following, the reaction function is dissected into
a part corresponding to a remote location of the incumbent ﬁrm in lemma 3 and a
part corresponding to a location close to the center of the city in lemma 4.
Lemma 3: Provided that dI ≤ d/I and for the price intervals p4E > pE > p5†E and
p4E > pE > p
.
E ﬁrm I's location reaction function comprises of:
(I) for p4E ≥ pE > p/E
pI =
pAccZI = 12 (pE + t− tdE + tdI + 2tZ) 0 < dE < dEpDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE) dE < dE (3.9)
(II.a) for Z > ζ and p/E ≥ pE > p.E , and
(II.b) for Z < ζ and p/E ≥ pE > p5†E
pI =

pAccZI =
1
2 (pE + t− tdE + tdI + 2tZ) 0 < dE < dˆE
pDetZI = pE + t(dI − dE) dˆE < dE < d×E
pDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE) d×E < dE
(3.10)
(III.a) for Z > ζ and p.E ≥ pE > p5†E
pI =
pDetZI = pE + t(dI − dE) 0 < dE < d×EpDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE) d×E < dE (3.11)
(III.b) for Z < ζ and p5†E ≥ pE > p.E
pI =

pAccZI =
1
2 (pE + t− tdE + tdI + 2tZ) 0 < dE < dˆE
pDetZI = pE + t(dI − dE) dˆE < dE < d†E
pAccI =
1
2(pE + t(1− dE + dI)) d†E < dE < d‡E
pDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE) d‡E < dE
(3.12)
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Lemma 4: Provided that dI ≥ d/I and for the price intervals p4E > pE > p5‡E and
p4E > pE > p
.
E ﬁrm I's location reaction function comprises of:
(I ) for p4E ≥ pE > p/E
pI =
pAccZI = 12 (pE + t− tdE + tdI + 2tZ) 0 < dE < dEpDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE) dE < dE (3.13)
(II.a) for Z > ζ and p/E ≥ pE > p.E , and
(II.b) for Z < ζ and p/E ≥ pE > p5‡E
pI =

pAccZI =
1
2 (pE + t− tdE + tdI + 2tZ) 0 < dE < dˆE
pDetZI = pE + t(dI − dE) dˆE < dE < d×E
pDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE) d×E < dE
(3.14)
(III.a) for Z > ζ and p.E ≥ pE > p5‡E
pI =
pDetZI = pE + t(dI − dE) 0 < dE < d×EpDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE) d×E < dE (3.15)
(III.b) for Z < ζ and p5‡E ≥ pE > p.E
pI =

pAccZI =
1
2 (pE + t− tdE + tdI + 2tZ) 0 < dE < dˆE
pDetZI = pE + t(dI − dE) dˆE < dE < dˇ†E
pDefI = pE + t(1− dI − dE) dˇ†E < dE < dˇ‡E
pDetI = pE − t(1− dI − dE) dˇ‡E < dE
(3.16)
with:
d/I =
1
2 + Z −
√
Z(12 + Z)
dE = 5 + dI +
1
t pE + 6Z − 4
√
(pEt + 1 + dI + 2Z)(1 + Z)
dˆE =
1
t pE + dI − 1− 2Z
d×E =
2(1+Z)− 1
t
pE−dI
3+4Z
d†E =
1
t pE + (dI − 1− 4Z) + 2
√
2
√
Z(1 + 2Z)
d‡E = 5 + dI +
1
t pE + 4Z − 4
√
(pEt + 1 + dI + Z)(1 + Z)
dˇ†E =
1
t pE − dI
(
1−2dI−2Z
1−2dI+2Z
)
dˇ‡E = 1− dI − pE(1−dI+Z)t(1+dI+Z)
p4E = t(3− dI + 2Z)
p/E = t
(
5+12Z+8Z2
4(1+Z) − dI
)
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p.E = t(1− dI + 2Z)
p5†E = t
(
5+18Z+16Z2−4dI(1+Z)−2
√
2
√
Z(1+2Z)(3+4Z)
)
4(1+Z)
p5‡E = t
(1−2dI)(1+dI+Z)(1+2Z)
2(1−2dI+2Z)(1+Z)
p./E =
1
2 t(1− 2dI)
ζ ≈ 0.015503
Proofs: See the appendix.
Generally, the expressions in lemma 3 and 4 demonstrate that contingent on the
price level of pE diﬀerent strategy combinations for the incumbent obtain to react
to the entrant's choice for his location dE . For the high price range (part (I)) the
accommodation-Z strategy supports market entry, for the modest price range (parts
(II.a) and (II.b)) the accommodation-Z strategy and the deterrence-Z strategy con-
stitute the entry accommodating strategy set, and for the low price range (parts
(III.a) and (III.b)) entry occurs either when the deterrence-Z strategy or a strategy
triple (pAccZI , p
DetZ
I , p
Acc
I ) and (p
AccZ
I , p
DetZ
I , p
Def
I ) is used. Furthermore, in the ex-
amined price ranges deterrence is always part of ﬁrm I's strategy set.
The location reaction function reveals the pattern that it is proﬁtable for the in-
cumbent to accept entry when the entry location lies below a threshold value and
that entry will be deterred when the entrant locates too far from his edge of the
city respectively. Particularly, for the parts (I), (II) and (III.a) the critical entry
locations where the incumbent switches to an entry deterring behavior are given
by the expressions dE and d
×
E . These represent ﬁrm I's indiﬀerence conditions be-
tween the deterrence strategy and the accommodation-Z strategy as well as with the
deterrence-Z strategy. We see that dE and d
×
E increase and dˆE decreases with decreas-
ing pE which determines the range of the accommodation-Z strategy and ﬁrm I's
proﬁt maximizing behavior when being in charge of the center. Let us depart for in-
stance at the high price interval (part (I): pE > p
/
E) where ﬁrm I optimizes his proﬁts
over pI setting p
AccZ
I when the entry location lies below dE and the transition in the
pricing behavior is described by a discontinuity. (cf. ﬁgure 3.6) Now, in the modest
price interval (part (II): pE > p
.
E , p
5†
E , p
5‡
E ) the accommodation-Z strategy is only
proﬁtable for locations until the threshold of dˆE since charging p
DetZ
I and defending
the claim for the center proves to be the best choice for locations exceeding dˆE . If
the incumbent charged pAccZI for locations dE > dˆE he would lose the center Z and
thus would not realize accommodation-Z proﬁts. Graphically, the proﬁt function for
the deterrence-Z strategy is a tangent to the parabola of the accommodation proﬁt
function at dˆE and the price transition is deﬁned by a kink. (cf. ﬁgure 3.7) Thus, for
dˆE < dE the deterrence-Z strategy ﬁlls up the space between the accommodation-Z
strategy and deterrence, and the switchover point for entry deterrence is determined
by d×E .
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Figure 3.6: Illustration of the incumbent's proﬁt and price functions over dE for part (I)
in lemma 3 and 4
Comment: The marked solid lines depict the viable proﬁt and price ranges. For low values of dE the
accommodation-Z strategy dominates until the proﬁt function intersects with the deterrence proﬁts
at dE ≈ 0.079 (marked by the ﬁrst vertical dashed line). Thus, for dE > dE deterrence is the domi-
nant strategy. The transition in the price functions is described by a discontinuity. Additionally, the
tangential intersection of the accommodation proﬁts with the proﬁts for the deterrence-Z strategy
(dashed proﬁt function) is given at dˆE = 0.8 (marked by the second vertical dashed line). The
proﬁts for the accommodation strategy are depicted by the dash-dotted function, and the proﬁts
for the deference case by the dotted function. Parameter values are dI = 0.4, pE = 2.0, t = 1, and
Z = 0.3.
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Figure 3.7: Illustration of the incumbent's proﬁt and price functions over dE for part (II)
in lemma 3 and 4
Comment: The marked solid lines depict the viable proﬁt and price ranges. For entry locations
dE < dˆE = 0.1 (ﬁrst vertical dashed line) the accommodation-Z strategy yields the highest proﬁts
and dominates the other strategies (due to the small resolution of the graphs this eﬀect is not
visualized). Since dˆE < dE ≈ 0.215 the deterrence-Z strategy is preferred for locations between dˆE
and the intersection of the deterrence-Z proﬁts with the deterrence proﬁt function at d×E ≈ 0.214
(second vertical dashed line). For dE > d
×
E deterrence is the dominant strategy. The transition in
the pricing behavior from the accommodation-Z strategy to the deterrence-Z strategy is given by
a kink, the change between the deterrence-Z strategy and the deterrence strategy is described by a
discontinuity. Parameter values are dI = 0.4, pE = 1.3, t = 1, and Z = 0.3.
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The centrality bonus Z has diﬀerent eﬀects on the location parameters. As argued
for the price reaction function, proﬁts for the accommodation and the deference
strategy are not aﬀected by a change in Z whereas proﬁts for the deterrence, the
deterrence-Z, and the accommodation-Z strategy are shifted upwards and slopes
increase when Z rises. Consequently, as illustrated in table 3.2, an increase in Z
causes the switchover points dE and d
×
E to mount. Additionally, an increase in Z
implies that the proﬁtability of the accommodation-Z strategy shrinks and causes
dˆE that marks the kink solution to decrease. Thus, for these three location parameters
an increase in Z shows the same impact on the location reaction as a decrease in
pE . In numbers, for pE = 1, Z = 0.2 and dI = 0.4 the accommodation-Z strategy
is not feasible anymore and the strategy set solely consists of pDetZI and p
Det
I which
corresponds to a transition of part (II.a) to part (III.a) in the reaction functions in
lemma 4, entry deterrence then occurs at the location d×E = 0.263. This reveals an
interesting result of the analysis: given the rise of dE and d
×
E when Z increases and
entry prices pE decrease the incumbent is less inclined to accommodate entry when
being in charge of the center (x > 12) as well as to deter entry, rather as intuition
might suggest the dominant strategy for moderate entry locations dE < d
×
E is to
defend the claim for the center and charge pDetZI . To turn this argument around
since, for instance, dˆE > dE in the high entry price scenario (pE = 2) in table
3.2 the accommodation-Z strategy proves to be more proﬁtable for all Z than the
deterrence-Z strategy.
Table 3.2: Model parameters of the location reaction function for dI = 0.4
pE = 2 pE = 1
Z dE dˆE d
×
E dE dˆE d
×
E
0 0.024 1.4 −0.133 0.203 0.4 0.200
0.05 0.032 1.3 −0.094 0.219 0.3 0.219
0.1 0.040 1.2 −0.059 0.235 0.2 0.235
0.15 0.049 1.1 −0.028 0.252 0.1 0.250
0.2 0.058 1.0 0.000 0.268 0.0 0.263
0.25 0.068 0.9 0.025 0.284 −0.1 0.275
0.3 0.079 0.8 0.048 0.301 −0.2 0.286
0.35 0.089 0.7 0.068 0.317 −0.3 0.295
0.4 0.101 0.6 0.087 0.334 −0.4 0.304
0.45 0.112 0.5 0.104 0.350 −0.5 0.313
0.5 0.124 0.4 0.120 0.367 −0.6 0.320
Secondly, the centrality bonus Z impacts the structure of the reaction function in the
parts (II) and (III) in lemma 3 and 4 where a distinction by two cases determined
by the numerical constant ζ has been made. Graphically, if Z shrinks the tangent
ΠDetZI to the parabola Π
AccZ
I ﬂattens (increase in dˆE), simultaneously the critical
location for a switchover of the deterrence-Z strategy to the accommodation strategy
and the deference strategy respectively decreases (decrease in d×E) since the diﬀer-
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ence between the two parabolas ΠAccZI and Π
Acc
I constantly diminishes. Thus, there
exists a threshold for Z given by ζ where the accommodation-Z strategy and the
accommodation strategy (in (III.b)) as well as the accommodation-Z strategy and
the deference strategy (in (III.b)) are part of the same location reaction function.
Alternatively, this eﬀect is found in the ambiguous relation of the price p.E with p
5†
E
and p5‡E respectively that mark the bounds for respective pricing strategies to exist.
Furthermore, lemma 3 and 4 illustrate for the low price range ((III.b) and (III.b))
that ﬁrm I's pricing behavior hinges upon its location dI . In particularly, for Z < ζ
the accommodation strategy is part of the preferred strategy set for locations that lie
in a remote part of the city, i.e. dI ≤ d/I , and the deference strategy is included in the
reaction function when I locates close to the center or dI ≥ d/I . The expression for d/I
is derived by a comparative proﬁt comparison of the accommodation and deference
strategy where the linear proﬁt function for the deference case marks a tangential
solution to the accommodation proﬁt function denoted as d˜E . Clearly, for locations
dE > d˜E charging p
Acc
I is not proﬁtable since otherwise the incumbent would be
undercut at his own mill. The existence of accommodation is only established when
the intersection of deterrence-Z proﬁts with accommodation proﬁts (d†E) falls below
the tangential intersection d˜E , for d
†
E > d˜E accommodation is obsolete and deference
exists. Note that the bound for the accommodation strategy d/I is dependent on Z
and matches with the corresponding bound in the analysis of the price reaction in
lemma 1.
3.4 The Entrant's Optimization Problem
This section provides an analysis of the entrant's decision on the strategic variables
price pE and location dE . Based upon the price reaction function in subsection 2.2
our approach is to apply the calculus of a classical Stackelberg leader-follower game
to derive expressions for pE . (cp. chapter 3 in Anderson (1987)) These represent
solutions for deﬁned sets of dI , dE and Z which subsequently enable us to endogenize
dE and derive expressions for an optimal entry set (p
∗
E , d
∗
E). Additionally, by means
of ﬁrm I's location reaction function in subsection 2.3. the incumbent's reaction to
the suggested price-location combinations for entry is examined.
Lemma 1 demonstrates that the price reaction of the incumbent ﬁrm dissects into
three diﬀerent parts. These are parts where the incumbent takes a strong, a moderate
and a weak market position in terms of his location dI with regards to the center.
Thus, we analyze the Stackelberg leader-follower game for each of these three parts.4
4According to the price reaction function in subsection 2.2 and proof 1 we assume d/I < d
.
I and
dE > d
/
E respectively (this order strictly holds for all Z ≤ 16 ). For d/I > d.I which occurs for small
dI and dE that is when the players locate far from one another the deference strategy (p
Def
I ) is
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Also, it is evident only to consider the cases where the incumbent does not opt for the
deterrence strategy. Initially, we have to identify diﬀerent combinations of locations
dI and dE with the possible set of entry prices pE .
3.4.1 Derivation of location segments
Generally, the entrant's optimization problem is formulated as5:
max
pE ,dE
ΠE(pE , dE , pI(pE , dE)) (3.17)
Since we scrutinize a two-stage game ﬁrm E's proﬁts and thus his optimization
problem is contingent upon ﬁrm I's price. Now, let us analyze the case with the
incumbent setting pAccZI and seizing the center (x >
1
2). Clearly, ﬁrm I then gains
demand in the amount of x+ Z and ﬁrm E in the amount of 1− x. It follows:
ΠE(p
AccZ
I ) =: Π
Acc
E = −
1
4t
p2E +
1
4
(3 + dE − dI + 2Z) pE (3.18)
Applying the ﬁrst order condition to ΠAccE yields ﬁrm E's best price as a function of
the locations of the contenders dE and dI as:
pAccE =
1
2
t (3 + dE − dI + 2Z) (3.19)
The entrant chooses pAccE only for a deﬁned set of dE and dI . The highest possible
price ﬁrm E could set is pE where the incumbent is indiﬀerent to the deterrence
strategy or the accommodation-Z strategy. Subsequently, the corner solution pE is
preferred to pAccE only if
∂ΠAccE
∂pE
> 0, i.e. when proﬁts can be increased by a slight
price increase. Evaluating
∂ΠAccE
∂pE
∣∣∣∣
pE
> 0 reduces to:
dI > 3 + dE + 2Z − 8
√
dE(1 + Z) (3.20)
On the contrary, since for any price exceeding pE entry is deterred, the existence of
pAccE demands pE > p
Acc
E which reduces to dI < 3 + dE + 2Z − 8
√
dE(1 + Z).
dominated by the accommodation strategy (pAccI ). The set dI ≤ d/I and dE < d/E implies p˜E < 0.
This is not dealt with in the cause of the price reaction function. For the argument to omit the
explicit treatment of this case refer to the proﬁt comparison in subsection 3.2.3.
5By symmetry ﬁrm E's demand and proﬁt functions are the same as ﬁrm I's only interchanging
subscripts and the term x with 1− x.
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The lowest possible price ﬁrm E charges under pAccZI is given by pˆE marking the point
of indiﬀerence for ﬁrm I between the accommodation-Z strategy and the deterrence-
Z strategy. Since proﬁts increase linearly in pE the corner solution pˆE is the best
price in this regard. Additionally, pAccZI demands 1 − x(pAccZI ) < 12 which reduces
to pE > pˆE . It follows that p
Acc
E must fulﬁll this price restriction from which we derive:
dI > dE + 2Z − 1 (3.21)
Condition (3.21) is fully in accord with pAccE > t(1 + dE − dI + 2Z) derived from
pAccZI < p
DetZ
I . By contrast, under p
AccZ
I a price decrease is proﬁtable for ﬁrm E for
the location set dI < dE + 2Z − 1 which follows from ∂Π
Acc
E
∂pE
∣∣∣∣
pˆE
< 0.
Finally, we have to consider the imposed restrictions from lemma 1. For dE we utilize
the boundaries d.E and d
/
E which both only depend on the value of Z, and for dI the
boundaries d/I and d
.
I have to be accounted for. Note that d
.
I is a function of dE and
Z whereas d/I is only determined by Z. Together with the expressions in (3.20) and
(3.21) these four terms deﬁne sets of locations that are attached to ﬁrm I's price
reactions according to his reaction function in lemma 1 and ﬁrm E's pricing decision
based on ΠAccE .
Figure 3.8: Illustration of the location segments for t = 1
Comment: The downward sloping curve represents the condition for pE in equation (3.20), the
straight increasing line depicts the condition for 1 − x < 1
2
in equation (3.21), and the concave
increasing curve refers to the term d.I . All three functions are drawn for Z =
1
2
. The lines that
parallel the ordinate and abscissa depict the boundaries d.E and d
/
I , the dashed lines correspond to
Z = 0, and the dotted lines to Z = 1
2
. The boundary d/E is found at the intersection of d
.
I with d
/
I
at a maximum value of 3√
2
− 2 ≈ 0.121 for Z = 1
2
.
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The ﬁndings of the previous section on the comparative statics are illustrated in ﬁgure
3.8. For any dE < d
.
E the incumbent can choose the accommodation-Z strategy, for
any dI > d
/
I the accommodation strategy is not applicable and both are decreasing
with growing Z. This is supplemented with the results of the inequalities in (3.20) and
(3.21). Accordingly, the entrant will optimize ΠAccE and charge p
Acc
E for suﬃciently
high values of dI . If Z increases the condition in (3.21) increasingly restricts the
location set such that the accommodating scenario with x > 12 between ﬁrm I and
ﬁrm E occurs. Particularly, the maximum is reached at dI = dE when Z =
1
2 , and
for Z ≤ 14 any set dI , dE ∈ [0, 12 ] implies that ﬁrm E maximizes his proﬁts by a price
increase. As regards the condition in (3.20) an increase in Z leads to a corresponding
upward shift increasing the set of locations for the accommodating scenario. Note
also that these two restrictions intersect at the boundary location d.E and that d
.
I
collapses to the limit 12 when Z converges to zero.
3.4.2 Analysis of the Stackelberg leader-follower game in prices
3.4.2.1 Strong market position of the incumbent
This case assumes that the incumbent locates within a distance of d.I with respect to
the center and refers to part (III) of the price reaction function in lemma 1. Graph-
ically, this corresponds to the location set bounded by the concave function and the
limit dI =
1
2 in ﬁgure 3.8. Now, consider ﬁrm E's pricing options in a descending
order.
Let us begin with entry locations dE < d
.
E such that the accommodation-Z strategy
is applicable for ﬁrm I. From the preceding subsection we can summarize that for
prices exceeding pE the entrant would be undercut by the incumbent. Subsequently,
for the location set deﬁned by condition (3.20) and ﬂipping the inequality sign ﬁrm
E's best response is to charge pAccE and the incumbent would respond with charging
pAccZI . In addition, the location set in (3.21) implies that under p
AccZ
I a price decrease
in pE does not yield a proﬁtable outcome for the entrant. Indeed, diverting from the
accommodation scenario and charging pˆE is not proﬁtable for the entrant. Clearly,
the entrant could never take the center as the price leader since ﬁrm I undercuts him
at x = 12 with p
DetZ
I . Then the entrant's proﬁts would be
1
2 pˆE . Comparing Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E )
with 12 pˆE reveals that proﬁts are even only at dI = dE + 2Z − 1, for all other loca-
tion sets ΠAccE (p
Acc
E ) yields higher proﬁts. Thus, in sum the increase in demand to
1− x = 12 does not compensate for the price drop to pˆE .
For entry locations dE > d
.
E the incumbent's reaction to entry consists of charging
pDetI and p
DetZ
I . Entry then only occurs under the deterrence-Z strategy with proﬁts
1
2pE . The best price for the entrant in this case is given by p
×
E where the incumbent
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is indiﬀerent between kicking ﬁrm E out of the market and defending the center.
For prices above p×E the entrant certainly is undercut, and prices below p
×
E are not
proﬁtable due to the linear increase in entry proﬁts with growing price levels. Re-
peatedly, the entrant has no chance to capture Z as the ﬁrst mover in the game.
In sum ﬁrm E's pricing behavior is described by the following options when ﬁrm I
dominates the location setting with dI > d
.
I :
• choose pAccE if dI < 3 + dE + 2Z − 8
√
dE(1 + Z) and dE < d
.
E
• choose pE if dI > 3 + dE + 2Z − 8
√
dE(1 + Z) and dE < d
.
E
• choose p×E if dE > d.E
A variation in Z has the expected eﬀects. The location set where pAccE represents the
best choice decreases whereas the set for p×E increases as Z grows since d
.
E declines.
In ﬁgure 3.8 the functions for d.E and the condition in (3.20) are shifted towards the
point of origin as well as the condition in (3.21) moves upwards for an increase in Z.
3.4.2.2 Moderate market position of the incumbent
This case assumes that ﬁrm I locates in a distance range of d/I < dI < d
.
I which for
Z = 12 is graphically illustrated in ﬁgure 3.8 by the area below the concave function
and the horizontally dotted line. Part (II) in the price reaction function in lemma
1 enhances the previous analysis by the fact that the entrant can possibly charge
an aggressive price trying to undercut the incumbent at his own mill (pˇE > 0). The
incumbent would then react with the deference strategy charging pDefI to stay in the
market.
For dE < d
.
E the entrant sets pE for the location set given in (3.20) and charges
pAccE for the inverse. Also, the center is not accessible for ﬁrm E with the location of
indiﬀerence between charging pAccE and pˆE at dI = dE + 2Z − 1. But does a further
decrease to pˇE now prove to be proﬁtable? Entry proﬁts in this case are given by
(1 − dI + Z)pE and increase linearly in prices. Thus, the best price ﬁrm E can
charge when undercutting the incumbent is pˇE . It follows that we need to compare
the entry proﬁts for the deference case (1 − dI + Z)pˇE and the accommodation
scenario ΠAccE (p
Acc
E ). This reveals that for dI , Z ∈ [0; 12 ] charging pAccE proves to be
more proﬁtable than charging pˇE (cf. proof 5a in the appendix). Put diﬀerently, the
necessary decline in prices and subsequent gain in demand to attack the incumbent
when entering the market does not oﬀset proﬁts earned in the scenario of a mutual
accommodating behavior of the two contenders.
For dE > d
.
E the incumbent reacts to entry by setting p
Det
I or p
DetZ
I for high entry
price levels. Then the entrant would choose p×E as his best price. For low entry price
108
Chapter 3. Does Entry Pay Oﬀ in a Linear City with a Center?
levels ﬁrm I chooses pDetZI or p
Def
I where ﬁrm E's best option is to charge pˇE . Thus,
a comparison between proﬁts 12p
×
E and (1 − dI + Z)pˇE has to be made. It follows
that for locations d.E < dE < d
split
E the entry price p
×
E is preferred, and for locations
dsplitE < dE <
1
2 the entry price pˇE yields the highest proﬁts. The switchover point is
a complex function in dI and Z given by d
split
E =
2−7dI+8d2I−4d3I+6Z−4dIZ+4Z2+4dIZ2
5−12dI+4d2I+16Z−16dIZ+12Z2
(cf. proof 5b in the appendix). Thus, when an accommodating scenario between ﬁrm
I and ﬁrm E does not exist, an aggressive pricing behavior of the entrant ﬁrm yields
a proﬁtable outcome only if he locates close enough to the center and the incumbent
respectively.
In sum ﬁrm E's pricing behavior is described by the following options when ﬁrm I
holds a moderate position in terms of his location with d/I < dI < d
.
I :
• choose pAccE if dI < 3 + dE + 2Z − 8
√
dE(1 + Z) and dE < d
.
E
• choose pE if dI > 3 + dE + 2Z − 8
√
dE(1 + Z) and dE < d
.
E
• choose p×E if d.E < dE < dsplitE
• choose pˇE if dE > dsplitE
In addition to the stated eﬀects of the centrality bonus on ﬁrm E's pricing behavior
in the previous subsection, a change in Z also impacts the pricing decision in terms
of the location dsplitE . Figure 3.9 illustrates that with increasing Z the critical location
to undercut the incumbent ﬁrm also increases.
Figure 3.9: Illustration of the location boundary dsplitE against Z for t = 1
Comment: For dE > d
split
E the entrant prefers to charge pˇE to p
×
E . The solid line depicts the location
for dI = 0.35, the small dashed line for dI = 0.45, and the tiny dashed line for dI = 0.5.
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The higher Z the closer the entrant has to locate to the center such that a price
attack against the incumbent pays oﬀ compared to setting p×E . Moreover, the eﬀect
of a variation of dI is depicted. As intuition suggests, with growing dI the entrant
has to locate closer to the center for the undercutting strategy to be proﬁtable. An
initially better market position of the incumbent forces the entrant to match up with
his rival in terms of his own location.
3.4.2.3 Weak market position of the incumbent
This case refers to part (I) of the price reaction function in lemma 1 and assumes ﬁrm
I's location to be restricted by dI < d
/
I which is illustrated by the location segment
below the horizontally dotted line in ﬁgure 3.8. Concerning the situation where the
incumbent chooses the deterrence strategy, the accommodation-Z strategy, and the
deterrence-Z strategy we follow the preceding treatments. Subsequently, we show
that ﬁrm E can not charge a proﬁt maximizing price when being in charge of the
center and ﬁrm I setting pAccI . Particularly, the best price the entrant can choose
under this scenario is given by pZE := t(1 + dE − dI) − ,  → 0. In addition, an
undercutting strategy with price p˜E is also not part of ﬁrm E's strategy set.
Recall that if the incumbent holds a comparatively weak market position locating at
a distance below d/I from the center and given that pE ∈ [p˜E , p†E ] his best strategy
is to accommodate entry and optimize his proﬁts charging pAccI (with Z = 0). The
entrant then seizes Z and gains a demand in the amount of 1−x(pAccI )+Z. Respective
entry proﬁts reduce to:
ΠE(p
Acc
I ) := Π
AccZ
E = −
1
4t
p2E +
1
4
(3 + dE − dI + 4Z) pE (3.22)
Applying the ﬁrst order condition yields ﬁrm E's best price:
pAccZE =
1
2
t(3 + dE − dI + 4Z) (3.23)
We see immediately that pAccZE > p
Acc
E for all dE , dI , Z. Clearly, 1 − x(pAccI ) > 12
must hold which reduces to pE < t(1 + dE − dI) = pZE . Setting pAccZE < pZE yields
the restriction dI < dE − 1 − 4Z which results in an empty set for any Z ≥ 0 if dI
and dE are restricted to the interval [0;
1
2 ]. Note also that p
Acc
I > p
DetZ
I demands the
same price restriction on pE .
Why is the entrant unable to charge his proﬁt maximizing price when being in charge
of the center? Indeed, the explanation is found in the existence of the bonus Z that
implies a higher price level between the contenders when both play according to an
entry accommodating scenario. For instance, see that pAccZI linearly increases in Z
110
Chapter 3. Does Entry Pay Oﬀ in a Linear City with a Center?
from which it follows from ΠAccE that p
Acc
E grows linearly in Z as well. Now, if ﬁrm
E takes the center and both players accommodate it is evident that ﬁrm I's proﬁt
maximizing price decreases (pAccZI > p
Acc
I ). Subsequently, this implies that the cor-
responding proﬁt-optimizing price of ﬁrm E, i.e., pAccZE also has to decrease since a
higher demand certainly requires a lower price for ﬁrm E. By contrast, since ﬁrm E
holds the center pAccZE increases with growing Z. In particular, the diﬀerence between
proﬁts amounts to ΠAccZE −ΠAccE = 12pEZ, and prices diﬀer by pAccZE −pAccE = tZ. The
counter eﬀects could only be dissolved by a corresponding variation in locations dI
and dE , however, algebra shows no solution set in the feasible location range obtains.
As a consequence, the solution for ﬁrm E when the incumbent charges pAccI is
given by pZE since it represents the highest price such that the entrant stays in
charge of the center. To reverse the argument, for every dI , dE ∈ [0; 12 ] the rank
pZE < p
AccZ
E holds which also implies that p
†
E is no feasible price for the entrant.
This is obvious since p†E > p
AccZ
E reduces to dI < dE − 1 + 4Z − 4
√
2Z(1 + Z) and
1− 4Z+ 4√2Z(1 + Z) > 12 for all Z ≥ 0. Also note that pZE < pˆE for all Z > 0. The
lower price bound is given by p˜E . As stated in the previous subsections the proﬁt
function for an undercutting strategy increases linearly in prices, thus, p˜E refers to
the best price the entrant could set with respective proﬁts of (1 − dI + Z)p˜E . The
incumbent then reacts by setting pDefI . Also note that the rank p˜E < p
Z
E remains
true for all dI ≤ 12 and any real dE .
A proﬁt comparison for ﬁrm E's pricing strategies yields the following results. Firstly,
charging p˜E is dominated by p
Z
E for all locations dI , dE ∈ [0, 12 ]. Secondly, intersect-
ing entry proﬁts for the accommodating scenarios when ﬁrm E is in charge of Z
and refrains from taking the center respectively, i.e., ΠAccZE (p
Z
E) = Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ) shows
that for moderate values of Z > 14
(
5− 2√6) proﬁts ΠAccZE (pZE) exceed ΠAccE (pAccE )
when the entrant locates closer to the center than a threshold value of dE > d
Z
E :=
1+dI+6Z−4
√
Z + 2Z2. (cf. proof of proposition 1 in the appendix) Correspondingly,
the strategy to ride the proﬁt function and leave the center to the incumbent is more
proﬁtable for distant locations, thus, when dE < d
Z
E . Additionally, the pricing strat-
egy to charge pAccE dominates setting p
Z
E for all Z <
1
4
(
5− 2√6). Thirdly, provided
that the accommodation-Z strategy and pAccZI is not feasible (dE > d
.
E) charging
p×E yields higher proﬁts than p
Z
E for small entry locations dE < d
Z×
E =
1+2dIZ
2(2+3Z) and
setting pZE leads to comparatively higher proﬁts for locations above d
Z×
E .
These results for the case pAccI complete the previous derivation of location segments
in subsection 3.4.1 for pAccZI . (see ﬁgure 3.10) Rewriting the terms for d
Z
E and d
Z×
E
yields the following two conditions that suggest for the entrant to pick the pricing
strategy of charging pZE compared to setting p
Acc
E and p
×
E :
dI <
2 + 3Z
Z
dE − 1
2Z
(3.24)
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dI < dE + 4
√
Z(1 + 2Z)− 1− 6Z (3.25)
Note that for Z → 0 the r.h.s. of (3.24) converges to d.E = 14 . Further, condition
(3.25) shows the same behavior under a variation of Z for Z ∈ [0, 12 ] as condition
(3.21), particularly, for Z = 12 both reduce to dI = dE . Thus, for decreasing Z the
location set for pZE to be a proﬁtable pricing strategy also decreases.
Figure 3.10: Illustration of the location segments for diﬀerent pricing strategies for ﬁrm E
when ﬁrm I applies the accommodation strategy (pAccI )
Comment: Graphs in ﬁgure 3.8 are enhanced by the restrictions given by dZE and d
Z×
E . The solid
lines depict the transitions in ﬁrm E's pricing behavior in terms of dI and dE for Z =
1
2
and the
dashed lines dZE and d
Z×
E for Z =
1
4
. Parameter values are t = 1.
In sum ﬁrm E's pricing behavior is described by the following options when ﬁrm I
holds a weak position in terms of his location with dI < d
/
I :
• choose pE if dI > 3 + dE + 2Z − 8
√
dE(1 + Z) and dE < d
.
E
• choose pAccE if dI > dE + 4
√
Z(1 + 2Z) − 1 − 6Z and dI < 3 + dE + 2Z −
8
√
dE(1 + Z) and dE < d
.
E
• choose pZE if dI < dE + 4
√
Z(1 + 2Z) − 1 − 6Z and dE < d.E , and if dI <
2+3Z
Z dE − 12Z and dE > d.E
• choose p×E if dI > 2+3ZZ dE − 12Z and dE > d.E
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3.4.2.4 Entry decision
So far our approach covered an analysis of the strategy options of the entrant ﬁrm.
According to the Stackelberg leader-follower game in prices we ﬁnd that ﬁrm E's set
comprises of pE , p
Acc
E , p
×
E , pˇE , and p
Z
E . The ﬁrst two prices pE and p
Acc
E correspond to
the scenario with both players optimizing their proﬁts and ﬁrm I gaining the center
Z, the next two p×E and pˇE refer to ﬁrm E's best choice if the accommodation-Z
strategy is not feasible and if the entrant sets an aggressive pricing behavior, ﬁnally
pZE represents ﬁrm E's best reply to the case where the incumbent accommodates
entry but loses the center. Additionally, we derived conditions to establish the ranks
pE > p
Acc
E > pˆE and p
AccZ
E > p
Z
E > p˜E . Moreover, we may state that the relations
pAccE > pˇE and p
Acc
E > p
Z
E hold for all dI , dE , Z ∈ [0; 12 ].
The next step is to evaluate ﬁrm E's proﬁts regarding the suggested ﬁve pricing
strategies. Respective proﬁts then are dependent on dE , dI , and Z and essentially
determine ﬁrm E's payoﬀs as a function of his location. As intuition suggests the best
choice for the entry set (pE , dE) depends on ﬁrm I's location. Thus, pursuing our
previous approach we distinguish between the case where the incumbent has a strong
market position and locates relatively close to the center (dI > d
/
I), and the case of
remote locations (dI < d
/
I). Furthermore, it is evident that ﬁrm E's behavior hinges
upon ﬁrm I's strategy set where emphasis lies on the scenario that the incumbent
retains a strong market position and accommodates entry. Consequently, we have to
diﬀerentiate the case where ﬁrm I's strategy set contains the pricing strategy pAccZI
or dE < d
.
E from the case where p
AccZ
I is excluded or dE > d
.
E . We make the following
propositions:
Proposition 1: For the location range dE < d
.
E and dI > d
/
I the proﬁt function
ΠAccE (p
Acc
E ) yields the highest values.
Proof : See the appendix.
Proposition 2: For the location range dE < d
.
E and provided that dI > d
cMax
I
ﬁrm E's strategy is to charge pAccE for locations 0 ≤ dE ≤ dIntsE and to charge pE
for locations dIntsE ≤ dE ≤ d.E . Then the local maximum and the entrant's proﬁt-
maximizing price-location pair is given by:
p∗E(dI , Z) =
2
9 t
(
25− 3dI + 22Z − Λ(dI , Z)− 6
√
(1 + Z) (23 + 3dI + 26Z − 2Λ(dI , Z))
)
d∗E(dI , Z) =
1
9 (23 + 3dI + 26Z − 2Λ(dI , Z))
with:
Λ(dI , Z) = 4
√
(1 + Z)(7 + 3dI + 10Z)
dcMaxI =
4Z+8Z2−1
4+4Z
dIntsE = 29 + dI + 30Z − 8
√
13 + dI + 27Z + dIZ + 14Z2
113
Chapter 3. Does Entry Pay Oﬀ in a Linear City with a Center?
Proof : See the appendix.
Proposition 3: For the location range dE > d
.
E and dI > d
/
I , and provided that dI >
dcMaxI ﬁrm E's dominant strategy is to choose the proﬁt-maximizing set (p
∗
E , d
∗
E) if
the restriction Z > κ ≈ 0.0305 is fulﬁlled.
Proof : See the appendix.
Proposition 4: As a result of ﬁrm I's location reaction function in lemma 3 the
entrant ﬁrm discards the strategy to charge pZE for any dE ∈ [0; 12 ].
Proof : See the appendix.
The propositions address all ﬁve possible pricing strategies for ﬁrm E and their re-
spective relations. Essentially, we determine conditions under which a local proﬁt
maximum given by the set (p∗E , d
∗
E) exists. (cf. proposition 2) The local equilibrium
is established in an accommodating market entry scenario. This scenario is char-
acterized by a modest behavior of the entrant ﬁrm in terms of his optimal entry
location and entry price. Indeed, the characteristic feature of ﬁrm E's choice is de-
scribed by a proﬁt maximum that is reached at a particular location dMaxE = d
∗
E .
As regards the pricing strategy the entrant aims at charging the highest possible
price such that the incumbent refrains from an undercutting strategy given by pE .
Since the proﬁt-maximizing location lies within the boundary of d.E the incumbent's
best reaction is to charge pAccZI and accommodate entry. Accordingly, the center of
the city is taken by the incumbent ﬁrm. Furthermore, the condition for the proﬁt
maximum to exist (dMaxE < d
.
E) is dependent on the location of the incumbent and
limits dI to exceed the threshold value of d
cMax
I which is a positive function in Z.
In addition, a comparison with ﬁrm I's location reaction function reveals that under
the entry price p∗E the incumbent would react by accommodating entry and charging
pAccZI if dE < dE or undercutting ﬁrm E by setting p
Det
I if dE > dE . Evidently, we
ﬁnd that d∗E is approximated by dE(p
∗
E) but never exceeds dE(p
∗
E) for 0 ≤ dI ≤ 12 .
An illustration of this market entry scenario is depicted in ﬁgure 3.11. It is inter-
esting to see that initially  for entry locations dE < d
Max
E  ﬁrm E prefers the
accommodation pricing strategy pAccE . However, as dE increases the accommodation
price shows a corresponding increase and a maximum for pAccE ≤ pE is reached at
a critical location of dIntsE ≈ 0.14 depicted by the ﬁrst vertical dashed line. (cf. also
equ. (3.20) in subsection 3.4.1) Certainly, higher proﬁts are gained sticking to the
accommodation price but are not feasible since otherwise ﬁrm E would be under-
cut. As a consequence, the entrant switches to pE and increases his location until
the proﬁt maximum is reached at dMaxE ≈ 0.17 (second vertical dashed line). A fur-
ther increase in dE leads only to decreasing proﬁts for ﬁrm E and an adaption in
the pricing strategies of the two contenders. If dE increases the threshold location
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of d.E ≈ 0.18 (third vertical dashed line) the accommodating entry scenario breaks
down. For instance, if the incumbent locates close to the center (dI > d
.
I) he reacts
either by deterring market entry and charging pDetI or by undercutting the entrant at
the center setting pDetZI if ﬁrm E locates at positions dE > d
.
E . (cf. lemma 1) Thus,
the entrant's best strategy is then to play p×E with decreasing proﬁts in dE . Addi-
tionally, if d/I < dI < d
.
I a further transition in the strategies of the two contenders
occurs at dsplitE ≈ 0.43 where an aggressive pricing behavior of the entrant becomes
proﬁtable and he drops prices from p×E to pˇE .
Subsequently, provided that the incumbent holds a strong market position (dI > d
/
I)
and comparing respective proﬁts in the location ranges dE < d
.
E and dE > d
.
E the
question arises which price and location pair yields the highest outcome. Is it most
proﬁtable for the entrant to behave modestly and optimize proﬁts under the implicit
constraints of ﬁrm I as the second mover or does an aggressive behavior against his
rival and thus an undercutting strategy yield a higher outcome for ﬁrm E as the ﬁrst
mover? We admit not to provide a closed form solution but merely give an indication
of the relation between the pricing strategies pE and pˇE . This could be a point of
departure for future research on the subject. The scenario illustrated in ﬁgure 3.11
suggests that the local maximum (p∗E , d
∗
E) represents also the dominant entry strate-
gy over the whole domain dE ∈ [0; 12 ]. In general the result depends on the parameter
conﬁguration and thus the variable set dI and Z. In our nonexhaustive treatment we
level the proﬁts of the proﬁt maximum in (p∗E , d
∗
E) with the highest possible proﬁts
that can be gained under an aggressive pricing of setting pˇE and locating inﬁnites-
imally close to the center. (cf. proposition 3) It turns out that the condition for pˇE
to be a viable option restricts the centrality bonus to be comparatively small. This
suggests that a signiﬁcantly high value of Z reduces ﬁerce competition in the market
and thus has a stabilizing eﬀect on the market setting. Put diﬀerently, under a high
centrality bonus Z ﬁrm E's strategy to impose a self restricting behavior in terms of
deliberately locating in a remote part of the city pays oﬀ compared to an aggressive
entry behavior where the aim is to push the incumbent rival out of the market. It has
to be noted that this ﬁnding is subject to a number of restrictions. However, under
speciﬁc assumptions for the parameters dI and Z we show that the incumbent reacts
adaptively to an undercutting of ﬁrm E initially charging pDefI . As ﬁrm E increases
his prices in accordance with his proﬁt function ΠˇE = (1−dI +Z)pˇE , the incumbent
switches to the deterrence strategy setting pDetI . This also suggests that the entrant
refrains from undercutting the incumbent for suﬃciently close locations to the cen-
ter and thus supports stable market conditions. (cf. the remark in the appendix and
table 3.4 in section 4)
In proposition 4 ﬁrm E's entry decision for the case of remote locations dI < d
/
I
is considered. The important feature in this location range is that according to his
proﬁt structure the incumbent's reaction to entry requires him to accept the loss of
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the center and accommodate entry by charging pAccI . The prerequisite is that the
entrant takes a comparatively strong market position exceeding a deﬁned location
d†E and that his prices fulﬁll p
5†
E ≥ pE > p.E (cf. lemma 3 and the corresponding
proof). Then the best strategy for ﬁrm E is to charge pZE and gain proﬁts Π
Z
E which
are an increasing function in dE . By a comparison of the threshold prices in the
location reaction function, most notably p5†E , with the entry price at the switchover
point for the pricing strategy pZE we show that the pricing strategy p
Z
E yields no
proﬁtable result for ﬁrm E. This ﬁnding is a result of ﬁrm I's reaction to entry. If
the entrant drops his prices to pZE ﬁrm I does not react modestly and accommodates
the loss of the center, depending on the parameter conﬁguration of dI and Z ﬁrm
I rather replies aggressively and defends his claim for the center (pDetZI ) or deters
entry (pDetI ).
Finally, we sketch the comparative static behavior of ﬁrm E's feasible entry proﬁts
under a variation of Z and dI . As expected, an increase in ﬁrm I's location leads to a
downward shift for the proﬁt functions of the pricing strategies pE , p
Acc
E , p
×
E , and pˇE
over the whole domain dE ∈ [0; 12 ]. Particularly, for a ﬁxed Z such that dI > dcMaxI
it follows that the proﬁt maximizing location dMaxE shrinks as dI grows. As already
argued the impact of dI on ΠˇE is determined by the functional form of d
split
E and
critically depends on the level of Z (cf. proof 5b and ﬁgure 3.13 in the appendix).
Generally, we may state that ΠˇE is shifted upward and the sensitivity of the proﬁts
to dE increases as the value of ﬁrm I's location increases.
Regarding a variation in Z, the proﬁt functions for the strategies pE and p
Acc
E show
an upward shift as Z increases. In addition, for a ﬁxed dI > d
cMax
I see that the local
maximum dMaxE as well as the tangential intersection d
Ints
E increase with growing
Z. Proﬁts for the strategy p×E also increase as the centrality bonus Z increases and
according to the interaction term between dE and Z in the proﬁt function the sen-
sitivity with respect to Z correspondingly rises. Eventually, mirroring the behavior
under a change in dI the proﬁt function for pˇE shows a complex reaction to Z. In
particular, we observe that proﬁts move up and the sensitivity of the proﬁt function
decreases with an increase in Z.
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Figure 3.11: Illustration of ﬁrm E's proﬁt function for diﬀerent pricing strategies against
his location dE
Comment: The solid lines depict the viable proﬁt and price ranges. The ﬁrst vertical dashed line
indicates the transition of the pricing strategy pAccE to pE at the location d
Ints
E , the second marks
the local proﬁt maximum at dMaxE . The next transition occurs from the pricing strategy pE to p
×
E
at d.E . Both transitions are described by a kink. Finally, the price drop from p
×
E to pˇE at d
split
E
captures the last change in strategies. Parameter values are dI = 0.4, Z = 0.4 and t = 1.
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3.5 Interpretation and Comparison of Results
In this section we summarize and interpret the previous ﬁndings and give examples
of the prices and proﬁts for ﬁrm E and ﬁrm I in three selected scenarios depicted
in tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. Moreover, we provide a comparison of our results and
implications with previous work on the subject by Anderson (1987).
Table 3.3: Summary of the entry accommodation scenario for dI = 0.4 and t = 1
Z d∗E p
∗
E Π
∗
E p
AccZ
I Π
AccZ
I d
cMax
I x
0 0.143 1.228 0.465 1.242 0.772 −0.250 0.621
0.05 0.147 1.277 0.501 1.315 0.865 −0.186 0.607
0.1 0.150 1.325 0.538 1.387 0.963 −0.118 0.594
0.15 0.153 1.373 0.577 1.460 1.066 −0.048 0.580
0.2 0.157 1.422 0.617 1.532 1.174 0.025 0.566
0.25 0.160 1.470 0.658 1.605 1.288 0.100 0.552
0.3 0.164 1.518 0.700 1.677 1.406 0.177 0.539
0.35 0.167 1.566 0.744 1.750 1.530 0.256 0.525
0.4 0.171 1.615 0.790 1.822 1.660 0.336 0.511
0.45 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.417 0.497
0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.500 0.483
The ﬁrst scenario represents the entry accommodation scenario described in proposi-
tion 2. Accordingly, ﬁrm E chooses the proﬁt-maximizing price-location pair (p∗E , d
∗
E)
in the ﬁrst stage of the game provided that dI > d
cMax
I or d
Max
E < d
.
E respectively.
Consequently, ﬁrm E discards the theoretical option to gain the centrality bonus Z
and the incumbent ﬁrm reacts by accommodating entry and optimizing his resulting
proﬁt function in the second stage. This scenario therefore expresses the advantage
of ﬁrm I to charge his prices as the second mover of the game and brings about a
state of equilibrium. A change in price and location for the entrant does not increase
his proﬁts and induces the incumbent to adapt his accommodating strategy. Firstly,
if ﬁrm E decreases his price, the resulting, comparatively low increase in market
share does not compensate for the decline in proﬁts. Furthermore, the incumbent is
inclined to change his pricing strategy and takes the center Z due to the second-
mover advantage. Secondly, an increase in ﬁrm E's location leads to lower net proﬁts
since pE as the corresponding pricing function decreases in dE . Additionally, at the
respective price level the incumbent chooses to undercut the entrant for locations
exceeding d∗E . Thirdly, if ﬁrm E decreases his location, he only gains lower proﬁts
compared to (p∗E , d
∗
E), and a price increase at the maximum is not possible in order
to avoid the incumbent to play the deterrence strategy.
It is important to note that the critical variable dcMaxI determining the condition
for the existence of the local maximum for ﬁrm E's corresponding proﬁt function
Π∗E = ΠE(p
∗
E , d
∗
E) positively depends on Z. Certainly, this implies that not for all
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combinations of dI and Z on the domain [0;
1
2 ] the local proﬁt maximum is feasible.
For instance, in table 3.3 see that under an assumed value of dI = 0.4 for Z ex-
ceeding the threshold of 0.4 the local proﬁt maximum does not exist. This is owed
to the reaction of ﬁrm I, if ﬁrm E locates at the corresponding location d∗E > d
.
E
charging pAccZI is not proﬁtable anymore and therefore entry is not possible in the
accommodation scenario. Additionally, the existence of ﬁrm E's proﬁt maximum is
reﬂected in the market boundary where for dI < d
cMax
I we obtain x <
1
2 which of
course is not reconcilable with an accommodating reaction of ﬁrm I.
Furthermore, we observe the impact of the centrality bonus on proﬁts and prices of
the contenders. By construction a higher value for Z corresponds to a larger market
area. As expected, we conﬁrm that ﬁrm I's proﬁts and accommodation prices in-
crease with increasing Z. As ﬁrm I is not induced to confront the entrant it follows
that ﬁrm E also beneﬁts from an increase of the market size in terms of Z even
though he is not in the position to gain the center. In particular, see that both ﬁrm
E's accommodation price p∗E as well as the optimal location d
∗
E increase as Z grows.
Table 3.4: Summary of the entry undercutting scenario for dI = 0.4 and t = 1
Z dsplitE pˇE Πˇ
min
E d
×
E Πˇ
th.
E p
Def
I Π
Def
I
0 0.267 0.667 0.400 0.311 0.427 1.000 0.400
0.05 0.339 0.473 0.307 0.384 0.336 0.700 0.280
0.1 0.375 0.375 0.263 0.419 0.293 0.550 0.220
0.15 0.396 0.316 0.237 0.440 0.270 0.460 0.184
0.2 0.410 0.277 0.221 0.454 0.256 0.400 0.160
0.25 0.420 0.248 0.211 0.463 0.248 0.375 0.143
0.3 0.427 0.227 0.204 0.470 0.243 0.325 0.130
0.35 0.432 0.210 0.199 0.475 0.240 0.300 0.120
0.4 0.436 0.196 0.196 0.479 0.239 0.280 0.112
0.45 0.440 0.185 0.195 0.482 0.239 0.264 0.105
0.5 0.443 0.176 0.194 0.485 0.240 0.250 0.100
The second scenario refers to the case of the entrant undercutting the incumbent at dI
in the ﬁrst stage of the game and the incumbent defending his market position in the
second stage. Thus, this scenario covers the instance of a possible ﬁrst-mover advan-
tage by considering that the entrant will take the center Z. In subsection 3.4.2.4 and
proposition 3 we argue that only for small values of Z the undercutting strategy pˇE
represents a viable option for the entrant. This is on the one hand linked to the com-
plex behavior and dependency of the proﬁt function ΠˇE = ΠE(pˇE(dE , dI , Z), dI , Z)
under a variation of dI and Z and on the other hand explained by the rise of p
∗
E and
Π∗E in the accommodation scenario under an increase in Z.
Now, table 3.4 provides further insights on the subject. Strikingly, the initial under-
cutting price pˇE taken at the switchover location d
split
E decreases as Z increases. This
implies that a higher bonus that could be grasped by the entrant requires him to set
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an increasingly lower undercutting price. This instance is conﬁrmed by the behav-
ior of the threshold dsplitE which increases in Z and thus expresses that the entrant
needs to take an increasingly stronger market position for the pricing strategy pˇE to
represent a viable option. As a consequence, corresponding proﬁts ΠˇminE evaluated at
pˇE and d
split
E decrease in Z and illustrate that a potential ﬁrst-mover advantage by
the entrant is diminishing. Clearly, since the incumbent has to react adequately to
the price attack to hold his market position his behavior mirrors the entrant's with
prices pDefI (pˇE(d
split
E )) and corresponding proﬁts Π
Def
I decreasing for growing values
of Z.
The depicted proﬁts ΠˇminE in table 3.4 represent the minimum values the entrant
gains under the undercutting strategy pˇE since proﬁts monotonically increase in dE .
By contrast in column 4 the numbers for d×E provide the location maxima and thus
ﬁrm E's preferred location taken at the switchover point dsplitE and corresponding
price pˇE(d
split
E ). According to ﬁrm I's location reaction function entry is deterred
when ﬁrm E locates at dE > d
×
E (cf. lemma 4). It is revealing that the situation
is characterized by a recursive relation since the entrant is inclined to increase dE
leading to an increase in pˇE to realize higher proﬁts whereas d
×
E decreases for growing
pE . To determine the theoretically highest proﬁts for the entry undercutting strat-
egy Πˇth.E we evaluate the proﬁt function at the lowest possible undercutting price
pˇE(d
split
E ) and the theoretical maximum location d
×
E . We conﬁrm that Πˇ
th.
E decreases
as Z grows. Additionally, we observe that the undercutting strategy is viable over
all Z since d×E exceeds d
split
E , however, in the provided example (dI = 0.4) a com-
parison of the theoretically highest undercutting proﬁts with corresponding proﬁts
for the accommodation scenario in table 3.3 shows that the accommodation strategy
(p∗E , d
∗
E) dominates.
Table 3.5: Summary of the entry undercutting-Z scenario for dI = 0.4 and t = 1
Z p×E(d
.
E) Π
×
E(d
.
E) p
×
E(d
split
E ) Π
×
E(d
split
E ) p
DetZ
I Π
DetZ
I
0 0.850 0.425 0.800 0.400 1.000 0.500
0.05 0.938 0.469 0.614 0.307 1.100 0.605
0.1 1.027 0.514 0.525 0.263 1.200 0.720
0.15 1.117 0.559 0.474 0.237 1.300 0.845
0.2 1.208 0.604 0.442 0.221 1.400 0.980
0.25 1.300 0.650 0.422 0.211 1.500 1.125
0.3 1.392 0.696 0.408 0.204 1.600 1.280
0.35 1.485 0.743 0.399 0.199 1.700 1.445
0.4 1.579 0.789 0.393 0.196 1.800 1.620
0.45 1.672 0.836 0.389 0.195 1.900 1.805
0.5 1.767 0.883 0.387 0.194 2.000 2.000
The third scenario considers the possibility for ﬁrm E to undercut the incumbent
ﬁrm at the location x = 12 and seize the center Z. Referring to the proﬁt-maximizing
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price-location set (p∗E , d
∗
E), we argue that an undercutting for the center is not a
proﬁtable strategy option.
To begin with, in table 3.5 we introduce the undercutting price p×E and corresponding
proﬁts Π×E at the transition locations d
.
E and d
split
E .
6 Note that the entry price and
proﬁt increase at d.E and decrease at d
split
E as Z grows. This reﬂects on the one hand
the relation of the strategy p×E with the strategy set (p
∗
E , d
∗
E), and on the other hand
the relation of p×E and Π
×
E with the mill-undercutting price and proﬁt. As already
argued, with increasing Z entry proﬁts under the pricing strategies pE and p
Acc
E
increase. Since d.E marks the intersection of pE and ΠE with p
×
E and Π
×
E the latter
are shifted upwards. Additionally, due to the increase of ΠˇE and pˇE under a decrease
of Z also Π×E and p
×
E increase at the intersection d
split
E . Moreover, the price and proﬁt
of ﬁrm I for the deterrence-Z strategy are depicted provided that ﬁrm E chooses
p×E(d
.
E). Note that in this particular case, i.e. at dE = d
.
E , the defensive price p
DetZ
I
is independent of dI .
Turning to the subject of interest, why does the existence of Z not induce the entrant
to undercut the incumbent at x = 12? Why is the undercutting-Z strategy for ﬁrm
E under speciﬁc circumstances not proﬁtable and thus feasible? Our answer is that
under consideration of ﬁrm I's response charging p×E and pˆE is outperformed by
the accommodating pricing strategies pE and p
Acc
E (cf. proofs for propositions 1 and
2). Additionally, we can show that the incumbent does not accept the loss of the
center in an accommodating scenario (cf. proof for proposition 4). Thus, regarding
the distribution of the centrality bonus Z our model suggests a clear second-mover
advantage on the side of the incumbent ﬁrm.
In particular, for distant entry locations dE < d
.
E the entrant eﬀectively has two
choices, he could concede Z to the incumbent and optimize his price setting behavior,
alternatively, he could challenge the claim for Z charging pˆE . As was shown, the
incumbent reacts to the ﬁrst option by accommodating entry and in the second case
undercuts the entrant at x = 12 to retain the center (cf. proof of lemma 1). Note
that setting p×E if dE < d
.
E is ruled out since it does not represent an appropriate
undercutting price and proves not to be proﬁtable (cf. proof of proposition 2). For
close entry locations dE > d
.
E an accommodating reaction by the incumbent is not
feasible, thus, his reaction would either be to defend the center (pDetZI ) or deter entry
(pDetI ). Concerning ﬁrm E, regardless of the strategy option pˇE , the best entry price is
therefore p×E . The characteristic feature then is that increasingly lower undercutting-Z
prices are required for increasingly closer entry locations which is highlighted in table
3.5 by a comparison of p×E evaluated at d
.
E and d
split
E . Intuitively, when aiming for the
bonus Z the entrant makes it also more diﬃcult to be undercut by the incumbent as
he locates closer to the center.
This leads to the following conclusion: under the pricing strategy p×E ﬁrm E has a
6In the underlying demand function for ﬁrm E we set Z = 0.
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clear preference to choose a distant location which is determined by the switchover
point d.E . This further implies that if the local maximum (p
∗
E , d
∗
E) exists the strategy
to choose this proﬁt-maximizing price-location set dominates the strategy to opt
for the pair (p×E , d
.
E) = (pE , d
.
E), by contrast, if the local maximum does not exist
the best entry set is given by the kink solution (p×E , d
.
E) = (pE , d
.
E). To illustrate
the point, for a comprehensive solution the non-applicable ﬁelds in table 3.3 are
substituted with the values of table 3.5 for Z = 0.45 and Z = 0.5. Moreover, we
conﬁrm that proﬁts Π∗E exceed proﬁts Π
×
E(d
.
E) over the assumed parameter range.
Our modeling approach is in full accord with the model of Anderson (1987). In
particular, the term for the proﬁt-maximizing entry location d∗E in proposition 2 of
our paper represents a generalized form of the location reaction function b∗(a) for
a ≤ 12 accounting for the centrality bonus Z in his proposition 4 (cp. Anderson (1987),
p. 383). Consequently, the results for ﬁrm B's entry location and corresponding prices
and proﬁts for both ﬁrms in proposition 5 and 6 in Anderson's article (ibid., pp. 385-
387) match our results for the equivalent cases dI =
1
2 and dI = 0 if Z = 0. This is, of
course, not surprising since we also took account of ﬁrm E's proﬁt functions under
the most proﬁtable pricing strategies following a Stackelberg leader-follower game
in prices. In a nutshell, our main contribution and extension of Anderson's work is
two-fold. Firstly, we evaluated more pricing options for the entrant which is a direct
consequence of the introduction of the centrality bonus Z. Secondly, we determined
the conditions for the existence and nonexistence  or at least the maximum bound
in the case of the undercutting strategy pˇE  of diﬀerent entry states taking into
account not only ﬁrm I's price reaction to ﬁrm E's price setting but also the price
reaction to the choice of the entry location. However, due to the emphasis that is
given to the impact of Z we used a more simpliﬁed approach compared to Anderson's
model reﬂected in the instance that ﬁrm I's location is not endogenized in our model.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we scrutinize a two-stage sequential market entry game between two
players, an incumbent ﬁrm (ﬁrm I) and an entrant ﬁrm (ﬁrm E) in the geographical
setting of a linear city a la Hotelling with linear transportation costs. The set up
is extended by a center in the middle of the city (x = 12) where additional demand
in the amount of Z can be gained. We focus on the resulting strategic interaction
between the players assuming that the incumbent already served the market in a
pre-monopolisitic stage which implies that his location (dI) is not disposable and,
thus, does not represent a strategic variable in the game. This leads us to provide a
solution set comprising the entry price and location (pE , dE) chosen in the ﬁrst stage
of the game and the price charged by ﬁrm I (pI) in the second stage.
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In the proceeding we ﬁrstly provide relevant parts of the reaction function to the
entry price as well as to the entry location under consideration of ﬁve diﬀerent pric-
ing options for ﬁrm I. These follow from the introduction of the demand dependent
centrality bonus Z and are: an undercutting strategy against ﬁrm E to deter entry,
a deterrence strategy to defend the claim for Z, two entry accommodating strategies
where Z is either taken by the incumbent or the entrant, and a strategy to defend
the market position against an undercutting strategy of ﬁrm E. In a second step,
based on the strategic set of ﬁrm I the best prices of ﬁrm E are derived. Subse-
quently, accounting for the corresponding demand these are inserted into ﬁrm E's
proﬁt function to analyze the dependency of diﬀerent entry proﬁts on the choice of
the entry location.
Our analysis highlights the interrelation of the players' locations with the centrality
bonus Z and generally shows that Z is crucial to determine the range for the pricing
strategies to be applicable and to describe the transition points between diﬀerent
pricing strategies. Particularly, we are for instance able to conﬁrm the intuitive as-
sumption that ﬁrm I is less likely to apply the accommodation strategies for higher
values of Z (exempliﬁed by d.E and d
/
I). The main ﬁnding of the paper is that we
provide a solution for an entry accommodation scenario where both ﬁrms optimize
the proﬁt functions over their strategic variables and the entry solution set given by
(p∗E , d
∗
E). The center is retained by the incumbent ﬁrm setting a higher price and
realizing higher proﬁts than the entrant who chooses a distant location. An increase
in Z increases prices and proﬁts but reduces the domain since the existence of the
equilibrium is bounded by ﬁrm I's location with the threshold location (dcMaxI ) de-
creasing as Z grows. This result is in full accord with the model of Anderson (1987)
since for Z = 0 our solution matches ﬁrm E's location reaction function in his paper.
In addition, our results suggest that ﬁrm E has no chance to capture Z. Firstly, we
argue that an aggressive entry behavior aiming at undercutting the incumbent ﬁrm
is not proﬁtable compared to the accommodating equilibrium. Intuitively, a higher
bonus Z requires even lower undercutting prices and leads to ﬁercer competition.
Secondly, a more modest entry strategy to refrain from undercutting the rival and
only capture the center Z is not feasible due to the second-mover advantage of ﬁrm
I and the structure of ﬁrm E's proﬁts. Thirdly, we exclude the case where ﬁrm E
seizes Z in an accommodating scenario.
In the course of our paper we try to bridge a gap between the subject of sequential
entry in spatial modeling (Anderson (1987), Fleckinger & Lafay (2010)) and spatial
monopolistic competition in centralized markets (Braid (1989), Braid (2013), Chen
& Riordan (2007)). To the best of our knowledge explicit expressions of reaction
functions with respect to entry price and location taking account of a market center
have not been used previously in analyses of sequential entry games under a linear
transportation cost scheme. A distinct feature of our approach compared to, for in-
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stance, Anderson (1987) is that after deriving ﬁrm E's best prices and corresponding
proﬁt functions the preferred entry locations are checked with respect to the price
reaction of ﬁrm I. Thus, we examine the incumbent's price reaction to both entry
price and location. This implies that our treatment therefore does not include a lo-
cation subgame where the incumbent optimizes dI with respect to ﬁrm E's entry
decision in a prevenient stage. (cp. Anderson (1987), p. 384, Proposition 5)
The appealing feature of our approach, however, is that we drill down ﬁrm I's re-
action to the most proﬁtable pricing decision and subsequently assess the market
structure as a result of ﬁrm E's best reply. Clearly, in our model entry is not prin-
cipally deterred but occurs under particular circumstances, these being that the
entrant deliberately restricts himself to a modest market position in a distant loca-
tion to the center. This refers to a business strategy characterized by the term 'judo
economics' introduced in the seminal paper of Gelman & Salop (1983) where the
entrant improves his strategic position by credibly committing himself to a limited
capacity. If he were to break his credible capacity-limitation commitment, the incum-
bent ﬁrm undercut the entry price and the entrant obtained no customers. In their
model the strategic variable of the incumbent only consists of his price. (cf. Gelman
& Salop (1983), p. 316) Our results are in line with this thesis in terms of the derived
location thresholds in ﬁrm I's location reaction function, if these were exceeded, the
incumbent deterred entry. We may also note that the credibility of ﬁrm E's decision
is supported by the construction of the spatial setting since product heterogeneity is
only attributed to the location in the city. Additionally, Fleckinger & Lafay (2010)
show that in a sequential entry game under catalog competition, that is two ﬁrms
deciding in one stage on both strategic variables, price and location, a second-mover
advantage results as the leader's strategy is to choose a low-price and low-market
share strategy to avoid being undercut by the follower. Thus, we conclude that a
comparison with the literature shows that the implications of our model ﬁt well into
the scholarly discussion.
Eventually, we may summarize shortcomings of our model as well as potential future
developments of it. For the price reaction function the case where the two contenders
locate very far from one another is not explicitly dealt with in the analysis, i.e., for
the range dE < d
/
E and dI ≤ d/I . However, with regards to the monotonicity of ﬁrm
E's accommodation proﬁts in dE this does not aﬀect the outcome of our analysis.
For the location reaction function the case of low undercutting prices charged by
the entrant is not explicitly analyzed, i.e., for the range pE < p
.
E , pE < p
5†
E , and
pE < p
5‡
E . The comparison of ﬁrm E's undercutting strategy and accommodation
strategy is therefore subject to restrictions for dI and Z (cf. remark in the appendix).
Nevertheless, we are able to determine an upper bound solution that determines the
range of where the proﬁt-maximizing set (p∗E , d
∗
E) dominates the undercutting strat-
egy (cf. proposition 3).
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Future developments could further consolidate our model with the work of Anderson
(1987) and Fleckinger & Lafay (2010). Potential enhancements comprise an endog-
enization of ﬁrm I's location dI and subsequent analysis on the impact of Z with
respect to ﬁrm I's location decision. Subsequently, referring to proposition 7 in An-
derson's paper (p. 386f) new insights could be gained assessing the timing structure
of the subgames in location and prices and to which extent Z determines ﬁrst-
and second-mover advantages. Furthermore, it would be interesting to study catalog
competition as in Fleckinger & Lafay (2010) in the context of a spatially centralized
market.
125
Chapter 3. Does Entry Pay Oﬀ in a Linear City with a Center?
Appendix
Proof 1: Recapitulating the dependencies from equation (3.5) we deﬁne:
ΠI(p
Det
I , 1 + Z) ≡ ΠDetI = [pE − t(1− dE − dI)](1 + Z),
ΠI(p
DetZ
I ,
1
2 + Z) ≡ ΠDetZI = [pE − t(dE − dI)](12 + Z),
ΠI(p
Def
I , dI) ≡ ΠDefI = pEdI + tdI(1− dI − dE),
ΠI(p
AccZ
I , x(p
AccZ
I ) + Z) ≡ ΠAccZI = α(pE)2 + βpE + γ, and
ΠAccZI (Z = 0) ≡ ΠAccI
with: α = 18t , β =
1
4(1−dE +dI +2Z), and γ = t8(1+d2E +d2I)+ t4(dI−dE−dEdI)+
t
2(Z
2 + Z + dIZ − dEZ).
See that all proﬁts increase in pE . Deterrence proﬁts Π
Det
I show the highest linear
increase by the amount of 1 + Z, deterrence-Z proﬁts ΠDetZI increase comparative-
ly lower by the factor 12 + Z, and deference proﬁts Π
Def
I increase by the smallest
amount of dI (recall that dI ≤ 12). Proﬁt functions for the two accommodation cases
ΠAccZI and Π
Acc
I are strictly convex and monotonically increasing on pE ≥ 0 since
the minimum pminE = −t(1− dE + dI + 2Z) < 0 for all dI , dE , Z ≥ 0. Clearly, Z > 0
implies that pminE (Z) < p
min
E (Z = 0) or that Π
AccZ
I > Π
Acc
I for all pE ≥ 0.
Next, we examine the proﬁt intersections. For high values of pE the deterrence and
accommodation-Z strategy are preferable. Matching ΠDetI with Π
AccZ
I yields the two
solutions pE = t(3 + dE − dI + 2Z − 4
√
dE(1 + Z)) and pE = t(3 + dE − dI +
2Z + 4
√
dE(1 + Z)). Further, we deﬁne p

E as the intersection of the corresponding
prices pDetI (p

E) = p
AccZ
I (p

E). See that the deterrence strategy is preferred to the
accommodation-Z strategy for every pE ∈ [pE , pE ] since pE < pE for all dI , Z ≥ 0
and dE < 1 + Z. This corresponds to the ﬁnding of Anderson (1987) in the original
setting of the linear city (i.e. for Z = 0).
Matching ΠAccZI with Π
DetZ
I we obtain the tangential solution pˆE = t(1 + dE − dI +
2Z). Likewise, pˆE proves to be the solution for the intersection of the price func-
tions pAccZI and p
DetZ
I which is supported by
∂ΠAccZI
∂pE
∣∣∣∣
pˆE
= 12 + Z. This implies that
the accommodation-Z strategy is preferred for every pE > pˆE and the deterrence-Z
strategy is applied for pE < pˆE . Intuitively, for pE < pˆE ﬁrm I loses the center when
charging pAccZI only realizing Π
Acc
I which induces him to play p
DetZ
I and gain higher
proﬁts ΠDetZI . This is consistent with the behavior of the market boundary where
x(pAccZI ) >
1
2 for all pE > pˆE and dE , dI , Z ≥ 0.
Matching ΠDetZI with Π
Acc
I yields the two solutions p
†
E = t(1 + dE − dI + 4Z −
2
√
2Z(1 + 2Z)) and p‡E = t(1 + dE − dI + 4Z + 2
√
2Z(1 + 2Z)). See that p†E <
pˆE < p
‡
E holds for all dE , dI , Z ≥ 0. This can also be concluded from the structure
of ΠAccZI and Π
Acc
I where
∂2ΠAccZI
∂p2E
=
∂2ΠAccI
∂p2E
= 14t . Further, intersect the respective
price functions pDetZI (p
†
E ) = p
Acc
I (p
†
E ) and see that p
†
E < p
†
E for all dE , dI , Z ≥ 0.
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It follows that the deterrence-Z strategy dominates the accommodation strategy for
p†E < pE < pˆE , and that the accommodation strategy is preferred to the deterrence-Z
strategy for pE < p
†
E .
We turn to the deference case. Matching ΠAccI with Π
Def
I yields p˜E = t(3dI +dE−1),
and matching ΠDetZI with Π
Def
I we get pˇE = t
(
dE + dI
(
1−2dI−2Z
1−2dI+2Z
))
. Leveling the
price functions pAccI and p
Def
I the proﬁt intersection p˜E obtains which can also seen
by
∂ΠAccI
∂pE
∣∣∣∣
p˜E
= dI . It follows that even though Π
Def
I < Π
Acc
I for pE < p˜E ﬁrm I
charges pDefI in order not to be undercut at his own mill. This ﬁnding speciﬁes the
analysis in Anderson (1987) where it is indicated that the deference strategy yields
higher proﬁts (see Fig.3 on p.376 and proof for proposition 1 lit.b on p.390). Addi-
tionally, due to the linear dependencies of ΠDetZI and Π
Def
I in pE the deterrence-Z
strategy is preferable for pE > pˇE , whereas the deference strategy dominates for
pE < pˇE . Note that p
Def
I > p
DetZ
I > p
Det
I ∀pE .
The ﬁnal step of the proof is to derive the ranges of validity for the ﬁve pricing
strategies with regards to Z. First note that the accommodation-Z strategy is only
viable when pE > pˆE . This corresponds to a restriction for dE contingent on Z, i.e.,
dE < d
.
E =
1
4(1+Z) . If dE > d
.
E the accommodation-Z strategy is always dominated ei-
ther by the deterrence strategy or the deterrence-Z strategy and the switchover point
is given by the intersection of ΠDetI with Π
DetZ
I at p
×
E = t(2+2Z−dE(3+4Z)−dI). For
dE > d
.
E the switchover point always lies below pˆE . The condition for the accommo-
dation strategy to exist is given by p†E > p˜E imposing a restriction on dI contingent
on Z, i.e., dI < d
/
I =
1
2 + Z −
√
Z(12 + Z). Also note that p
†
E > p˜E restricts p
†
E to
be positive. To check on the deference case we ﬁrst see that the boundaries d.E and
d/I yield a positive value for p˜E for all 0 ≤ Z ≤ 12 . Next we see that p˜E > 0 only if
dE > d
/
E = 3
√
Z(12 + Z) − 12(1 + 6Z) is fulﬁlled for dI = d/I . Note that p˜E(d/I) > 0
for all dE ≤ 12 and Z < 16 . Since d.E > d/E for all 0 < Z ≤ 12 a nonnegative set for
dI < d
/
I obtains which proves part (I) of ﬁrm I's proposed price reaction. For parts
(II) and (III) we ﬁnd that pˇE < p˜E for all dE , Z > 0 when the deterrence-Z strategy
dominates the accommodation strategy, i.e., dI > d
/
I . Again, Z determines the prof-
itability of ΠDetZI in relation to Π
Def
I with pˇE strictly monotonically decreasing in Z.
Setting pˇE ≥ 0 we get dI < d.I = 14(1−2dE−2Z+
√
4d2E + (1− 2Z)2 + 4dE(1 + 6Z)),
and pˇE < 0 for d
.
I < dI ≤ 12 respectively (the negative root only yields d.I < 0 for
dE , Z > 0). Next we compare d
/
I < d
.
I and ﬁnd the ﬂoor for dE at the same d
/
E as
for part (I). Since the interval [d/E ; d
.
E ] is nonempty the existence of parts (II) and
(III) is established. Also note that d/E > 0 only if Z >
1
6 which implies that d
/
I < d
.
I
holds for all dE ≤ 12 if Z < 16 . This completes the proof.
Proof 2: Consider the proﬁt generating functions: ΠgAccZI (pI) = −
p2I
2t +
pI
2 − pIdE2 +
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pIdI
2 +
pIpE
2t + pIZ and Π
gAccZ
I (Z = 0) = Π
gAcc
I (pI). Further, recall Π
gDet
I (pI) =
pI(1 + Z) and Π
gDetZ
I (pI) = pI(
1
2 + Z) from proof 1. Now, we will evaluate these
proﬁt functions at the switchover points pE , pˆE and p
†
E to show under which restric-
tions the maxima in ΠgAccZI and Π
gAcc
I are covered.
7
If ﬁrm E charges pE , the incumbent is indiﬀerent between the deterrence strate-
gy and the accommodation-Z strategy. Realizing ΠgDetI and qI = 1 − dE requires
pI ≤ pDetI and realizing ΠgAccZI corresponds to pDetI < pI < pDetZI . Thus, the in-
cumbent applies the deterrence strategy for low pI until pE − t(1 − dI − dE) is
reached. For higher pI he switches to an accommodating behavior until the thresh-
old of pE+t(dI−dE) is reached. This of course restricts the market boundary to fullﬁll
1 − dE ≤ x ≤ 12 . Also we see that the intersection of ΠgDetI with ΠgAccZI lies below
pDetI for all dE , dI , pE > 0. Inserting and expanding yields the following expressions:
pDetI (pE) = 2t(1+dE+Z−2
√
dE(1 + Z)), p
AccZ
I (pE) = 2t(1+Z−
√
dE(1 + Z)), and
pDetZI (pE) = 3t+2t(Z−2
√
dE(1 + Z)). The rank p
Det
I (pE) < p
AccZ
I (pE) < p
DetZ
I (pE)
only holds true for dE <
1
4(1+Z) (and dE < 1 + Z respectively).
Analogously, taking pˆE we get p
Det
I (pˆE) = 2t(dE + Z), p
AccZ
I (pˆE) = t(1 + 2Z) and
pDetZI (pˆE) = t(1+2Z). The existence of the maximum in Π
gAccZ
I , i.e., p
DetZ
I > p
AccZ
I
demands pE > pˆE . Graphically, this corresponds to the intersection of the straight
line ΠgDetZI with the slope
1
2 +Z with the parabola Π
gAccZ
I . At pˆE prices are identi-
cal and a kink in the price reaction function obtains which is also supported by the
analysis of the price and proﬁt intersections in proof 1. Note that at the kink pAccZI
and pDetZI are independent of the locations dE and dI .
Finally, we compare ΠgDetZI with Π
gAcc
I . First we ﬁnd the respective proﬁt intersection
at pcI := pE−2tZ+ t(dI−dE). See that pcI ≥ pAccI only holds if pE ≥ t(1+4Z− (dI−
dE)) := p
c
E . We can conclude that pˆE < p
c
E for all Z > 0 which implies that p
Acc
I > p
c
I
for every pE < pˆE . Now, inserting p
†
E yields p
DetZ
I (p
†
E) = t(1 + 4Z − 2
√
2Z(1 + 2Z),
pAccI (p
†
E) = t(1+2Z−
√
2Z(1 + 2Z) and pDefI (p
†
E) = 2t(1−dI +2Z−
√
2Z(1 + 2Z).
The relation pDetZI (p
†
E) < p
Acc
I (p
†
E) holds true for all Z ≥ 0 and pAccI (p†E) < pDefI (p†E)
holds true if Z > 0 and dI < d
/
I . This completes the proof.
Proof 3: The starting point are the proﬁt functions ΠDetI , Π
DetZ
I , Π
Def
I , Π
AccZ
I , and
ΠAccI from proof 1. Now, their intersections and respective existence conditions are
analyzed with respect to dE .
Proﬁts for the deterrence case ΠDetI are linearly increasing in dE with the slope 1+Z.
7For clarity: ΠgAccZI , Π
gAcc
I , Π
gDet
I , and Π
gDetZ
I are general functions of the proﬁts for arbitrary
prices pI , in proof 1 the rank of proﬁts was derived with regards to ﬁrm I's ﬁve possible pricing
strategies. Recall from equations (3.5) and (3.4) that ΠgAccZI gives the proﬁts in pI when ﬁrm I
captures the indiﬀerent consumer which equals a demand in the amount of the market boundary,
i.e., qI = x. Graphically, Π
gAccZ
I is depicted by a parabola, e.g., ﬁrm I's optimal choice is to
charge pAccZI (pE) to realize the highest possible proﬁts. Π
gDet
I incorporates the proﬁts for any
pI when qI = x = 1− dE . Graphically, ΠgDetI is a line with the slope 1 + Z.
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All other proﬁt functions decrease in dE over the range [0;
1
2 ]: Π
DetZ
I by the factor
1
2 +Z, Π
Def
I by the factor dI , and the accommodation proﬁts are convex in dE with
the minima at 1t pE + 1 + dI + 2Z and
1
t pE + 1 + dI respectively. Both accommo-
dation proﬁts have the same covexity given by
∂2ΠAccZI
∂d2E
=
∂2ΠAccI
∂d2E
= t4 > 0. Thus,
for Z > 0 the minimium of ΠAccI will always lie below the minimum of Π
AccZ
I and
accommodation-Z proﬁts will exceed accommodation proﬁts over dE ∈ [0; 12 ].
For high pE deterrence dominates all other strategies. Setting Π
Det
I = Π
AccZ
I yields
the two solutions dE = 5+dI+
1
t pE+6Z±4
√
(pEt + 1 + dI + 2Z)(1 + Z), the higher
always lies above 12 and thus the lower solution stated as dE indicates the switchover
point from the deterrence to the accommodation-Z strategy. Expression dE > 0 re-
duces to pE < t(3− dI + 2Z) for all dI , t, Z > 0 named as p4E and marking the price
limit for the accommodation-Z strategy to exist. Further, leveling respective pricing
functions pDetI = p
AccZ
I yields d

E = 1− 13(dI + 1t pE − 2Z). We see that dE < d

E for
pE < p
4
E , thus at dE ﬁrm I's price reaction is described by a discontinuity.
The intersections between the accommodation-Z strategy and the deterrence-Z strat-
egy as well as between the accommodation strategy and the deference case each reveal
a tangential solution. Firstly, setting ΠAccZI = Π
DetZ
I and p
AccZ
I = p
DetZ
I we obtain
dˆE =
1
t pE +dI −1−2Z or
∂ΠAccZI
∂dE
∣∣∣∣
dˆE
= −t(12 +Z). Secondly, matching ΠAccI = ΠDefI
and pAccI = p
Def
I yields d˜E = 1 − 3dI + 1t pE or
∂ΠAccI
∂dE
∣∣∣∣
d˜E
= −tdI . For dE > dˆE the
accommodation-Z strategy is prefered to the deterrence-Z strategy, and for dE > d˜E
the accommodation strategy is prefered to the deference strategy. If the incumbent
would show an accommodating behavior for locations below these boundaries he
would be undercut by the entrant. Thus, his pricing behavior changes at dˆE and d˜E ,
and the corresponding price reactions are described by a kink. Additionally, inter-
secting accommodation proﬁts with the deterrence-Z proﬁts yields the two solutions
1
t pE − (1− dI + 4Z)± 2
√
2Z(1 + 2Z) where only the higher term is applicable with
respect to dE ∈ [0; 12 ] which we denote as d†E . The intersection of deterrence proﬁts
with accommodation proﬁts yields 5+dI +
1
t pE +4Z±4
√
(pEt + 1 + dI + Z)(1 + Z)
where only the lower solution is feasible w.r.t. dE denoted as d
‡
E .
We turn to the intersections of the linear proﬁt functions. Leveling ΠDetI = Π
DetZ
I
yields d×E =
2(1+Z)− 1
t
pE−dI
3+4Z with deterrence as the preferred strategy for dE > d
×
E
and deterrence-Z dominating for dE < d
×
E . Matching Π
DetZ
I = Π
Def
I we obtain
dˇ†E =
1
t pE − dI
(
1−2dI−2Z
1−2dI+2Z
)
with the deterrence-Z startegy as the preferred option
for dE < dˇ
†
E and deference for the remaining part. Likewise, we deﬁne the inter-
section for ΠDetI = Π
Def
I as dˇ
‡
E = 1 − dI − pE(1−dI+Z)t(1+dI+Z) with deterrence prefered for
dE > dˇ
‡
E . Since p
DetZ
I and p
Def
I are parallel and p
DetZ
I intersects p
Det
I at dE =
1
2 ∀pE
respective transitions in the pricing behavior of the three strategies are characterized
by a discontinuity.
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Next, we determine the ranges of validity for the derived intersections. As already ar-
gued part (I) refers to the condition dE ≥ 0 or pE ≤ p4E which holds for all dI , t, Z >
0, to rule out the deterrence-Z strategy dE < dˆE must hold which reduces to pE >
t
(
5+12Z+8Z2
4(1+Z) − dI
)
:= p/E . Further, dE =
1
2 yields pE = t
(
7
2 − dI + 2Z ± 2
√
2
√
(1 + Z)
)
with p4E and p
/
E lying within these boundary values for all dI , Z ≥ 0. Thus, the
accommodation-Z strategy is proﬁtable for 0 ≤ dE < dE and the deterrence strategy
is prefered for dE < dE <
1
2 . To check for consistency see that p
4
E > p
/
E holds for
dI , Z ≥ 0. In addition, dE is monotonically decreasing in pE ∀pE ∈ [0; p4E ] and dˆE is
monotonically increasing in pE with slope
1
t .
Part (II.a) and part (II.b) require dE > dˆE or pE < p
/
E . The lower price bound for
(II.a) is determined by dˆE > 0 or pE > t(1 − dI + 2Z) := p.E . A consistency check
reveals that p/E > p
.
E holds for dI , Z ≥ 0. Consider also that d×E > dˆE is fullﬁlled for
pE < p
/
E and dI , Z ≥ 0. Further, d×E < 12 requires pE > 12 t(1 − 2dI) := p./E , and we
see that p./E < p
.
E holds for dI , Z ≥ 0. Thus, p.E and p/E constitute the price bounds
for part (II.a).
Part (III.a) accounts for dˆE < 0 or pE < p
.
E and covers solely the deterrence-Z strat-
egy and the deterrence strategy with d×E as the point of indiﬀerence. The existence
of the accommodation strategy (pAccI , x <
1
2) hinges upon the value of dI and Z.
Graphically, for a decreasing dI the tangent in d˜E shifts downwards. This implies
that the value of d˜E increases and charging p
Acc
I becomes proﬁtable. Analytically,
d†E < d˜E states the condition for p
Acc
I to exist which reduces to the familiar rela-
tion dI <
1
2 + Z +
√
Z(12 + Z) := d
/
I (cf. lemma 1 and proof 1). Thus, for every
dI > d
/
I the accommodation strategy does not exist. If the accommodation strate-
gy exists the proﬁt functions ΠDetZI and Π
Acc
I intersect. Now, d
×
E is monotonically
decreasing in pE , thus, for d
×
E = d
†
E proﬁts for the deterrence-Z strategy, the deter-
rence strategy and the accommodation strategy are equal. Then d×E < d
†
E reduces
to pE >
t
(
5+18Z+16Z2−4dI(1+Z)−2
√
2
√
Z(1+2Z)(3+4Z)2
)
4(1+Z) := p
5†
E . In addition, the deter-
rence strategy in part (III.a) is prefered for every dE > d
×
E which requires pE > p
./
E .
To establish the reaction function in (III.a) we ﬁnd p5†E > p
./
E ∀dI , Z ≥ 0.
To derive the expressions in part (II.b) and (III.b) we have to compare p.E with
p5†E . There is no deﬁnite order between these price boundaries instead it depends
on the value of Z. Particularly, we ﬁnd that p.E > p
5†
E holds if Z exceeds a nu-
merical value of ζ ≈ 0.015503 (this refers to the numerical solution of the third
root of a third degree polynomial in Z)8. Consequently, for Z < ζ p5†E > p
.
E holds.
It follows that under these conditions the accommodation-Z strategy is prefered
for 0 ≤ dE < dˆE since pE > p.E . Further, the accommodation strategy is feasible
since pE < p
5†
E or d
×
E > d
†
E , the ranges for p
Acc
I are determined by respective prof-
it intersections, i.e., d†E < dE < d
‡
E . A consistency check shows p
/
E > p
5†
E for all
8in Mathematica: Root
[−1 + 62#1 + 160#12 + 96#13&, 3]
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dI , Z, t > 0, thus p
5†
E constitutes the price bound for parts (II.b), (III.a) and (III.b).
Finally, for part (III.b) for deterrence to exist see that d‡E =
1
2 yields a price set
with the bounds 12 t
(
7− 2dI + 8Z ± 4
√
2
√
1 + 3Z + 2Z2
)
. This set contains p.E for
all dI , Z ≥ 0 which completes the proof.
Proof 4: We use the proﬁt functions and intersections from the preceeding proof.
Part (I ) refers to lemma 3 since the price relation p4E > p
/
E holds for all dI , Z ≥ 0.
For parts (II ) and (III ) we follow the same line of argumentation but examine the
case dI > d
/
I .
If the accommodation strategy does not exist, ΠDetZI and Π
Det
I intersect with Π
Def
I .
Then the condition d×E = dˇ
†
E marks the transition. Setting d
×
E < dˇ
†
E yields pE >
(1−2dI)t(1+dI+Z)(1+2Z)
2(1−2dI+2Z)(1+Z) := p
5‡
E , and as expected dˇ
†
E(p
5‡
E ) = dˇ
‡
E(p
5‡
E ). Additionally,
d×E <
1
2 or pE > p
./
E must hold. A consistency check reveals that p
5‡
E > p
./
E holds true
for Z > 0 and 0 < dI <
1
2 .
Next, we have to compare p.E > p
5‡
E . Solving for equality yields the two solutions
d
(1,2)
I =
5+14Z+8Z2±√1−60Z−284Z2−416Z3−192Z4
2(6+8Z) . This implies that for d
(1)
I < dI < d
(2)
I
we obtain p.E < p
5‡
E . Since p
5‡
E has a singularity at dI =
1
2 +Z for Z > 0 we see that
the intersections only occur at the lower branch of the splitted function. Further, the
existence of the intersections d
(1,2)
I is restricted to the positive discriminant of the
root, i.e., to a value Z = ζ ≈ 0.015503 (which corresponds to the same root as in
proof of lemma 3). Thus, for Z > ζ the inequality p.E > p
5‡
E holds for all dI ∈ [0; 12 ].
We still have to check p/E > p
5‡
E which holds for all dI , Z ≥ 0. Finally, for deterrence
to exist dˇ‡E <
1
2 yields pE > t
(1−2dI)(1+dI+Z)
2(1−dI+Z) , and p
.
E > t
(1−2dI)(1+dI+Z)
2(1−dI+Z) holds for
dI , Z ≥ 0 which completes the proof.
Proof 5a: Firstly, we set ΠˇE := (1−dI +Z)pˇE and see that ΠˇE linearly increases in
dE with slope
t(1−3dI+2d2I+3Z−4dIZ+2Z2)
1−2dI+2Z ; the slope is positive for all Z and dI < 1+Z.
Secondly, consider that the minimum for ΠAccE (p
Acc
E ) given at dE = dI−3−2Z is neg-
ative for dI , Z ∈ [0, 12 ] which implies that respective proﬁts monotonically increase
in dE over the positive range. Next, we match the proﬁt functions ΠˇE = Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ).
This yields a solution function with linear and quadratic terms in dE , and linear,
quadratic terms and terms to the power of three in dI and Z as well as mixed terms
between dE , dI and Z. We ﬁnd the following two solutions in dE :
d
(1,2)
E =
1
1− 2dI + 2Z
(
5 + 14d2I + 16Z + 12Z
2 − dI(17 + 26Z)± 4Γ
)
(3.26)
with:
Γ =
√
αd4I − βd3I + γd2I − δdI + ξ
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α = 8
β = 20(1 + 2Z)
γ = 2
(
9 + 36Z + 32Z2
)
δ =
(
7 + 40Z + 72Z2 + 40Z3
)
ξ = (1 + Z)(1 + 2Z)3
Graphically, this solution set corresponds to the intersections of the linear function
ΠˇE and the parabola Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ) (see ﬁgure 3.12). Restricting the lower boundary
solution to d
(1)
E <
1
2 shows that this inequality is not fulﬁlled for any dI <
1
2 if
Z > 0. Additionally, see that d.E < d
(1)
E and d
(1)
E < d
(2)
E for all 0 < Z <
1
2 and
dI <
1
2(1 + 3Z)− 12
√
2Z + 5Z2. At dI =
1
2(1 + 3Z)− 12
√
2Z + 5Z2 the intersections
d
(1,2)
E collapse (Γ = 0) and the proﬁt functions intersect in a tangential point, if dI
further increases ΠAccE dominates ΠˇE for all dE ≥ 0. This completes the proof.
Figure 3.12: Illustration of the relation between ΠˇE and Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ) against dE
Comment: Parameter values are t = 1, dI = 0.4, and Z =
1
2
.
Proof 5b: Let us denote Π×E :=
1
2p
×
E and take over ΠˇE from proof 5a. By taking
the respective ﬁrst derivatives it is straightforward to see that Π×E linearly decreases
and ΠˇE linearly increases in dE for dI ∈ [0, 12 ] and Z ≥ 0. Thus, we ﬁnd the proﬁt
intersection at:
dsplitE =
2− 7dI + 8d2I − 4d3I + 6Z − 4dIZ + 4Z2 + 4dIZ2
5− 12dI + 4d2I + 16Z − 16dIZ + 12Z2
(3.27)
dsplitE shows a complex dependency on dI and Z since it comprises of two polynomials
in the nominator and denominator. Let us ﬁrst consider the impact of dI . For Z = 0
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dsplitE reduces to
2−7dI+8d2I−4d3I
5−12dI+4d2I
where the nominator and the denominator equal zero
at dI =
1
2 and the denominator yields a second null at
5
2 . Thus, d
split
E (Z = 0) is
not deﬁned at dI =
1
2 and over the range 0 ≤ dI < 12 the function is monotonically
decreasing in dI . For Z > 0 the dependency of d
split
E on dI is solely determined by the
null of the denominator given at 12(1+2Z). For increasing Z the singularity increases
and the convexity of dsplitE in dI on the intervall [0,
1
2 ] decreases. As a result d
split
E
is shifted upwards for reasonably large locations dI (see ﬁgure 3.13). As regards the
dependency of dsplitE on Z we consider the singularity at
1
2(−1+2dI), for Z exceeding
this boundary dsplitE is monotonically increasing in Z. The singularity shifts towards
the origin for increasing dI and d
split
E converges to
1
2 for dI → 12 . (see ﬁgure 3.9)
Further, we see that dsplitE <
1
2 for Z > 0 and
1
2 −
√
1
2 + Z + Z
2 < dI <
1
2 and
that dsplitE > 0 for all dI , Z ∈ [0, 12 ]. Clearly, for dsplitE < 0 we get ΠˇE > Π×E , and if
dsplitE >
1
2 the relation ΠˇE < Π
×
E obtains. A consistency check shows that d
.
E < d
split
E
for all Z, dI ∈ [0, 12 ] and that 12 −
√
1
2 + Z + Z
2 < d/I for all Z ≥ 0 which completes
the proof. We conclude ﬁrstly that undercutting the incumbent setting pˇE will never
strictly dominate the strategy of charging p×E , and secondly that only for locations
of dI >
1
2 −
√
1
2 + Z + Z
2 the strategy to charge pˇE will yield higher proﬁts than
setting p×E .
Figure 3.13: Illustration of the relation between dsplitE and dI for diﬀerent values of Z
Comment: An increase in Z leads to an increase in dsplitE as dI grows depicted for Z = 0 (solid
curve), Z = 0.1 (tiny dashed curve), Z = 0.25 (small dashed curve), and Z = 0.5 (medium dashed
curve). Parameter values are t = 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: Based on the previous analyses in proof 5a and 5b we
ﬁrstly deﬁne ﬁrm E's proﬁt functions and summarize their characteristics. Secondly,
we conduct a comparative proﬁt analysis. The relevant proﬁt functions for ﬁrm E's
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proﬁt optimization problem are:
ΠE(pE , 1− x(pAccZI )) ≡ ΠE = t((3 + dE − dI + 2Z)
√
dE(1 + Z)− 4dE(1 + Z)),
ΠE(p
Acc
E , 1− x(pAccZI )) = ΠAccE (pAccE ) = 116 t(3 + dE − dI + 2Z)2,
ΠE(p
Z
E , 1− x(pAccI ) + Z) ≡ ΠZE = 12 t(1 + dE − dI)(1 + 2Z),
ΠE(p
×
E , 1− x(pDetZI )) = Π×E = 12 t(2− 3dE − dI + 2Z − 4dEZ), and
ΠE(pˇE , 1− x(pDefI ) + Z) = ΠˇE .
ΠZE and ΠˇE increase linearly in dE with steeper slopes as Z grows. Further, Π
×
E
decreases linearly in dE also with increasing slopes in Z. Proﬁts Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ) increase
monotonically in dE over the positive range for all dI , Z ∈ [0, 12 ]. Finally, ΠE shows a
local maximum at dMaxE =
1
9
(
23 + 3dI + 26Z − 8
√
7 + 3dI + 17Z + 3dIZ + 10Z2
)
and intersects ΠAccE (p
Acc
E ) at dE = 29 + dI + 30Z ± 8
√
13 + dI + 27Z + dIZ + 14Z2
where we denote the lower intersection with dIntsE . See that the ﬁrst derivatives of ΠE
and ΠAccE (p
Acc
E ) in dE are identical at the proﬁt intersections, particularly at d
Ints
E ,
from which we conclude that ΠE is dominated by Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ) over the domain.
As regards the comparison of ΠAccE (p
Acc
E ) with Π
Z
E two intersections at dE = 1 +dI +
6Z ± 4√Z + 2Z2 obtain. A nonnegative set requires 1 + dI + 6Z − 4
√
Z + 2Z2 < 12
which holds for all Z > 0 and dI <
1
2(−1− 12Z) + 4
√
Z + 2Z2. Since dI is bounded
Z is restricted to 0 < 12(−1− 12Z) + 4
√
Z + 2Z2 < 12 . The upper bound is fullﬁlled
for all 0 ≤ Z < 12 , the lower bound reduces to 14
(
5− 2√6) < Z < 14 (5 + 2√6).
Thus, for Z < 14
(
5− 2√6) the rank ΠAccE (pAccE ) > ΠZE holds for all dE , dI ∈ [0, 12 ],
and for Z above this boundary it holds if dE < 1 + dI + 6Z − 4
√
Z + 2Z2 := dZE .
Additionally, a further match reveals that dZE > d
.
E holds for a threshold value of
dI >
1
4+4Z + 4
√
Z + 2Z2 − 1 − 6Z := dcritZI for all Z ≥ 0. Referring to ﬁrm I's
reaction functions see then immediately that d/I > d
critZ
I for all Z ≥ 0. In sum this
implies that for locations dI < d
/
I and dE < d
.
E the rank Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ) > Π
Z
E is always
true. For distant locations of the incumbent the strategy of charging pAccE does not
dominate pZE anymore.
Next we consider the relation between ΠAccE (p
Acc
E ) and Π
×
E . We demonstrate that p
×
E
is only an alternative for ﬁrm E for the location range dE > d
.
E , i.e. when p
AccZ
I is
not a proﬁtable strategy option, but rather pDetI and p
DetZ
I respectively are preferred.
This follows from the rank pˆE < p
×
E < pE which holds true for all dI , Z ∈ [0, 12 ] and
as expected for dE < d
.
E . For dE < d
.
E ﬁrm E's strategy to capture the center is
given by pˆE which is dominated by p
Acc
E for all 0 ≤ dE , Z ≤ 12 . Clearly, ﬁrm E
could charge p×E when dE < d
.
E , proﬁts then would be Π
Acc
E (p
×
E) since the incumbent
reacts with pAccZI . Thus, match Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ) = Π
Acc
E (p
×
E) and the tangential solution
dE =
1−dI+2Z
7+8Z obtains which is also evident since p
Acc
E solves the ﬁrst order condi-
tion. Also note that p×E and p
Acc
E intersect at this dE . Alternatively, see that proﬁts
ΠAccE (p
×
E) and Π
×
E intersect at d
.
E which is fully in accord with the suggested order of
entry prices. We conclude that the strategy pAccE dominates p
×
E for all dI , Z ∈ [0, 12 ]
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and dE < d
.
E . Put diﬀerently, the match Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ) = Π
×
E is not of economic interest
in the range dE < d
.
E since ﬁrm I would never choose p
DetZ
I when pE ∈ [pˆE ; pE ].
To conclude the proof recall from proof 5a that ΠAccE (p
Acc
E ) > ΠˇE holds over the
domain dE , dI , Z ∈ [0, 12 ].
Proof of Proposition 2: Recall
∂ΠAccE
∂dE
> 0 and from the preceding proof that
∂ΠE
∂dE
= 0 yields dMaxE and that Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ) and ΠE intersect at d
Ints
E . Note that the
intersection lies below the maximum on the given domain, i.e., dIntsE < d
Max
E for all
dI , Z ∈ [0, 12 ].
Next, we compare the maximum with the boundary for pAccZI to be applicable and
set dMaxE < d
.
E which holds for all Z ≥ 0 and dI > 4Z+8Z
2−1
4+4Z := d
cMax
I . This implies
that for every Z < 14
(√
3− 1) the maximum lies within the range of d.E and for a
higher Z there exists a set of dI < d
cMax
I such that d
Max
E is out. More speciﬁcally
by applying dcMaxI < d
/
I we ﬁnd that
9 for Z < Z ′ ≈ 0.379 for every dI > d/I also
dI > d
cMax
I . By contrast for Z > Z
′ there exist some dI such that d/I < dI < d
cMax
I .
So far we have established conditions such that ﬁrm E maximizes his proﬁts ΠE over
dE , however, from the preceding proof we know that Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ) yields higher proﬁts.
It is straightforward to show that this is only true for locations dE < d
Ints
E . Intu-
itively, the proﬁt maximizing accommodation price of ﬁrm E pAccE can not become
arbitrarily large. The limit is set by the price such that the incumbent is indiﬀerent
between deterring the entrant or playing pAccZI . This price is of course pE . Now for
certain location pairs (dI , dE) the rank p
Acc
E > pE obtains. (cf. equ. (3.20) in sub-
section 3.1) Evaluating this particular expression with respect to dE yields the term
for dIntsE which essentially proofs our proposition. In short ΠE = Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ) and
pAccE = pE at d
Ints
E . Thus, for dE < d
Ints
E the entrant charges p
Acc
E and for dE > d
Ints
E
he sets pE . Since d
Ints
E < d
Max
E the proﬁt maximizing location is of course d
Max
E = d
∗
E .
The transition in proﬁts and prices is described by a kink. Clearly, inserting dMax
into pE and evaluating the expression yields p
∗
E .
For p∗E and d
∗
E to be the optimal solution in the range dE < d
.
E we have to show that
the pricing strategy pE also dominates the two strategies p
×
E and pˆE that lead the en-
trant to decrease his prices. Thus, we ﬁrstly match ΠE = Π
Acc
E (p
×
E) and ﬁnd the inter-
sections at d.E and s
(1,2) =
14−3dI+22Z−4dIZ+8Z2±4
√
10−3dI+28Z−7dIZ+26Z2−4dIZ2+8Z3
(3+4Z)2
.
See that at d.E the proﬁt functions share a tangential intersection since the ﬁrst
derivatives in dE are equal and that for dE ∈ [s(1), s(2)] ΠE > ΠAccE (p×E) since pE >
p×E . (see ﬁgure 3.14) Furthermore, we ﬁnd that s
(1) ≤ dIntsE holds for all dI ∈ [0, 12 ]
and Z ≥ 0 which proves that ΠE > ΠAccE (p×E) holds for all s(1) < dE < d.E and thus
rules out the strategy to charge p×E . Secondly, we set ΠE = ΠˆE which yields the three
solutions d.E and s
(1,2) = 7 + dI + 6Z ± 4
√
3 + dI + 5Z + dIZ + 2Z2 with ΠE > ΠˆE
9in Mathematica: Root
[−9− 4#1 + 52#12 + 56#13&, 3]
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for s(1) < dE < d
.
E . Also note that s
(2) > 12 for all dI , Z ≥ 0. Moreover s(1) < dMaxE
holds for Z ≥ 0 and 2√Z + Z2 − 2 < dI < 2(15 + 16Z)− 10
√
8 + 17Z + 9Z2 where
the boundaries comprise the domain dI ∈ [0; 12 ] for all 0 ≤ Z ≤ 12 . A further drill
down shows that s(1) < dIntsE for all Z ≥ 0 and dcMaxI < dI , thus, pˆE is not a prof-
itable pricing strategy compared to pE if dE < d
.
E and d
cMax
I < dI .
To conduct a ﬁnal consistency check we use part (I) of the location reaction function
in lemma 3 and 4. See that the rank p∗E < p
4
E holds for all dI , Z ∈ [0; 12 ] and that
p∗E > p
/
E remains true for the location set dI > d
cMax
I for all Z ≥ 0. Thus, if ﬁrm E
chooses his proﬁt maximizing set (p∗E , d
∗
E) ﬁrm I reacts with p
AccZ
I or p
Det
I according
to his location reaction function. We use the boundary dE and insert p
∗
E . Comparing
dE(p
∗
E) with d
∗
E reveals that the local maximum d
∗
E does not exceed the boundary
for all dI , Z ∈ [0; 12 ]. By contrast, we ﬁnd that the relation d∗E > dE(p∗E) holds for
Z ≥ 0 and dI > 31 + 30Z which shows that under the entry set (p∗E , d∗E) deterrence
does not occur. This completes the proof.
Figure 3.14: Illustration of the relation between the proﬁt functions ΠE , Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ), Π
×
E ,
and ΠAccE (p
×
E)
Comment: ΠE , Π
Acc
E (p
Acc
E ), and Π
×
E are depicted as solid functions, Π
Acc
E (p
×
E) is depicted as the
dotted curve. The vertical dashed lines indicate the intersections of ΠE with Π
Acc
E (p
×
E). For locations
dE > s
(1) ≈ 0.139 charging pE yields higher proﬁts than p×E , at dE = d.E ≈ 0.179 respective proﬁt
functions share a tangential intersection. Parameter values are dI = 0.4, Z = 0.4 and t = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3: For dE > d
.
E charging p
AccZ
I is not feasible, thus pE and
pAccE are not part of ﬁrm E's strategy set. Therefore we are left to evaluate the relation
between ΠZE , Π
×
E and ΠˇE and derive solutions sets for market entry on the domain
dE > d
.
E . In addition, we compare these with the proﬁt-maximizing set (p
∗
E , d
∗
E).
Firstly, matching the linear functions Π×E and Π
Z
E yields Π
×
E > Π
Z
E for dE <
1+2dIZ
2(2+3Z) :=
dZ×E with 0 ≤ dZ×E < 12 for all dI , Z ∈ [0, 12 ]. Secondly, recall from proof 5b that
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Π×E > ΠˇE holds for dE < d
split
E and dI , Z ∈ [0, 12 ], and thirdly see that ΠZE > ΠˇE
holds for all Z > 0, dI <
1
2 .
Referring to lemma 1 and subsection 3.2.2 recall that for d/I < dI < d
.
I and dE > d
.
E
charging p×E is the preferred strategy for locations dE < d
split
E and pˇE for dE > d
split
E .
The transition in prices is described by a discontinuity since for all Z ≥ 0 and dI < 12
the proﬁt intersection dsplitE lies below the location dE where pˇE and p
×
E intersect. For
close locations dI > d
.
I ﬁrm E's undercutting price is pˇE < 0, thus the pricing strat-
egy p×E dominates. Next we have to consider that
∂Π×E
∂dE
< 0 and ∂ΠˇE∂dE > 0. (cf. proof
of proposition 1) This implies that ﬁrm E has no incentive to increase his location
dE when dE < d
split
E or when p
×
E is the only pricing option respectively. In particular,
the best location ﬁrm E can choose under p×E is dE = d
.
E since this is where proﬁts
Π×E and ΠE as well as prices p
×
E and pE intersect. Accounting for the results from
proof of proposition 2 we can conclude that provided dI > d
cMax
I the set (p
∗
E , d
∗
E)
yields higher proﬁts than the best price-location set under the pricing strategy p×E .
Further, we ﬁnd that the transition from pE to p
×
E and ΠE to Π
×
E respectively is
described by a kink at the location d.E .
Provided that pˇE > 0, the behavior of ΠˇE suggests that ﬁrm E increases his location
when dE > d
split
E . Recall from proof 5b that d
.
E < d
split
E for all Z, dI ∈ [0, 12 ]. Thus,
we compare the proﬁts for the proﬁt-maximizing set (p∗E , d
∗
E) with proﬁts under the
pricing strategy pˇE at dE =
1
2 − , → 0. We omit the fact that ﬁrm I deters entry
at a location below dE =
1
2 , however, since ΠˇE and pˇE monotonically increase in dE
we can conclude that the comparison indicates an upper boundary for the proﬁtabil-
ity of the undercutting strategy. Clearly, for locations dE <
1
2 and particularly for
locations where the undercutting strategy pˇE is viable undercutting proﬁts do not
exceed ΠE(d
Max
E ) under the following conditions.
Evaluating ΠE(d
Max
E ) = ΠˇE(dE =
1
2) yields a complex numerical solution set in dI
and Z. For the domain dI , Z ∈ [0; 12 ] we ﬁnd that the proﬁts for the set (p∗E , d∗E)
strictly increase proﬁts ΠˇE(dE =
1
2) if Z > κ ≈ 0.0305.10 For Z < κ playing pˇE
implies ΠE(d
Max
E ) < ΠˇE(dE =
1
2) if dI lies in a deﬁned interval [dˇ
1
I ; dˇ
2
I ] where respec-
tive boundaries are again numerical functions in Z. This completes the argument
and demonstrates that the level of Z determines whether (p∗E , d
∗
E) constitutes a local
or a global maximum in comparison with the undercutting strategy pˇE .
Proof of Proposition 4: We examine the location ranges dE > d
Z×
E and dE > d
Z
E ,
and show that the reaction of ﬁrm I does not allow for the entry pricing strategy pZE
10In Mathematica evaluating ΠE(d
Max
E ) > ΠˇE(dE =
1
2
) leads to the following expression for Z
Root[−2049517− 157017785#1 + 5288937559#12 + 59510555641#13 + 262944127002#14
+648457185140#15 + 997636619952#16 + 997008491936#17 + 647640924928#18
+263301336320#19 + 60596977664#110 + 5985009664#111&, 7]
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to be proﬁtable. Initially, recall that
∂ΠZE
∂dE
> 0.
We begin by setting dZ×E > d
.
E which reduces to dI >
1
4+4Z for Z > 0. Also see that
1
4+4Z < d
/
I holds true for all Z ≥ 0. Thus, there is a nonempty set of locations dI
such that strategy p×E is preferred for d
.
E < dE < d
Z×
E and strategy p
Z
E for dE > d
Z×
E .
It follows that when opting for the pricing strategy pZE then the lowest possible price
is given by pZE(d
Z×
E ). It is straightforward to compare this price with the thresholds
of the location reaction function in lemma 3 to assess ﬁrm I's reaction. Matching
pZE(d
Z×
E ) < p
/
E reveals that part (I) is not applicable since the rank holds for all
dI , Z ∈ [0; 12 ]. Evaluating pZE(dZ×E ) < p.E reveals an ambigous result depending on
the interaction of the parameters dI and Z. We turn to the next price threshold and
ﬁnd that the rank pZE(d
Z×
E ) > p
5†
E remains true for all dI , Z > 0. This implies that
ﬁrm I will never apply part (III.b) of his location reaction function and that ﬁrm
I never reacts with charging pAccI but for instance with p
DetZ
I to the entry strategy
pZE . Consequently, if ﬁrm E drops his price from p
×
E to p
Z
E at d
Z×
E his proﬁts will not
be ΠZE(p
Z
E) but e.g. Π
×
E(p
Z
E) since
Π×E
∂dE
< 0 and thus clearly not proﬁtable. This is
due to the fact that the incumbent will not adapt his pricing strategy and accommo-
date entry, he rather applies his defensive reaction strategies. In particular, ﬁrm I
reacts with pDetZI to the price drop from p
×
E to p
Z
E . To prove this argument see that
the relation d×E(p
Z
E(d
Z×
E )) > d
Z×
E holds for all dI , Z ∈ [0; 12 ] and furthermore that
dˆE(p
Z
E(d
Z×
E )) < d
Z×
E holds on the same domain. It suﬃces to compare the critical
locations d×E and dˆE with d
Z×
E since p
Z
E(d
Z×
E ) < p
/
E and part (I) is ruled out.
11
In the second step of the proof we focus on the threshold dZE or a comparison of
the strategies pAccE and p
Z
E . Analogously to the preceding above, we determine the
price level at the discontinuity pZE(d
Z
E) and assign it to a corresponding price range
of the location reaction function in lemma 3. Noteably, pZE(d
Z
E) > p
5†
E holds again
for all dI , Z > 0 which rules out an accommodating reaction of ﬁrm I under a
loss of Z. The further assignments of pZE(d
Z
E) to the parts (I), (II.a), (II.b) and
(III.a) hinge upon interactions of dI and Z. Especially, p
/
E > p
Z
E(d
Z
E) reduces to
dI < 4
√
Z + 2Z2 − 3+20Z+16Z24(1+Z) . It remains to compare the locations dˆE , d×E , and dE
for the entry price pZE(d
Z
E) with d
Z
E . Firstly, a consistent result is obtained due to
the rank dˆE(p
Z
E(d
Z
E)) < d
Z
E which holds for all dI , Z > 0 since ﬁrm I would never
react with pAccZI for dE > d
Z
E . Secondly, the rank d
×
E(p
Z
E(d
Z
E)) < d
Z
E holds for all
dI > 4
√
Z + 2Z2− 3+26Z+24Z24(1+Z) and thus depends on the value of Z. Particularly, for
any dI ∈ [0; 12 ] ﬁrm I reacts with pDetI if Z < Z ′′′ ≈ 0.077 and with pDetZI if Z > Z ′′′.12
Thirdly, dE(p
Z
E(d
Z
E)) < d
Z
E remains true for any dI < 4
√
Z + 2Z2 − 14(3 + 23Z). We
compare this limit with the boundary derived from p/E > p
Z
E(d
Z
E) and ﬁnd that
11Note that the demonstrated interdependence between the contenders holds for all 0 < dI <
1
2
and is not restricted to the location range dE > d
.
E (or dI >
1
4+4Z
) since the reaction of ﬁrm I
is determined by the price level of the entry price pE .
12In Mathematica reducing 4
√
Z + 2Z2 − 3+26Z+24Z2
4(1+Z)
< 0 yields 0 ≤ Z <
Root
[
9− 100#1− 204#12 − 32#13 + 64#14&, 3]
138
Chapter 3. Does Entry Pay Oﬀ in a Linear City with a Center?
4
√
Z + 2Z2− 14(3 + 23Z) < 4
√
Z + 2Z2− 3+20Z+16Z24(1+Z) is true for Z > 0. This implies
that for any pZE(d
Z
E) > p
/
E entry is deterred or dE(p
Z
E(d
Z
E)) < d
Z
E .
Remark: The aim is to identify to which price range of the location reaction function
in lemma 4 the undercutting price pˇE is assigned. At the location d
split
E the pricing
behavior of the entrant ﬁrm shifts from p×E to pˇE and therefore for dE > d
split
E the
undercutting strategy dominates. (cf. ﬁgure 3.15) Thus, we use pˇE at d
split
E for the
allignment and note that the strategic behavior of ﬁrm E does not change under an
increase in dE since
∂ΠˇE
∂dE
> 0.
The rank p/E > pˇE(d
split
E ) holds for all Z > 0 and dI ∈ [0; 12 ]. Secondly, we set
pˇE(d
split
E ) > p
.
E . This rank holds true if Z and dI remain in certain numerically de-
ﬁned intervals, i.e. for Z < Z ′′ ≈ 0.0128 and the boundaries for dI are a decreasing
numerical function in Z with the maximum interval at Z = 0 (≈ [0.363; 12 ]) and the
minimum at Z = Z ′′.13 Consequently, for Z < Z ′′ and dI outside the deﬁned interval
as well as Z > Z ′′ and any 0 ≤ dI ≤ 12 the relation p.E > pˇE(dsplitE ) obtains. Thirdly,
we set p5‡E > pˇE(d
split
E ) and ﬁnd that this rank holds for all dI , Z ∈ [0; 12 ]. Considering
the threshold value ζ from lemma 4 it follows that for any Z < Z ′′ and given that
dI lies in the predeﬁned numerical interval part (III.b) from the location reaction
function is applicable. Now, due to the symmetry of dˇ†E and pˇE  the two expressions
describe the same intersection between ﬁrm I's proﬁts for the deterrence-Z strategy
and the deferrence strategy  we ﬁnd the identity dˇ†E(pˇE(d
split
E )) = d
split
E . This implies
that the incumbent initially reacts with pDefI to the undercutting of ﬁrm E at d
split
E .
Recall that pˇE(d
split
E ) marks the lowest feasible price for the undercutting strategy
and that pˇE increases in dE . Thus, the entrant increases dE when choosing the pric-
ing strategy pˇE since corresponding proﬁts move up. In turn, it follows that pE will
exceed p5‡E at a certain location dE . Clearly, ﬁrm I's reaction then switches from
part (III.b) to (II.b) and from pDefI to p
Det
I since pE > p
5‡
E is equivalent to d
×
E < dˇ
†
E .
(cf. proof 4)
13In Mathematica:
0 < Z < Root
[−57 + 4114#1 + 26856#12 + 63792#13 + 66592#14 + 25728#15&, 3]
Root
[−3− 20Z − 40Z2 − 24Z3 + (15 + 48Z + 36Z2)#1 + (−20− 32Z)#12 + 4#13&, 1] < dI <
Root
[−3− 20Z − 40Z2 − 24Z3 + (15 + 48Z + 36Z2)#1 + (−20− 32Z)#12 + 4#13&, 2]
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Figure 3.15: Illustration of ﬁrm E's proﬁt function for diﬀerent pricing strategies against
his location dE
Comment: The solid lines depict the viable price and proﬁt ranges. Proﬁts for the undercutting
strategy amount to 0.464 at dE =
1
2
and exceed proﬁts for the set (p∗E , d
∗
E) which are 0.457. However,
ﬁrm E is only able to play the undercutting strategy in the location interval [dˇ†E , dˇ
†
E ] ≈ [0.292; 0321]
(second and third vertical tiny dashed lines). The location d×E ≈ 0.320 is the threshold for deterrence
if pE > p
5‡
E (medium dashed line) and d
.
E is approximately 0.248 (ﬁrst vertical tiny dashed line).
Parameter values are dI = 0.44, Z = 0.01 and t = 1.
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4 Price Dispersion, Search Costs and
Spatial Competition*
4.1 Introduction
In contrast to predictions of simple textbook models, causal observations suggest
that homogeneous products are sold at diﬀerent prices by rival ﬁrms even in markets
with intense competition. In fact, empirical studies reveal that prices, diﬀerent ﬁrms
charge for the same product, diﬀer signiﬁcantly and persistently and deviations from
the 'law of one price' are the norm, rather than the exception. Since the existence of
price diﬀerences for identical products is an indication of the eﬃciency of markets,
programs and policies to improve access to information may result in lower prices
for consumers and enhance consumer welfare.1 The eﬀects of competition-enhancing
policies, however, might not be as straightforward as those implied by standard
models. Rather, increased competition can potentially aﬀect the price distribution
asymmetrically and may have diﬀerent impacts on the welfare of diﬀerent types of
consumers.2 Thus, a thorough examination of the price distribution may shed light
on structural relationships of a market economy and in turn provide a useful basis
for advising policy makers.
Intuition suggests there are two straightforward explanations for the behavior of
prices and the existence of price diﬀerences. Firstly, price levels and price disper-
sion are related to product and seller heterogeneity. Even though products might
appear homogenous in terms of physical characteristics, as in the case of gasoline,
they are being sold at diﬀerent stores. In turn, retail outlets diﬀer in convenience
*This paper was presented at the XXVI Jornadas de Economia Industrial on 16th of September
2011 held at the Universitat de Valencia in Valencia, and at research seminars at the School
of Geographical Sciences of the Arizona State University (ASU) on 14th of April 2012 and
at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen in September 2011 in the cause of scholar visits supported
and organized by the Network for European and United States Urban and Regional Studies
(NEURUS).
1The Austrian economics ministry for instance recently passed an act on the conduct rules of
gasoline station operators eﬀectively regulating gasoline pricing. It lays down that individual
gasoline stations are only permitted to raise gasoline prices once a day. More evidence on the
issue of government intervention and price discrimination in retail gasoline markets is available
in Borenstein (1991) and Borenstein & Bushnell (2005).
2Cp. Lach & Moraga-Gonzalez (2009) and Morgan et al. (2006).
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and amenities. Thus consumers may be willing to pay a premium for products that
they perceive to be of higher quality, e.g. peculiar brands are perceived to be in
the premium segment or shops having a reputation for extraordinary services to be
rendered to customers. Additionally, products may also diﬀer in a spatial context.
In particular, buying decisions and customer satisfaction may be related to sellers'
locations allowing, for instance, consumers to access a retail outlet conveniently or in
a very short amount of time since outlets may be distributed across diﬀerent market
areas.3
Secondly, prices and price diﬀerences are determined by the factor information and
explained by the economics of information.4 Accordingly, variance in prices are as-
sociated with costs incurred by consumers and ﬁrms while processing market infor-
mation. Sellers have incentives to charge diﬀerent prices since consumers may diﬀer,
for instance, in their willingness and capabilities to collect information about sellers'
location, prices and pricing strategies. In turn, demand is fragmented into consumer
groups that diﬀer according to their knowledge of the price distribution. As a result,
markets are characterized by arbitrage opportunitities and market equilibrium out-
comes are cleary impacted by the existence of consumer groups that diﬀer in their
preferences to balance the costs and beneﬁts of price search activities.
These two distinct approaches in mind, this paper examines the diesel price distri-
bution in the Austrian retail market with respect to the inﬂuence competition and
diﬀering levels of search costs have on the mean price and the price variance. The
Austrian gasoline market is particularly useful in testing hypothesis on the com-
parative static behavior of the price distribution. Firstly, it is characterized by a
high level of concentration where the four major chains controll almost 60% of the
market.5 Secondly, gasoline can be considered an almost perfectly homogenous good
with respect to its physical and chemical properties. From the perspective of the con-
sumer, the key issue of diﬀerentiation in this market is the location of the individual
station. Thus, competition intensity is directly related to the geographical proximity
of sellers. We use two measures that account for sellers' distance relations in local
markets. Additionally, from ﬁrms' perspective a critical issue in optimizing pricing
strategies relates to the diﬀerences in the knowledge of stations' pricing behavior
among consumers. The distribution of information reﬂects consumers' likelihood to
police excessive market pricing. Intuitively, a station sets low prices in areas where
consumers are susceptible to spotting gasoline prices and thus likely to switch be-
3Products that diﬀer via their quality characteristics are considered to be vertically diﬀerenti-
ated since consumers agree over the preference ordering. In contrast, distinct seller locations
refer to the notion of horizontal product diﬀerentiation implying that optimal consumer choices
strongly depend on consumers' preferences that generally diﬀer with respect to the observed
characteristic, cp. Tirole (2003), p. 96ﬀ.
4In the words of George Stigler: it would be metaphysical, and fruitless, to assert that all dispersion
is due to heterogeneity (Stigler (1961), p. 214).
5Cf. Report of the Austrian Ministry of Economics, BMWA (2005).
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tween sellers. On the other hand, a proﬁtable strategy for a station in an area where
consumers' ignorance of price levels and price changes is prevalent is to charge high
prices.
In conclusion, the following research questions will be addressed: How does spatial
competition between diﬀerent gasoline stations aﬀect the price distribution of diesel?
How does the fraction of informed consumers and of uninformed consumers impact
the price distribution and what are possible implications for the relationship for the
level of search costs and the price distribution?
By using data on stations` characteristics and local market characteristics, our strat-
egy is to initially control for product heterogeneity and estimate a model that ex-
amines the relationship between competition, search cost variables and proxies for
sellers' location as well as station speciﬁc characteristics with price levels. In a sec-
ond step we will test hypotheses on the relation between the fraction of informed
consumers, search costs and competition with price dispersion measured by the price
variance. Besides the usual OLS techniques we will also test for spatial autocorre-
lation and to avoid misspeciﬁcation apply a spatial error model (SEM) to estimate
market prices. In addition, further robustness checks concerning the use of alterna-
tive spatial weights matrices and search cost proxies will be carried out.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: subsection 4.2 presents a selected overview
of the theoretical literature on the existence and behavior of the equilibrium price
distribution with respect to the spatial distribution of ﬁrms and the existence of
search costs among consumers. Special attention is drawn to the relationship be-
tween the fraction of informed consumers, the level of search costs and the number
of sellers with the average price and price dispersion. Subsection 4.3 gives details on
data and methodology and outlines the strategy for the empirical analysis. Subsec-
tion 4.4 presents the results and eventually subsection 4.5 closes with a concluding
discussion on the ﬁndings.
4.2 Survey of Price Models
4.2.1 Spatial Competition Models
Standard models of spatial competition assume a uniform distribution of consumers
in a one dimensional market setting for a homogenous product. (e.g. Hotelling (1929),
Salop (1979)) Each ﬁrm serves a customer base that is within a certain local mar-
ket range. Implications of these sort of models are that competition is a localized
phenomenon since sellers compete in prices for potential customers with comparable
transportation costs and settled within a common local market of interest. In par-
ticular, by reducing his price a seller i could attract consumers that are located farer
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away and who would otherwise be indiﬀerent between purchasing at ﬁrm i's outlet
or at the sites of his close competitors. In equilibrium prices obtain as the sum of
sellers' (equal) marginal cost and a markup that depends on the degree of spatial
diﬀerentiation. Put diﬀerently, due to his location a seller holds a certain degree of
monopoly power over its local market customer base which is reﬂected in the nega-
tive dependency of prices with geographical distance.
Now, an increase in competition intensity in terms of the number of sellers (due to
reductions in ﬁxed costs or increases in the number of consumers) is associated with
a decrease in the ability to employ market power upon the original customer base.
If a new ﬁrm enters the market it locates in the previously segmented market space
eﬀectively shrinking the local monopolies of neighbouring competitors by establish-
ing its own local niche market. Accordingly, increased competition aggravates ﬁrms'
possibilities to (spatially) diﬀerentiate themselves, leads to a denser net of outlets
and thus erodes the basis to extract a surplus from nearby consumers since they
reconsider their purchase decision due to this increase in seller variety. What follows
is that under entry competition the price elasticity of demand increases, the price
markup decreases and thus the market price declines.6
Further, unit transportation cost t can be interpreted as a measure of consumers'
search cost incurred to compare prices of neighbouring sellers and get additional
price quotes. Consequently, an increase in t decreases consumers' incentives to visit
stores competing in prices. In turn, sellers are able to appropriate more surplus from
their captives and as a result prices are expected to rise as the unit transportation
cost increases.
While spatial competition models are straightforward in explaining the relation be-
tween market prices, transportation costs and competition intensity, the issue of
market information and price dispersion is not explicitly addressed.7 Rather, price
dispersion is expected to arise due to asymmetries in the spatial distribution of ﬁrms.
Comparable to the behavior of price levels, the competitive pressure of market entry
6Salop (1979) shows that in equilibrium ﬁrms realize zero proﬁts with prices above marginal
cost and a markup that inversely depends on the number of competitors by assuming maximal
product diﬀerentiation. In turn, the number of ﬁrms is endogenously determined by the amount
of ﬁxed costs and market size (total number of consumers), cf. p. 147ﬀ.
Additionally, Perloﬀ & Salop (1985) abstract from spatial competition models and examine the
properties of a more general consumer model of product diﬀerentiation. They show that for a
symmetric (and diﬀerentiable) probability distribution of brand preferences equilibrium prices
increase with increases in the intensity of consumers' preferences. Further, they provide two
conditions under which the competitiveness of markets is established. Accordingly, increased
entry competition (number of ﬁrms converging to inﬁnity) leads to a decrease in the equilibrium
price only if either consumers' brand preferences are bounded or if price elasticity of demand is
suﬃciently increasing (cp. p.111 and the example on p. 113).
7Noteable exceptions are given in the work of Sheppard et al. (1992) and Haining et al. (1996).
They scrutinize the existence and properties of spatial price equilibria under special distributions
of consumer choice sets. However, they do not focus on the comparative static behavior of the
resulting equilibrium price distribution under entry competition or a variation in consumers'
search costs and the fraction of informed consumers respectively.
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then leads price diﬀerences across the market to decrease. Thus, price dispersion is
expected to decrease under an increase in seller density.8
4.2.2 Consumer Search Models
4.2.2.1 Price Distribution, Search Costs and the Fraction of Informed
Consumers
For price dispersion to be an equilibrium outcome all ﬁrms and consumers in a
market must not have incentives to reconsider buying decisions and change pricing
strategies.9 In other words, charging a range of prices would be a rational response
of sellers to consumers' optimal search behavior. Thus, generally the existence and
behavior of an equilibrium price distribution is a function of consumers' search costs.
Two extreme cases highlight the intuition behind this argument. If for instance all
consumers in a market got a price quote from every ﬁrm at no cost, the ﬁrm with the
cheapest price would serve the whole market. Not surprisingly, ﬁerce price competi-
tion is the result of this speciﬁc distribution of information. What follows is that for
identical sellers with identical cost functions, price dispersion would not occur since
sellers' best response is the Bertrand outcome with every ﬁrm charging the perfect
competitive price at marginal cost (Bertrand (1883)).
In contrast, the existence of imperfect information among consumers does not natu-
rally imply that sellers set distinct prices in equilibrium. Rather, Diamond (1971) was
the ﬁrst to emphasize the paradox that consumers behave rationally under sequential
search with strictly positive and identical search costs when they do not search at
all. Thus, a natural outcome in a setting where consumers lack price information
is not price dispersion but monopoly pricing by sellers. The argument is as follows.
Consumers purchase a unit of a good only at prices equal or below their reservation
price r. In contrast they would search if prices exceeded r and incur a cost s for
every new price quote. The reservation level varies with the unit search cost and
price distribution, thus, for a given distribution F (p) and identical unit search cost
reserveration prices are identical among consumers. Clearly, sellers' rational response
in this case is to set the identical optimal price r. In turn, if there exist no price dif-
8Based on the ﬁndings of Perloﬀ & Salop (1985), Barron et al. (2004) for instance argue that
in asymmetric demand cases an increase in the number of sellers tends to increase the price
elasticity across diﬀerent seller types, and thus reduces respective markups and prices. Under a
given common marginal cost this implies that the increase in the number of sellers leads to a
reduction in the variance of prices or reduced price dispersion (p. 1045).
9In a survey of then existing equilibrium models, Rothschild proposed the following conditions: A
satisfactory model of adjustment to equilibrium will have at least three parts: a discussion of the
rules which market participants follow when the market is out of equilibrium; a description of how
a market system in which individuals follow these rules operates; and, of course, a convergence
theorem. (Rothschild (1973), p. 1285f.)
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ferences among sellers, it does not pay oﬀ for any customer to search. Consequently,
sellers optimal response is to charge the monopoly price. The conclusion from the
Diamond model is that, the existence of an equilibrium price distribution requires
some form of heterogeneity among buyers and/or sellers and that the resulting price
distribution reﬂects this underlying buyer and seller characteristics.10
In his well-known 'model of sales' Varian (1980), for instance, shows that under a spe-
cial dichotomous distribution of search costs among consumers prices are dispersed
in equilibrium. On the supply side he assumes that ﬁrms sell a homogenous product
with an identical production cost structure unable to discriminate in pricing. On
the demand side consumers are devided into two groups. Shoppers who are perfect-
ly informed about sellers' locations and prices and therefore purchase the good at
the cheapest ﬁrm without incurring any cost of search. By contrast, the regular or
uninformed buyers initially observe only the price from the seller that they chose at
random. If the actually charged price is below their reservation level, they purchase.
Any further seller visit and additional price quote causes them nonnegative visiting
or search costs. Now, the appealing feature of Varian's model is that ﬁrms' optimal
pricing strategy has to reconcile conﬂicting goals to realize proﬁts in the two dis-
tinct consumer segments. Intuitively, a seller could focus on the informed consumers
and make proﬁts by undercutting all his rivals; or he could aim at appropriating
surplus from the uninformed consumers employing a high price strategy. Clearly,
these strategies can not be applied simultaneously, rather ﬁrms' optimize their price
setting in a dynamic and probabilistic context. The upshot is that in equilibrium
ﬁrms price in mixed strategies randomizing their prices between a lower bound and
an upper bound determined by their average costs and the consumers' reservation
price respectively. As a result, extreme prices are more frequently charged whereas
the frequency of intermediate prices diminishes. Thus, in equilibrium there is price
dispersion.
In an eﬀort to close the gap between the equilibrium outcomes of marginal cost
pricing and monopoly pricing, Stahl (1989) developed a model of equilibrium price
10Since early versions of models based on sequential consumer search were not capable of showing
that price dispersion arises in equilibrium a special type of search models, so called clearinghouse
models were developed. These incorporate a third party an information clearinghouse that
sells a list of prices charged by diﬀerent ﬁrms in a homogenous product market to a subset of
consumers who subsequently purchase at the seller with the lowest listed price. Additionally,
ﬁrms are also charged fees by the clearinghouse to be listed. Baye & Morgan (2001) show
that when consumers` and ﬁrms` decision to access the clearinghouse, as well as respective
subscription and advertisement fees are endogenized, the owner of the clearinghouse maximizes
his proﬁts in a dispersed price equilibrium in which all consumers have access to the market price
list. Furthermore, the simplest clearinghouse assumption states that consumers may potentially
become informed of all current prices on a market at once. Thus, a clearinghouse serves the
role of interconnecting dispersed local markets and establishing competition between locally
separated sellers. Consequently, predictions of clearinghouse models have been tested on online
markets and studies showed that price dispersion on the internet is pervasive and signiﬁcant (cf.
Baye et al. (2004), and Baylis & Perloﬀ (2002)).
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dispersion for two distinct consumer groups: shoppers with zero search costs and
uninformed regular buyers. Importantly, he extends Varian's work by assuming that
the regular consumers do not remain uninformed. Rather, their search behavior is
characterized by optimal sequential search with nonnegative search costs for ev-
ery additional price quote.11 The asymptotic behavior of the resulting equilibrium
price distribution reveals interesting ﬁndings.12 Firstly, as the fraction of informed
consumers goes to zero, the lower bound converges to the upper bound, eventually
converging to the monopoly price. Secondly, as the fraction of informed consumers
approaches one, the price mark-up vanishes leading to perfectly competitive pricing.
Thirdly, as search costs converge to zero, the reservation price continously declines,
the upper bound converges to the lower bound with the end result of marginal cost
pricing. Further, comparative static analyses support previous ﬁndings and show
that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the fraction of informed consumers or a decrease
in search costs causes the reservation price and the lower bound to decline respec-
tively.
In conclusion, price dispersion in equilibrium obtains as a function of the fraction
of informed consumers and the level of search costs. In the limit of only perfectly
informed consumers in the market or search costs converging to zero, the price dis-
tribution degenerates to the competitive price revealing the Bertrand outcome. By
contrast, as the fraction of the informed goes to zero, ﬁrms charge the monopoly
price and the Diamond result obtains. These ﬁndings imply a negative correlation
between the expected price and the fraction of informed consumers and a positive
correlation between the expected price and the level of search costs.13 Intuitively,
under constant search intensity of the regular buyers, a higher proportion of shop-
pers raises ﬁrms' incentives to charge lower prices.14 Likewise, a decrease in search
costs leads to more intense search of the uninformed consumers and creates more
competitive pressure on market prices.15
A general treatment of the comparative static behavior of prices and price dispersion
with respect to the proportion of perfectly informed consumers is found in a recent
study by Waldeck (2008). He investigates the properties of the ﬁrst two moments
of the equilibrium price distribution (expected price and variance) for two diﬀerent
11Important features of his model are that, (1) the ﬁrst price quote for the uninformed is free,
and (2) consumers' reservation price ρ is endogenized. Thus, the equilibrium price distribution
F (p, µ,N, ρ(µ,N, c)) is dependent on the fraction of informed consumers µ, the level of search
costs c and the number of ﬁrms N .
12Cf. proposition 2 and 3, p. 705.
13This is a special outcome for the case of full consumer participation. If search is truly costly,
i.e. the uninformed consumers incur a search cost for every price quote, some may drop out of
the market. Under this partial consumer participation equilibrium there is no net eﬀect of the
fraction of informed on expected price and expected price increases as the level of search costs
decreases. For details see Janssen et al. (2005).
14The reservation price ρ is a decreasing function in the fraction of informed consumers µ. Cf. Stahl
(1989), p. 704, equation 8 and 9.
15ρ is also an increasing function in the level of search costs c. Cf. ibid.
147
Chapter 4. Price Dispersion, Search Costs and Spatial Competition
search modes that refer to the previous work of Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989): ﬁxed
sample search and sequential search.16 His results are in line with previous ﬁndings.
For both search speciﬁcations average prices paid by the uninformed and informed
consumers decrease as the fraction of informed consumers rises. Further, in both
cases price dispersion is an inverse U-shaped function of the fraction of informed
consumers and for the sequential search mode an increase in search costs implies
higher price dispersion.
4.2.2.2 Price Distribution and the Number of Sellers
What do search models tell us about the comparative static behavior of the price
distribution under entry competition? In contrast to predictions of spatial competi-
tion models, ﬁndings by Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) suggest that an increase in
the number of sellers leads to an increase in the expected price. The intuition be-
hind this odd result is given by the tension in ﬁrms' pricing strategies accruing from
inherent diﬀerences in consumers' search activities. In particular, a larger number
of competitors implies that the probability of gaining a proﬁt from the uninformed
consumer segment falls less rapidly than the probability of realizing proﬁts by focus-
ing on the informed consumers. Firms face increased competition intensity in two
ways: ﬁrstly, an increase in the number of ﬁrms enlarges the choice set for the well
informed consumers, and secondly, increased competition implies a decrease in the
number of captive consumers per ﬁrm, thus, reducing the average purchase per un-
informed consumer. In sum expected proﬁts due to the chance of being the lowest
priced seller and catching the informed segment are outbalanced by expected proﬁts
obtained from imposing high prices on a reduced uninformed consumer segment. In
sum a high-pricing strategy proves to be more attractive under entry competition
and average prices which are essentially the prices uninformed consumers pay rise.
Morgan et al. (2006) elaborate on the ﬁndings of the comparative competition analy-
sis in the Varian model. Interestingly, they provide theoretical and empirical evidence
that entry competition implies an ambigous eﬀect on the market price distribution
and highlight that information imposes beneﬁcial externalities on their holders. In
particular, they show in a variant17 of the Varian model that not only the average
price rises with the number of ﬁrms but that simultaneously the expected value of
the minimum price (of the equilibrium distribution) declines. Referring to the com-
16In the step of endogenizing consumers' reservation price a connection is established between
ﬁxed sample search and sequential search. Under certain parameter values (small fraction of
informed and large number of ﬁrms) sequential search 'converges' to the ﬁxed sample type. The
reservation price then exceeds a certain threshold and is further assumed to be exogenously
given. Cf. Waldeck (2008), lemma 15 and table 3, p. 353.
17They assume the ratio of uninformed and informed consumers as well as the number of competing
ﬁrms to be exogenously ﬁxed whereas in the original Varian model the number of ﬁrms is
determined by a zero proﬁt condition (cf. Varian (1980), equation (5) on p. 656).
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petition eﬀect in the lower price segment, ﬁrms react by reducing competitive prices.
The upshot is that under entry competition informed consumers pay on average low-
er prices and, as argued before, uninformed consumers are charged on average higher
prices. As a result, price dispersion increases in the number of sellers.18
Similar ﬁndings on the distinct eﬀects of competition on the equilibrium price distri-
bution through the distribution of price information among consumers are obtained
in the work of Lach & Moraga-Gonzalez (2009). Assume that a fraction µs of con-
sumers is informed about s price quotes in the market. In total there are N ﬁrms,
thus the ratio of the perfectly informed consumers corresponds to µN and the ratio
of the fully uninformed consumers to µ1.
19 Generally, every fraction of consumers
µs(N) depends on the actual number of sellers in the market since a typical con-
sumer in an informational segment is exposed to a particular number of price quotes
while, for instance, in the case of gasoline pricing driving to work.20 Further, the
total number of consumers is denoted as L and marginal costs c for every ﬁrm are
identical. Now, in the fashion of Varian, every ﬁrm sets a proﬁt maximizing price p
in a mixed pricing strategy according to the cumulative distribution F (p).21 Thus,
given the random pricing strategies of all other competitors, expected proﬁts for an
arbitrary ﬁrm i from all types of consumers are given by:
Πi(p, F ) = L(p− c)
[
N∑
s=1
µs
s
N
(1− F (p))s−1
]
(4.1)
Intuitively, a ﬁrm has the chance to make a proﬁt in every information segment
18In contrast to these ﬁndings, the evidence on the comparative behavior of price dispersion in the
Varian model is not clear-cut. Baye et al. (2004), for instance, examine the theoretical relation-
ship between the number of ﬁrms and the level of price dispersion, measured by the diﬀerence
between the lowest and the second lowest price. According to their simulations price dispersion
in the Varian model is a nonmonotonic function in the number of sellers. Nonmonotonicity arises
due to strategic price eﬀects that dominate when the number of sellers is small, and contrarily,
order statistic eﬀects determine the course of price dispersion for large numbers of sellers. In
sum, they ﬁnd that as the number of sellers rises, price dispersion initially increases and then
smoothly declines (cf. Baye et al. (2004), p. 486f). Furthermore, Janssen & Moraga-Gonzalez
(2004) scrutinize comparative statics in a closed form of the Varian model and ﬁnd no analytical
characterization of the behavior of price dispersion with respect to the number of ﬁrms (cf.
p. 1096ﬀ).
19The uninformed consumers know at least the price at the one seller they would purchase the
good (this equals the deﬁnition of uninformed consumers in the Varian model). Additionally,
the segment s = 0 and µ0 would refer to the uninformed consumers that do not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial
anymore to stay in the market. Consequently, from this segment no proﬁts can be obtained.
Further, every consumer group can be completely and unambigously characterized:
∑N
s=0 µs = 1.
20Making the fractions of consumers µs endogenous implies twofold. Firstly, enhanced competition
may only aﬀect the price distribution via the distribution of information among consumers, and
secondly, it enables an analysis of the change in search behavior or a change in these diﬀerent
kinds of consumer fractions s respectively under entry competition. Details for special cases of
this dependence are discussed below.
21They focus only on symmetric equilibria, cf. Janssen & Moraga-Gonzalez (2004), p. 1093 and
Lach & Moraga-Gonzalez (2009), p. 5.
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s. Correspondingly, the quantity sold is dependent on (i) the fraction of informed
consumers in the respecitve segment µs, (ii) the likelihood s/N that the consumers
observe the price quote from ﬁrm i, and (iii) the probability (1−F (p))s−1 that ﬁrm
i sells the good to the segment s at price p. In equilibrium, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts
by randomizing prices. Thus, they are indiﬀerent between charging any price in the
support of F , especially the upper bound marked by consumers' reservation level p¯ =
v since proﬁts for either pricing strategy are equal.22 Formally, Πi(p, F ) = Πi(p¯, F )
has to be satisﬁed which yields the equilibrium condition:
(p− c)
[
N∑
s=1
µss(1− F (p))s−1
]
= (v − c)µ1 (4.2)
Equation (4.2) determines the price distribution F (p) in an equilibrium with ﬁrms
setting proﬁt maximizing prices in mixed strategies and consumers searching ac-
cording to their information set depicted in the vector µ(N) = (µ1(N), ..., µN (N))
representing the overall distribution of price information in the market. Generally,
equation (4.2) can not be solved with respect to the equilibrium distribution F (p).
Special cases are investigated, however, in the study of Janssen & Moraga-Gonzalez
(2004). In particular, they distinguish between three diﬀerent search modes: (i) low
search intensity (µ1 < 1) where consumers randomize between searching for one
price quote or dropping out of the market, (ii) moderate search intensity and every
uninformed consumer searching once (µ1 = 1), and (iii) high search intensity with
uninformed consumers randomizing between searching for one price and searching
for two prices µ = (µ1 < 1, µ2 < 1). Now, comparable to the ﬁndings of Morgan
et al. (2006), the equilibrium distribution F (p) for exogenously given µ1 in moder-
ate search intensity is characterized by increased frequencies to charge low and high
prices, thus increased price dispersion, as the number of sellers rises.23 Interestingly,
as the propensity to search µ1 is endogenized
24 no equilibrium obtains and consumers
change their search behavior. In particular, as the number of sellers grows average
prices paid by the uninformed consumers rise continously reducing their incentives
22The lower bound is obtained by setting F = 0 and solving for p in the equilibrium condition
(4.2).
23Technically, the distribution F (p,N) is not stochastically ﬁrst-order dominated by F (p,N + 1).
This result of Varian (1980), Janssen & Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) and Morgan et al. (2006) is in
contrast to the ﬁndings of Rosenthal (1980). He provides evidence for stochastic dominance in the
cdf of the price, formally F (p,N) > F (p,N + 1), implying that in a mixed strategy equilibrium
charging higher prices for any price level is preferred under the entry of an additional competitor.
Thus, average prices for uninformed and informed consumers rise. His ﬁndings are due to the
fact that the average number of informed consumers or the common market per ﬁrm decreases
as the number of sellers rises. On the contrary, Varian assumes that the number of captive
consumers per seller falls with N .
24The search process occurs under the condition that the net utility from purchasing the product
is positive and that there are no incentives to change the search mode (cf. Janssen & Moraga-
Gonzalez (2004), conditions 3.1. and 3.2. on p. 1097).
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to stay in the market.25 Turning to the low search intensity scenario, results show
that the drop out in demand counteracts with the tendency to increase prices in
the upper price segment. In turn, the rise in the average price comes to a halt and
ﬁrms react to adjusted search preferences by equally strengthening their strategies of
setting extreme prices merely inducing more price dispersion as the number of sellers
increases.
Finally, ﬁndings for the high search intensity mode provide further evidence for the
adaption of consumers' search behavior to the market structure promoting the impact
enhanced competition has on the price distribution. Speciﬁcally, given the number
of sellers is suﬃciently small consumers search more intensely under increased en-
try competition. In contrast, provided that the number of sellers is large incentives
to search are reduced as an additional competitor enters the market.26 As expect-
ed, ﬁrms' proﬁt maximizing pricing strategy under entry is determined by charging
low prices to attract informed and high prices to extract surplus from uninformed
consumers with the latter eﬀect dominating. As a result, expected prices increase
monotonically in N . Now, the non-monotonic search behavior of the captive cus-
tomers interacts with ﬁrms' pricing strategies in two ways. In markets with a large
status quo number of sellers both eﬀects concur and unambigously lead to an increase
in the average price. In markets with a low status quo number of ﬁrms, however, in-
creased propensities to search counteract with ﬁrms' incentive to raise prices. Thus,
the authors conclude that in line with the non-monotonic search behavior the ex-
pected price decreases with the number of sellers to begin with but subsequently
increases as the number of ﬁrms gets suﬃciently large. Further, they ﬁnd numerical
evidence for an increase in price dispersion as the expected price declines. This also
leads them to conclude that price dispersion may have a non-monotonic relationship
with respect to the number of sellers in the high search intensity mode.27
The intuition behind these results is that in local markets with a small number of
competitors an increase in the number of ﬁrms induces higher price competition in
the lower price segment. The reason is twofold; ﬁrstly, ﬁrms compete as expected
for the informed consumers, and secondly, the uninformed consumers show increased
search activity and consequently the probability for these to purchase at a low listed
price increases. In sum, incentives for ﬁrms to focus on stealing rivals' business by
oﬀering the potentially lowest market price increase whereas at the same time ex-
tracting surplus from uninformed consumers remains viable. This tendency reverses
as the proﬁtability of focusing on the low price segment declines with a growing
25The equilibrium fraction of uninformed consumers who ﬁnd it still beneﬁcial to remain in the
market is essentially determined by the level of marginal search costs incurred for every new
quote (cf. Janssen & Moraga-Gonzalez (2004), p. 1100).
26Simulations show that the turning point is given for a number of ﬁrms of 6 or 7 (cf. Janssen &
Moraga-Gonzalez (2004), p. 1107).
27Cf. Janssen & Moraga-Gonzalez (2004), footnote 18 on p. 1108.
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number of rivals in the market accompanied by a decrease in search intensity of the
uninformed consumers. In turn, ﬁrms shift to the strategy of appropriating surplus
from their captives, pressures on the low priced segment are released and the average
market price increases in N .
4.2.3 Summary of Models' Predictions, Review of Empirical Evidence
and Postulation of Hypotheses
The previous discussion revealed that the existence and behavior of the equilibri-
um price distribution is critically related to the distribution of (price) information
among consumers and the degree of competition in the market. Table 4.1 summarizes
suggested correlations between the fraction of informed consumers, the number of
sellers and average prices and price dispersion, respectively.
Table 4.1: Summary of correlations in diﬀerent price models
Dispersion model Predicted correlation between:
Fraction of informed Number of
consumers and sellers and
average price average price
price dispersion price dispersion
Spatial competition models
with asymmetries across ﬁrms
(Hotelling (1929), Salop (1979)) negative negative negative
Consumer search models
with heterogenous search costs
& ﬁxed sample search (Varian (1980)) negative inverse U positive positive*
with heterogenous search costs
& sequential search (Stahl (1989)) negative inverse U positive negative
with ﬁxed-sample-size search:
• low search intensity (0 < µ1 < 1) none positive
• moderate search intensity (µ1 = 1) positive ?
• high search intensity (0 < µ1, µ2 < 1) nonlinear nonlinear
(Janssen & Moraga-Gonzalez (2004))
(*) consumer search and number of ﬁrms exogenously ﬁxed (cp. Morgan et al. (2006))
Firstly, ﬁrms' market position is characterized by their location which implies a
straightforward relation between prices, competition intensity and consumers' propen-
sity to search. In short, market power and thus the ability to raise proﬁts is reﬂected
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in geographical proximity to (potential) customers and rivals. Increased competition
via a higher number of sellers leads to lower average prices and price dispersion. In
the search theoretic context a decrease in unit transportation costs can be interpret-
ed as an increase in the fraction of informed consumers and implies a decrease in the
average price.
Secondly, the interrelation between search and pricing activities is explained in search
models. Intuitively, given a certain purchasing behavior and a division of market de-
mand into distinct consumer groups, ﬁrms could either oﬀer very low prices and sell
large quantities or charge high prices and sell a small amount of goods. Their pricing
strategies and thus the average market price and price variance, i.e. the resulting
market price distribution is determined by these conﬂicting proﬁt-seeking goals. In
this setting variations in consumers' information sets have a direct impact on the
price distribution. An increase in the proportion of shoppers and a decrease in the
level of search costs respectively causes average prices to decline. Further, in the
limit the price distribution degenerates, thus price dispersion is expected to show an
inverse U-shaped relation with the fraction of informed consumers.
Table 4.2: Survey of selected empirical studies investigating price dispersion
Empirical study in industry Correlation between
competition and
price dispersion
Gasoline industry
Marvel (1976) negative
Png & Reitman (1994) positive
Barron et al. (2004) negative
Clemenz & Gugler (2006) negative
Lewis (2008) ambigous
Lach & Moraga-Gonzalez (2009) positive
Airline industry
Borenstein & Rose (1994) positive
Gerardi & Shapiro (2009) negative
Grocery products
Walsh & Whelan (1999) positive
Electronics products
Baye et al. (2004) negative
A comparison on models' predictions on the relation between competition intensity
and the price distribution reveals ambigous results. Clearly, the reason is that a vari-
ation in the number of sellers impacts average prices and price dispersion through
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changes in consumers' search and purchasing behavior.28 Indeed, as depicted in table
4.2 the existing empirical literature across diﬀerent industries also provides mixed
evidence on the correlation between the number of sellers and price dispersion.
Marvel (1976), for instance, reports that an increase in the number of competitors
reduces the range in the price of gasoline. Barron et al. (2004) study the structural
determinants of price dispersion in the retail gasoline industry in four geographic lo-
cations, and ﬁnd empirical support that an increase in station density decreases both
price levels and price dispersion. For the Austrian retail gasoline market Clemenz &
Gugler (2006) ﬁnd a negative correlation between seller density and price disper-
sion. More recently, Lewis (2008) also observes a negative relationship between the
number of sellers and price dispersion of gasoline though his results reveal that cor-
relations vary signiﬁcantly for diﬀerent types of sellers and diﬀerent measures of
dispersion. Furthermore, Png & Reitman (1994) ﬁnd that prices of gasoline stations
are more dispersed in markets with greater number of competitors. Likewise, Lach
& Moraga-Gonzalez (2009) display empirical evidence that the distribution of gaso-
line prices spreads out as the number of stations increases implying an asymmetric
aﬀect of competition on the welfare distribution of consumers. In the airline indus-
try, Borenstein & Rose (1994) similarly ﬁnd that dispersion among airfares increases
on routes with more competition or lower ﬂight density whereas Gerardi & Shapiro
(2009) recently show that higher competition has a negative eﬀect on price disper-
sion. Finally, Walsh & Whelan (1999) report that brand price dispersion in the Irish
grocery market increases with competition and Baye et al. (2004) provide evidence
that price dispersion of consumer electronics products on Internet price comparison
sites decreases with the number of sellers.
Our empirical work scrutinizes determinants of the price distribution of the Austrian
retail gasoline market. Concluding the previous discussion this paper addresses two
interesting issues. First, predictions on the relationship between the proportion of
informed consumers and the level of search costs with the mean and the variance of
the price distribution will be tested, respectively. Second, the relationship between
entry competition and the mean and variance of prices will be examined. Referring
to the predictions of the discussed models in subsection 4.2.1, subsection 4.2.2 and
table 4.1 we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1.1: The mean price is a decreasing function of the fraction of informed
consumers in the market.
28Lach & Moraga-Gonzalez (2009), for instance, argue that the eﬀect of ﬁrm entry on the share
of consumers who perceive a selected range of seller`s prices is principally undetermined. Thus,
diﬀerent percentiles of the price distribution may be aﬀected diﬀerently by increased competitive
pressure in the market. As a result, the net eﬀect of an increase in the number of sellers on the
dispersion of prices can either be positive or negative, which leads them to conclude that the
direction and magnitude [of such eﬀect] remains an empirical matter (p. 19).
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Hypothesis 1.2: The mean price is an increasing function of the level of search
costs.
Hypothesis 1.3: The price variance is a non-monotonic function of the fraction of
informed consumers in the market.
Hypothesis 1.4: The price variance is an increasing function of the level of search
costs.
Hypothesis 2.1: The comparative static behavior of the price distribution is a
complex function of entry competition. Thus, the mean price may be a positive or
negative function of the number of sellers. Likewise, the price variance may be a
positive or negative function of the number of sellers.
Hypothesis 2.2: If the mean price is negatively (positively) correlated with the
number of sellers, then the mean price is expected to be positively (negatively)
correlated with a distance measure between a station and its next neighbour.
Hypothesis 2.3: If the price variance is negatively (positively) correlated with the
number of sellers, then the price variance is expected to be positively (negatively)
correlated with a distance measure between a station and its next neighbour.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
4.3.1 Description of Data and Variable Speciﬁcation
In our analysis we use data from various sources. Gasoline price data are collected
by the Austrian chamber of labor and are available quarterly at irregular intervals
from the period October 1999 to March 2005 (23 time periods). For the sample
of gasoline stations used, the price data are unbalanced and consist of prices of
diesel ranging from a maximum of 1,386 observations per time period (September
2003) to a minimum of 598 observations (March 2003) with 25,150 nonzero price
observations over time. In total, price information was available for 61% of the station
sample or for 1,718 out of all 2,822 Austrian gasoline stations for at least one of
the given 23 time periods. The price data is merged with data for the geographical
location of stations and other station speciﬁc as well as regional data. Demographical
and regional data are obtained from the Austrian statistical oﬃce as part of the
population census in 2001 and are available on a municipality level. Information
about stations' characteristics covering their geographical coordinates is collected by
Catalist in 2003 on an individual level.
Descriptive statistics are reported in table 4.3 where the set of covariates is arranged
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into four main categories.
1. Station Competition Proxies
We specify the degree by which stations spatially diﬀerentiate themselves and
characterize stations' competitive environments with three main variables: the
number of competitors in a circular radius of 3 kilometer (Density), the road
travelling distance of a station to its nearest competitor (Distance) and a dum-
my variable with nonzero entries if a station does not have a rival seller within
its 3km-periphery and thus is to be considered a local monopolist (Monop).
The existing empirical literature suggests diﬀerent measures of spatial diﬀeren-
tiation.29 The market geography of gasoline retailing in Austria is characterized
by the dichotomy of local monopoly structures in remote areas and high seller
density zones in metropolitan areas or along principal roadways. Accordingly,
more than three quarters or 78.25% of stations have their nearest competitor
within a distance of 3km. In contrast, for a local market radius comparable to
the median of the distance distribution (0.96km) 838 stations are considered
to be a monopolist having no competitor in the respective geographical range.
Thus, intuition might suggest that the choice of a circular competition zone
should not be too narrow to capture the (complex) spatial patterns of com-
petitive interactions between stations. However, by deﬁnition the local market
radius may also establish a commensurable match between the demand and
search cost proxies, given on an aggregate municipaly level, and the stations'
(cirucular) competitive environment.30 Consequently and to be consistent with
the previous literature (Barron et al. (2004), Lewis (2008)) we deﬁne a local
market radius of 3km.
Further, the number of ﬁrms in a particular region will generally be proportion-
al to the average distance between ﬁrms as long as ﬁrms are equally distribut-
ed over the geographic area. If, however, individual shops are not distributed
equally, the number of sellers in a local market is an inaccurate measure for the
degree of spatial diﬀerentiation (cp. Pinkse et al. (2002)). Taking account of
asymmetric location patterns, we additionally use the road distance between
nearest competitors measured in km to proxy for competition intensity.31
29A group of studies uses a circular approach with a local market radius of 1.5 miles to operationalize
seller density in urban areas (cp. Barron et al. (2004) and Lewis (2008)) while other studies
calculate the number of sellers in local municipals (cp. van Meerbeck (2003) and Clemenz &
Gugler (2006)).
30According to the descriptives in table 4.3, the median of the municipal area amounts to 35.23km2
or an approximated circular radius of 3.35km.
31Netz & Taylor (2002) use the Euclidean distance between retail outlets to account for spatial
diﬀerentiation. Nonetheless this procedure ignores the fact that stations are connected via a
network of roads. Consequently, the Euclidean distance might capture the relevant dimension
of distance only very poorly. Based on the information on stations` geographic coordinates by
using GIS-software we link the location of individual stations to the road network and calculate
distances between neighbouring retail outlets.
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2. Search Cost Proxies
On the demand side, consumers' search costs are proxied by variables cor-
responding to two diﬀerent consumer groups that accordingly diﬀer in their
knowledge on local market pricing patterns. Particularly, we have information
on the number of people commuting out of and commuting into a municipality
and the number of overnight stays in a municipality.
Commuters are considered to purchase gasoline in high frequencies for their
daily working trips. Consequently, they are characterized by a relatively high
price elasticity of demand that relates to a low level of search costs and a
profound knowledge of local sellers' pricing strategies respectively. On the con-
trary, the number of overnight stays proxies for the number of people that are
not familiar with pricing patterns in the local gasoline market. Hence, this con-
sumer group supposedly shows a lower price elasiticity and incurs higher costs
for their search for the cheapest gasoline retailer.
Accordingly, in the further analysis the consumer group with a low level of
search costs is represented by the share of commuters commuting out of a mu-
nicipality relative to the number of employed people in that respective munic-
ipality (Coms). Further, the group of consumers characterized by a high level
of search costs refers to the share of overnight stays relative to the number of
inhabitants again on the municipal level (Nights).32
3. Location and Regional Characteristics
The third set of price determinants characterizes stations' location features.
Accordingly, population density, given as the number of inhabitants in a mu-
nicipality per square kilometer, allows to speciﬁy whether a station is located in
a metropolitan or rural area (PopDens). Further, refering to respective speed
limits, two dummy variables indicate if a station is located on a highway or a
freeway distinguished by respective speed limits (100kmh, 130kmh). Similarily,
the dummy Access denotes if a station is considered to be highly accessible
by cardrivers and ﬁnally nine state dummies display in which of the Austrian
states a station is located.
4. Station Characteristics
Except for stations' plot size, individual station characteristics are all repre-
sented by dummy variables and specify diﬀerent features that may aﬀect sellers'
pricing behavior. These comprise stations' opening times (Open24h), car ser-
vices (Wash), service policies (Service, Leisure), product features (Microwave)
as well as its payment facilities (Creditcard). Further, a set of dummies indi-
cate a station's brand aﬃliation.
32Additional variables listed in table 4.3 will be used for robustness checks.
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Finally, based on information on stations' geographical coordinates and distance
relations, spatial interdependencies between individual gas sellers are incorporated
in a spatial weights matrix W . It states that, if one station (i) is to be considered a
neighbour to another station (j) the respective element in the weights matrix (wij)
will be nonzero. Further, each matrix element is weighted according to the inverse
distance of the corresponding neighbourhood relationship (dij). Given this weighting
scheme each element of the matrix is recalculated subject to the row standardization
of W .33 Formally:
(W )ij = w˜ij =
wij∑
j wij
(4.3)
wij =
{
1
dij
i and j neighbours
0 other
∑
j
w˜ij = 1
In the construction of W two neighbourhood criteria are applied. Firstly, the nearest
neighbour of every single station is included and secondly every seller in a 3-kilometer-
periphery around each station is to be considered a neighbour.34 Technically, this
ensures that all row sums of the weighting matrix are nonzero and implies that every
station is spatially related to another station. In addition,W takes into account that
stations in more densly populated and presumably in more competitive areas are
subject to more complex spatial interdependencies compared to local monopolies.
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics (Number of observations = 25, 150)
V ariable Description Mean Median S.D.
pd Diesel price (euro cents) 76.49 75.9 6.36
Station competition proxies:
Density Number of stations in 3km radius 6.672 3.0 8.68
Distance Distance to nearest station 1.816 0.898 2.514
Monop No neighbour in 3km radius 0.187 0.0 0.390
Search cost proxies:
Coms ComsOut/Employed 0.325 0.311 0.141
ComsTot ComsSum/Inhabitants 0.361 0.331 0.140
33Thus, closer neighbours are related to higher values of corresponding weights with every row ofW
summing up to 1. It follows that stations with single neighbours (special case: local monopolists)
correspond to matrix elements equal to 1.
34To test for robustness two alternative weighting matrices will be used. For details see table 4.6
in the appendix.
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Nights Overnight/Inhabitants 2.082 0.143 6.481
NightsC Overnight/ComsSum 8.000 0.368 34.543
ComsSum ComsIn+ComsOut 10, 860.0 3, 034.0 16, 078.0
ComsOut Number of commuters out of a mu-
nicipality
3, 591.0 1, 176.0 5, 067.0
ComsIn Number of commuters into a mu-
nicipality
7, 270.0 1, 746.0 12, 098.0
Overnight Number of overnight stays in a mu-
nicipality
79, 610.0 1, 062.0 206, 197.0
Location and regional characteristics:
PopDens Inhabitants/Area 1, 292.0 281.1 2, 943.0
Inhabitants Number of inhabitants in a munici-
pality
36, 470.0 7, 368.0 57, 162.0
Employed Number of employed in a munici-
pality
17, 890.0 3, 462.0 27, 891.0
Area Municipal area (km2) 51.50 35.23 48.98
100kmh On Freeway (80-100km/h) 0.018 0.0 0.132
130kmh On Highway (100-130km/h) 0.023 0.0 0.151
Access Highly accessible 0.6 1.0 0.49
Bgld Station in state: Burgenland 0.035 0.0 0.184
Ktn Station in state: Carinthia 0.095 0.0 0.294
Noe Station in state: Lower Austria 0.161 0.0 0.368
Ooe Station in state: Upper Austria 0.144 0.0 0.352
Slb Station in state: Salzburg 0.092 0.0 0.289
Stk Station in state: Styria 0.183 0.0 0.387
T ir Station in state: Tyrol 0.129 0.0 0.335
V bg Station in state: Vorarlberg 0.031 0.0 0.175
V ie Station in state: Vienna 0.126 0.0 0.332
Station characteristics:
Open24h Station is open 24h 0.145 0.0 0.353
Wash Station has a carwash 0.704 1.0 0.456
Service Station oﬀers full-service 0.227 0.0 0.418
Leisure Station oﬀers leisure facilities 0.509 1.0 0.5
Microwave Station sells microwave products 0.265 0.0 0.441
Creditcards Station oﬀers credit card payment 0.921 1.0 0.271
Agip Station brand: Agip 0.074 0.0 0.262
Aral Station brand: Aral 0.002 0.0 0.044
Avanti Station brand: Avanti 0.049 0.0 0.216
Avia Station brand: Avia 0.019 0.0 0.137
BP Station brand: BP 0.221 0.0 0.415
Esso Station brand: Esso 0.076 0.0 0.266
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Jet Station brand: Jet 0.045 0.0 0.208
OMV Station brand: OMV 0.181 0.0 0.385
Shell Station brand: Shell 0.132 0.0 0.338
Stroh Station brand: Stroh 0.022 0.0 0.145
Unbranded Station Unbranded 0.178 0.0 0.384
Plotsize Station Plotsize 1, 785.0 1, 500.0 1, 718.0
4.3.2 Model Speciﬁcation
4.3.2.1 The Price Equation
The empirical analysis of the price distribution takes advantage of the panel struc-
ture of the dataset and will proceed in two steps.35 We ﬁrst estimate a model on the
relationship between gasoline prices and local market characteristics as well as indi-
vidual seller characteristics. The aim is to analyze the determinants of gasoline prices
and control for price diﬀerences resulting from station heterogeneity.36 According to
the four sets of covariates described in section 4.3.1 the structure of the empirical
model for gasoline prices is given by
log(pdit) = α0 + α1Competitioni + α2Searchit + α3Locationi + α4Stationi
+
T∑
t=1
χtTimet + uit
(4.4)
with:
Competitioni = {log(Densityi), log(Distancei)}
Searchit = {Comsi, log(Nightsit)}
Locationi = {log(PopDensi), 100kmhi, 130kmhi, Accessi, Statei}
Stationi = {Open24hi,Washi, Servicei, Leisurei,Microwavei, Creditcardsi, log(Plotsizei), Brandi}
where the dependent variable is denoted pdit, the self service, regular price of diesel
at station i at a point of time t, measured in euro cents per liter; Competitioni
represents proxies for the competitive environment of each station, essentially (the
logarithms of) seller density and the distance to the closest rival; Searchit subsumes
the search cost proxies share of commuters and share of overnight stays; Locationi
speciﬁes characteristics of a station's location, including state ﬁxed eﬀects; Stationi
captures station speciﬁc price determinants, including brand ﬁxed eﬀects; ﬁnally time
35The data is structured in a repeated cross section and sorted according to the diﬀerent time
periods.
36Since all of the explanatory variables except for Overnight and Nights respectively do not change
over time, ﬁxed eﬀects for individual gasoline stations will not be included in the regressions.
160
Chapter 4. Price Dispersion, Search Costs and Spatial Competition
ﬁxed eﬀects are included in the estimation and uit denotes an error term.
Price equation (4.4) is estimated using two diﬀerent statistical approaches. Previous
studies for the Austrian market (Clemenz & Gugler (2006); Pennerstorfer (2009))
have investigated determinants of gasoline price levels. Their ﬁndings highlight the
impact of spatial competition in gasoline retail pricing. Since our analysis focuses on
determinants of the unexplained price variance, additionally to standard OLS, we
use a GMM approach37 accounting for spatial eﬀects in the price residuals
uit = λ
ntT∑
j=1
w˜ijujt + νit (4.5)
where the weighting matrix W = (w˜ij) equals a single block diagonal matrix of
dimension ntT × ntT consisting of the spatial weight matrices Wt for each period
t = 1, ...23 and with nt as the number of corresponding cross sectional observations
and T as the number of periods.
The intuition behind the Spatial Error Model (SEM) in (4.5) is that certain eﬀects
remain outside the model of the price equation and enter the price residuals. In
turn, these unmodeled price eﬀects could show a spatial pattern, i.e. they spill over
across neighbouring gasoline stations. Correspondingly, the residuals comprise of a
part that is explained by the spatial structure imposed by W and the innovations
νit; the existing spatial autocorrelation is then captured by the autoregressive pa-
rameter λ. On the contrary, ignoring spatial autocorrelation in the residuals implies
biased standard errors and is thus associated with diﬃculties in the interpretation
of coeﬃcients (cp. LeSage (1997)).
4.3.2.2 Analysis of Price Dispersion
The second step of the analysis determines the relationship between price dispersion,
competition, search costs and other location and station characteristics by
log(2it) = β0 + β1Competitioni + β2Searchit + β3Locationi + β4Stationi
+
T∑
t=1
χtTimet + ηit
(4.6)
37Technically, spatial autoregressive models or spatial error models respectively can be implemented
via deﬁning a maximum likelihood (ML) function and subsequently solving for the autoregressive
parameter λ and variance. Generally, however the weights matrix W will be characterized by an
asymmetric structure and for large datasets the computation of the corresponding eigenvalues is
not feasible anymore. We implement a GMM estimator for a spatial simultaneous autoregressive
error model in R using the spdep package. For technical details of the estimation procedure
see Kelejian & Prucha (1999); an introduction into spatial econometrics focusing on the ML
approach is provided in Anselin (1988) and LeSage & Pace (2009).
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with:
Competitioni = {log(Densityi), log(Distancei)}
Searchit =
{
Comsi, Coms
2
i , Nightsit, Nights
2
it
}
Locationi = {log(PopDensi), 100kmhi, 130kmhi, Statei}
Stationi = {Brandi}
where as the dependent variable it = {uit or νit} is interpreted as a measure of
unexplained price variation, free of store-, time-, and spatial eﬀects of a station i
during period t relative to the statewide average gasoline price. As with the price
regression the main covariates of interest for explaining price diﬀerences are (the
logarithms of) Density and Distance, the search cost proxies Coms and Nights as
well as their quadratic forms Coms2 and Nights2. Analogous to the approach in
modeling market price levels, other location and station speciﬁc parameters act as
controls to isolate the competition eﬀects and the (indirect) eﬀects of search costs.
Again, time ﬁxed eﬀects are included and ηit is an error term.
Ning & Haining (2003) highlight in their case study of gasoline pricing in the Sheﬃeld
metropolitan area the spatial structure of price residuals as a feature of localized in-
teraction between stations. Similarly, Lewis (2008) constructs a localized dispersion
measure that captures stations' average price deviation from its neighbouring com-
petitors and ﬁnds signiﬁcant competition eﬀects. We will use the residuals from price
equation (4.4) as a measure of (local) price dispersion in the market. These quantify
the unknown deviation from the average gasoline price for each seller in the market
after controlling for signiﬁcant price determinants relating to competition intensity,
local demand structures, stations' location and additional individual seller charac-
teristics. Further spatial interdependencies or potential spatial autocorrelation in the
OLS residuals respectively will be accounted for by applying the Spatial Error Model
speciﬁed in equation (4.5). Accordingly, the dependent variable it = {uit or νit} in
the price dispersion regressions consists of two sets of price residuals: uit denoting
the residuals calculated in the OLS speciﬁcation and νit representing the residuals
as an outcome of the Spatial Error Model.
4.4 Results
This section provides results for the eﬀects of competition, search costs, location and
station characteristics on price levels and price dispersion. Estimates of the price
model parameters in equation (4.4) are presented in table table 4.4 and estimated
coeﬃcients of the disperson model in (4.6) are reported in table 4.5 respectively.38
38All of the reported t-statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity. We apply a White-HC0-estimator
to ﬁt the OLS regression models. For details see Zeileis (2004).
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4.4.1 Price Determinants
Although small in magnitude, the results for the competition proxies log(Density)
and log(Distance) in the price equation reveal consistent ﬁndings that are in line
with theoretical predictions from spatial competition models (Salop (1979)) and with
previous empirical studies (Clemenz & Gugler (2006); Pennerstorfer (2009)). Gen-
erally, the ﬁndings suggest that stations' price levels are a result of their local ge-
ographic monopoly structure whose size depends on rivals' market power and the
prices charged by neighbouring competitors. In a nutshell the price regressions show
that enhanced competition has on average a diminishing eﬀect on market price lev-
els, other factors held constant. Correspondingly, in both the OLS and the GMM
speciﬁcations the coeﬃcient on log(Density) is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level or better. Further, the coeﬃcient on log(Distance) is positive and signiﬁcant
(p < 0.02) across OLS estimations. Particularly, the elasticity of Density amounts
to −0.0023 (−0.0021) in the standard speciﬁcation of the OLS (GMM) model indi-
cating that as the number of competitors in a radius of 3km increases by 1% gasoline
prices on average decrease by 0.0023% (0.0021%).39 Similarly, increasing a station's
distance to its closest competitor by 1% leads to an average increase in price levels
by 0.0006% (0.0003%). We also check for robustness in an alternative speciﬁcation
by substituting the Distance variable with the monopoly dummy Monop and ﬁnd
positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀects for the latter for both the OLS and GMM
estimations.40 Accordingly, stations who have no neighbour in their 3km market pe-
riphery charge on average higher prices by approximately 1.1% (0.65%) other factors
equal.
Results for the search cost proxies Coms and log(Nights) support predictions of spa-
tial competition between stations. They provide evidence that diﬀerences between
consumer groups concerning their knowledge and information on market prices aﬀect
sellers' pricing behavior. Other variables held constant, an increase in the share of
informed consumers causes the average market price level to decrease whereas the
price level tends to increase as the share of uninformed consumers rises. In context
with the unit transportation cost t this implies a positive correlation between con-
sumers' search cost levels and the mean price. Correspondingly, in all speciﬁcations
(OLS and GMM) coeﬃcients on Coms are negative and highly signiﬁcant and co-
eﬃcients on log(Nights) are positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level or better. In
particular, this implies for the standard OLS (GMM) speciﬁcation that the percent-
age change in gasoline prices is given by −0.0327 (−0.0166) when the share of people
commuting out of a municipality relative to the employed in that region increases by
one percentage point. Likewise, the elasticity of Nights amounts to 0.0016 implying
39See columns 1 and 2 in table 4.4.
40See columns 5 and 6 in table 4.4.
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price increases of approximately 0.002% as the proportion of overnight stays relative
to the number of inhabitants in a municipality rises by one percent.
In an additional speciﬁcation (columns 3 and 4), we also include a spatially lagged
variable for Coms, denoted W ∗ Coms, accounting for the spatial inﬂuence of the
search cost proxy for neighbouring stations.41 Respective coeﬃcient estimates show
signiﬁcant negative signs and thus are in line with estimation results of the Coms
variable. In particular, they indicate that an increase of the spatially averaged com-
muter share of neighbouring stations by one percentage point leads to a decrease
in prices of −0.0072% and −0.0068% in OLS and GMM speciﬁcations. Eventually,
column 5 and 6 also report results for an interaction term between the monopoly
dummy Monop and Coms. Respective coeﬃcient estimates in the OLS and GMM
models are highly signiﬁcant and negative. This implies that stations with no neigh-
bours in their market periphery of 3km show a substantial stronger price reaction
to an increase in the number of informed consumers than stations with competitors
in their local market. Speciﬁcally, the diﬀerence amounts to −0.0224% (−0.0142%)
as the share of commuters increases by one percentage point for the OLS (GMM)
estimation.42
Estimated coeﬃcient results for the location parameters reveal that stations locat-
ed on major roadways and stations that are highly accessible set on average higher
prices. In addition, regression results provide statistical evidence that stations locat-
ed in more densly populated areas are more likely to charge lower prices. Particularly,
results of the OLS estimations reveal that stations located on major highways routes
(speedlimits: up to 130km/h) charge signiﬁcantly higher prices by about 3.9%; re-
spective estimates in the GMM speciﬁcations show mark-ups of more than 4%. If a
station is located on a major roadway (speedlimits up to 100km/h) signiﬁcant price
increases of more than 1% are observed across OLS and GMM speciﬁcations and
ﬁnally accessibility mark-ups amount to more than 0.1% in all model estimations.
The impact of population density log(PopDens) on price levels is small but highly
signiﬁcant: the OLS estimates indicate that an increase of density by one percent
leads to price decreases of around 0.002%; corresponding estimates for the elasticities
in the GMM speciﬁcations yield smaller values between −0.0006 and −0.0009 below
a signiﬁcance level of 1%.43
41Since the local market radius does not diﬀerentiate if competitors are within the same munici-
pality, these eﬀects arise due to the irregular shape of administrative units as well as the fact
that stations may be located close to a municipal border. We also included a spatially lagged
term of the second search cost proxy W ∗Nights but found no signiﬁcant eﬀects in any of the
speciﬁcations.
42Again the interaction eﬀect between the search cost proxy for the uninformed consumers and the
monopoly dummy Nights ∗Monop was not signiﬁcant.
43Clemenz & Gugler (2006) show that population density predominantely explaines location and
thus density patterns of gasoline stations in the Austrian market. Leaving out the population
density proxy log(PopDens) across diﬀerent price speciﬁcations (OLS and GMM) does not
change signs and signiﬁcance levels of all coeﬃcients for one notable exception (correspond-
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After controlling for stations' spatial diﬀerentiation, estimate results for station spe-
ciﬁc characteristics show further dimensions in which product diﬀerentiation occurs.
All variables except for the dummies controlling for carwash and leisure facilities
(Wash,Leisure) have signiﬁcant positive signs. In particular, stations that have
permanent opening times (Open24h: 0.32% to 0.38%) or oﬀer full-service (Service:
0.22% to 0.56%) tend to charge higher prices. Further, sellers who oﬀer potential for
ﬁnancing purchases using company credit cards (Creditcards: 0.31% to 0.49%) as
well as a broad variety of other goods in a convenience store (Microwave: 0.20% to
0.22%) also impose higher mark-ups.
The spatial autoregressive coeﬃcient λ is estimated roughly as 0.612, and in all three
GMM speciﬁcations it is highly signiﬁcant. The test result for the Moran`s I statistic
of the OLS model in equation (4.4) amounts to 0.771 (p < 2.2e-16) indicating spa-
tial autocorrelation in the residuals. We conduct a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test to
generally determine which alternative speciﬁcation to use and to conﬁrm the applica-
tion of the Spatial Error Model suggested in equation (4.5). In line with the Moran`s
I test statistic, both standard LM-Error and LM-Lag test statistics reveal highly
signiﬁcant results and reject the null hypothesis (LM-Error: 14682.41 (p < 2.2e-16);
LM-Lag: 14248.40 (p < 2.2e-16)). Finally, the robust forms of the test statistics show
also both highly signiﬁcant results but with a substantial larger value for the test
statistic of the Error Model (RLM-Error: 457.93 (p < 2.2e-16); RLM-Lag: 23.92 (p
< 1.005e-06)).
Anselin (2005) provides a simple decision rule concerning the selection process in spa-
tial regression modeling (p. 199).44 In the classical textbook case one of the (robust)
test statistics signiﬁcantly rejects the null hypothesis whereas the other alternative
does not reject or only rejects the null on much smaller orders of statistical magni-
tude. Since both robust statistics (RLM-Error and RLM-Lag) in our case are highly
signiﬁcant we proceed with the speciﬁcation with the higher robust test value. To
check for robustness and avoid possible misspeciﬁcations relating to the imposed
spatial structure, we rerun the GMM price regressions and LM speciﬁcation tests
with alternative weighting matrices.45 Results on signs and signiﬁcance levels of the
ing results are given in table 4.8 in the appendix): due to multicolinearity the coeﬃcient on
log(Density) is partly aﬀected. In the OLS speciﬁcations its value approximately doubles and
its signiﬁcance level rises substantially. In contrast, in the GMM speciﬁcation, respective coef-
ﬁcient values remain stable and only signiﬁcance levels increase. Since our main conclusions in
terms of coeﬃcients signs and signiﬁcance levels are not aﬀected, we report the results including
the population density covariate in the regression tables.
44For technical details on LM tests regarding spatial model speciﬁcations see Anselin et al. (1996).
In addition, LeSage & Pace (2009) provide a concise overview of the comparison between spatial
and non-spatial model applications (p. 155ﬀ). Further, a more conceptual overview of spatial
modeling in applied econometrics is given in the well known seminal paper of Anselin (2002).
45Accordingly, two additional matrices are constructed: W2 is based on the same neighbourhood
criterion as W but with weights relating to the squared inverse distances; W10 captures the
ten nearest neighbours of every station (if applicable) with weights depending on the inverse
distance measure. See table 4.6 in the appendix.
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regression coeﬃcients as well as conclusions regarding the model selection remain
unchanged.46 Additionally, further robustness checks are carried out to test the re-
sults of OLS and GMM price models with regards to their functional form. Results
indicate that structural relationships in terms of coeﬃcient signs and signiﬁcance
levels are independent of log-log and lin-lin model speciﬁcation forms.47
Table 4.4: Price function regressions (log-log)
Independent : Dependent : log(pd)
Weights Matrix : W
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept −0.3772∗∗∗ −0.3907∗∗∗ −0.3764∗∗∗ −0.3882∗∗∗ −0.3798∗∗∗ −0.3906∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0036)
log(Density) −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
log(Distance) 0.0006∗∗ 0.0003 0.0006∗∗ 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Monop 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0016)
Coms −0.0327∗∗∗ −0.0166∗∗∗ −0.0281∗∗∗ −0.0173∗∗∗ −0.0219∗∗∗ −0.0128∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0023)
(W )(Coms) −0.0072∗∗ −0.0068∗∗∗ −0.0092∗∗∗ −0.0077∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0022)
(Monop)(Coms) −0.0224∗∗∗ −0.0142∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0033)
log(Nights) 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
log(PopDens) −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0009∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0020∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
100kmh 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0010)
130kmh 0.0387∗∗∗ 0.0425∗∗∗ 0.0384∗∗∗ 0.0424∗∗∗ 0.0387∗∗∗ 0.0425∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0011)
Access 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗
46Again the standard as well as the robust LM-Error and LM-Lag test statistics are highly signiﬁcant
with higher robust test statistics for the SEM. Refer to table 4.7 and for corresponding GMM
regression results to table 4.9 in the appendix.
47For the log-log form see table 4.4 and the lin-lin form table 4.10 in the appendix.
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(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003)
Open24h 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Wash −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Service 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0005)
Leisure −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0019∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Microwave 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Creditcards 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0007)
log(Plotsize) 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005)
lambda 0.6122∗∗∗ 0.6127∗∗∗ 0.6124∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055)
Median(νit) 0.0025 0.0024 0.0023
S.E.(νit) 0.0229 0.0229 0.0229
Median(uit) 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021
S.E.(uit) 0.0364 0.0364 0.0364
Adj.R2 0.804 0.804 0.804
Obs 25, 150 25, 150 25, 150 25, 150 25, 150 25, 150
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, ∗ at the 10% level
Omitted brand category = Unbranded, omitted state category = Vienna, omitted time category = 199910
(Coeﬃcients for the time-, state- and brand-ﬁxed eﬀects have been omitted)
White heteroscedasticity correction (H0) is applied to OLS standard errors.
(Standard errors in parentheses)
4.4.2 Determinants of Price Dispersion
Coeﬃcient estimates of the elasticities for the competition proxies Density and
Distance reveal consistent ﬁndings regarding changes in the competitive environ-
ment on stations' price diﬀerences. Correspondingly, the pricing behavior of stations
exposed to a higher degree of (spatial) competition intensity is likely to be character-
ized by a higher variance in prices. In short, higher spatial competition is associated
with higher price dispersion. Particularly, we ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant positive re-
lationship between the logarithm of the number of stations in a 3km periphery,
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log(Density), as well as statistcal evidence for a negative relationship between the
logarithm of the distance of a station to its closest competitor, log(Distance), with
the logarithm of the squared price residuals from equation (4.4) and (4.5) respective-
ly. Corresponding estimates, for instance, show that an 1% increase in the number
of competitors in a 3km local market radius leads to an increase in price dispersion
of roughly 0.1% holding other factors equal.48 Likewise, dispersion declines by about
0.04% to 0.045% (0.021% to 0.027%) as the distance measure (in km) increases by
1% when using the OLS (GMM) residuals in the estimations.49
As regards predictions of search models, regression results across the two diﬀerent
sorts of residuals (uit and νit) suggest a signiﬁcant nonlinear relationship between
the share of informed consumers proxied by the Coms variable and the level of price
dispersion. According to the coeﬃcient estimates of the linear and quadratic term
in table 4.5 the course of price dispersion is characterized by an inverse U-shaped
function of Coms.50 In particular, the maximum of price dispersion is reached for
a commuters-employed ratio in the interval of 0.4 to 0.5 implying that price vari-
ance increases with the share of commuters (informed consumers) in municipalities
with a low proportion of commuting people whereas similarly dispersion decreases
with increases in the Coms proxy in municipalities with high shares of commuters.
Correspondingly, for a share of commuters to the number of employed people of 0.2
estimates in column 2 of table 4.5 for instance suggest an increase of gasoline price
variance of 0.75% as the respective ratio increases by one percentage point. Like-
wise, as the commuters-employed ratio amounts to 0.5 price dispersion decreases by
0.12% for a corresponding one-percentage-point increase in the share of informed
consumers. Note that for the turning point of 0.4662 (cf. column 2) about 20% of
the observations for Coms lie in the decreasing part of the inversed U and for a value
of 0.4333 (column 4) for more than 25% of the sample this is true.
Coeﬃcient estimates of the other search cost variable Nights show that price dis-
persion increases as the share of uninformed consumers in a municipality rises. In-
clusion of the squared term Nights2 does not reveal signiﬁcant results and supports
the hypothesis of a positive linear relationship. Speciﬁcally, all else equal dispersion
increases across diﬀerent speciﬁcations by roughly 0.01% when the share of overnight
stays in a municipality to the number of inhabitants in the respective administrative
unit increases by one percentage point.
48Coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 0.05% level or better.
49Estimates in the model with the OLS residuals uit are signiﬁcant at the 1% level or better; p-values
for estimations with the GMM residuals νit amount to p < 0.07 (table 4.5 column 3) and p < 0.16
(column 4).
50Across diﬀerent speciﬁcations respective linear coeﬃcients are statistically diﬀerent from zero at
the 2% signiﬁcance level or better; p-values for the quadratic terms amount to p < 0.069 (table
4.5 column 2) and p < 0.036 (column 4).
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Table 4.5: Results of price dispersion regressions for diﬀerent residuals
Independent : Dependent : log(u2it) Dependent : log(ν
2
it)
(OLSResiduals) (GMMResiduals)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept −8.0711∗∗∗ −8.3536∗∗∗ −7.9964∗∗∗ −8.2982∗∗∗
(0.1556) (0.2095) (0.1547) (0.2099)
log(Density) 0.1012∗∗∗ 0.1153∗∗∗ 0.1210∗∗∗ 0.1363∗∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0297) (0.0289) (0.0297)
log(Distance) −0.0450∗∗∗ −0.0400∗∗∗ −0.0266∗ −0.0208
(0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0148)
Coms 0.3312∗∗ 1.3289∗∗ 0.2771∗∗ 1.4223∗∗
(0.1364) (0.5644) (0.1380) (0.5658)
Coms2 −1.4252∗ −1.6412∗∗
(0.7847) (0.7842)
Nights 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0020) (0.0038)
Nights2 −3.74e−05 −1.75e−05
(2.92e−05) (2.39e−05)
log(PopDens) −0.0912∗∗∗ −0.0863∗∗∗ −0.0995∗∗∗ −0.0946∗∗∗
(0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0158) (0.0160)
100kmh 0.2944∗∗∗ 0.2931∗∗∗ 0.2254∗∗ 0.2237∗∗
(0.0996) (0.0995) (0.1133) (0.1132)
130kmh 0.6047∗∗∗ 0.6053∗∗∗ 0.4574∗∗∗ 0.4565∗∗∗
(0.0869) (0.0868) (0.0895) (0.0894)
Median(ηit) 0.4670 0.4655 0.4445 0.4421
S.E.(ηit) 2.174 2.174 2.158 2.158
Adj.R2 0.101 0.101 0.107 0.108
Obs 25, 150 25, 150 25, 150 25, 150
∗∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level
∗ at the 10% level
Omitted brand category = Unbranded
Omitted state category = Vienna
Omitted time category = 199910
(Respective FE-Coeﬃcients have been omitted)
White heteroscedasticity correction (H0) is applied.
(Standard errors in parentheses)
With respect to the location parameters estimates provide signiﬁcant evidence for a
negative relationship between the logarithm of population density log(PopDens) and
the price dispersion measures log(u2it) and log(ν
2
it). Particularly, variance shrinks by
about 0.09% (0.1%) in the speciﬁcations using the OLS (GMM) residuals as the num-
ber of inhabitants per square kilometer rises by 1% holding other factors constant.
Further, corresponding estimation results for the dummies indicating a station's lo-
cation on a major road or highway show signiﬁcant positive signs. Using the OLS
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residuals, stations on freeways with a speed limit of 100km/h are on average charc-
terized by a higher price dispersion of about 30% and stations on interstates with
speed limits of 130km/h have a higher price variance of about 60% both compared
to stations that are not located on main roads and other factors held constant. Cor-
responding estimates for the speciﬁcation with the GMM residuals yield a mark-up
of 22% for the 100kmh and 46% for the 130kmh covariate.
As with the price function additional checks on speciﬁcation form and robustness are
carried out. Particularly, we conduct a LM Test and Moran's I Test on the residuals
of the standard OLS dispersion model given in equation (4.6) with log(uit) as the de-
pendent variable. Corresponding results reveal highly signiﬁcant values for Moran's
I and for the standard LM-Error and LM-Lag test statistics. As regards the robust
test statistics, the RLM-Lag consistently rejects the null hypothesis whereas the
RLM-Error shows only weak signiﬁcant or insigniﬁcant results.51 As a consequence,
we apply a spatial lag model to the OLS speciﬁcation.52 Corresponding results con-
ﬁrm previous ﬁndings and reveal highly signiﬁcant positive elasticities for Density,
highly signiﬁcant negative elasticities for Distance, highly signiﬁcant evidence for a
quadratic dependence of price dispersion on Coms as well as a signiﬁcant positive
relationship between Nights and the level of price dispersion.53
Finally, we also test the robustness of our results and run regressions with an alterna-
tive set of search cost proxies leaving the remaining regression model in equation (4.6)
unchanged. Accordingly, the proxy for the ratio of informed consumers in the market
(Coms) is substituted with the share of the total number of commuters (number of
people commuting out and into the municipality) relative to the number of inhabi-
tants in the respective administrative unit, denoted ComsTot. Further, the measure
for the share of uninformed gasoline consumers (Nights) is replaced with the proxy
NightsC, denoting the number of overnight stays devided by the total number of
commuters in a municipality.54 In addition to the residual derivatives log(u2it) and
51Again test results are provided for diﬀerent weights matrices, cf. table 4.11 in the appendix.
52The spatial lag model takes the form
log(u2it) = ρ
ntT∑
j=1
wij log(u
2
jt) + βX +
T∑
t=1
χtT imet + κit (4.7)
with the same set of covariatesX = {Competitioni, Searchit, Locationi, Stationi} as in equation
(4.6) and a spatial weights matrix (W )ij = wij (cp. equation (4.3) and table 4.6, regression
results are reported for weights matrices W , W2 and W10 in non row standardized form).
Technically, the SAR model is implemented as a Generalized Spatial Two Stage Least Square
model (GS2SLS) in R via the spdep package. The estimator ﬁts the regression model by using
spatially lagged X variables as instruments for the spatially lagged dependent variable with ρ
as the coeﬃcient of spatial dependence, for details see Kelejian & Prucha (1998).
53Accordingly, coeﬃcients of log(Density) and log(Distance) across various speciﬁcations are signif-
icant at the 1% level or better (all standard errors are subject to a White-H0 heteroscedasticity
correction). In addition, using the weights matrix W the turning point for Coms is given at
0.4673 with 80.75% of the observations in the decreasing part of the parabola. For details see
table 4.12 in the appendix.
54For descriptives of the variables see also table 4.3.
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log(ν2it), we also introduce an alternative dispersion measure ωit accounting for ob-
served and unobserved price diﬀerences due to seller heterogeneity.55 In line with
previous results estimated elasticities for Density and Distance across alternative
speciﬁcations are signiﬁcant at the 1% level or better with expected signs. Likewise,
the linear and quadratic coeﬃcients of ComsTot and ComsTot2 are signiﬁcant and
support the hypothesis of an inverse U-shaped form of price dispersion with respect
to the share of informed consumers in the market. Further, coeﬃcient estimates
on NightsC indicate a signiﬁcant positive linear relationship between the share of
uninformed consumers and the level of price dispersion.56
4.5 Conclusion
This research paper examines determinants of the empirical diesel price distribution
in the Austrian retail gasoline market. Particularly, we speciﬁed a model to test the
relationship between the mean price and price variance with a set of spatial com-
petition proxies and a set of search cost proxies referring to two distinct consumer
groups. Our work is motivated by the fact that predictions by search models highlight
the importance of information diﬀerentials among consumers for the existence and
comparative static behavior of the equilibrium price distribution. In addition, model
predictions and the empirical evidence on the impact of entry competition, in terms
of the number of sellers, on the average price and price dispersion is not straight-
forward. Consequently, our contribution focuses on the question how the fraction of
informed and uninformed consumers in the gasoline market relate to the mean price
and price variance. Further, we provide evidence for the statistical correlation of the
mean and variance with the number of competitors in the local market periphery of
55With reference to Lach (2002) (p. 436f) and Lewis (2008) (p. 658f) we estimate a two stage panel
regression on gasoline prices using seller-ﬁxed eﬀects and time-ﬁxed eﬀects to control for any
price diﬀerences resulting from observed and unobserved heterogeneities in time. Consequently,
the remaining residuals are used in the dispersion analysis and are denoted ωit. Formally:
pit = α+
I∑
i=1
ζiStationi +
T∑
t=1
χtT imet + ωit
56For details see regression table 4.13 in the appendix. The turning point for ComsTot in regressions
using the OLS (GMM) residual derivative log(u2it) (log(ν
2
it)) as the dependent variable amounts
to 0.8297 (0.7573) with 1.82% (2.11%) of the observations lying in the decreasing part of the
inverse U (columns 2 and 4). Corresponding results for estimations on the dispersion measure
log(ω2it) yield a maximum for ComsTot at a share of 0.6327 with a comparably higher percentage
of observations (5.24%) in the upper interval (column 6). In contrast, the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on the squared variable NightsC in the regressions on log(ω2it) does not support predictions
on a decreasing eﬀect of the number of uninformed consumers on price dispersion since the
sample of observations in the respective interval (0.07%) is so small it can practically be ignored.
Eventually, the alternative speciﬁcations in table 4.13 are also tested with a spatial lag model
structurally speciﬁed according to equation 4.7. Respective results are given in table 4.14 in the
appendix and support all previous ﬁndings.
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a station as well as with the distance between nearest rivals.
In the analysis a two-step procedure is applied. Firstly, the price function is esti-
mated to identify the impact of price determinants, most notably, the competition
and search cost variables, and to eﬀectively control for further observed station and
product characteristics. In turn, the price residuals are interpreted as a measure for
unexplained price diﬀerences free of time, store and spatial eﬀects. Thus, in the sec-
ond step the squared price residuals are regressed on a set of covariates to investigate
the impact of consumer fractions with diﬀering information sets and competition in-
tensity on price dispersion. Besides the usual OLS techniques, spatial econometric
tools are used in the analysis to control for spatial spillover eﬀects in the price resid-
uals. Particularly, we apply a Spatial Error Model (SEM) in the estimation of price
levels and pertinent tests (LM and Moran's I) to suggest a proper model speciﬁ-
cation. In addition, to check for robustness we conduct the SEM estimations with
diﬀerent kinds of weighting matrices.
Econometric results are in line with theoretical predictions and conﬁrm our pro-
posed hypotheses.57 As implied by spatial competition models and search models
the fraction of informed consumers, represented by the share of out-commuters to
the employed in a municipality (Coms), is found to be negatively correlated with the
mean price (Hypothesis 1.1). Likewise, ﬁndings reveal a positive correlation between
the quotient of overnight stays with the number of inhabitants in a municipality
(Nights) and the mean price. This indirectly supports predictions of the positive
impact of the level of search costs on average prices (Hypothesis 1.2). Arguably,
visitors in a particular region or municipality lack knowledge of sellers who charge
especially high or low prices. As a consequence, they are considered to be uninformed
consumers and associated with high costs of search to compare sellers prices.
Our main result refers to predictions from the search models of Varian (1980), Stahl
(1989) and Waldeck (2008). Accordingly, price dispersion is expected to show a non-
monotonic relationship with the fraction of informed consumers in the market. In-
deed, regression results conﬁrm that price dispersion, as measured by the squared
price residuals, is characterized by an inverse U-shaped form with respect to Coms
(Hypothesis 1.3).58 Commuters arguably are attentive towards price changes in local
markets and could easily identify stations oﬀering low prices on their daily commut-
ing paths. Thus, consistent with theoretical considerations, price dispersion initially
increases as the fraction of commuters rises and starts to decline when the fraction
of these informed consumers exceeds about 43%.
As regards the relation of the fraction of uninformed consumers with price dispersion,
57See Subsection 4.2.3.
58Brown & Goolsbee (2002) provide similar results in their study that examines the impact the
internet has on the relation between consumer search behavior and term-life insurance pricing. To
our knowledge the relationship between the fraction of informed consumers and price dispersion
in the gasoline retailing industry has not been examined yet.
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a positive correlation between Nights and the price variance obtains. Varian (1980)
initially argues that in equilibrium an increase in the share of uninformed consumers
causes the average price to rise and the expected minimum price, i.e. the price paid
by the informed consumers, to decline.59 Accordingly, price disperison would increase
with an increasing proportion of uninformed consumers in the market. By contrast,
Morgan & Sefton (2001) revise this ﬁnding and prove that an increase in the fraction
of uninformed consumers in Varian's model unambigously leads to an increase in
the expected minimum price. They argue that a higher proportion of uninformed
consumers induces more ﬁrms to enter the market which in turn causes two con-
ﬂicting eﬀects. An increase in the number of sellers raises incentives to focus on the
high price segment, as a consequence average prices increase (cf. Hypothesis 1.2). In
contrast an increase in the number of ﬁrms enlarges the choice set of the informed
consumers putting pressure on minimum prices. In sum, they show that the ﬁrst ef-
fect dominates the latter. However, the behavior of price dispersion has eluded their
proof. Now, our results suggest an increase in the mean price and price variance as
the fraction of uninformed consumers increases, other factors constant. Referring to
the ﬁndings of Morgan & Sefton (2001) this suggests that the increase in the upper
price segment is stronger than in the lower price segment. Further, provided that the
fraction of uninformed consumers is associated with a high level of search costs, our
results indirectly support predictions of Stahl (1989) and Waldeck (2008).60
Intuition suggests that entry of an additional ﬁrm in a ﬁxed local market area im-
pedes spatial diﬀerentiation among stations and thus reduces the average distance
between nearest neighbours. As a consequence, we use two measures to capture the
potential eﬀect of increased competition: the number of competitors in a circular
range of 3km around each station and the distance to its closest competitor. Accord-
ing to predictions of spatial competition models an increase in competition intensity
is associated with a decrease in the mean market price and price dispersion whereas
consumer search models forcefully argue that higher competition leads to an increase
in average market prices (predictions on the behavior of price dispersion remain am-
bigous). Thus, as regards our variable set we would expect consistent results in the
case of both competition proxies having opposite signs (Hypothesis 2.2 and Hypoth-
esis 2.3).
Concerning the price levels, our ﬁndings support hypothesis of spatial competition
between stations. Firstly, a signiﬁcant negative relationship between the number of
sellers and the mean price obtains. Secondly, the distance measure is found to be
59 [...] pmin will decrease with M - the uninformed consumers confer a beneﬁcial externality on
the informed consumers. p. 657.
60Cp. Hypothesis 1.4. Stahl shows that as search costs decrease the equilibrium price distribution
degenerates to the competitive price, i.e. the average price and price dispersion decrease. Waldeck
proposes that price dispersion (variance of the equilibrium distribution) increases as search costs
increase in a setting of sequential search and the reservation price endogenized (cf. Proposition
19, p. 355).
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signiﬁcantly positively correlated with the mean. Further, these results are in line
with previous work on spatial competition analysis in the Austrian gasoline mar-
ket. Most notably, Clemenz & Gugler (2006) provide evidence that an increase in
station density reduces average prices. As competition proxies they use the number
of stations per square kilometer and the Herﬁndahl index as a measure of market
concentration.
With respect to the relationship between price dispersion and entry competition re-
sults suggest a signiﬁcant positive correlation of price variance with the number of
sellers and a signiﬁcant negative correlation of the variance with the distance mea-
sure. In sum, the comparative static behavior of the price distribution reveals that
as competition increases the mean price decreases and dispersion increases. In con-
text with predictions from search models this shift can be interpreted by a higher
propensity of sellers to focus on the lower price segment whereas at the same time
incentives to extract surplus from uninformed consumers remain intact. Generally,
search models emphasize that sellers price in mixed strategies and tend to extreme
pricing patterns. Thus, an increase in price dispersion is reﬂected in a shift of the
probability mass towards the upper and lower bounds of the distribution. Now, re-
sults indicate that a higher number of sellers and closer proximity between stations
leads to a lower mean price and higher dispersion. Consequently, these ﬁndings sug-
gest that increased competition implies a downward shift in the probability mass and
highlights that pricing activities in the lower segment become more frequent. Refer-
ring to the discussion of search models in section 4.2 this outcome of the competition
analysis is partly in line with predictions of Janssen & Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) for
the high search intensity mode.61 Further, theoretical evidence for a negative relation
between the number of sellers and the average price and a positive relation between
the number of sellers and price variance is given in the model of Carlson & McAfee
(1983).
In conclusion, our empirical analysis highlights that both competition and the dis-
semination of market information among consumers have a critical impact on the
price distribution. It is shown that an increase in the fraction of (un)informed con-
sumers leads to a decrease (increase) in the mean market price. Further, the course of
price dispersion is determined by the fraction of informed consumers and accordingly
follows an inverse U-shaped form whereas an increase in the fraction of uninformed
consumers implies higher price dispersion. In turn, the eﬀect of increased competi-
tion intensity is twofold. First, in line with previous empirical research the behavior
of price levels supports predictions of spatial competition models. Speciﬁcally, an in-
crease in the number of sellers and a decrease in the distance between nearest rivals
implies a decrease in the mean price. Second, price dispersion signiﬁcantly increases
as competition intensiﬁes. Together with the behavior of the mean price this ﬁnding
61The empirical evidence supports the case of a small initial number of ﬁrms in the market.
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emphasizes the interrelation between competition, consumers' search behavior and
ﬁrms' pricing strategies.
Referring to the triangulation of consumer search, competition and strategic pricing
future directions for empirical research might address predictions of extended ver-
sions of the model by Stahl (1989). In particular, it would be interesting to examine
the relationship between search intensity, for instance in terms of purchase frequency,
and the degree of market competition. Intuitively, a higher number of ﬁrms would
be associated with a positive or negative change in search behavior. This would give
further insights in the mechanisms and eﬀects increased competition has on the equi-
librium price distribution. Further, theoretical evidence is found that for the case of
consumers opting out of the market (if search costs become considerably high and
net utility becomes negative) relations between the number of ﬁrms, search costs and
the fraction of shoppers with the expected price deviate from predictions of classical
models (cp. Janssen et al. (2005)). Consequently, it would be interesting to test these
alternative model predictions in an appropriate setting.
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Appendix
Table 4.6: Summary of diﬀerent spatial weights matrices used in spatial price regressions
W W2 W10
Neighbourhood criterion: Nearest neighbour
plus all stations
in a circular range
of 3km
Nearest neighbour
plus all stations
in a circular range
of 3km
10 nearest
neighbours
Number of stations: 25, 150 25, 150 25, 150
Number of nonzero links: 113, 864 113, 864 251, 489*
Symmetric: No No No
Row standardized: Yes Yes Yes
Weights: wij wij =
1
dij
wij =
1
(dij)2
wij =
1
dij
Min(wij): 0.0001129 0.000003 0.001588
Max(wij): 1 1 0.967300
Mean(wij): 0.2209 0.2209 0.1
Median(wij): 0.0889 0.0597 0.0779
Percentage of nonzero weights: 0.018 0.018 0.040
(*) Due to missing price information two stations had a maximum of eight and seven stations had a maximum of nine
neighbours.
Table 4.7: Summary of test statistics of the standard OLS price speciﬁcation for diﬀerent
spatial weights matrices
W W2 W10
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
LM-Err 14,682.41 < 2.20e-16 13.215.28 < 2.20e-16 36,556.21 < 2.20e-16
LM-Lag 14,248.40 < 2.20e-16 12.873.88 < 2.20e-16 35,385.22 < 2.20e-16
RLM-Err 457.93 < 2.20e-16 366.83 < 2.20e-16 1,231.70 < 2.20e-16
RLM-Lag 23.92 1.01e-06 25.43 4.59e-07 60.70 6.66e-15
Moran`s I 0.78 < 2.20e-16 0.78 < 2.20e-16 0.72 < 2.20e-16
Figure 4.1: Moran`s I plot of standard OLS speciﬁcation for weights matrix W
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Table 4.8: Price function regressions (log-log) without log(PopDens) variable
Independent: Dependent: log(pd)
Weights Matrix: W
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(t-value) (z-value) (t-value) (z-value) (t-value) (z-value)
Intercept -0.3888 -0.3972 -0.3875 -0.3943 -0.3899 -0.3956
(123.19) (143.44) (121.77) (135.65) (115.77) (128.77)
log(Density) -0.0046 -0.0026 -0.0048 -0.0029 -0.0045 -0.0026
(11.70) (7.20) (12.04) (7.77) (9.97) (5.81)
log(Distance) 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002
(2.22) (1.71) (1.95) (1.42)
Monop 0.0129 0.0073
(5.52) (4.70)
Coms -0.0313 -0.0141 -0.0257 -0.0150 -0.0183 -0.0105
(13.27) (7.19) (8.67) (7.57) (5.61) (4.83)
(W )(Coms) -0.0088 -0.0071 -0.0113 -0.0080
(3.05) (3.27) (3.87) (3.63)
(Monop)(Coms) -0.0284 -0.0158
(5.60) (4.83)
log(Nights) 0.0021 0.0019 0.0021 0.0018 0.0019 0.0017
(4.64) (4.39) (4.52) (4.24) (4.11) (3.88)
100kmh 0.0124 0.0144 0.0124 0.0141 0.0127 0.0143
(6.35) (13.99) (6.31) (13.83) (6.44) (13.86)
130kmh 0.0391 0.0426 0.0388 0.0424 0.0391 0.0426
(18.47) (38.02) (18.34) (37.94) (18.45) (38.10)
Access 0.0020 0.0012 0.0020 0.0012 0.0020 0.0013
(3.60) (3.56) (3.56) (3.56) (3.67) (3.70)
Open24h 0.0036 0.0040 0.0035 0.0039 0.0035 0.0039
(4.83) (9.55) (4.69) (9.42) (4.68) (9.29)
Wash -0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0026
(3.95) (6.77) (4.06) (6.87) (4.05) (6.96)
Service 0.0021 0.0056 0.0021 0.0056 0.0020 0.0055
(2.42) (11.92) (2.48) (11.93) (2.27) (11.70)
Leisure -0.0036 -0.0018 -0.0035 -0.0018 -0.0035 -0.0019
(5.68) (4.67) (5.65) (4.72) (5.65) (4.96)
Microwave 0.0019 0.0020 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019
(2.99) (5.25) (3.02) (5.20) (2.91) (5.17)
Creditcards 0.0030 0.0050 0.0029 0.0050 0.0029 0.0049
(2.46) (6.98) (2.40) (6.98) (2.38) (6.82)
log(Plotsize) 0.0034 0.0021 0.0035 0.0022 0.0034 0.0021
(4.26) (4.34) (4.39) (4.48) (4.33) (4.32)
lambda 0.613 0.614 0.613
(112.05) (112.20) (112.10)
Adj.R2 0.803 0.804 0.804
Obs 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150
Median(uit) 0.0021 0.0020 0.0021
S.E.(uit) 0.0365 0.0365 0.0365
Median(νit) 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023
S.E.(νit) 0.0230 0.0229 0.0229
Omitted brand category = Unbranded
Omitted state category = Vienna
Omitted time category = 199910
(Coeﬃcients for the time-, state- and brand-ﬁxed eﬀects have been omitted)
White heteroscedasticity correction (H0) is applied to OLS standard errors.
(Absolute values of t-statistic and z-statistic in parentheses)
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Table 4.9: GMM Price function regressions (log-log) with weights matrices W2 and W10
Independent: Dependent: log(pd)
Weights Matrix: W2 Weights Matrix: W10
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value)
Intercept -0.3900 -0.3872 -0.3840 -0.3883 -0.3881 -0.3918
(119.53) (115.28) (109.75) (94.78) (93.97) (91.98)
log(Density) -0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0018
(5.65) (6.38) (4.89) (6.06) (6.04) (4.41)
log(Distance) 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005
(1.53) (1.19) (3.13) (3.06)
Monop 0.0068 0.0090
(4.28) (6.11)
Coms -0.0174 -0.0181 -0.0134 -0.0142 -0.0140 -0.0084
(8.32) (8.63) (5.69) (7.78) (7.47) (3.97)
(W )(Coms) -0.0079 -0.0087 -0.0009 -0.0017
(3.64) (3.95) (0.51) (0.88)
(Monop)(Coms) -0.0146 -0.0177
(4.35) (5.76)
log(Nights) 0.0016 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0014
(3.72) (3.58) (3.40) (3.92) (3.90) (3.52)
log(PopDens) -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0006
(3.63) (3.44) (2.63) (3.79) (3.75) (2.56)
100kmh 0.0143 0.0141 0.0143 0.0117 0.0117 0.0119
(13.89) (13.71) (13.75) (11.76) (11.74) (11.95)
130kmh 0.0424 0.0422 0.0424 0.0422 0.0422 0.0425
(37.53) (37.41) (37.57) (39.49) (39.45) (39.76)
Access 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010
(3.07) (3.07) (3.21) (2.77) (2.77) (2.95)
Open24h 0.0037 0.0037 0.0037 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041
(8.86) (8.72) (8.68) (10.26) (10.25) (10.25)
Wash -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022
(6.70) (6.81) (6.90) (6.15) (6.17) (6.20)
Service 0.0056 0.0056 0.0055 0.0048 0.0048 0.0047
(11.79) (11.78) (11.58) (10.80) (10.81) (10.54)
Leisure -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015
(4.74) (4.78) (4.99) (4.15) (4.14) (4.32)
Microwave 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0018 0.0018 0.0017
(5.41) (5.34) (5.29) (4.97) (4.98) (4.86)
Creditcards 0.0049 0.0048 0.0048 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052
(6.73) (6.72) (6.61) (7.63) (7.61) (7.63)
log(Plotsize) 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0022 0.0022 0.0021
(4.57) (4.72) (4.58) (4.80) (4.81) (4.60)
lambda 0.596 0.596 0.596 0.808 0.808 0.808
(110.50) (110.63) (110.52) (80.99) (80.95) (80.91)
Obs 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150
Median(νit) 0.0023 0.0023 0.0022 0.0021 0.0021 0.0018
S.E.(νit) 0.0231 0.0231 0.0231 0.0207 0.0207 0.0207
Omitted brand category = Unbranded
Omitted state category = Vienna
Omitted time category = 199910
(Coeﬃcients for the time-, state- and brand-ﬁxed eﬀects have been omitted)
(Absolute values of z-statistic in parentheses)
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Table 4.10: Price function regressions (lin-lin)
Independent: Dependent: pd
Weights Matrix: W
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(t-value) (z-value) (t-value) (z-value) (t-value) (z-value)
Intercept 0.6746 0.6684 0.6753 0.6705 0.6765 0.6717
(283.61) (318.40) (280.16) (305.85) (284.25) (307.35)
Density -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002
(8.29) (5.03) (8.67) (5.63) (9.00) (6.12)
Distance 0.0010 0.0006 0.0010 0.0006
(11.16) (9.87) (10.99) (9.78)
Monopy 0.0134 0.0072
(8.21) (6.70)
Coms -0.0221 -0.0106 -0.0185 -0.0110 -0.0134 -0.0079
(13.29) (7.44) (8.54) (7.73) (5.64) (5.04)
(W )(Coms) -0.0056 -0.0054 -0.0078 -0.0064
(2.61) (3.34) (3.60) (3.95)
(Monop)(Coms) -0.0223 -0.0120
(5.90) (4.86)
Nights 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(3.48) (3.66) (3.54) (3.74) (3.31) (3.56)
PopDens -5.0e-07 -3.0e-07 -4.8e-07 -3.0e-07 -4.6e-07 -2.7e-07
(6.07) (3.85) (5.82) (3.87) (5.52) (3.53)
100kmh 0.0104 0.0112 0.0104 0.0111 0.0107 0.0112
(7.03) (14.60) (6.99) (14.45) (7.19) (14.68)
130kmh 0.0311 0.0328 0.0309 0.0327 0.0314 0.0331
(19.18) (39.19) (19.08) (39.14) (19.33) (39.61)
Access 0.0013 0.0008 0.0012 0.0008 0.0013 0.0009
(3.08) (3.13) (3.04) (3.09) (3.17) (3.36)
Open24h 0.0025 0.0029 0.0024 0.0029 0.0025 0.0029
(4.39) (9.27) (4.30) (9.15) (4.47) (9.21)
Wash -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020
(3.95) (6.89) (4.05) (6.99) (4.04) (7.07)
Service 0.0015 0.0043 0.0015 0.0042 0.0016 0.0043
(2.36) (12.07) (2.42) (12.07) (2.47) (12.20)
Leisure -0.0028 -0.0014 -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0015
(5.98) (5.12) (5.97) (5.18) (5.87) (5.17)
Microwave 0.0012 0.0014 0.0012 0.0014 0.0011 0.0014
(2.51) (5.14) (2.54) (5.07) (2.37) (4.93)
Creditcards 0.0020 0.0036 0.0019 0.0036 0.0020 0.0036
(2.22) (6.67) (2.15) (6.64) (2.22) (6.72)
log(Plotsize) 0.0027 0.0020 0.0028 0.0020 0.0023 0.0017
(4.62) (5.38) (4.69) (5.52) (4.00) (4.55)
lambda 0.608 0.608 0.608
(110.20) (110.35) (110.14)
Adj.R2 0.820 0.820 0.820
Obs 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150
Median(uit) 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
S.E.(uit) 0.0270 0.0270 0.0270
Median(νit) 0.0014 0.0014 0.0013
S.E.(νit) 0.0171 0.0171 0.0171
Omitted brand category = Unbranded
Omitted state category = Vienna
Omitted time category = 199910
(Coeﬃcients for the time-, state- and brand-ﬁxed eﬀects have been omitted)
White heteroscedasticity correction (H0) is applied to OLS standard errors.
(Absolute values of t-statistic and z-statistic in parentheses)
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Table 4.11: Summary of test statistics of the standard OLS price dispersion model (depen-
dent: log(u2it)) for diﬀerent weights matrices
W W2 W10
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
LM-Err 4,999.55 < 2.20e-16 4,580.66 < 2.20e-16 11,115.33 < 2.20e-16
LM-Lag 5,036.85 < 2.20e-16 4,610.88 < 2.20e-16 11,186.95 < 2.20e-16
RLM-Err 4.44 0.04 2.87 0.09 1.94 0.16
RLM-Lag 41.75 < 2.20e-16 33.08 < 2.20e-16 73.57 < 2.20e-16
Moran`s I 0.45 < 2.20e-16 0.46 < 2.20e-16 0.40 < 2.20e-16
Table 4.12: Results of price dispersion regressions for diﬀerent weights matrices estimated
by S2SLS
Independent: Dependent: log(u2it)
(Weights Matrix: W ) (Weights Matrix: W2) (Weights Matrix: W10)
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value)
Intercept -8.0506 -8.3234 -8.0714 -8.3536 -8.0632 -8.3406
(51.67) (39.69) (51.79) (39.87) (51.65) (39.67)
log(Density) 0.0943 0.1080 0.1014 0.1153 0.1004 0.1143
(3.25) (3.63) (3.48) (3.86) (3.47) (3.84)
log(Distance) -0.0560 -0.0509 -0.0448 -0.0340 -0.0510 -0.0452
(3.82) (3.40) (3.03) (2.66) (3.07) (2.67)
Coms 0.3218 1.2830 0.3314 1.3288 0.3295 1.3045
(2.36) (2.27) (2.43) (2.35) (2.42) (2.31)
(Coms)2 -1.3728 -1.4251 -1.3925
(1.75) (1.82) (1.78)
Nights 0.0065 0.0103 0.0065 0.0104 0.0065 0.0104
(3.05) (2.65) (3.04) (2.67) (3.04) (2.65)
(Nights)2 -3.64e-05 -3.74e-05 -3.69e-05
(1.25) (1.28) (1.26)
log(PopDens) -0.0899 -0.0852 -0.0912 -0.0863 -0.0904 -0.0857
(5.56) (5.22) (5.64) (5.28) (5.59) (5.25)
100kmh 0.2941 0.2928 0.2944 0.2931 0.2953 0.2939
(2.95) (2.94) (2.96) (2.95) (2.97) (2.95)
130kmh 0.6077 0.6082 0.6046 0.6053 0.6076 0.6078
(6.99) (7.00) (6.96) (6.97) (6.98) (6.98)
rho 0.0002 0.0002 -9.32e-08 -1.21e-08 0.0354 0.0301
(2.39) (2.34) (0.06) (0.01) (0.63) (0.54)
Obs 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150
Median(κit) 0.4653 0.4640 0.4670 0.4655 0.4653 0.4647
S.E.(κit) 2.173 2.174 2.174 2.174 2.173 2.173
Weight matrices not row standardized
Omitted brand category = Unbranded
Omitted state category = Vienna
Omitted time category = 199910
(Coeﬃcients for the time-, state- and brand-ﬁxed eﬀects have been omitted)
White heteroscedasticity correction (H0) is applied to standard errors.
(Absolute values of z-statistic in parentheses)
180
Chapter 4. Price Dispersion, Search Costs and Spatial Competition
Table 4.13: OLS price dispersion regressions with alternative search cost proxies
Independent: Dependent: log(u2it) Dependent: log(ν
2
it) Dependent: log(ω
2
it)
(OLS Residuals) (GMM Residuals) (2WFE Residuals)
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value)
Intercept -7.9140 -8.0716 -7.8535 -7.9753 -9.9591 -10.2480
(57.05) (51.16) (57.39) (51.21) (36.52) (33.68)
Density 0.0878 0.0934 0.1071 0.1120 0.1047 0.1161
(3.22) (3.41) (3.92) (4.08) (3.14) (6.12)
Distance -0.0404 -0.0376 -0.0239 -0.0213 -0.0427 -0.0368
(2.86) (2.64) (1.64) (1.45) (2.74) (2.38)
ComsTot 0.3475 1.0041 0.2286 0.7980 0.2246 1.5442
(3.19) (2.74) (2.08) (2.21) (2.06) (3.63)
(ComsTot)2 -0.6051 -0.5269 -1.2204
(1.89) (1.66) (3.35)
NightsC 0.0009 0.0020 0.0011 0.0017 0.0010 0.0026
(2.70) (2.58) (3.51) (2.10) (2.72) (2.89)
(NightsC)2 -1.39e-06 -6.99e-07 -1.85e-06
(1.55) (0.91) (1.82)
PopDens -0.1068 -0.1081 -0.1103 -0.1123 -0.0803 -0.0845
(6.43) (6.46) (6.82) (6.90) (4.09) (4.29)
100kmh 0.2992 0.2962 0.2301 0.2269 0.0851 0.0779
(3.00) (2.98) (2.03) (2.00) (0.80) (0.73)
130kmh 0.6108 0.6073 0.4633 0.4584 0.0025 0.0080
(7.03) (6.99) (5.19) (5.13) (0.02) (0.08)
Adj.R2 0.101 0.101 0.107 0.107 0.055 0.055
Obs 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150
Median(ηit) 0.465 0.466 0.446 0.443 0.458 0.459
S.E.(ηit) 2.174 2.173 2.158 2.158 2.675 2.675
Omitted brand category = Unbranded
Omitted state category = Vienna
Omitted time category = 199910
(Coeﬃcients for the time-, state- and brand-ﬁxed eﬀects have been omitted)
White heteroscedasticity correction (H0) is applied to standard errors.
(Absolute values of t-statistic in parentheses)
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Table 4.14: S2SLS price dispersion regressions with alternative search cost proxies
Independent: Dependent: log(u2it) Dependent: log(ν
2
it) Dependent: log(ω
2
it)
(OLS Residuals) (GMM Residuals) (2WFE Residuals)
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value)
Intercept -7.8978 -8.0486 -7.8297 -7.9413 -9.9403 -10.2230
(56.88) (50.94) (57.16) (50.91) (36.50) (33.65)
Density 0.0812 0.0868 0.0973 0.1019 0.0972 0.1087
(2.96) (3.15) (3.56) (3.72) (2.91) (3.22)
Distance -0.0509 -0.0479 -0.0392 -0.0366 -0.0544 -0.0479
(3.44) (3.21) (2.59) (2.40) (3.29) (2.92)
ComsTot 0.3257 0.9448 0.1968 0.7107 0.2005 1.4819
(2.98) (2.58) (1.79) (1.96) (1.83) (3.49)
(ComsTot)2 -0.5697 -0.4749 -1.1833
(1.78) (1.49) (3.25)
NightsC 0.0010 0.0020 0.0011 0.0017 0.0010 0.0026
(2.74) (2.58) (3.57) (2.10) (2.76) (2.89)
(NightsC)2 -1.37e-06 -6.75e-07 -1.83e-06
(1.54) (0.88) (1.81)
PopDens -0.1047 -0.1060 -0.1073 -0.1091 -0.0780 -0.0822
(6.30) (6.32) (6.64) (6.70) (3.97) (4.17)
100kmh 0.2989 0.2962 0.2298 0.2269 0.0850 0.0780
(3.00) (2.98) (2.03) (2.00) (0.80) (0.73)
130kmh 0.6137 0.6105 0.4675 0.4632 0.0057 0.0048
(7.07) (7.03) (5.23) (5.18) (0.05) (0.04)
rho 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
(2.21) (2.14) (2.49) (2.44) (2.73) (2.52)
Obs 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150 25,150
Median(κit) 0.462 0.465 0.446 0.444 0.456 0.458
S.E.(κit) 2.173 2.173 2.157 2.157 2.675 2.674
Weights matrix W (not row-standardized) is applied in S2SLS regressions.
Omitted brand category = Unbranded
Omitted state category = Vienna
Omitted time category = 199910
(Coeﬃcients for the time-, state- and brand-ﬁxed eﬀects have been omitted)
White heteroscedasticity correction (H0) is applied to standard errors.
(Absolute values of z-statistic in parentheses)
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